Supreme Court of the United States

Transcripción

No. 12-____
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
————
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ET AL., Petitioners,
v.
JANE DOE, Respondent.
————
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT
OF APPEALS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO
————
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
————
BARBARA B. BROWN
STEPHEN B. KINNAIRD
Counsel of Record
NEAL D. MOLLEN
INTRA L. GERMANIS
ERIN E. LARUFFA
PAUL HASTINGS LLP
875 15th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 551-1700
[email protected]
Counsel for Petitioners
WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. – (202) 789-0096 – W ASHINGTON, D. C. 20002
-i-
QUESTION PRESENTED
The arbitration agreement between petitioner
Limited Liability Company (“LLC”), a business with
offices in Puerto Rico and Washington, D.C., and
respondent requires, in relevant part, arbitration of
“any action, suit, complaint or demand of whatever
nature and for whatever relief or remedy against the
[LLC] or any of its Members or employees ….” Despite
the sweeping scope of this arbitration clause in an
agreement governing operation of an interstate
business, the Court of Appeals for the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico ruled that the underlying agreement was
not a contract “evidencing a transaction involving
commerce” that was subject to the Federal Arbitration
Act (“FAA”). 9 U.S.C. § 2. Having declared the FAA
inapplicable, the Court of Appeals disregarded the
selection of commercial arbitration rules that empower
the arbitrator to decide questions of arbitrability, and
applied arbitration-specific Puerto Rico law that would
have otherwise been preempted by the FAA to deny
arbitration. The questions presented are
1. Is the contract for operation of an interstate
business “a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce” governed by the FAA?
2. Are arbitration-specific rules under Puerto Rico
law that limit an arbitration clause to the
subject matter of the underlying agreement and
entitle a person to judicial enforcement of
discrimination and retaliation claims preempted
by the FAA?
3. Should questions of arbitrability be decided by
the arbitrator when the parties select
commercial arbitration rules that so provide?
-ii-
PARTIES
In addition to petitioner Limited Liability Company
(“LLC”) and respondent Jane Doe listed in the caption,
the other parties below (all petitioners in this Court)
are John Doe, Jean Doe, Jack Joe, Jacky Joe, Larry
Loe, Larissa Loe; Unknown Defendants A, B and C; and
Unknown Insurance Companies Defendants X, Y, Z.
In accordance with Supreme Court Rule 29.6, Petitioner
McConnell Valdés LLC, a law firm, is a limited liability
company with no parent company. No entity of any
kind has 10 percent or greater ownership in McConnell
Valdés LLC.
“Limited Liability Company” or “LLC” refers to the law
firm of McConnell Valdés LLC. “John Doe” refers to
Arturo J. Garcia-Sola, the Managing Director of
McConnell Valdés. “Jean Doe” refers to Garcia-Sola’s
wife, Isis Carballo, who is a special counsel at
McConnell Valdés. “Jack Joe” refers to Néstor Durán
Gonzáles, who is a retired capital member of McConnell
Valdés and who now works as an independent
contractor for McConnell Valdés. “Jacky Joe” refers to
Elaine Ruiz, who is Durán’s wife and who is not an
employee or capital member of McConnell Valdés.
“Larry Loe” refers to Alfredo Hopgood Jovet, a capital
member of McConnell Valdés and the chair of the firm’s
employment practice group. “Larissa Loe” refers to Ana
M. Otero, who is Hopgood’s wife and who is not an
employee or capital member of McConnell Valdés.
“Jane Doe” refers to Plaintiff Maggie Correa Avilés.
-iiiTABLE OF CONTENTS
Page(s)
QUESTION PRESENTED .............................................. i
PARTIES ......................................................................... ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS................................................ iii
TABLE OF APPENDICES ..............................................v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................... vii
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI ................. 1
OPINIONS AND ORDERS BELOW ............................. 1
JURISDICTION.............................................................. 2
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED ..................... 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE........................................ 3
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
BELOW ................................................................ 5
A.
Jane Doe Was A Capital Member Of LLC .......... 5
B.
Jane Doe Agreed To Arbitrate Any Claim “Of
Whatever Nature And For Whatever Relief”
She Might Have Against LLC Or Its
Members ............................................................... 6
C.
LLC Reduced Jane Doe’s Compensation
Pursuant To The Operating Agreement ............. 8
D.
Jane Doe Invoked The Claim Resolution
Process Set Forth In The Operating
Agreement ............................................................ 9
E.
Jane Doe Filed A Lawsuit In Puerto Rico
Court To Enjoin The Arbitration; LLC
Responded With A Petition To Compel
Arbitration............................................................ 9
-ivTABLE OF CONTENTS
(continued)
Page(s)
F.
The Trial Court Denied LLC’s Motion To
Compel Arbitration ............................................ 10
G.
LLC’s Appeal To The Appellate Court Was
Unsuccessful....................................................... 11
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ........... 14
I.
The Ruling Below That The Operating
Agreement Was Not Subject To The FAA
Because It Did Not Evince A “Transaction
Involving Commerce” Conflicts With The
Decisions Of This Court ..................................... 15
II.
The Court of Appeals Improperly Applied
Restrictive, Arbitration-Specific Puerto Rico
Law That Is Clearly Pre-empted By The FAA
Under This Court’s Precedents ......................... 18
III.
The Ruling Below That The Scope of An
Arbitration Clause Providing For AAA
Arbitration Is Determined By The Court Is
In Conflict With Decisions Of Federal Courts
Of Appeals .......................................................... 27
CONCLUSION ............................................................. 31
-vTABLE OF APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
Jane Doe v. Limited Liability Co., No.
KLCE201200821, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
Court of Appeals, Judicial Region of San Juan
Panel III, Resolution, June 15, 2012
APPENDIX B
Jane Doe v. Limited Liability Co., No. KPE20121204, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Court of
First Instance San Juan Superior Court,
Resolution, June 4, 2012
APPENDIX C
Jane Doe v. Limited Liability Co., No. CC-20120532, Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, Order
Denying Petition for Certiorari, Sept. 7, 2012
APPENDIX D
Denying First Motion for Reconsideration of
Denial of Certiorari, Oct. 5, 2012
APPENDIX E
Denying Second Motion for Reconsideration of
Denial of Certiorari, Nov. 30, 2012
-viTABLE OF APPENDICES
(continued)
APPENDIX F
First Instance San Juan Superior Court, Motion
to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and to Compel
Compulsory Arbitration in Light of Binding
Arbitration Agreement, Apr. 11, 2012
APPENDIX G
Jane Doe v. Limited Liability Co., No
Panel III, Limited Liability Co.’s Petition for
Certiorari, June 12, 2012
APPENDIX H
Jane Doe v. Limited Liability Co., No. CC-20120532, Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, Limited
Liability Co.’s Petition for Certiorari, June 19,
2012
APPENDIX I
Excerpts of Limited Liability Co.’s Operating
Agreement
-viiTABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
CASES
Aggarao v. MOL Ship Mgmt. Co.,
675 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2012) ................................ 17
Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson,
513 U.S. 265 (1995) .................................... 4, 16, 17
Apollo Computer Inc. v. Berg,
886 F.2d 469 (1st Cir. 1989) ................................. 29
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,
131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) .......................... 5, 21, 22, 28
AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am.,
475 U.S. 643 (1986) ............................ 14, 25, 26, 27
Benders v. Bellows & Bellows,
515 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2008) ................................ 17
Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co.,
254 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2001) .............................. 20
Brown v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp.,
211 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir. 2000) ............................ 24
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Soft Drink
& Brewery Workers Union Local 812,
242 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2001) .................................... 15
Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.,
348 U.S. 426 (1955) .............................................. 26
-viiiTABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page(s)
CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood,
132 S. Ct. 665 (2012) ............................................ 15
Contec Corp. v. Remote Solution, Co.,
398 F.3d 205 (2d Cir. 2005) ............................ 28, 29
Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd,
470 U.S. 213 (1985) .............................................. 15
Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto,
517 U.S. 681 (1996) .............................................. 21
Doe v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd.,
657 F.3d 1204 (11th Cir. 2011) ............................ 24
E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc.,
534 U.S. 279 (2002) .............................................. 17
Edwards v. Hovensa, LLC,
497 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 2007) .................................. 17
Fallo v. High-Tech Institute,
559 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2009) ................................ 28
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan,
514 U.S. 938 (1995) ........................................ 25, 27
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
500 U.S. 20 (1991) .................................... 14, 20, 23
Green v. SuperShuttle Int’l, Inc.,
653 F.3d 766 (8th Cir. 2011) ................................ 28
-ixTABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page(s)
Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc.,
446 U.S. 578 (1980) .............................................. 26
Levin v. Alms & Assocs., Inc.,
634 F.3d 260 (4th Cir. 2011) ................................ 24
Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown,
132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012) .................................. passim
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,
514 U.S. 52 (1995) ................................................ 25
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614 (1985) .................................... 3, 14, 21
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc.,
723 F.2d 155 (1st Cir. 1983), aff’d in part and
rev’d on other grounds, 473 U.S. 614 (1985) ........ 21
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp.,
460 U.S. 1 (1983) .................................................. 14
Nitro-Lift Technologies, LLC v. Howard,
No. 11-1377, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 8897 (Nov. 26,
2012).............................................................. passim
Perry v. Thomas,
482 U.S. 483 (1987) .............................................. 21
-xTABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page(s)
Pers. Sec. & Safety Sys., Inc. v. Motorola, Inc.,
297 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2002) ................................ 24
Petrofac, Inc. v. DYNMcDermott Petroleum
Operations Co.,
687 F.3d 671 (5th Cir. 2012) ................................ 28
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,
388 U.S. 395 (1967) .............................................. 16
Qualcomm Inc. v. Nokia Corp.,
466 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2006)....................... 27, 29
Rent-A-Center v. Jackson,
130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010) .............................. 23, 24, 27
Riley Mfg. Co. v. Anchor Glass Container Corp.,
157 F.3d 775 (10th Cir. 1998) .............................. 29
SCI v. Fulmer,
883 So.2d 621 (Ala. 2003) ..................................... 16
Southland Corp. v. Keating,
465 U. S. 1 (1984) ................................................... 2
Terminix Int’l Co. v. Palmer Ranch Ltd.
Partnership,
432 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2005) ...................... 20, 29
United States v. Gonzales,
520 U.S. 1 (1997) .................................................. 26
-xiTABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page(s)
Urbanic v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
No. 10-2368 (WYD) (MJW), 2011 WL 1743412
(D. Colo. May 6, 2011) .......................................... 29
CONSTITUTION, STATUTES, AND GUIDELINES
28 U.S.C.
§ 1257 ...................................................................... 2
§ 1258 ...................................................................... 2
9 U.S.C. § 2................................................... 2, 4, 16, 21
OTHER AUTHORITIES
American Arbitration Association, Commercial
Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures
(June 1, 2009) ........................................... 12, 20, 28
Eugene Gressman et al., Supreme Court Practice
(9th ed. 2007) .......................................................... 2
-1PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioners Limited Liability Company, John Doe,
Jean Doe, Jack Joe, Jacky Joe, Larry Loe, Larissa Loe,
CP John and Jean Doe, CP Jack and Jacky Doe, and CP
Larry and Larissa Loe, Unknown Defendants A, B, C,
and Unknown Insurance Companies Defendants X, Y, Z
(collectively “LLC”)1 respectfully petition for a writ of
certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of
Appeals for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
OPINIONS AND ORDERS BELOW
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is unreported and
included at App. 1a-34a. The order of the Court of First
Instance for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is
unreported and has been kept under seal by the courts
below, and is included at App. 35a-77a. The Supreme
Court of Puerto Rico’s opinion and order denying
certiorari is unreported and has been kept under seal
by the courts below, but is included at App. 78a-82a.
The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico’s first and second
orders denying LLC’s motions for reconsideration of the
denial of the petition for certiorari are unpublished and
have been kept under seal by the courts below, but are
included as App. 83a-87a, 88a-96a.
1As
explained infra at pp. 7-8, the Operating Agreement at issue
requires that all parties keep any claims by a member against the
firm and its members confidential, the parties have litigated this
case using pseudonyms and made filings under seal, and the
Puerto Rico courts at every level have kept the proceedings under
seal. For that reason, we use “Jane Doe” rather than respondent’s
real name, and we refer to the petitioners collectively as “LLC.”
-2JURISDICTION
The Court of First Instance for the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico entered its order denying arbitration on
June 4, 2012. App. 56a. The Court of Appeals for the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico entered its judgment
confirming the denial of arbitration and denying a
petition for certiorari on June 15, 2012. App. 33a. The
Supreme Court of Puerto Rico denied a petition for
certiorari on September 7, 2012, App. 80a, and denied
motions for reconsideration on October 5, 2012 and
November 30, 2012 (the latter by a 5-4 split vote). App.
85a, 92a. An order denying arbitration is a final
judgment subject to this Court’s review under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1258. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U. S. 1, 7-8
(1984) (ruling under 28 U.S.C. § 1257).2
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §
2, provides, “A written provision in any maritime
transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any
part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to
arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a
contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
Eugene Gressman et al., Supreme Court Practice § 4.24, at 294
(9th ed. 2007) (noting that section 1258 creates parallel jurisdiction
with section 1257, and “for review purposes affords the Supreme
Court of Puerto Rico the status of the highest court of a state”); id.
§ 3.13, at 179 (“Should the highest court decline to exercise its
authority, the judgment of an intermediate court rather than the
order of refusal by the higher court is the judgment reviewable
under § 1257. . . .”) (citing cases).
2
-3exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.”
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act
(“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, “to overcome an anachronistic
judicial hostility to agreements to arbitrate, which
American courts had borrowed from English common
law.”
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 n.14 (1985) (citations
omitted). The Court of Appeals below manifested just
such hostility and flouted this Court’s precedents in
declaring that an agreement for the operation of an
interstate business did not involve interstate commerce,
and proceeded to apply restrictive, arbitration-specific
Puerto Rico law to refuse to enforce an exceptionally
broad arbitration clause – despite the fact that this
Court’s recent and unambiguous precedents have made
clear that such state laws are preempted by the FAA.
This case is cut from the same cloth as the misguided
actions of the West Virginia and Oklahoma Supreme
Courts that were recently summarily vacated by this
Court. See Nitro-Lift Technologies, LLC v. Howard, No.
11-1377, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 8897, at *1 (Nov. 26, 2012)
(per curiam); Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v.
Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012) (per curiam). The
decision below should receive similar treatment in light
of its obdurate refusal to submit to the tenets of
preemptive federal law. E.g., Nitro-Lift, 2012 U.S.
LEXIS 8897, at *1 (“It is a matter of great importance
… that state supreme courts adhere to a correct
interpretation of the legislation[.]”).
The agreement at issue is the Operating Agreement
(also referred to as “OA”) of LLC, the largest law firm in
Puerto Rico. The Operating Agreement provides that
-4any claims by a capital member against the firm or
other members will be handled confidentially by a
three-step process of internal resolution, mediation, and
arbitration.
The arbitration agreement has
comprehensive breadth, applying to “any action, suit,
complaint or demand of whatever nature and for
whatever relief or remedy against the firm or any of its
members or employees,” with enumerated exceptions
not relevant here. After the firm reviewed and reduced
the compensation of Jane Doe, a capital member of the
firm, pursuant to the Operating Agreement because her
origination of business declined with the loss of a major
client, Jane Doe initially pursued a claim for
discrimination under the three-step resolution process.
But after the firm filed for arbitration, she sought to
circumvent this final stage and air her complaint in a
judicial forum.
The Court of Appeals for the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico upheld the trial court’s denial of LLC’s
motion to compel arbitration in a decision irreconcilable
with this Court’s FAA precedents. The court below first
narrowly construed the FAA requirement of a “contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce,” 9 U.S.C.
§ 2, to declare the FAA inapplicable to the Operating
Agreement, in contravention of Allied-Bruce Terminix
Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995). Having
done so, the Court of Appeals applied restrictive,
arbitration-specific Puerto Rico law – state law which
limits an exceptionally broad arbitration clause to the
subject matter of the underlying agreement and
effectively prohibits arbitration of all discrimination
and retaliation claims under the Puerto Rico
constitution – to deny arbitration, in contravention of
Nitro-Lift Technologies, Marmet Health Care Center,
-5and AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740
(2011).
Indeed, here, the Puerto Rico Court of Appeals
strayed even farther from this Court’s precedents than
did the state courts in Nitro-Lift and Marmet Health
Care Center, and its decision is even more deserving of
summary vacatur. The court below contrived to hold
that a contract for the operation of an interstate
business is not a contract evincing a transaction
involving commerce that is subject to the FAA. It used
this holding – which contravenes this Court’s
precedents establishing the broad applicability of the
FAA – as a stepping stone to applying Puerto Rico law
that would otherwise be preempted. This Court cannot
tolerate the irrepressible hostility of state courts to
federal pro-arbitration policy, and it should grant
review to vindicate its precedents and the supremacy of
federal law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
BELOW
A. Jane Doe Was A Capital Member Of LLC
LLC is a law firm that became a limited liability
company governed under the General Law of
Corporations of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in
2007. LLC has offices in San Juan, Puerto Rico, and
Washington, D.C., and represents a variety of
principally corporate clients both within and outside
Puerto Rico. Jane Doe was a capital member of LLC
from 2007 until 2012, and an equity partner at LLC for
20 years before the firm changed the manner in which
it is organized under Puerto Rican law.
LLC’s operations are governed by an “Operating
Agreement” to which all of its owners are signatory.
-6Among other things, it provides a process for
establishing
equity
accounts,
setting
owner
compensation, and distributing profits and losses; it
establishes committees for firm administration and sets
out the procedures for the election and expulsion of
members. From 2009 to 2012, Jane Doe was elected to
and served as a member of the LLC’s seven-member
governing Policy Committee, which makes strategy
decisions for the firm, recommends the promotion of
new
capital
members,
approves
the
annual
compensation and bonuses of capital members, and
generally makes the policy decisions that govern the
LLC.
B. Jane Doe Agreed To Arbitrate Any Claim “Of
Whatever Nature And For Whatever Relief”
She Might Have Against LLC Or Its Members
In addition to ordering the administration of LLC,
the Operating Agreement also contains the mutual
agreement of the firm and each signatory ownermember to resolve any claim that might arise between
LLC and any current or former capital member
exclusively by following a three-step alternative dispute
resolution process. First, the complaining party must
submit the dispute to the firm’s Policy Committee. If
the dispute is not resolved to the satisfaction of both
parties by the Committee, the matter is then submitted
to mediation. Finally, claims that are not resolved in
the first two steps proceed to arbitration. App. 490a492a (Agreement ¶¶ 1.07, 14.01-14.04).
When they execute the Operating Agreement, all
capital members “expressly agree[]” that any claim will
be resolved by mediation or arbitration. App. 490a
(Agreement ¶ 14.01) (“It is the intent and purpose of
the [LLC] and any Claimant to resolve any Claim by
-7mediation
or
arbitration.”)
(emphasis
added).
Specifically, the firm and its members agree that “[i]f
mediation fails, the Claim shall be settled by
arbitration administered by the American Arbitration
Association under its Commercial Arbitration Rules,
and judgment on the award rendered by the
arbitrator(s) may be entered in any court having
jurisdiction thereof.” App. 490a, 491a (Agreement ¶
14.04).
That promise to arbitrate is not limited to disputes
arising out of the terms of the Operating Agreement.
Rather, by becoming an owner of the firm and executing
the Operating Agreement, each member-owner commits
without reservation or exception to arbitrate any
“claim” he or she might have against the firm or any of
its employees or other members. The sweep of this
promise is reflected in Paragraph 1.06 of the Operating
Agreement which defines the word “claim” as used in
the arbitration provision. “‘Claim’ means any action,
suit, complaint or demand of whatever nature and for
whatever relief or remedy against the [LLC] or any of its
Members or employees,” excepting only actions for
injunctive or equitable relief by the firm for unfair
competition or unauthorized disclosure of trade secrets.
App. 483a (Agreement ¶ 1.06) (emphasis added).
A principal reason the owners of LLC have made
this mutual promise, to each other and to the firm, is
the desire of all concerned to resolve disputes among its
members in confidence, without undermining the firm’s
reputation among its clients and the public. Thus,
Paragraph 14.05 of the Operating Agreement explicitly
provides that every “claim” will be resolved
confidentially:
-8The Claimant and the [LLC] agree that the
underlying purpose of the provisions set forth in
section 14 of this Agreement is to provide a
mechanism by which any Claim shall be resolved in
a confidential manner, without publicity and the
attendant distractions. Accordingly, all mediation
meetings and arbitration hearings shall be private
and confidential, and attended by the parties,
counsel, and witnesses only. The parties agree to
maintain the confidentiality of such meetings and
hearings, and of the documents produced or created
in such meetings and hearings. . . .
App. 492a (Agreement ¶ 14.05) (emphasis added).
C. LLC Reduced Jane Doe’s Compensation
Pursuant To The Operating Agreement
During her career, Jane Doe was successful in
developing a significant amount of business from just
one major client, a large pharmaceutical company
headquartered in the continental United States.
Beginning in 2008, when that client became the
acquisition target of another pharmaceutical company,
firm management advised Jane Doe to undertake all
necessary efforts and initiatives to replace the
anticipated loss of that client’s business from existing or
new clients.
When business from that client
disappeared in 2010, as predicted, Jane Doe was unable
to replace this work, and her business production — her
economic contribution to the firm — plummeted.
Pursuant to paragraph 5.01 of the Operating
Agreement, the LLC’s Policy Committee annually
reviews and adjusts member compensation, and in May
2011, the Policy Committee (on which Jane Doe served)
-9decided to reduce Jane Doe’s compensation if she was
unable to meet certain goals by a date certain. It
informed Jane Doe promptly of the decision. She failed
to achieve the goals set for her, and her compensation
reduction became effective in December 2011.
D. Jane Doe Invoked The Claim Resolution
Process Set Forth In The Operating Agreement
Jane Doe disputed the reduction in her
compensation. On January 24, 2012, she invoked the
Operating Agreement’s three-step resolution process as
described above by submitting a claim to the Policy
Committee, alleging that the decision to reduce her
compensation breached the LLC’s Operating Agreement
and constituted discrimination against her on the basis
of sex and age in violation of various local and federal
laws. When the Policy Committee rejected her claim,
the parties proceeded to mediation, the second step in
the Operating Agreement’s dispute resolution process.
The mediation was unsuccessful. On March 22, 2012,
LLC initiated the third and final step of the process by
filing a Demand for Arbitration with the AAA.
E. Jane Doe Filed A Lawsuit In Puerto Rico
Court To Enjoin The Arbitration; LLC
Responded With A Petition To Compel
Arbitration
On April 2, 2012, Jane Doe sought an injunction
against the AAA arbitration proceedings in the Court of
First Instance (the trial court). In filing this court
action, Jane Doe used fictitious names to preserve the
confidentiality of the dispute in accordance with
Paragraph 14.05 of the Operating Agreement, pending
the trial court’s decision on the arbitrability issue. The
trial court issued an order preserving confidentiality.
-10Jane Doe sought a declaratory judgment as well as a
preliminary and permanent injunction permitting her
to avoid arbitration, claiming that she was not bound by
the arbitration provision because her claims related to
her employment relationship with LLC, rather than her
status as a capital member.
LLC moved to compel arbitration, and also expelled
Jane Doe as a result of this and other blatant breaches
of the Operating Agreement. LLC argued that the
Operating Agreement was a contract affecting
interstate commerce; that the question of arbitrability
should be submitted to the arbitrator under the
Commercial Arbitration Rules; and that under the FAA
Jane Doe’s claims were clearly arbitrable pursuant to
the broadly worded arbitration clause. App. 134a-160a.
F. The Trial Court Denied LLC’s Motion To
Compel Arbitration
On June 4, 2012, the trial court denied the motion
to compel arbitration, for several reasons.
First, it rejected arbitration as a permissible forum
for Jane Doe’s claims because if the dispute were
arbitrated, the court held, the arbitrator would be
“delegated to resolve the disagreement in a completely
confidential forum with no right of appeal for the
affected parties,” a result the court apparently found
unacceptable. App. 74a. Second, in its “Findings of
Law,” the trial court held that “[b]ecause these claims
arise from the employment relationship between Jane
Doe and LLC they are excluded from the arbitration
demand filed under the OA. This is because it [the OA]
governs the operational and administrative aspects of
the LLC and not the existing employment relationship
between the capital members and the LLC that is
-11regulated by the EM [Employee Manual].” Id. at 74a75a (original emphasis deleted). The court so ruled
even though Jane Doe’s compensation is governed by
paragraph 5.01 of the Operating Agreement, and her
termination is governed by paragraph 12.02 of the same
(and there is no provision in the Employee Manual
governing compensation or termination of capital
members).3
G. LLC’s Appeal To The Appellate Court Was
Unsuccessful
LLC immediately sought discretionary review of the
trial court’s decision on June 12, 2012 by filing a
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari with the Puerto Rico
Court of Appeals as well as an Urgent Motion for Stay
of the Proceedings. LLC argued each of the points now
raised in this petition for certiorari. App. 163a-247a,
248a-380a.
On June 15, the Appellate Court denied both the
motion to stay and the petition for certiorari and
effectively adopted the result reached by the trial court.
App. 31a-32a (“we believe that the Court of First
Instance did not err upon concluding that the
arbitration clause is not controlling as to respondent’s
role” in deciding the merits of Jane Doe’s claims; “The
Judge of [First] Instance not only reasonably exercised
his discretion but also made a determination that is
correct in Law.”). In addition to adopting the trial
court’s legal conclusions, the Appellate Court held that:
LLC disputes whether Jane Doe – a capital member of the firm
and a member of its Policy Committee – was an employee entitled
to bring discrimination and retaliation claims, but that is a merits
question that should be resolved by the arbitrator.
3
-121. the FAA only applies to “contracts [that] involve
interstate commercial transactions,” a
“circumstance [that] is not present in this case,”
App. 26a, 31a.
2. although Jane Doe agreed to arbitrate every
possible claim “of whatever nature and for
whatever relief or remedy,” App. 483a (Agreement
¶ 1.06), Jane Doe’s employment claims are not
arbitrable because they are “not related to the
governance or administration of the LLC,” which
are the only matters “regulated by the arbitration
clause of the Operating Agreement,” App. 31a; and
3. arbitration would be inconsistent with Puerto Rico
public policy because injunctive relief must be
available for claims of constitutional violations,
App. 31a-32a.
The Court of Appeals also held that the trial court was
entitled to decide the question whether the parties had
agreed to arbitrate Jane Doe’s claims because “the
parties did not agree that the adjudication of the
arbitrability [question] . . . would be referred to an
arbitrator.”
App. 31a.
The court reached this
conclusion notwithstanding the fact that the parties
had expressly agreed to adopt the rules of the AAA,
App. 491a (Agreement ¶ 14.04), including the rule that
“[t]he arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or
her own jurisdiction, including any objections with
respect to the existence, scope or validity of the
arbitration agreement.”4
4American Arbitration Association, Commercial Arbitration Rules
and Mediation Procedures, Rule R-7(a) (June 1, 2009),
http://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/aoe/commercial
(follow
“AAA
-13Finally, the Court of Appeals gave its apparent
approval to the trial court’s inclination to open the
record to the public with dispatch. It approved of the
trial court’s intention to “soon issue its ruling regarding
the extent of the term of the confidentiality agreement
keeping confidential the names of the above-captioned
parties [and it] encourage[d] giving the issue priority in
the Court calendar.” App. 32a. Weighing in on the
merits of that question, the Court of Appeals noted that
the “[p]ublic interest calls for individuals to know about
the judicial system’s activities” and cited the
“presumption . . . stating that the parties’ identities
form part of the public record.” Id. The court did not
weigh against this presumption the right of contracting
parties to the benefit of their bargain.5
LLC filed for a stay and petition for certiorari with
the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico. The petition raised
each of the questions presented in this petition for
certiorari. App. 455a, 464a, 470a, 475a. After initially
granting a stay, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico
denied the petition for certiorari without explanation on
September 7, 2012. The Supreme Court denied LLC’s
first petition for reconsideration on October 5, 2012,
and its second petition for reconsideration on November
30, 2012, by a 5-4 vote. App. 86a, 95a.
Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures”
hyperlink) (hereafter, “AAA Commercial Rules”) (emphasis added).
5 Petitioners have sought a writ of certiorari to the Court of
Appeals because its opinion, although formally styled as a denial of
certiorari, resolved the arbitration questions on the merits in a
manner different from the Court of First Instance. Alternatively,
to the extent that the judgment of the Court of First Instance is
deemed the operative judgment, petitioners seek a writ of
certiorari to that court.
-14-
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
The FAA’s “purpose was to reverse the longstanding
judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had
existed at English common law and had been adopted
by American courts, and to place arbitration
agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.”
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,
24 (1991) (citations omitted). Because the FAA declares
“a national policy” in favor of arbitration, courts must
apply the “federal substantive law of arbitrability,
applicable to any arbitration agreement within the
coverage of the Act.” Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S.
at 626 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)). That federal
substantive law commands that courts apply a
presumption of arbitrability in determining which
claims must be submitted to arbitration: “[a]n order to
arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied
unless it may be said with positive assurance that the
arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation
that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be
resolved in favor of coverage.” AT&T Techs., Inc. v.
Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986)
(emphasis added) (quoting Steelworkers v. Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960));
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24-25. State
court hostility to the FAA continues unabated as
evidenced by those courts’ continued invocation of statespecific laws and policies hostile to arbitration to trump
the federal policy to which they must defer. This case is
just the latest in a string of such cases. The message of
federal supremacy should be reinforced by summary
vacatur of the holdings below.
-15LLC’s motion to enforce Jane Doe’s agreement to
arbitrate should have been a simple matter in light of
the presumption of arbitrability and Jane Doe’s
unambiguous and unqualified agreement to arbitrate
any claim “of whatever nature and for whatever relief
or remedy.”
App. 483a (Agreement ¶ 1.06); see
CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669
(2012) (agreement to arbitrate must be enforced
according to its terms); Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v.
Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985).
No categorical
exclusion for discrimination claims exists in her
promise to arbitrate; indeed, the Agreement excludes
two types of claims expressly (certain trade-secret and
trademark claims), which militates against implied
exclusion of other claims. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of
N.Y., Inc. v. Soft Drink & Brewery Workers Union Local
812, 242 F.3d 52, 57 (2d Cir. 2001). The court below,
however, exuding hostility to arbitration, flouted the
terms of the FAA, the explicit scope of Jane Doe’s
agreement to arbitrate, and fundamental federal
policies, as well as numerous precedents of this Court,
in denying arbitration. This Court should grant review
and summarily vacate the decision below, or
alternatively set the case for argument.
I. The Ruling Below That The Operating
Agreement Was Not Subject To The FAA
Because It Did Not Evince A “Transaction
Involving Commerce” Conflicts With The
Decisions Of This Court.
Remarkably, the Court of Appeals held that the
FAA did not even apply to the Operating Agreement. It
declared that the FAA only applies to “contracts [that]
involve interstate commercial transactions,” a
circumstance that it held is “not present in this case.”
-16App. 26a, 31a. This holding ignores this Court’s
decisions on the broad meaning of “commerce” as used
in the FAA.
The FAA applies to arbitration clauses in any
“contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce.”
9 U.S.C. § 2. In Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies v.
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995), this Court read the word
“involving” in the statutory phrase as the functional
equivalent of “affecting.” Id. at 273-74. Because the
term “affecting commerce” signals Congress’s intent to
exercise its Commerce Clause powers to the maximum
extent possible, id. at 273, the Court applied that
expansive scope to the FAA. Id. at 274. Extending the
reach of the FAA to the limits of Congress’s Commerce
Clause power is consistent with the Act’s purpose to
“put arbitration provisions on the ‘same footing’ as a
contract’s other terms.” Id. at 275 (quoting Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974)).
The Court of Appeals simply disregarded this
precedent in denying application of the FAA to the
Operating Agreement altogether. There is no question
that an agreement for the operation of a law firm is a
contract evidencing transactions involving commerce.
See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388
U.S. 395, 401 (1967) (finding a contract that, among
other things, was tied “to the continuing operations of
an interstate manufacturing and wholesaling business”
to be a contract involving commerce); SCI v. Fulmer,
883 So.2d 621, 629 (Ala. 2003) (“[I]t would be difficult
indeed to give an example of an economic or commercial
activity that one could . . . declare beyond the reach of
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, and, by
extension, under the FAA.”). The U.S. legal services
industry is a $220 billion industry, U.S. Commerce
-17Dep’t Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1998-2011 NAICS
Data, http://www.bea.gov/industry/gdpbyind_ data.htm
(last visited Oct. 24, 2012), and Congress has exercised
its Commerce Clause power to regulate law firms. See
Benders v. Bellows & Bellows, 515 F.3d 757, 764 (7th
Cir. 2008) (applying Title VII to defendant law firm).
Moreover, the Court of Appeals stated that “[b]oth
the Operating Agreement and the Employee Manual
are part of Jane Doe’s employment contract.” App. 31a.
Following Allied-Bruce, this Court has observed that
“[e]mployment contracts, except for those covering
workers engaged in transportation, are covered by the
FAA,” E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289
(2002), and courts of appeals have routinely applied the
FAA to arbitration clauses in employment agreements,
even when the claimant’s work itself may not involve
interstate contacts. See, e.g., Aggarao v. MOL Ship
Mgmt. Co., 675 F.3d 355, 369 (4th Cir. 2012) (“As the
Supreme Court has observed, ‘a contract evidencing a
transaction
involving
commerce’
includes
an
employment contract.”) (quoting Circuit City Stores,
Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 113 (2001)); Edwards v.
Hovensa, LLC, 497 F.3d 355, 363 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[t]he
[Supreme] Court made clear that the Federal
Arbitration Act applies to employment contracts”)
(citation omitted).
So long as the contract is subject to the Commerce
Power of Congress, it is within the scope of the FAA;
there is no requirement that the claims to be arbitrated
must be as well. In any event, Jane Doe’s own claims
did involve interstate commerce. As a part-owner of a
law firm with offices in both San Juan, Puerto Rico, and
Washington, D.C. that served clients from outside
Puerto Rico, she derived part of her income from
-18“interstate” operations, and as she alleged in her
Complaint, her principal client was a pharmaceutical
company headquartered in the continental United
States.
Indeed, her allegations of discrimination
include the accusation that her co-owners failed to
support her efforts to keep that client by accompanying
her to a meeting in New York. Third Am. Compl. ¶¶
49-53; App. 157a-158a (Defs.’ Motion to Dismiss for
Lack of Jurisdiction and to Compel Compulsory
Arbitration in Light of Binding Arbitration Agreement.)
The lower court’s summary ruling that the contract
did not evidence transactions involving commerce
manifests its hostility to the FAA and the federal policy
of arbitration, and disregards the precedent of this
Court that defines the proper interstate commerce rule
for determining applicability of the FAA. “When this
Court has fulfilled its duty to interpret federal law, a
state court may not contradict or fail to implement the
rule so established.” Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v.
Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1202 (2012) (per curiam)
(citation omitted).
II. The Court of Appeals Improperly Applied
Restrictive, Arbitration-Specific Puerto Rico
Law That Is Clearly Pre-empted By The FAA
Under This Court’s Precedents.
The Puerto Rican courts below did not enforce the
Arbitration Clause according to its broad terms and
compel arbitration of Jane Doe’s employment claims.
In its “Findings of Law,” the trial court held that
“[b]ecause these claims arise from the employment
relationship between Jane Doe and LLC they are
excluded from the arbitration demand filed under the
OA. This is because it [the OA] governs the operational
and administrative aspects of the LLC and not the
-19existing employment relationship between the capital
members and the LLC that is regulated by the EM.”
App. 75a (original emphasis deleted and new emphasis
added).
Having dispensed with the FAA with its interstate
commerce ruling, the Court of Appeals invoked
restrictive Puerto Rico law to limit the scope of the
arbitration agreement. The court relied upon Article 1
of Puerto Rico’s Commercial Arbitration Act, which
provides that the parties “may include in a written
agreement a provision for the settlement by arbitration
of any dispute which may in future arise between
them from such settlement or in connection
therewith.” App. 26a (quoting Art. 1 of the Arbitration
Act, 32 L.P.R.A. § 3201) (emphasis in original). The
court interpreted that provision to mean that “the law
of Puerto Rico allows the parties to bind themselves to
arbitrate any possible future controversy arising from
their contract.” App. 26a (emphasis in original).
Accordingly, the court deemed the arbitration clause,
despite the exceptional breadth of its language, to be
limited to only those claims that arise from what it
considered to be the scope of the Operating Agreement
(i.e., governance or administration of the LLC):
[W]e believe that the Court of First Instance did not
err upon concluding that the arbitration clause is
not controlling as to respondent’s role. Both the
Operating Agreement and the Employee Manual are
part of Jane Doe’s employment contract; thus, at
this stage of the proceedings, the dispute of the case
is not related to the governance or administration of
the LLC, which is regulated by the arbitration
clause of the Operating Agreement.
-20App. 31a (original emphasis deleted and new emphasis
added). The Court of Appeals buttressed its ruling by
invoking Puerto Rico policy favoring judicial resolution
of discrimination and retaliation claims under the
Puerto Rico constitution. The court ruled that the trial
court “made a determination that is correct in Law,” for
“the claim that Jane Doe moves for the judicial forum to
adjudicate is one attributing to LLC a severance
resulting from discrimination and retaliation,” and the
“dispute is related to conduct attributed to the LLC that
violates her fundamental constitutional rights which
our current legal system protects through injunctive
relief.” App. 32a.6
The remedial element the court below assumed would be lacking
in arbitration — “the protect[ions] [of] injunctive relief” — is fully
available in arbitration. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32 (“arbitrators
do have the power to fashion equitable relief”) (citation omitted);
Terminix Int’l Co. v. Palmer Ranch Ltd. Partnership, 432 F.3d
1327, 1329 n.2 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting that arbitrator could award
injunctive relief) (citation omitted); Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co.,
254 F.3d 925, 939 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting that arbitrator had
power to order injunctive relief and that any doubts regarding the
arbitrator’s authority to award certain remedies should be resolved
in favor of the arbitrator); AAA Commercial Rule R-43(a) (“The
arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief that the arbitrator
deems just and equitable and within the scope of the agreement of
the parties. . . .”). As the Court held in Gilmer, “[b]y agreeing to
arbitrate a statutory [discrimination] claim, a party does not forgo
the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to
their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.” 500
U.S. at 26 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Any policy of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
that a party must have recourse to the courts to secure injunctive
relief for violations of the Puerto Rico constitution is superseded by
the federal policy of the FAA that gives parties the right to agree to
an arbitration forum that provides these remedies.
6
-21Thus, by its peremptory and unreasoned ruling that
the FAA does not apply to a contract that clearly
involves interstate commerce, the Court of Appeals
succeeded
in
applying
arbitration-specific
commonwealth rules that the FAA would clearly
preempt. State (or commonwealth) policy of whatever
kind must give way to the paramount federal policies
embodied in the FAA.7 The FAA preempts any statelaw rule that “stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress” in making arbitration
agreements fully enforceable on their terms. AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753
(2011). “By enacting § 2, Congress precluded States
from singling out arbitration provisions for suspect
status, requiring instead that such provisions be placed
upon the same footing as other contracts.” Doctor’s
Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 682 (1996) (citation
omitted); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987)
(“[The FAA] is a congressional declaration of a liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,
notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural
This is not the only example of Puerto Rican hostility to
arbitration.
In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., 723 F.2d 155, 158 (1st Cir. 1983), aff’d in part and
rev’d on other grounds, 473 U.S. 614 (1985), the First Circuit
confronted another example of Puerto Rico’s hostility to
arbitration: a statute that explicitly refused to enforce any
arbitration agreement that would “obligate[] a [car] dealer to . . .
arbitrate . . . any controversy . . . regarding [the] dealer’s contract
outside of Puerto Rico, or under foreign law or rule of law.” The
Court of Appeals in Mitsubishi held that the Puerto Rico statute
was preempted by federal law. The issue was not raised in this
Court, which held that statutory antitrust claims were subject to
arbitration.
7
-22policies to the contrary.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citation omitted).
Quite recently, in Marmet Health Care Center, the
Court granted certiorari and summarily vacated a
decision materially indistinguishable from the decisions
below in this case. There, the Court confronted a series
of state supreme court decisions that refused to enforce
pre-dispute arbitration agreements in nursing home
admission agreements as “a matter of public policy
under West Virginia law.” The West Virginia Supreme
Court had concluded that “Congress did not intend for
the FAA to be, in any way, applicable to personal injury
or wrongful death suits that only collaterally derive
from a written agreement that evidences a transaction
affecting interstate commerce. . . .” 132 S. Ct. at 1203.
Summarily vacating the judgment, the Court reiterated
what it had said just last term in AT & T Mobility LLC,
131 S. Ct. at 1747:
“When state law prohibits outright the arbitration of
a particular type of claim, the analysis is
straightforward: The conflicting rule is displaced by
the FAA . . . .” The [FAA’s] text includes no
exception for personal-injury or wrongful-death
claims. It “requires courts to enforce the bargain of
the parties to arbitrate.” Dean Witter Reynolds Inc.
v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217, 105 S. Ct. 1238, 84
L.Ed.2d 158 (1985). It reflects an “emphatic federal
policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution.”
KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 565 U.S. ––––, ––––, 132 S.
Ct. 23, 25, 181 L.Ed.2d 323 (2011) (per curiam)
(quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 87
L.Ed.2d 444 (1985)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
-23Marmet Health Care Ctr., 132 S. Ct. at 1203.
Similarly, in Nitro-Lift Technologies, the Court
summarily vacated a decision of the Oklahoma
Supreme Court, which had applied state law governing
non-competition agreements in lieu of an FAA rule of
decision established by the Court. This Court declared
that “[i]t is a matter of great importance … that state
supreme courts adhere to a correct interpretation of the
legislation[,]” 2012 U.S. LEXIS 8897, at *1, and that
state courts “must abide by the FAA, which is ‘the
supreme Law of the Land,’ U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2,
and by the opinions of this Court interpreting that law.”
Id. at *7.8
There is no question that the commonwealth law
and policy invoked by the Court of Appeals conflicts
with the rules that would govern the interpretation of
the arbitration clause under the FAA. First, the FAA
does not permit a court to limit an exceptionally broad
arbitration clause based on the subject matter of the
underlying agreement. In Gilmer, this Court upheld
the arbitration of statutory employment discrimination
claims even though the agreement containing the
arbitration clause was indisputably not an employment
contract: “the arbitration clause at issue is in Gilmer’s
securities registration application, which is a contract
with the securities exchanges, not with Interstate [the
employer].” 500 U.S. at 25 n.2. Indeed, a separate
employment contract would have been relevant only if
it had its own (potentially conflicting) arbitration
clause. Id. And in Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct.
Petitioners notified the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico of the
Nitro-Lift Technologies decision prior to its denial of the second
petition for reconsideration.
8
-242772 (2010), this Court enforced a free-standing
arbitration agreement that was not embedded in any
underlying contract, holding that the federal rule that
the arbitration clause is severable “does not depend on
the substance of the remainder of the contract.” Id. at
2779.9
Second, the approach of the Court of Appeals below
under Puerto Rico law – which looks to the scope of the
underlying agreement to narrow a broad arbitration
clause, and prefers judicial resolution of commonwealth
The decision below that a broad arbitration clause is limited by
the subject matter of the underlying agreement also starkly
conflicts with decisions of multiple courts of appeals that reject
that rule. See Doe v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 657 F.3d 1204,
1218 (11th Cir. 2011) (“If the cruise line had wanted a broader
arbitration provision, it should have left the scope of it at ‘any and
all disputes, claims, or controversies whatsoever’ instead of
including the limitation that narrowed the scope to only those
disputes, claims, or controversies ‘relating to or in any way arising
out of or connected with the Crew Agreement, these terms, or
services performed for the Company.’ That would have done it
. . . .”); Levin v. Alms & Assocs., Inc., 634 F.3d 260, 267-68 (4th Cir.
2011) (holding that broad arbitration clause covered disputes that
arose prior to parties’ signing of agreement that contained clause,
even though agreement did not explicitly state that it covered
earlier disputes and previous agreements between the parties did
not contain arbitration provisions); Pers. Sec. & Safety Sys., Inc. v.
Motorola, Inc., 297 F.3d 388, 393 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that
arbitration provision in one contract governed dispute under
another contract between the parties, where the arbitration
provision was broad and where “the agreements must be construed
together because they were executed at the same time as part of
the same overall transaction”); see also Brown v. ITT Consumer
Fin. Corp., 211 F.3d 1217, 1221 (11th Cir. 2000) (“The language of
the [arbitration] clause at issue is brief, unequivocal and allencompassing. It states that ‘any dispute between them or claim
by either against the other’ is subject to arbitration. By using this
inclusive language, the parties agreed to arbitrate any and all
claims against each other, with no exceptions.”).
9
-25constitutional claims of discrimination and retaliation –
runs directly afoul of the federal presumption of
arbitrability. This presumption applies with special
force to clauses that use “broad” language like the one
at issue here. AT&T Techs., Inc., 475 U.S. at 657. “In
such cases, ‘[in] the absence of any express provision
excluding a particular grievance from arbitration, we
think only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to
exclude the claim from arbitration can prevail.’” Id. at
657 (quoting Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 584-85); First
Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945
(1995) (the FAA “insist[s] upon clarity before concluding
that the parties did not want to arbitrate a related
matter”).
The omission of any express mention of employment
discrimination or retaliation claims in the agreement is
of no moment. In Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman
Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 59 & n.2 (1995), this Court
interpreted a clause requiring arbitration of “any
controversy arising out of or relating to” accounts or
transactions with a securities broker to include claims
for punitive damages. The Court found nothing in the
contract that “expresses an intent to preclude an award
of punitive damages[.]” Id. at 62. It noted that even if
a separate choice-of-law provision created ambiguity as
to the scope of the arbitration clause, “due regard must
be given to the federal policy favoring arbitration, and
ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause
itself resolved in favor of arbitration.” Id. (quoting Volt
Info. Scis., Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford
Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989)). It did not
matter that the arbitration clause did not specifically
refer to punitive damages; it was enough that the
clause “appears broad enough at least to contemplate
such a remedy.” Id. at 61. So too here the omission of
-26specific references to employment claims cannot defeat
the parties’ bargained-for right to arbitration.
The Operating Agreement uses the broadest of
possible terms to place in arbitration every claim that a
member has against the firm or another member:
“‘Claim’ means any action, suit, complaint or demand of
whatever nature and for whatever relief or remedy
against [LLC] or any of its Members or employees.”
App. 483a (emphasis added). “Read naturally, the word
‘any’ has an expansive meaning, that is, ‘one or some
indiscriminately of whatever kind.’” United States v.
Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997) (citation omitted).
Further, the term “whatever” gives a “sweeping scope”
to this provision. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.,
348 U.S. 426, 429 (1955); see also Harrison v. PPG
Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 589 (1980) (holding that
there was “no indication whatever that Congress
intended” to limit the “expansive language” “any other
final action” to particular kinds of agency action). The
arbitration clause is certainly susceptible of an
interpretation that would include Jane Doe’s
discrimination and retaliation claims, AT&T Techs.,
Inc., 475 U.S. at 650; indeed, that interpretation is
compelled.
The FAA is enforceable in state court, but it is only
this Court that can police judicial hostility to
arbitration when it occurs. Like the West Virginia and
Oklahoma Supreme Courts, the Court of Appeals here
“by misreading and disregarding the precedents of this
Court interpreting the FAA, did not follow controlling
federal law . . . .” Marmet Health Care Ctr., 132 S. Ct.
at 1202. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico abdicated
its role of ensuring compliance with the FAA,
necessitating this Court’s intervention. This Court
-27should grant certiorari and summarily vacate the
judgment below.
III. The Ruling Below That The Scope of An
Arbitration Clause Providing For AAA
Arbitration Is Determined By The Court Is In
Conflict With Decisions Of Federal Courts Of
Appeals.
In First Options of Chicago, this Court held that
“the question ‘who has the primary power to decide
arbitrability’ turns upon what the parties agreed about
that matter.” 514 U.S. at 943. The term “arbitrability”
refers to “whether [the parties] agreed to arbitrate the
merits” of the dispute (i.e., whether the claim is within
the scope of the arbitration clause). Id.10 The parties
may agree to submit questions of arbitrability to the
arbitrator, but “[i]f, on the other hand, the parties did
not agree to submit the arbitrability question itself to
arbitration, then the court should decide that question
just as it would decide any other question that the
parties did not submit to arbitration, namely
independently.” Id. Furthermore, “[c]ourts should not
assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability
unless there is clear and unmistakable evidence that
they did so.”
Id. at 944 (brackets and internal
quotation marks omitted).11
Arbitrability may also include other “gateway” issues such as
whether the parties have a valid agreement to arbitrate. Rent-ACenter, 130 S. Ct. at 2777-78.
11 See also AT&T Techs., Inc., 475 U.S. at 649 (“Unless the parties
clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise, the question of
whether the parties agreed to arbitrate is to be decided by the
court, not the arbitrator.”); Qualcomm Inc. v. Nokia Corp., 466
F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (although the question of
arbitrability is usually for the court, the arbitrator has the power
10
-28Applying the default rule, Puerto Rico courts below
declared the court should determine the question
whether the parties had agreed to arbitrate Jane Doe’s
claims. App. 22a, 31a-32a, 71a-73a. But the court
disregarded that the parties explicitly agreed to be
bound by the Rules of the American Arbitration
Association, and those rules provide that the “arbitrator
[and not the courts] shall have the power to rule on his
or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with
arbitration agreement.” AAA Commercial Rule R-7(a)
(emphasis added). Having made this agreement, the
parties are bound by it, and the courts are required to
enforce their agreement “according to [its] terms.”
AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1745-46. The courts below
should have left for the arbitrator the question whether
the parties had agreed to arbitrate Jane Doe’s claims.
This question is the subject of a mature split in the
circuits. Based on the rule that arbitration agreements
must be enforced according to their terms, many courts
have left to arbitrators the question of arbitrability
where the parties have incorporated the AAA rules by
reference. See, e.g., Petrofac, Inc. v. DYNMcDermott
Petroleum Operations Co., 687 F.3d 671, 675 (5th Cir.
2012) (“We agree with most of our sister circuits that
the express adoption of these rules presents clear and
unmistakable evidence that the parties agreed to
arbitrate arbitrability.”).12 Other courts, however, have
to make that decision if the parties so agreed); Contec Corp. v.
Remote Solution, Co., 398 F.3d 205, 211 (2d Cir. 2005) (same).
12See, e.g., Green v. SuperShuttle Int’l, Inc., 653 F.3d 766, 769 (8th
Cir. 2011) (“By incorporating the AAA [Commercial] Rules, the
parties agreed to allow the arbitrator to determine threshold
questions of arbitrability.”); Fallo v. High-Tech Institute, 559 F.3d
874, 878 (8th Cir. 2009) (parties’ incorporation of AAA Commercial
-29refused to enforce this part of the parties’ bargain and
thus would have concurred in the approach adopted by
the courts below notwithstanding the parties’
agreement to the contrary.13
The decision below, then, represents one side of a
controversy that has divided the lower federal courts:
whether courts are obligated to enforce the parties’
agreement to leave to the arbitrator questions of
arbitrability when they evidence that agreement by
Rules into their arbitration agreement “constitutes a clear and
unmistakable expression of the parties’ intent to leave the question
of arbitrability to an arbitrator”); Qualcomm Inc., 466 F.3d at 1373
(arbitrator should decide questions of arbitrability when the
parties incorporated the AAA rules into their arbitration
agreement); Contec Corp., 398 F.3d at 208 (incorporation of AAA
Commercial Rules “serves as clear and unmistakable evidence of
the parties’ intent to delegate [questions of arbitrability] to an
arbitrator”); Terminix Int’l Co., LP v. Palmer Ranch Ltd.
Partnership, 432 F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th Cir. 2005) (“By
incorporating the AAA [Commercial] Rules . . . into their
agreement, the parties clearly and unmistakably agreed that the
arbitrator should decide whether the arbitration clause is valid.”);
see also Apollo Computer Inc. v. Berg, 886 F.2d 469, 473 (1st Cir.
1989) (parties agreed to have arbitrator decide arbitrability by
incorporating International Chamber of Commerce rules into their
arbitration agreement).
13Riley Mfg. Co. v. Anchor Glass Container Corp., 157 F.3d 775, 780
(10th Cir. 1998) (court should decide arbitrability, despite the
reference to the AAA Commercial Rules in the arbitration
provision); see also Urbanic v. Travelers Ins. Co., No. 10-2368
(WYD) (MJW), 2011 WL 1743412, at *6 (D. Colo. May 6, 2011)
(“[W]hile I find that Traveler’ Arbitration Agreement references
the AAA, it does not expressly incorporate specific AAA Rules, nor
does it state that the validity of the Arbitration Agreement shall be
decided by the arbitrator. Accordingly, I find that the Arbitration
Agreement does not contain a ‘clear and unmistakable’ choice of
arbitration of the validity of whether the parties agreed to
arbitrate.”).
-30incorporating the AAA (or some other set of) rules that
would dictate that result. The question is an important
one, as parties who do business in multiple jurisdictions
are currently uncertain as to the rules that govern the
enforceability of ubiquitous agreements that select the
commercial arbitration rules of the AAA.
The need for review is underscored by the
importance of the issues presented. The unprecedented
rulings of the Court of Appeals, the only one in Puerto
Rico, is of great importance in the Commonwealth. The
holdings that the basic operating agreements of
partnerships and limited liability corporations are not
subject to the FAA, and that the broadest arbitration
clauses in such agreements will not be deemed to apply
to employment-related claims, create enormous
uncertainty as to the validity and reliability of existing
agreements.
But this case has broader national
importance. As it did in Nitro-Lift and Marmet Health
Care Center, this Court must continue to review the
decisions of wayward state courts – including courts of
last resort in jurisdictions where the FAA is applicable
– that still manifest an antiquated hostility to
arbitration, and in particular must bring into line
courts that avoid this Court’s preemption rulings by the
contrivance of declaring agreements outside Congress’s
Commerce Power. Only this Court can ultimately
secure to parties in state court their rights under the
FAA and thereby vindicate the pro-arbitration policy of
supreme federal law.
-31CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant
the petition for a writ of certiorari and summarily
vacate the judgment below, or alternatively grant the
petition and set the case for argument.
Respectfully submitted,
BARBARA B. BROWN
STEPHEN B. KINNAIRD
COUNSEL OF RECORD
NEAL D. MOLLEN
INTRA L. GERMANIS
ERIN E. LARUFFA
PAUL HASTINGS LLP
875 15TH STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, DC 20005
(202) 551-1700
[email protected]
Counsel for Petitioners
December 2012
APPENDICIES
-vTABLE OF APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
Jane Doe v. Limited Liability Co., No.
Panel III, Resolution, June 15, 2012
APPENDIX B
First Instance San Juan Superior Court,
Resolution, June 4, 2012
APPENDIX C
Denying Petition for Certiorari, Sept. 7, 2012
APPENDIX D
Denying First Motion for Reconsideration of
Denial of Certiorari, Oct. 5, 2012
APPENDIX E
Denying Second Motion for Reconsideration of
Denial of Certiorari, Nov. 30, 2012
-viTABLE OF APPENDICES
(continued)
APPENDIX F
First Instance San Juan Superior Court, Motion
to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and to Compel
Arbitration Agreement, Apr. 11, 2012
APPENDIX G
Jane Doe v. Limited Liability Co., No
Panel III, Limited Liability Co.’s Petition for
Certiorari, June 12, 2012
APPENDIX H
Jane Doe v. Limited Liability Co., No. CC-20120532, Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, Limited
Liability Co.’s Petition for Certiorari, June 19,
2012
APPENDIX I
Excerpts of Limited Liability Co.’s Operating
Agreement
1a
APPENDIX A
ESTADO LIBRE ASOCIADO DE PUERTO RICO
TRIBUNAL DE APELACIONES REGIÓN
JUDICIAL DE SAN JUAN PANEL III
JANE DOE,
Demandante-Recurrida,
v.
COMPAÑÍA DE RESPONSABILIDAD LIMITADA
(“CRL”); FULANO DE TAL, PERSONALMENTE, EN SU
CARÁCTER DE PATRONO DE JANE DOE Y COMO COADMINISTRADOR DE LA SOCIEDAD LEGAL DE BIENES
GANANCIALES (“SLG”) CONSTITUIDA CON FULANA DE
TAL, QUIEN ES DEMANDADA COMO CO-ADMINISTRADORA
DE LA SLG CONSTITUIDA CON FULANO DE TAL; “SLG
FULANO Y FULANA DE TAL” SUTANO DE CUAL
PERSONALMENTE, EN SU CARÁCTER DE PATRONO DE
JANE DOE Y COMO CO-ADMINISTRADOR DE LA SLG
CONSTITUIDA CON SUTANA DE CUAL, QUIEN ES
DEMANDADA COMO CO-ADMINISTRADORA DE LA “SLG
SUTANO Y SUTANA DE CUAL” CONSTITUIDA CON SUTANO
Y SUTANA DE CUAL; ESPERENCEJO MÁS CUAL,
JANE DOE Y COMO CO ADMINISTRADOR DE LA SLG
CONSTITUIDA CON ESPERENCEJA MÁS CUAL,
QUIEN ES DEMANDADA COMO CO-ADMINISTRADORA DE LA
SLG CONSTITUIDA CON ESPERENCEJO MÁS CUAL;
“SLG ESPERENCEJO Y ESPERENCEJA MÁS CUAL”
CONSTITUIDA POR ESPERENCEJO Y ESPERENCEJA MÁS
CUAL; DEMANDADOS DESCONOCIDOS A, B Y C;
DEMANDADAS COMPAÑÍAS ASEGURADORAS
DESCONOCIDAS X, Y, Z
2a
DemandadosPeticionarios.
___________
KLCE201200821
___________
CERTIORARI
procedente del Tribunal de Primera Instancia, Sala
Superior de San Juan
Caso Núm.:
___________
K PE2012-1204
___________
Sobre:
Sentencia Declaratoria e Injunction
3a
Panel integrado por su presidente, el Juez Ramírez
Nazario, el Juez Piñero Gonzáles y la Juez Surén
Fuentes
Surén Fuentes, Juez Ponente
RESOLUCIÓN
En San Juan, Puerto Rico, a 15 de junio de 2012.
La peticionaria Compañía de Responsabilidad
Limitada (CRL) comparece ante nos mediante recurso
de certiorari y nombrándose a sí y a las partes
demandadas mediante nombres ficticios.
En el
mismo, impugna una resolución emitida por el
Tribunal de Primera Instancia, Sala de San Juan
(TPI), la cual determinó tener jurisdicción para
adjudicar en sus méritos las reclamaciones de
discrimen, represalias y daños y perjuicios incoadas
por Jane Doe en su segunda demanda enmendada
contra de la CRL.
I.
Estancado el proceso de mediación entre Jane Doe
y la CRL, ésta última presentó el 22 de marzo de
2012, solicitud de arbitraje ante el American
Arbitration Association (AAA) utilizando las Reglas
de Arbitraje Comercial de dicha Asociación. El 2 de
abril de 2012, Jane Doe presentó Demanda Jurada en
Solicitud de Sentencia Declaratoria e Injunction
Preliminar y Permanente. El objeto de su Sentencia
Declaratoria fue solicitarle al TPI declarara la
inaplicabilidad de una cláusula de arbitraje para que
sus contenciones laborales -predicadas en discrimen
en el empleo y represalia- fueran atendidas
judicialmente. Jane Doe arguyó que con la solicitud
de arbitraje, la CRL estaba tratando de impedir la
litigación de las causas de acción presentadas en su
4a
demanda ante el TPI. También presentó Moción
Urgente en Solicitud de Orden en la que solicitó que
los procedimientos se mantuvieran en estricta
confidencialidad, por lo que no reveló los nombres
reales de la partes en el epígrafe. Explicó que su
solicitud de confidencialidad era “hasta tanto se
resolviera la controversia de umbral que se plantea
en la demanda de epígrafe.” (Ap., pág. 20). Jane Doe
proveyó mediante declaración jurada las identidades
de los demandados.
Al día siguiente de Jane Doe haber presentado la
demanda, el foro de Instancia le ordenó a ésta
justificar su solicitud de confidencialidad. Fue así
que el 4 de abril de 2012, Jane Doe explicó que la
única disposición en que descansaba para solicitar
que los procedimientos se llevaran a acabo de forma
confidencial, era la cláusula de arbitraje contenida en
la Sección 14.03 del Artículo 14 del Procedimiento de
Resolución de Disputas contenido en el Acuerdo
Operativo (“Operating Agreement”) entre la CRL y
sus empleados y contratistas. Fue al amparo de esta
cláusula arbitral en que la CRL se basó para solicitar
resolver las controversias en al foro arbitral. Esta
cláusula de arbitraje lea de la siguiente forma:
“14.05 Confidentiality- The Claimant and the
Firm agree that all the underlying purpose of
the provisions set forth in section 14 of this
Agreement is to provide a mechanism by which
any Claim shall be resolved in a confidential
manner, without publicity and the attendant
distractions.
Accordingly, all mediation
meetings and arbitration hearings shall be
private and confidential, and attended by the
parties, counsel, and witnesses only. The
5a
parties agree to maintain confidentiality of
such meetings and hearings, and of the
documents produced or created in such
meeting and hearings. Any and all actions
taken by the parties shall be in conformity
with the underlying purpose set forth in
section 14 of this Agreement.”
(AP. TA., pág. 98).
El 11 de abril de 2012, el TPI celebró vista de
injunction preliminar en la que la CRL presentó
solicitud de desestimación por falta de jurisdicción.
Adujo que conforme al Acuerdo Operativo, las partes,
incluyendo a Jane Doe, “acordaron resolver todas sus
desavenencias a través del antedicho proceso interno
de resolución de disputas, el cual culmina con el
arbitraje.” Id., pág. 41.
Las partes acordaron
mantener la confidencialidad del expediente mientras
el tribunal adjudicara la controversia relativa al
deber de las partes en someter las controversias al
foro arbitral. El foro de Instancia expidió orden a la
Secretaría para que tomara las medidas necesarias
para que el expediente se tramitara de forma
confidencial y permitieran la presentación de
documentos sellados con sus respectivas firmas. Id.
págs. 127-128. Luego de que Jane Doe presentara
oposición a la solicitud de desestimación y enmendara
en dos ocasiones la demanda original, el 4 de junio de
2012, notificada ese mismo día, el TPI emitió la
resolución de la cual la CRL aquí recurre. En dicho
dictamen el foro de Instancia resolvió que
“adjudi[caría] en sus méritos las reclamaciones de
discrimen, represalias y daños y perjuicios
presentadas por Jane Doe y no un árbitro del AAA, así
como la solicitud de remedio interdictal peticionada.”
6a
Id., pág. 498. De este modo, se resolvió el asunto
sobre la arbitrabilidad de la controversia y quedó
pendiente para vista el desfile de prueba con relación
a la solicitud del remedio interdictal. Id.
Las determinaciones a las que arribó el foro de
Instancia consistieron en que las reclamaciones de
Jane Doe no estaban comprendidas en el Acuerdo
Operativo que contenía la cláusula arbitral. En
cuanto al hecho de si Jane Doe era empleada,
propietaria o ambas, el foro de Instancia determinó
que ello aún estaba por dilucidarse luego de que las
partes desfilaran prueba al respecto. Id., pág. 497.
Aun así, el TPI consideró que “ambas capacidades,
empleada o propietaria de ser probadas, no son
mutuamente excluyentes.” Id.
El mismo día de dictada esta resolución de la cual
la CRL recurre, Jane Doe presentó solicitud para que
el TPI ordenara la apertura de los procedimientos y
permitiera la presentación de una Tercera Demanda
Enmendada desvelando los nombres de todas las
partes del epígrafe. También presentó el 5 de junio
de 2012, solicitud de reinstalación a su puesto como
remedio adicional al amparo de la Regla 59.4 de
Procedimiento Civil, 32 L.P.R.A. Ap. V, al pago de
sus haberes y a que dictara sentencia parcial al
amparo de la Lay Núm. 115 de Represalias, 29
LP.R.A. § 194 et seq.1 Inconforme con la resolución
emitida por el TPI el 4 de junio de 2012, -que tuvo el
Celebrada la vista de injunction preliminar de 5 de junio de
2012, surge que Jane Doe le solicitó al TPI que se diera* por
terminado el acuerdo de confidencialidad entre las partes y el
tribunal, y la CRL solicitó lo contrario. (Ap., pág. 548). Así las
cosas, el TPI le dio hasta el 15 de junio de 2012 a la CRL para
consignar su posición por escrito en cuanto a la confidencialidad.
1
7a
efecto de denegar la solicitud de desestimación por
falta de jurisdicción y para obligar a que las
controversias
fuesen
resueltas
mediante
el
procedimiento de arbitraje-, la CLR presentó el
recurso de certiorari del epígrafe, imputándole al foro
de Instancia la comisión de los siguientes errores:
ERRÓ MANIFIESTAMENTE EL TPI AL
ASUMIR
JURISDICCIÓN
SOBRE
LA
CONTROVERSIA DE SI JANE DOE ESTÁ
OBLIGADA A ARBITRAR SUS SUPUESTOS
RECLAMOS:
JANE
DOE
Y
CRL
INEQUÍVOCAMENTE PACTARON QUE EL
ÁRBITRO TIENE LA FACULTAD DE
DETERMINAR EL ALCANCE DE SU
JURISDICCIÓN.
CONCLUIR QUE JANE DOE NO TIENE
QUE
ARBITRAR
SUS
SUPUESTOS
RECLAMOS CONTRA CRL Y LOS DEMÁS
DEMANDADOS-PETICIONARIOS PUESTO
QUE LA CLÁUSULA DE ARBTTRAJE DEL
ACUERDO ES AMPLIA, CLARA Y ABARCA
CUALQUIER
RECLAMO
ENTRE
LAS
PARTES.
EXIMIR A JANE DOE DE ARBITRAR SUS
RECLAMOS
POR
LA
ALEGADA
NATURALEZA “DE EMPLEO” O ‘‘LABORAL”
Y “CONSTITUCIONAL” DE ESTOS YA QUE
EL FAA DESPLAZA (“PREEMPTS”) TODA
POLÍTICA ESTATAL CONTRARIA AL
ARBITRAJE.
La peticionaria acompañó el recurso con una
“Moción Urgente en Auxilio de Jurisdicción”.
8a
II.
El auto de certiorari es un remedio procesal
extraordinario utilizado para que un tribunal de
mayor jerarquía pueda corregir un error cometido por
un tribunal de primera instancia. Pueblo v. Colon
Mendoza, 149 D.P.R. 630, 637 (1999). Distinto a los
recursos de apelación, el tribunal apelativo tiene la
facultad de expedir el auto de certiorari de manera
discrecional. Negrón Placer v. Srio. de Justicia, 154
D.P.R. 79, 91 (2001); J. Cuevas Segarra, Tratado de
Derecho Procesal Civil, San Juan, Publicaciones
J.T.S., 2000, T. I, pág. 884. Esta discreción, en
nuestro ordenamiento jurídico, ha sido definida como
una
forma
de
razonabilidad
aplicada
al
discernimiento judicial para llegar a una conclusión
justiciera. Negrón Placer v. Srio. de Justicia, supra;
Bco. Popular de P.R. v. Mun. de Aguadilla, 144
D.P.R. 651, 658 (1997); Pueblo v. Sánchez González,
90 D.P.R. 197, 200 (1964). No significa poder actuar
en una forma u otra haciendo abstracción del resto
del derecho, porque ciertamente eso constituiría un
abuso de discreción. Íd.
Con el fin de que este Tribunal pueda ejercer de
una manera sabia y prudente su facultad discrecional
de entender o no en los méritos de los asuntos que le
son planteados mediante recurso de Certiorari la
Regla 40 del Reglamento del Tribunal de Apelaciones,
4 L.P.R.A. Ap. XXII-B, establece los siguientes
criterios al determinar si expide un auto de
Certiorari:
A. Si el remedio y la disposición de la decisión
recurrida, a diferencia de sus fundamentos, son
contrarios a derecho.
9a
B. Si la situación de hechos planteada es la más
indicada para el análisis del problema.
C. Si ha mediado prejuicio, parcialidad o error
craso y manifiesto en la apreciación de la prueba
por el Tribunal de Primera Instancia.
D. Si el asunto planteado exige consideración mas
detenida a la luz de los autos originales, los cuales
deberán ser elevados, o de alegatos más
elaborados.
E. Si la etapa del procedimiento en que se
presenta el caso es la más propicia para su
consideración.
F. Si la expedición del auto o de la orden de
mostrar causa no causan un fraccionamiento
indebido del pleito y una dilación indeseable en la
solución final del litigio.
G. Si la expedición del auto o de la orden de
mostrar causa evita un fracaso de la justicia.
Si ninguno de los criterios anteriores está
presente en la petición ante nuestra consideración,
entonces procede que nos abstengamos de expedir el
auto solicitado, de manera que se continúe con los
procedimientos del caso, sin mayor dilación, ante el
Tribunal de Primera Instancia.
De otra parte, En Puerto Rico, el arbitraje, como
método alterno de solucionar las disputas, juega un
papel muy importante. VDE Corporation v. F & R
Contractors, 180 D.P.R. 21 (2010).
Así, el
ordenamiento jurídico de Puerto Rico permite que las
partes en un contrato se obliguen al arbitraje de las
posibles controversias futuras relacionadas con su
contrato. Esta facultad surge principalmente de la
10a
Ley Núm. 376 de 8 de mayo de 1951, 32 L.P.R.A. §§
3201 et seq., conocida como la Ley de Arbitraje
Comercial. El Articulo 1 de esta legislación establece
que las partes “podrán incluir en un convenio por
escrito una disposición para el arreglo mediante
arbitraje de cualquier controversia que en el
futuro surgiere entre ellos de dicho acuerdo o
en relación con el mismo.” Art. 1 de la Ley de
Arbitraje, 32 L.P.R.A. § 3201. (Énfasis nuestro)
La Ley de Arbitraje tiene su génesis y sigue en
gran medida las disposiciones de la Federal
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1- 307 (“FAA” por sus
siglas en inglés o “Ley Federal de Arbitraje”).
Méndez Acevedo v. Nieves Rivera, 179 D.P.R. a la
pág. 369; Cristina Navarro Motta, estudiante, La
participación de terceros no signatarios en los
procesos de arbitraje en Puerto Rico, 44 Rev. Jur.
U.I.P.R. 615, 618 (2010); David M. Helfeld, La
jurisprudencia creadora: Factor determinante en el
desarrollo del derecho de arbitraje en Puerto Rico, 70
Rev. Jurídica U.P.R. 1, 25 (2001). Sin embargo, esta
legislación no aplica ni ocupa el campo bajo toda
circunstancia. La Ley Federal de Arbitraje aplica a
los estados cuando se trata de contratos que
involucran transacciones en el comercio interestatal.
9 U.S.C. § 2; Méndez Acevedo v. Nieves Rivera, 179
D.P.R. a la pág. 370; Mun. de Mayagüez v. Lebrón,
167 D.P.R. 713, 721 (2006). Es decir, “sus
disposiciones se activan solamente, cuando las partes
alegan y prueban que la transacción envuelta en la
controversia formó parte del comercio interestatal.”
pág. 371; Medina v. Crus Azul de P.R., 155 D.P.R.
735, 742 (2001).
11a
Ahora bien, aclaramos que ante la inaplicabilidad
de la Ley Federal de Arbitraje, tanto sus
disposiciones como su jurisprudencia interpretativa
se han seguido estrechamente en la doctrina
puertorriqueña cuando se trata de materia de
arbitraje. Su inaplicabilidad tampoco implica que los
tribunales estemos impedidos de observar lo resuelto
por otros foros que comparten nuestra política
arbitral. Mun. de Mayagüez v. Lebrón, 167 D.P.R.
713 (2006).
Ahora bien, la figura del arbitraje es una de
carácter contractual. Méndez Acevedo v. Nieves
Rivera, 179 D.P.R. 359, 367 (2010). En la materia de
las obligaciones y los contratos de Puerto Rico rige el
principio de la autonomía de la voluntad. Este
principio le concede a las partes que desean obligarse
libertad de acción. VDE Corporation v. F & R
Contrators, supra; BPPR v. Sucn. Talavera, 174
D.P.R. 686, 693 (2008). La aludida norma está
recogida en el Artículo 1207 del Código Civil, el cual
dispone que “los contratantes pueden establecer los
pactos, cláusulas y condiciones que tengan por
conveniente, siempre que no sean contrarios a las
leyes, a la moral, ni al orden público”. 31 L.P.R.A. §
3372. Además, conforme a lo establecido en nuestro
Código Civil, “[l]as obligaciones que nacen de los
contratos tienen fuerza de ley entre las partes
contratantes, y deben cumplirse al tenor de los
mismos.” Art. 1044 del Código Civil, 31 L.P.R.A. §
2994.
También, sobre la interpretación contractual, el
Artículo 1233 de nuestro Código Civil dispone: “[s]i
los términos de un contrato son claros y no dejan
duda sobre la intención de los contratantes, se estará
12a
al sentido literal de sus cláusulas”. 31 L.P.R.A. §
3471. Así bien “[u]na vez se determina lo que las
partes acordaron, el juzgador debe resolver las
controversias entre las partes acorde a lo estipulado.”
C.F.S.E. v. Unión, 170 D.P.R. 443, 451 (2007). Una
vez acordado el arbitraje, los tribunales carecen de
discreción respecto a su eficacia y tienen que dar
cumplimiento a lo acordado. S.L.G. Méndez Acevedo
v. Nieves Rivera, 179 D.P.R. a la pág. 368; Municipio
Mayagüez v. Lebrón, 167 D.P.R. a la pág. 721.
Además, debe tenerse presente que, en el ámbito
estatal puertorriqueño y en la jurisdicción federal
norteamericana se ha reiterado constantemente que
“existe una fuerte política pública a favor del
arbitraje, y que toda duda que pueda existir sobre si
procede o no el arbitraje, debe resolverse a favor de
éste.” Méndez Acevedo v. Nieves Rivera, 179 D.P.R. a
la pág. 368; Quiñones v. Asociación, 161 D.P.R. 668,
673 (2004).
Por lo anterior, ante un convenio de arbitraje, lo
prudencial es la abstención judicial.
Pero, la
intervención judicial no está vedada.
VDE
Corporation v. F&R Contrators, supra; Municipio
Mayagüez v. Lebrón, 167 D.P.R. a la pág. 721; S.L.G.
pág. 368. La propia Ley de Arbitraje Comercial que
dispone:
Si existe controversia respecto a la obligación de
arbitrar, las partes tienen derecho a que se dirima en
los tribunales. Art. 4, Ley de Arbitraje, 32 L.P.R.A. §
3204; 167 D.P.R. 713 (2006). En Puerto Rico y en
Estados Unidos se ha suscitado en numerosas
ocasiones controversias sobre el foro que le
13a
corresponde dilucidar la obligatoriedad de arbitrar
las controversias, si los tribunales o los árbitros.
Recientemente, en Méndez Acevedo v. Nieves
Rivera, 179 D.P.R. 359 (2010), el Tribunal Supremo
de Puerto Rico acogió la norma pautada en Buckeye
Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440
(2006), en cuanto a que un reclamo de nulidad de un
contrato en su totalidad que contiene una cláusula de
arbitraje debe ser atendida por un árbitro. Sin
embargo, cuando se trata de una controversia para
dilucidar la obligatoriedad o invalidez del acuerdo de
arbitraje en sí, la misma le compete a los tribunales.
Es decir, “la determinación de si un acuerdo crea el
deber de las partes de arbitrar una controversia, en
particular es tarea judicial”. Crufon Construction
Corp. v. Autoridad de Edificios Públicos, 156 D.P.R.
197, 205 (2002); Navarro Motta, supra, a la pág. 619.
Cabe distinguir, que esta norma no aplicaría si las
partes en el contrato pactan expresamente que la
determinación de arbitrabilidad será adjudicada por
un árbitro. Ante esa situación, los tribunales deben
referir el caso al árbitro para que determine si el
proceso continuará mediante el proceso de arbitraje.
Esta fue la norma aplicada en Rent-A-Center v.
Jackson, ___ U.S. ___ (2010), 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010).
En nuestra tarea de adjudicar la obligatoriedad de
un acuerdo de arbitraje debemos tener presente que,
a pesar de que existe una fuerte política pública a
favor del arbitraje, no se trata de una norma
absoluta. Se han reconocido excepciones a la norma
general de cumplimiento del acuerdo de arbitraje.
Así, en el pasado se ha prescindido de darle
efectividad al acuerdo de arbitraje cuando una unión
obrera falta a su deber de proveer justa
14a
representación a sus miembros, cuando referir el caso
a arbitraje constituya un gesto fútil y vacío, y en
reclamaciones por hostigamiento sexual bajo la Ley
Núm. 17 de 22 de abril de 1998, 29. L.P.R.A. §§ 146,
et seq. Quiñones González v. Asociación de
Condóminos Plava Azul II, 161 D.P.R. 668, 673
(2004) citando a F.S.E. v. J.R.T., 111 D.P.R. 505
(1981), Hermandad Unión de Empleados v. F.S.E.,
112 D.P.R. 51 (1982) y Vélez v. Serv. Legales de P.R.,
144 D.P.R. 673 (1998).
III.
En su escrito de certiorari la CRL valora que la
resolución recurrida no interpretó íntegramente la
totalidad de la cláusula arbitral, de la cual
claramente surge “la intención y el propósito de las
partes, incluyendo a Jane Doe y los comparecientes,
el resolver cualquier reclamación (“any claim”)
mediante mediación y arbitraje.” (Escrito del recurso,
pág. 21). La CRL expone que esta expresión “no
puede significar otra cosa que no sea “cualquier
reclamación”. La cual se traduce en este caso como
una reclamación de compensación que hace Jane Doe
en calidad de Miembro de Capital de CRL, por lo que
arguye que es de aplicación la cláusula arbitral del
Acuerdo operativo y le corresponde al foro arbitral
adjudicar los reclamos de discrimen o represalias en
el foro arbitral conforme las disposiciones del FAA y
su jurisprudencia interpretativa.
Constituye la pretensión de la peticionaria de que
expidamos el presente recurso para revocar la
determinación del foro de Instancia de adjudicar en
los méritos las reclamaciones de discrimen,
represalias y daños y perjuicios.
Sin embargo,
entendemos que no erró el foro de Instancia al
15a
entender que la cláusula de arbitraje no es
controlante al rol de la recurrida. Tanto el Acuerdo
Operativo como el Manual de Empleado son
partes del contrato de trabajo de Jane Doe, por
lo que en la etapa en la que se encuentran los
procedimientos, la disputa en este caso no es
relativa al gobierno o administración de la
CRL, regida por la cláusula arbitral del
Acuerdo Operativo.
Como explicamos, el Artículo 1 de la Ley de
Arbitraje Comercial, 32 L.P.R.A. sec. 3201, establece
que las partes pueden convenir para el arreglo
mediante arbitraje de cualquier controversia entre
las partes que surja y se relacione con el acuerdo
pactado. Véase, Martínez Marrero v. González Droz,
180 D.P.R. 579, 587-588 (2011). Las disposiciones de
la Federal Arbitration Act tampoco ocupan el campo
sobre las reclamaciones hechas por la recurrida.
Como hemos señalado, la FAA ocupa el campo
cuando la transacción envuelta en la controversia
formó parte del comercio interestatal.
Esta
circunstancia no está presente en este caso.
Asimismo, el árbitro no es el único llamado a
determinar la obligatoriedad de la cláusula de
arbitraje. La jurisprudencia estatal puertorriqueña y
federal ha distinguido las circunstancias bajo las
cuales precede referir ese asunto a un árbitro y
cuando son los tribunales los foros facultados para
hacer esa determinación. Bajo las circunstancias del
presente caso, el TPI tenía autoridad para hacer esa
adjudicación y así lo hizo porque se trata de la
arbitrabilidad de la controversia y no sobre la nulidad
del contrato en su totalidad. Tampoco surge que las
partes pactaron que la adjudicación de la
16a
arbitrabilidad de la controversia también iba a ser
referida a un árbitro.
Evaluado los hechos y el derecho aplicable,
conforme a la Regla 40 no vemos circunstancia
alguna que provoque efecto perjudicial a la CRL en
esta etapa temprana del pleito. El Tribunal de
Primera Instancia consideró los argumentos de las
partes y el trámite procesal del caso y denegó la
solicitud de desestimación. Al así actuar el Juez de
Instancia no solo ejerció su discreción con
razonabilidad sino que tomó una determinación que
es correcta en Derecho. Ello en atención a que la
reclamación que Jane Doe interesa que el foro
Judicial adjudique es una que imputa a la CRL el
haberla separado de manera discriminatoria y por
represalias. Además, dicha controversia trata de una
conducta imputada a la CRL en violación de sus
derechos constitucionales fundamentales, por lo que
nuestro estado de derecho le reconoce a la recurrida
vindicar tales derechos mediante una acción de
injunction. Véase, Arroyo y Rattan Specialties, Inc.,
117 D.P.R. 35, 65-66 (1986). La CRL no nos ha
puesto en condiciones de sustituir el ponderado
criterio del foro primario en esta etapa, por lo que
resolvemos denegar la expedición del auto de
certiorari.
Ante el hecho de que el TPI resolverá pronto la
duración del acuerdo de confidencialidad que
mantiene en resguardo los nombres de las partes del
epígrafe, invitamos a que este asunto sea prioritario
en el calendario de la Sala. Es parte del interés
público que las personas conozcan lo que el sistema
judicial está haciendo.
También existe una
17a
presunción de que la identidad de las partes es parte
del expediente público.
IV.
Por los fundamentos antes expuestos se deniega la
expedición del auto de certiorari. En consecuencia, se
declara sin lugar la moción en auxilio de jurisdicción
sometida por el peticionario.
Adelántese a las partes y al Tribunal de
Primera Instancia inmediatamente por fax, por
teléfono o por correo electrónico y notifíquese
por la vía ordinaria.
Lo acordó el Tribunal y lo certifica la Secretaria
del Tribunal de Apelaciones.
/s/
[signature]
Lcda. Dimarie Alicea Lozada
Secretaria del Tribunal de
Apelaciones
18a
APPENDIX A
COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO
COURT OF APPEALS
JUDICIAL REGION OF SAN JUAN
PANEL III
JANE DOE
Plaintiff− Respondent
v.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY (LLC); JOHN
DOE, in his personal capacity and as employer of
JANE DOE and as co-administrator of the Conjugal
Partnership (“CP”) constituted with JEAN DOE, who
is sued as co-administrator of the CP constituted with
John Doe; “CP John and Jean Doe” JACK JOE in his
personal capacity and as employer of JANE DOE and
as co-administrator of the “CP” constituted with
JACKY JOE, who is sued as co-administrator of the
“CP Jack and Jacky Joe” constituted by Jack and
Jacky Joe; LARRY LOE in his personal capacity and
as employer of JANE DOE, and as co-administrator
of the CP constituted with LARISSA LOE, who is
sued as co-administrator of the CP constituted with
Larry Loe; “CP Larry and Larissa Loe” constituted by
Larry and Larissa Loe; Unknown Defendants A, B
and C; Unknown Insurance Companies Defendants,
X,Y,Z,
Defendants− Petitioners
KLCE201200821
19a
CERTIORARI FROM THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE, SAN JUAN SUPERIOR PART
__________________
Case No.: K PE2012-1204
__________________
RE:
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND INJUNCTION
Panel formed by its president, Judge Ramírez
Nazario, Judge Piñero González and Judge Surén
Fuentes
Ruling by Surén Fuentes, Judge
20a
RESOLUTION
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this June 15, 2012.
Petitioner Limited Liability Company (LLC)
appears before us through a Certiorari petition and
identifying itself and defendants with fictitious
names. In it, they challenge a resolution issued by
the Court of First Instance, San Juan Part (CFI)
determining that that Court has jurisdiction to
adjudicate on its merits the claims of discrimination,
retaliation and damages initiated by Jane Doe in her
second amended complaint against LLC.
I.
Upon facing a standstill in the mediation process
between Jane Doe and LLC, on March 22, 2012, LLC
filed a demand for arbitration before the American
Arbitration Association (AAA) using its Commercial
Arbitration Rules. On April 2, 2012, Jane Doe filed a
Verified
Complaint
Requesting
Declaratory
Judgment
and
Preliminary
and
Permanent
Injunction.
In the Declaratory Judgment, she
requested the CFI to declare the arbitration clause
inapplicable, so that her work-related contentions
based on employment discrimination and retaliation
could be adjudicated by the courts. Jane Doe argued
that, through the arbitration demand, LLC was
attempting to prevent litigation of the causes of
action included in her complaint before the CFI. She
also filed an Urgent Motion Requesting Order where
she petitioned strict confidentiality of the
proceedings, for which reason she did not reveal the
real names of the parties in the caption. She
explained that her request for confidentiality would
continue “until the threshold issue asserted in the
captioned complaint was resolved.” (App., page 20).
21a
Jane Doe submitted through sworn statement the
identities of the defendants.
The day after Jane had filed the complaint, the
CFI, ordered her to justify her request for
confidentiality. Thus, on April 4, 2012, Jane Doe
indicated that the only provision, on which she based
the request for the confidentiality of the proceedings,
was the arbitration clause of Section 14.03, Article 14
of the Dispute Resolution Process provided in the
Operating Agreement existing between LLC and its
employees and contractors. That was the arbitration
clause that LLC used as basis to demand arbitration.
The arbitration clause reads as follows:
“14.5 Confidentiality- The Claimant and the Firm
agree the all the underlying purposes of the
provisions set forth in Section 14 of this Agreement is
to provide a mechanism by which any Claim shall be
resolved in a confidential manner, without publicity
and the attendant distractions.
Accordingly, all
mediation meetings and arbitration hearings shall be
private and confidential, and attended by the parties,
maintain confidentiality of such meetings and
in such meetings and hearings. Any and all actions
taken by the parties shall be in conformity with the
underlying purpose set forth in section14 of this
Agreement.”
(App. TA., page 98).
On April 11, 2012, the CFI held a preliminary
injunction hearing where LLC presented a motion
requesting dismissal due to lack of jurisdiction. It
argued that, in accordance with the Operating
Agreement, the parties, including Jane Doe, “agreed
22a
that the resolution of all their disagreements through
the aforesaid internal process of dispute resolution,
which culminates with the arbitration.” Id., page 41.
The parties agreed to maintain the confidentiality of
the records while the court adjudicated the issue
regarding the duty of the parties to submit the
disputes to the arbitration process. The CFI issued
an order to the Clerk of the Court with instructions to
take the needed measures for the records to be
processed confidentially and to allow the filing of
sealed
documents
with
their
corresponding
signatures. Id. pages 127-128. After Jane Doe filed
her opposition to the motion to dismiss and twice
amended the original complaint, on June 4, 2012,
notified that same date, the CFI issued its resolution,
which LLC herein seeks review. In its resolution the
CFI determined that “the Court and not an arbitrator
from the AAA, will adjudicate in its merits, the
discrimination, retaliation and damages claims filed
by Jane Doe, as well as the request for injunctive
relief.” Id., page 498. With this, the issue of the
arbitrability of the dispute was resolved and only the
presentation of evidence over the injunctive relief
remained pending for hearing. Id.
The determinations by the CFI were that Jane
Doe’s claims were not comprised in the Operating
Agreement containing the arbitration clause. In
regard to the question whether Jane Doe was an
employee, owner or both, the CFI found that it was to
be adjudicated after the parties presented evidence in
that regard. Id., page 497. Even so, the CFI
considered that “both roles, employee and owner, if
proven, are not mutually exclusive.” Id.
23a
The same date the resolution was issued, which
LLC seeks review, Jane Doe filed a petition before the
CFI requesting an order to open the proceedings and
allow the filing of a Third Amended Complaint
releasing the names of all the above-captioned
parties. On June 5, 2012, under Rule 59.4 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, 32 L.P.R.A. App V, she also
filed a request of reinstatement of her employment as
an additional remedy, the payment of her salary, and
a partial judgment under Retaliation Act No. 115, 29
L.P.R.A. Sec 194, et seq.1 In disagreement with the
Resolution issued by the CFI on June 4, 2012, which
had the effect of denying the request for dismissal
due to lack of jurisdiction and to compel the
resolution of the disputes through arbitration, the
LLC filed the above-captioned Certiorari petition,
arguing that the CFI had erred as follows:
THE CFI CLEARLY ERRED UPON ASSUMING
JURISDICTION OVER THE ISSUE REGARDING
JANE DOE’S OBLIGATION TO ARBITRATE HER
ALLEGED CLAIMS:
JANE DOE AND LLC
UNEQUIVOCALLY
AGREED
THAT
THE
ARBITRATOR HAS THE AUTHORITY TO
DETERMINE
THE
SCOPE
OF
HIS/HER
JURISDICTION.
THE
CFI
CLEARLY
ERRED
UPON
CONCLUDING THAT JANE DOE IS NOT
REQUIRED TO ARBITRATE HER ALLEGED
At the June 5, 2012 preliminary hearing, Jane Doe requested
that the CFI terminate the confidentiality agreement between
the Parties and the Court, and LLC opposed the petition. (App.,
page 548). Moreover, the CFI granted the LLC until June 15,
2012, to submit in writing its position concerning
confidentiality.
1
24a
CLAIMS AGAINST LLC AND THE REMAINING
DEFENDANTS-PETITIONERS, INASMUCH AS
THE
ARBITRATION
CLAUSE
IN
THE
AGREEMENT
IS
BROAD,
CLEAR,
AND
ENCOMPASSES ANY CLAIM BETWEEN THE
PARTIES.
THE CFI CLEARLY ERRED UPON RELEASING
JANE DOE FROM HER OBLIGATION TO
ARBITRATE HER CLAIMS DUE TO THE
ALLEGED
“EMPLOYMENT”
OR
“WORKRELATED” AND “CONSTITUTIONAL” NATURE
THEREOF INASMUCH AS THE FAA PREEMPTS
ANY STATE POLICY AGAINST ARBITRATION.
Petitioner filed with her brief an “Urgent Motion
in Aid of the Court’s Jurisdiction.”
II.
The writ of Certiorari is an extraordinary
remedial procedure used to allow a higher ranking
court to correct an error made by a court of first
instance. Pueblo v. Colón Mendoza, 149 D.P.R. 630,
637 (1999). As opposed to appeals, the Court of
Appeals may issue the writ for Certiorari in a
discretionary manner. Negrón Placer v. Srio. de
Justicia, 154 D.P.R. 79, 91 (2001); J. Cuevas Segarra,
Tratado de Derecho Procesal Civil, San Juan,
Publicaciones J.T.S., 2000, T. I., page 884. Such
discretion has been defined in our legal system as a
formula of reasonability applied to judicial
discernment in order to arrive at a justice-seeking
conclusion. Negrón Placer v. Srio de Justicia, supra;
Banco Popular de P.R. v. Municipio de Aguadilla, 144
D.P.R. 651, 658 (1997); Pueblo v. Sánchez González,
90 D.P.R. 197, 200 (1964). It does not signify having
the authority to act in one way or another setting
25a
aside all other laws, because this would certainly
constitute an abuse of discretion. Id.
In order that this Court may exercise its
discretionary authority to hear on the merits the
issues posed through Certiorari petitions, Rule 40 of
the Rules for the Court of Appeals, 4 L.P.R.A. Ap.
XXII-B, provides the following criteria for the
determination as to whether to issue a writ of
Certiorari:
A. If the remedy and disposition of the decision
for which review is sought, as opposed to its legal
grounds, are contrary to the law.
B. If the findings of facts that have been posed are
the most suitable for the analysis of the problem.
C. If the court of first instance has incurred in
prejudice, partiality or a gross and manifest error
upon consideration of the evidence.
D. If the posed issue requires more detailed
consideration in light of the original case records,
which shall be submitted, or of more intricate
pleadings.
E. If the current stage of the proceeding is the
most favorable for its consideration.
F. If the issuance of the writ or orders to show
cause do not produce undue fragmentation of the
case and an undesirable delay in the final
resolution of the litigation.
G. If issuance of the writ or order to show cause
will avert a failure of justice.
If none of the aforesaid criteria exists in the
petition before us, then we shall abstain from issuing
26a
the requested writ, so as to allow continuance of the
proceedings in the Court of First Instance without
further delays.
On the other hand, arbitration in Puerto Rico
plays a major role as an alternate method of dispute
resolution. VDE Corporation v. F&R Contractors,
180 D.P.R. 21 (2010). Thus, the law of Puerto Rico
allows the parties to bind themselves to arbitrate any
possible future controversy arising from their
contract. Said authority arises mainly from Act No.
376 of May 8, 1951, 32 L.P.R.A. Secs. 3201 et. seq.,
known as the Commercial Arbitration Act. Article 1
of this legislation provides that the parties “may
include in a written agreement a provision for the
settlement by arbitration of any dispute which
may in future arise between them from such
settlement or in connection therewith.” Art. 1 of
the Arbitration Act, 32 L.P.R.A. sec. 3201. (Emphasis
ours).
The Arbitration Act originates and follows mainly
the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9
U.S.C. Secs. 1-307 (“FAA” or “Federal Arbitration
Act”). Méndez Acevedo v. Nieves Rivera, 179 D.P.R,
page 369; Cristina Navarro Motta, student, La
participatión de terceros no signatarios en los procesos
de arbitraje en Puerto Rico, 44 Rev. Jur. U.I.P.R. 615,
618 (2010); David M. Helfeld, La jurisprudencia
creadora: Factor determinante en el desarrollo del
derecho de arbitraje en Puerto Rico, 70_Rev. Juridica
U.P.R 1, 25 (2001). However, this legislation does not
apply nor preempt the field under every
circumstance. The Federal Arbitration Act applies to
the states when the contracts involve interstate
commercial transactions. 9 U.S.C. Sec. 2; Méndez
27a
Acevedo v. Nieves Rivera, 179 D.P.R page 370;
Municipio de Mayagüez v. Lebrón, 167 D.P.R. 731,
721 (2006). That is to say, its “provisions apply only
when the parties allege and prove that the
transaction involving the dispute was part of
interstate commerce.” Méndez Acevedo v. Nieves
Rivera, 179 D.P.R page 371; Medina v. Cruz Azul de
P.R., 155 D.P.R. 735, 742 (2001).
However, given the inapplicability of the Federal
Arbitration Act, we must clarify that Puerto Rico’s
doctrine in the subject matter of arbitration has
closely followed its provisions, as well as its
interpretative case law. Its inapplicability does not
imply that the courts are precluded from observing
the case law in other forums sharing our arbitration
policy. Mun. de Mayagüez v. Lebrón 167 D.P.R. 713
(2006).
Now, the concept of arbitration is contractual in
character. Méndez Acevedo v. Nieves Rivera, 179
D.P.R 359, 367 (2010). In the legal matter of
obligations and contracts of Puerto Rico, the free will
principle rules. This principle grants the contracting
parties freedom of action. VDE Corporation v. F&R
Contractors, supra; BPPR v. Sucn. Talavera, 174
D.P.R. 686, 693 (2008). This norm is presented in
Article 1207 of the Civil Code, which provides that
“the contracting parties may make the agreement
and establish the clauses and conditions which they
may deem advisable, provided they are not in
contravention of law, morals, or public order.” 31
L.P.R.A. Sec. 3372. Furthermore, per our Civil Code,
“Obligations arising from contracts have legal force
between the contracting parties, and must be fulfilled
28a
in accordance with their stipulations.” Art. 1044 of
the Civil Code, 31 L.P.R.A. Sec. 2994.
Also, in regard to contractual interpretation,
Article 1233 of our Civil Code provides that “if the
terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt as to
the intentions of the contracting parties, the literal
sense of its stipulations shall be observed.” 31
L.P.R.A. Sec. 3471. Therefore, “once it is determined
what the parties stipulated, the judge must resolve
the disputes between the parties based on what was
stipulated.” C.F.S.E. v. Unión, 170 D.P.R. 443, 451
(2007).
Once the arbitration has been agreed
between the parties, the courts have no discretion
over its efficacy and must comply with the
agreement. S.L.G. Méndez Acevedo v. Nieves Rivera,
179 D.P.R., page 368; Municipio Mayagüez v. Lebrón,
167 D.P.R., page 721. Furthermore, it must be kept
in mind that, both in Puerto Rico and in the North
American federal jurisdictions, it has been repeatedly
reiterated that “a strong public policy in favor of
arbitration exists, and that any doubt that may arise
about whether arbitration proceeds or not must be
solved in favor thereof.” Méndez Acevedo v. Nieves
Rivera, 179 D.P.R. page 368; Quiñones v. Asociación,
161 D.P.R. 668, 673 (2004).
Therefore, upon encountering an arbitration
agreement, prudency calls for judicial abstention.
But judicial intervention is not prohibited. VDE
Corporation v. F&R Contractors, supra; Municipio
Mayagüez v. Lebrón, 167 D.P.R., page 721; S.L.G.
Méndez Acevedo v. Nieves Rivera, 179 D.P.R page
368. The Commercial Arbitration Act states:
If a dispute exists regarding the obligation to
arbitrate, the parties have a right to have it resolved
29a
at the courts. Art. 4, Arbitration Act, 32 L.P.R.A.
3204; 167 D.P.R. 713 (2006). Both in Puerto Rico and
the United States, the issue over which forum shall
determine the obligation to arbitrate the disputes,
the courts or arbitrators, has surfaced in numerous
occasions.
Recently, in Méndez Acevedo v. Nieves Rivera,
179 D.P.R 359 (2010), the Supreme Court of Puerto
Rico invoked the norm advised in Buckeye Check
Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006), in the
sense that a claim of nullity of a contract, in its
entirety, that contains an arbitration clause shall be
determined by an arbitrator. However, if the dispute
deals with from the binding effect or nullity of the
arbitration agreement per se, the courts shall
entertain it. That is to say, “Whether an agreement
creates a binding effect upon parties to arbitrate a
particular controversy is an issue to be determined by
the Courts.” Crufon Construction Corp v. Autoridad
de Edificios Públicos, 156 D.P.R. 197, 205 (2002);
Navarro Motta, supra, page 619. It must be noted
that this norm does not apply if the parties to the
contract expressly agree that the arbitrability issue
will be adjudicated by an arbitrator.
Upon
encountering such situation, the courts must move
the case to the arbitrator who will determine if the
process will continue through arbitration. This norm
was applied in Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, ___
U.S. ____ (2010), 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010).
Upon taking up the task of adjudicating the
binding force of an arbitration agreement we must
keep in mind that, even though a strong public policy
favoring arbitration exists, we are not dealing with
an absolute norm. Exceptions to the general rule of
30a
the binding effect of an arbitration agreement have
been acknowledged. Case in point, in the past, the
arbitration agreement has been rendered ineffective
when a workers union does not grant fair
representation to its members, when referring the
case to arbitration constitutes a futile and empty
gesture, and in claims of sexual harassment under
Act No. 17 of April 22, 1998, 29 L.P.R.A. Secs. 146 et
seq., Quiñones González v. Asociación de Cóndominos
Playa Azul II, 161 D.P.R. 668, 673 (2004), quoting,
F.S.E. v. J.R.T., 111 D.P.R. 505 (1981), Hermandad
Union de Empleados v. F.S.E., 112 D.P.R. 51 (1982)
and Vélez v. Serv. Legales de P.R., 144 D.P.R. 673
(1998).
III.
In its Certiorari petition, the LLC argues that the
resolution for which review is sought did not fully
interpret the entirety of the arbitration clause, where
it is clearly established that “the intention and
purpose of the parties, including Jane Doe and the
appearing parties, is to resolve any claim through
mediation and arbitration.” (See Certiorari petition,
page 21) The LLC argues that this statement “has no
possible meaning other than “any claim,” which, in
this case translates to a compensation claim made by
Jane Doe as a Capital Member of the LLC; thus, it
argues, the arbitration clause of the Operating
Agreement applies, and the arbitration forum must
adjudicate the retaliation or discrimination claims in
the arbitration forum per the FAA provisions and its
interpretative jurisprudence.
The petitioner moves with the petition herein so
we reverse the ruling of the Court of First Instance
where it determined to adjudicate in its merits the
31a
claims of discrimination, retaliation and damages.
However, we believe that the Court of First Instance
did not err upon concluding that the arbitration
clause is not controlling as to respondent’s role. Both
the Operating Agreement and the Employee
Manual are part of Jane Doe’s employment
contract; thus, at this stage of the proceedings,
the dispute of the case is not related to the
governance or administration of the LLC,
which is regulated by the arbitration clause of
the Operating Agreement.
As we explained, Article 1 of the Commercial
Arbitration Act, 32 L.P.R.A. Sec. 3201, establishes
that the parties may agree to arbitrate any dispute
between them that arises and is related to the
contracted agreement. See Martinez Marrero v.
González Droz, 180 D.P.R. 579, 587-588 (2011). The
Federal Arbitration Act provisions do not preempt
the claims raised by respondent.
As pointed out before, the FAA preempts when the
transaction involved in the dispute formed part of
interstate commerce.
That circumstance is not
present in this case. Also, the arbitrator is not the
only one called upon to determine the binding force of
the arbitration clause. Both Puerto Rican and federal
jurisprudence have distinguished the circumstances
under which that issue must be referred to an
arbitrator and when the courts are the forum with
authority to hear the matter. Under the present
case, the CFI had the authority to adjudicate and so
it did because the issue was the arbitrability of the
dispute, and not the nullity of the contract in its
entirety. Furthermore, the parties did not agree that
32a
the adjudication of the arbitrability of the dispute
would be referred to an arbitrator.
Upon evaluation of the facts and applicable law, in
accordance with Rule 40, we find no circumstance
that will cause a prejudicial effect to LLC at this
early stage of the case. The Court of First Instance
took into consideration both parties’ arguments and
the procedural course of the case and denied the
motion to dismiss. The Judge of Instance not only
reasonably exercised his discretion but also made a
determination that is correct in Law.
This, in
consideration of the fact that the claim that Jane Doe
moves for the judicial forum to adjudicate is one
attributing LLC a severance resulting from
discrimination and retaliation. Furthermore, said
dispute is related to conduct attributed to the LLC
that violates her fundamental constitutional rights
which our current legal system protects through
injunctive relief. See, Arroyo v. Rattan Specialties,
Inc., 117 D. P.R. 35, 65-66 (1986). The LLC has not
placed us in a position at this stage, where we can
substitute the well-pondered criteria of the court of
instance, wherefore we decide to deny the issuance of
the writ of certiorari.
Since the CFI will soon issue its ruling regarding
the extent of the term of the confidentiality
agreement keeping confidential the names of the
above-captioned parties, we encourage giving the
issue priority in the Court calendar. Public interest
calls for individuals to know about the judicial
system’s activities. A presumption also exists stating
that the parties’ identities form part of the public
record.
33a
IV.
In view of the foregoing, the Certiorari petition is
denied. Therefore, the motion in aid of the Court’s
jurisdiction filed by the petitioner is denied.
Notify the parties and the Court of First
Instance via fax, telephone or electronic mail
and notify them through regular mail.
Agreed by the Court and certified by the Clerk of
the Court of Appeals
/s/
[signature]
Dimarie Alicea Lozada
Clerk of the Court of Appeals.
34a
The LanguageWorks, Inc.
1123 Broadway
New York, NY 10010
Tel. 212 447 6060
Fax 212 447 6257
LanguageWorks
STATE OF NEW YORK
)
) ss:
COUNTY OF NEW YORK )
CERTIFICATION
This is to certify that the accompanying, to the best of
my knowledge and belief, is a true and accurate
translation from Spanish into English of a Resolution
issued by the Court of Appeals of the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico on June 15, 2012, completed on
October 29, 2012.
/s/
Kevin Rees
President
Sworn to and subscribed before me this 29th day of
October, 2012
/s/
Notary Public
35a
APPENDIX B
TRIBUNAL DE PRIMERA INSTANCIA CENTRO
JUDICIAL DE SAN JUAN SALA SUPERIOR
JANE DOE,
Demandante,
v.
COMPAÑÍA DE RESPONSABILIDAD
LIMITADA (“CRL”); FULANO DE TAL,
JANE DOE Y COMO CO-ADMINISTRADOR DE LA
SOCIEDAD LEGAL DE BIENES GANANCIALES (“SLG”)
CONSTITUIDA CON FULANA DE TAL, QUIEN ES
DEMANDADA COMO CO-ADMINISTRADORA DE LA SLG
CONSTITUIDA CON FULANO DE TAL; “SLG FULANO Y
FULANA DE TAL; CONSTITUIDA POR FULANO Y FULANA
DE TAL; SUTANO DE CUAL PERSONALMENTE, EN SU
CARÁCTER DE PATRONO DE JANE DOE Y COMO COADMINISTRADOR DE LA SLG CONSTITUIDA CON
SUTANA DE CUAL, QUIEN ES DEMANDADA COMO COADMINISTRADORA DE LA “SLG SUTANO Y SUTANA DE
CUAL” CONSTITUIDA CON SUTANO DE CUAL; “SLG
SUTANO Y SUTANA” CONSTITUIDA POR SUTANO Y
SUTANA DE CUAL; ESPERENCEJO MÁS CUAL
JANE DOE Y COMO CO-ADMINASTRADOR DE LA SLG
CONSTITUIDA CON ESPERENCEJA MÁS CUAL,
QUIEN ES DEMANDADA COMO CO-ADMINISTRADORA DE LA
SLG CONSTITUIDA CON ESPERENCEJO MÁS CUAL;
“SLG ESPERENCEJO Y ESPERENCEJA MÁS CUAL”
CONSTITUIDA POR ESPERENCEJA Y ESPERENCEJA MÁS
CUAL; DEMANDADOS DESCONOCIDOS A, B Y C;
36a
DEMANDADAS COMPAÑÍAS ASEGURADORAS,
DESCONOCIDAS X, Y, Z,
Demandados.
___________
CIVIL NUM.: KPE 2012-1204
___________
SALA: 904
SOBRE:
SENTENCIA DECLARATORIA; INJUNCTION
PRELIMINAR Y PERMANENTE; VIOLACIÓN A
DERECHOS CONSTITUCIONALES;
REPRESALIAS; DAÑOS Y PERJUICIOS
37a
RESOLUCIÓN
I.
La acción de marras tiene su génesis el 2 de abril
de 2012 cuando la Parte Demandante, Jane Doe ,
presentó una Demanda Jurada en Solicitud de
Sentencia Declaratoria e Injunction Preliminar y
Permanente.1 Acompañó la Demanda original con
una Moción Solicitando Injunction Preliminar y
Permanente y una Moción Urgente en Solicitud de
Orden. Mediante esta última solicitaba que los
procedimientos judiciales se mantuvieran en estricta
confidencialidad.2
En su Segunda Demanda Enmendada y Jurada
Jane Doe presentó las siguientes causas de acción:
Solicitad de Sentencia Declaratoria; Violación a
Política Pública; Injunction; Violación de Derechos
Constitucionales; Represalias.
Jane Doe reclamó a su vez del Tribunal que
resolviera que:
Jane Doe solicitó enmendar la Demanda original en dos
ocasiones conforme a la Regla 13.1 de las de Procedimiento
Civil, vigentes. Las tres demandas fueron acompañadas de una
Declaración Jurada suscrita por Jane Doe en las que proveía la
verdadera identidad de todas las partes. La parte demandada se
opuso a la presentación de la primera demanda enmendada
únicamente. Mediante Orden el 23 de mayo de 2012 indicamos
que no haríamos pronunciamiento alguno hasta considerar el
asunto de la arbitrabilidad de las reclamaciones. Véase,
Clemente González v. Departamento de la Vivienda, 114 D.P.R.
763,771 (1983).
2 Por esto, Jane identificó a todas las partes con nombres
ficticios. En la vista de injunction preliminar celebrada el 11 de
abril de 2012 ambas partes acordaron que el caso se ventile, en
etapa de los procedimientos, de forma confidencial dado un
acuerdo escrito por las mismas que las obliga a tramitar así el
litigio, al menos en esta etapa.
1
38a
(1)
a. El Acuerdo Operacional (AO) y su
procedimiento de resolución de disputas son nulos e
ineficaces porque, de ser interpretados como pretende
la demandada, tendrían el efecto de extinguir los
derechos constitucionales y estatutarios de Jane y
proveer un mecanismo para eliminar las protecciones
en contra del discrimen que constituyen la política
pública del ELA;
b. la cláusula de arbitraje del AO no es aplicable;
va dirigida a la resolución de disputas que surgen de
la operación y administración de la Compañía de
Responsabilidad Limitada (CRL) y no de las
reclamaciones que surgen de la relación de empleo
entre la CRL y sus empleados y miembros;
c. las reclamaciones de Jane no están sujetas a la
cláusula de arbitraje del AO porque surgen de su
relación de empleo con la CRL; y
d. Jane es empleada de la parte demandada;
(2) en la alternativa, una Sentencia declarando
que el acuerdo de arbitraje es irrazonable y excesivo
(“unconscionable”) como cuestión de derecho y, por lo
tanto, nulo;
(3) un Injunction Permanente ordenando a la parte
demandada a desistir con perjuicio de la solicitud de
arbitraje presentada ante la AAA el 22 de marzo de
2012;
demandada reinstalar inmediatamente a Jane como
empleada y Miembro Capital de la CRL, con todos los
haberes dejados de devengar, o en su defecto, una
compensación por salarios en vez de la reinstalación
(“front pay”), si el tribunal determina que la
reinstalación no es factible;
39a
demandada y todos sus agentes y empleados a
desistir de todo discrimen y/o represalia en contra de
Jane, una vez reinstalada en su empleo;
(6) daños compensatorios por una cantidad no
menor de $3,000,000.00;
(7) doble daño conforme a la Ley Núm. 115 de 20
de diciembre de 1991;
(8) una cantidad equivalente al 25% por concepto
de honorarios de abogado, más una partida razonable
por concepto de costas y gastos incurridos en el litigio;
y
(9) cualquier otro remedio que en derecho proceda.
Según las alegaciones, la CRL presentó una
solicitud de arbitraje y Jane Doe estaba obligada a
contestar dicho procedimiento y a participar del
mismo, salvo que este Tribunal ordenara a la parte
demandada desistir de su reclamación en arbitraje
para que las reclamaciones fueran resueltas por el
Tribunal. Jane Doe también solicitó que el tribunal
dictara una sentencia declarando la improcedencia
del procedimiento arbitral conforme la §14.04 del
Acuerdo Operacional (“AO”), porque el mismo no
contemplaba las reclamaciones de discrimen,
represalia y de daños que surgían de la relación de
empleo. Alegó que la CRL admitió en su solicitud de
arbitraje que las reclamaciones de discrimen y
represalias y daños a arbitrarse no surgían de una
reclamación de empleo.
En su petición de injunction preliminar Jane Doe
solicitó que del Tribunal conceder el remedio
interdictal solicitado, se paralizara el procedimiento
arbitral iniciado por la CRL en lo que el Tribunal
resolvía si, en efecto, el arbitraje era el método
40a
obligatorio escogido por las partes para resolver sus
controversias.
Hasta ahora, todos los escritos han sido
presentados bajo sello y tomando medidas de
seguridad necesarias para lograr la confidencialidad
solicitada y acordada por todas las partes. A priori,
dicha confidencialidad fue protegida y el 3 de abril de
2012 requerimos de Jane Doe que justificara las
razones para proceder de ese modo. Al día siguiente,
en cumplimiento con la Orden del Tribunal, Jane Doe
explicó que su pedido de tramitar el litigio de manera
confidencial en esta etapa estaba predicada en su
afán de protegerse de potenciales alegaciones que
pudiese hacer la parte demandada sobre la supuesta
violación de Jane Doe al acuerdo de confidencialidad
del AO y para evitar que se tomaran represalias
adicionales en su contra. Aclaró que la única base
para solicitar que los procedimientos fuesen
confidenciales era la cláusula contenida en la sección
14.05 del AO. No obstante, enfatizó estar consciente
de que la norma prevaleciente requiere que los
procedimientos judiciales sean abiertos, excepto en
casos excepcionales. Fulana de Tal v. Demandado A,
138 D.P.R. 610, 616 (1995).
El 3 de abril de 2012 emitimos una orden para
dilucidar la procedencia del recurso extraordinario y
señalamos vista para el 11 de abril a los 9:30 a.m.
Dispusimos para la pronta notificación de la misma.
La parte demandante fue emplazada con copia de los
escritos y órdenes el 4 de abril de 2012, a través de su
agente autorizado para tales efectos.
El 11 de abril de 2012, se celebró la vista de
injunction preliminar en el caso.
Las partes
comparecieron representados por sus respectivos
abogados. Allí llegaron a un acuerdo para disponer
de
la
solicitud
de
injunction
preliminar,
41a
provisionalmente.
Mediante éste, la parte
demandada solicitaría la paralización de los
procedimientos de arbitraje ante la Asociación
Americana de Arbitraje (“AAA”), mientras el
Tribunal adjudicaba la controversia planteada
sobre la arbitrabilidad de las reclamaciones de
Jane Doe. De igual forma, las partes acordaron
mantener la confidencialidad que se había preservado
hasta ese momento, en lo que el Tribunal resolvía el
asunto planteado,3 En la vista, Jane Doe reiteró lo
expuesto en su Moción en Cumplimiento de Orden
presentada el 4 de abril de 2012. La parte solicitó que
se mantuviese la confidencialidad.
La parte demandada le anticipó al Tribunal
durante la vista que presentaría su posición por
escrito. Al concluir la vista, la parte demandada
entregó copia a Jane Doe y copia de cortesía al
Tribunal de su Solicitud de Desestimación por Falta
de Jurisdicción y para Compeler Arbitraje
Compulsorio en Vista de Acuerdo Vinculante de
Arbitraje, en adelante “Solicitud de Desestimación”
radicada posteriormente ese mismo día y se pautaron
las fechas en que se presentarían los respectivos
escritos replicando a la posición de las partes. Se
pautó, además, una vista para desfilar prueba, de ser
necesario, para el 10 de mayo de 2012.4 El primer
asunto que el Tribunal dispuso resolver fue la
arbitrabilidad de la controversia. Véase, Minuta
Resolución del 11 de abril de 2012.
El 13 de abril de 2012 emitimos Orden para preservar la
confidencialidad en esta etapa de los procedimientos, a tenor con
la solicitud de ambos partes.
4 Posteriormente se transfirió dicha villa a solicitud de ambas
partes al 5 de junio de 2012.
3
42a
En su Solicitud de Desestimación5, la parte
demandada adujo varios argumentos para que el
recurso extraordinario y demanda presentados fuesen
desestimados a saber: que existía un programa de
resolución de disputas que incluía el arbitraje que
Jane Doe había firmado como miembro capital; que
era el árbitro y no el juez el llamado a dilucidar si las
controversias eran arbitrables; que Jane Doe no era
empleada de la CRL, sino que tenía que considerarse
como patrono y que por tanto “ausente una relación
de empleo,” no existían reclamaciones laborales que
la cobijaran, sino reclamaciones contractuales que sí
estaban incluidas en la cláusula de arbitraje; que el
“Federal Arbitration Act” (“FAA”) requería del
Tribunal que pusiese en vigor el pacto de arbitraje
Aunque la parte demandada expresa no estar sometiéndose a
la jurisdicción del tribunal en su Solicitud de Desestimación, ya
lo había hecho en su comparecencia inicial y a través de su
participación activa durante la vista del 11 de abril de 2012 sin
hacer reserva alguna. En reiteradas ocasiones el Tribunal
Supremo de Puerto Rico ha resuelto que aquella parte que
comparece voluntariamente y realiza algún acto sustancial que
la constituya parte en el pleito, se somete a la jurisdicción del
tribunal. Así a modo de ejemplo, en Rodríguez v. Urbin Brands,
167 D.P.R. 509 (2006) el Tribunal Supremo señaló que “a pesar
de que [la parte] ha indicado que comparece ante el Tribunal de
Primera Instancia sin someterse a su jurisdicción para
cuestionar el emplazamiento y la notificando de la sentencia, es
claro que en sus comparecencias orales y escritas presentó
argumentas en los méritos en curanto a la suficiencia de la
prueba presentada [p]or lo tanto, entendemos que [la parte] se
sometió tácitamente a la jurisdicción del foro de instancia y
renunció a su planteamiento sobro suficiencia del
emplazamiento”. Peña v. Warren, 162 D.P.R 714 (2003);
Vázquez v. López, 160 D.P.R. 714 (2003); Qume Caribe, Inc. v.
Srio.de Hacienda, 153 D.P.R, 700 (2001), citados en Cruz
González v. Carrera, 2009 TA 3249. Véase además. Banco
Santander v. Fajardo Faros, 141 D.P.R. 237 (1996) y Fernández
v. Rodríguez Arroyo, 2009 TA 4677.
5
43a
favoreciendo la política pública establecida y que
ocupaba el campo, entre otras alegaciones.
En su Oposición a la Solicitud de Desestimación,
en adelante “Oposición”, Jane Doe adujo, entre otras
cosas, que la cláusula de arbitraje del AO no era
aplicable a sus reclamaciones que surgían de su
relación de empleo con la CRL, sino que aplicaba a
asuntos
relacionados
con
la
operación
y
administración de la CRL y que la intención de las
partes no era la inclusión de estas reclamaciones bajo
el AO; que el propio AO en su cláusula 14.03 permitía
presentar la controversia ante el Tribunal como otro
foro de resolución de disputas; que ella era empleada
para propósitos de las reclamaciones que surgían de
su relación de empleo con la parte demandada y, por
tanto, las mismas estaban excluidas del arbitraje del
AO; y que ella no había renunciado a arbitrar sus
reclamaciones de derechos constitucionales y las que
surgían de su relación de empleo y, por tanto, que la
cláusula de arbitraje invocada era nula6. Jane Doe
también argumentó que le aplicaba el Manual del
Empleado (“ME”) de la CRL y éste no contenía
disposición alguna relativa al arbitraje de disputas
sobre las reclamaciones surgidas de la relación de
empleo.
El 1 de mayo de 2012 la parte demandada
presentó su Réplica a Oposición, en lo sucesivo
“Réplica”, y la parte demandante presentó su Dúplica
de la Demandante (“Dúplica”) el 7 de mayo de 2012.7
Jane Doe también argumentó que, de aplicar la cláusula de
arbitraje del AO, la misma seria “unconscionable’’ y por lo tanto
inválida, ya que requeriría que el árbitro adjudicara sus
reclamaciones constitucionales en ausencia de una renuncia
expresa e inequívoca de tales derechos.
7 Concedimos el plazo solicitado por la parte demandada para
reaccionar a la Dúplica. Luego de revisar la misma, la
6
44a
La parte demandada reiteró su posición de que las
reclamaciones que presentaba Jane Doe al Tribunal
surgían del AO y por tanto, ésta tenía una obligación
prima facie de arbitrar las mismas. Sin embargo, en
su Réplica la parte demandada admite que no es
importante determinar si el reclamo es de naturaleza
laboral o administrativo, pues se trata de una
reclamación que surge a la luz del AO por diferencias
en cuanto a la compensación de Jane Doe.8 También
argumentó que Jane Doe venía obligada a arbitrar
sus alegadas causas de acción aunque fuesen de
índole constitucional y que el Manual de Empleado de
la CRL no neutralizaba la obligación de arbitrar de
Jane Doe, ni la convertía en empleada.9 Finalmente
la parte demandada en su Réplica argumentó que era
innecesario e inapropiado que el Tribunal resolviese
si Jane Doe era empleada o patrono.
En la Dúplica de la Demandante, en adelante
“Duplica”, Jane Doe reiteró que conforme a la
admisión de la CRL, el arbitraje compulsorio del AO
no aplicaba a reclamaciones que surgen de una
relación de empleo, y sus reclamaciones si surgían de
su relación de empleo con la parte demandada. Es
demandada informó que no presentaría escrito adicional alguno
y dio por sometido el asunto.
8 Para la parte demandada había sido importante, hasta ese
momento determinar la naturaleza del reclamo, puesto que
había argumentado que Jane Doe no tenía ninguna reclamación
que surgiese de su relación de empleo por supuestamente ser
“patrono” y no “empleada”, Así surge de su solicitud de
arbitraje (“Demand for Arbitration”).
9 Adviértase que la parte demandada reconoce la aplicación del
Manual de Empleado a Jane Doe, lo cual surge claramente del
propio texto de dicho Manual. Sin embargo, en su posición que le
aplica sólo en “su capacidad de supervisora”. (De una cuidadosa
revisión de los documentos sometidos no encontramos en las
disposiciones del Manual de Empleados que éste sólo aplique a
Jane Doe en su capacidad do supervisora).
45a
decir, que aún validando la existencia de dicha
cláusula en el AO, la misma no podía utilizarse para
obligar a Jane Doe a arbitrar reclamaciones que no
están contempladas en el ámbito del AO, ni en su
cláusula de arbitraje. Jane Doe argumentó que la
cláusula de arbitraje del AO es para un arbitraje
comercial de los asuntos operacionales, comerciales y
administrativos de la CRL.10 Jane Doe también alegó
que las controversias que surgen de su relación de
empleo están cubiertas por el ME, no por el AO. De
hecho, indicó que el AO no contiene políticas de
discrimen, represalia, hostigamiento, etc. Argumenta
que el AO en ningún lugar habla de reclamaciones de
discrimen o represalias.
Tras un análisis objetivo, sereno y cuidadoso de
las contenciones de las parles y de la totalidad del
voluminoso legajo que constituye los autos del caso
formulamos las siguientes:
II. DETERMINACIONES DE HECHOS
(1) Jane Doe es abogada licenciada por el Tribunal
Supremo de Puerto Rico desde hace 38 años.
(2) La CRL se organizó d 13 de septiembre de 2007
para limitar la responsabilidad civil de sus miembros,
de esa fecha en adelante denominados miembros
capitales. Véase, Ley Núm. 487 de 23 de septiembre
de 2004.
(3) Los miembros capitales pudieran tener dos
capacidades en la CRL: (1) como propietarios; y (2)
empleados. Estas no son mutuamente excluyentes.
10 Jane Doe resulto y la parte demandada no refutó que los
Regias de la AAA que incorpora el AO son las de arbitraje
comercial y no las que la AAA promulga para reclamaciones de
empleo.
46a
(4) La CRL es una compañía de responsabilidad
limitada creada conforme a la Ley General de
Corporaciones del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto
Rico.
(5) Al cambiar su estatus de sociedad a ente
corporativo, la CRL aprobó un AO, que reglamenta
sus aspectos operacionales y administrativos.
(6) Jane Doe se convirtió en miembro capital de la
CRL en el 2007, cuando firmó el AO.
(7) El AO regula los asuntos internos y de
administración de las operaciones de la CRL y provee
para el establecimiento de cuentas capitales,
distribución de ganancias pérdidas, pago de
contribuciones sobre ingresos, la administración de la
CRL, el establecimiento de comités, elección de los
miembros y Director Administrativo, establecimiento
de quórum, terminación de miembros, proceso de
compensación, salarios y bonos, asuntos de
contabilidad interna, asuntos encomendados al
Director Administrativo, clasificación de miembros y
sus responsabilidades, deber de fiducia y lealtad,
retiros, suspensiones o expulsiones de miembros,
retiros mandatarios, pagos en caso de retiros,
expulsiones o muertes, resoluciones de reclamaciones
y otras relacionadas con la operación de la CRL.
(8) El AO no tiene disposiciones relacionadas con
reclamaciones que surjan de una relación de empleo,
tales como de discrimen, hostigamiento o represalia.
(9) El ME aplica a los miembros capitales.
(10)
El ME incluye las políticas, prácticas,
obligaciones y beneficios aplicables a todos los
empleados y miembros capitales, incluyendo políticas
sobre discrimen, hostigamiento sexual, represalia,
incapacidad, licencias de maternidad, vacaciones y
enfermedad, código de vestimenta, entre otras.
47a
(11)
El ME no contempla el arbitraje como el
mecanismo para resolver disputas que surjan de la
relación de empleo.
(12)
El ME se firmó con posterioridad al AO,
el 22 de octubre de 2007.
(13)
El AO tiene una cláusula de arbitraje en
su sección 14.04.
(14)
La cláusula de arbitraje aplica a
cualquier reclamación presentada por un miembro
capital sobre asuntos operativos o administrativos de
la CRL
(15)
El 22 de marzo de 2012, la CRL presentó
una solicitud de arbitraje (“Demand for Arbitration”)
ante el AAA bajo las reglas de arbitraje comercial.
(16)
En su solicitud de arbitraje, la CRL
admitió que las reclamaciones que presentó Jane Doe
por discrimen, represalia y daños, no surgen de una
relación de empleo.
(17)
Desde su reclamación del 24 de enero de
2012, Jane Doe ha cuestionado la aplicabilidad de la
cláusula de arbitraje del AO a sus reclamaciones de
empleo de discrimen, represalia y daños.
(18)
En la cláusula de arbitraje del AO se
incorporan específicamente las reglas de arbitraje
comercial de la AAA.
(19)
El AAA tiene reglas de arbitraje para
resolver disputas surgidas de una relación de empleo.
(20)
Los daños allegadamente sufridos por
Jane Doe son la consecuencia del alegado discrimen y
represalias sufridos por parte de las actuaciones de la
parte demandada, según se alega y deberán ser
probados.
48a
(21)
Jane Doe no pactó arbitrar las
reclamaciones que surgen de su relación de empleo
con la parte demandada al firmar el AO.
(22)
El 30 de marzo de 2012 la CRL destituyó
a Jane Doe del Consejo Directivo por haber
presentado su reclamación de discrimen y represalia
contra ésta el 24 de enero de 2012.
(23)
Jane Doe presentó su Demanda original
y solicitud de injunction preliminar y permanente el 2
de abril de 2012 para, entre otras cosas, dejar sin
efecto el arbitraje solicitado por la parte Demandada.
(24)
El 5 de abril de 2012, el Consejo
Directivo de la CRL recomendó la expulsión de Jane
Doe por haber presentado esta acción civil.
(25)
El 9 de abril de 2012, Jane fue despedida
de la CRL por haber presentado su Demanda Jurada
y Solicitud de Sentencia Declaratoria y de Injunction
Preliminar y Permanente.
A tenor con
precedentemente
siguientes:
las determinaciones de hecho
expuestas
formulamos
las
III. CONCLUSIONES DE DERECHO
De entrada es menester pormenorizar que el
punto de partida en el ámbito de materia de
interpretación de las cláusulas de arbitraje lo son las
disposiciones contractuales acordadas entre las
partes. Se ha reconocido federal y estatalmente que
el arbitraje es materia de contrato. AT & T Techs.,
Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 648
(1986). “Whether given parties have agreed to
arbitrate a dispute is a matter of contract
interpretation and, thus, is normally for the court to
decide.” United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav.
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Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-583, 80 S.CL 1347,4 L.Ed.2d
1409 (1960).
Esta política tiene relación con la doctrina de la
autonomía de los contratantes enunciada en el Art.
1207 de nuestro Código Civil, 31 L.P.RA. § 3372. En
Puerto Rico rige el principio de la libertad de
contratación. Véase Unisys v. Ramallo Brothers, 128
D.P.R, 842, 850 (1991). Como parte de esta norma,
“los contratantes pueden establecer los pactos,
cláusulas y condiciones que tengan por conveniente,
siempre que no sean contrarios a las leyes, a la moral,
ni al orden público”. Art. 1207 del Código Civil, 31
L.P.R.A. § 3372.
Si el propio contrato entre las partes establece
ciertos tipos de disputas especificas que se verán en
arbitraje, o si el contrato excluye algunas
controversias particulares, los tribunales deben
actuar de acuerdo con lo dispuesto en el contrato.
Medina Betancourt v. La Cruz Azul de P.R, 155
D.P.R. 735 (2001).
Una vez establecidas las cláusulas y condiciones
del acuerdo, se entenderá perfeccionado el contrato
por el consentimiento entre las partes y, desde ese
momento, cada una de ellas vendrá obligada no sólo a
cumplir con lo expresamente pactado, sino también
con las consecuencias que, según su naturaleza, sean
conformes a la buena fe, al uso y a la ley. Art. 1210
del Código Civil, 31 L.P.R.A. § 3375.
Esa obligación de cumplir con lo pactado se
fundamenta en el principio de la buena fe, la cual
exige no defraudar la confianza que otro ha puesta en
una promesa o conducta. Unisys v. Ramalo, supra, a
la pág. 852, citando a L. Diez-Picazo, Fundamentos de
Derecho Civil Patrimonial, 2da ed., Madrid, Ed.
Tecnos, 1983, Vol. I, Cap. IV, pág. 99.
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La glosa jurisprudencial ha establecido que
generalmente, cuando las cortes deben decidir si las
partes acordaron arbitrar un asunto, éstas deben
utilizar principios comunes de derecho estatal que
gobiernan la formación de contratos. Combined
Energies v. CCI, Inc. 514 F.3d 168 (lst Cir. 2008),
citando a First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Koplan, 514
U.S. 938, 943-944 (1995). A una parte no puede
obligarse a someter a arbitraje una disputa que no
acordó resolver por ese procedimiento. AT&T Techs,
Inc, 475 U.S. a la pág. 648; Combined Energies,
supra; Municipality or San Juan v. Corporación para
el Fomento Económico de la Ciudad Capital, 415 F.3d
145,149 (lst Cir. 2005); InterGen N.V. v. Grina, 344
F.3d 134, 142 (1st Cir. 2003).
Por otro lado, el propósito fundamental del
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) es que los tribunales
pongan en vigor los contratos válidos de arbitraje.
FAA 9 U.S.C. § 1. La política pública a favor del
arbitraje como método alterno para la solución de
disputas no es absoluta y tiene sus excepciones.
La regla general bajo el estatuto federal es que la
arbitrabilidad de una disputa deberá ser determinada
por un tribunal. AT&T Techs., Inc, 475 U.S. a la pág.
649; Apollo Computer, Inc. v. Berg, 886 F.2d 469, 472
(lst Cir. 1989). Las partes pueden pactar que sea el
árbitro quien decida si una disputa en particular es
arbitrable, así como también los méritos de la disputa
Id., a la pág. 473. Pero sólo cuando las partes han
acordado clara e inequívocamente que el árbitro
debería decidir si una cuestión es arbitrable, éste se
convierte en un asunto que deberá ser decidido por el
árbitro. Awah v. Coverall N. Am, Inc, 554 F.3d 7,10
(1st Cir. 2009).11 Los árbitros derivan su autoridad
En este caso, no hay que determinar si la delegación de
jurisdicción al árbitro bajo la cláusula es clara e inequívoca,
11
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para resolver disputas solamente porque las partes
han acordado de antemano someter dichos agravios a
arbitraje, AT&T Techs., Inc, supra, a la pág. 648. No
obstante la política pública a favor del arbitraje y la
presunción general de arbitrabilidad, los tribunales
no pueden anular la intención de las partes dándole a
la cláusula de arbitraje mayor amplitud de lo que las
partes acordaron, pues en última instancia se corre el
peligro de socavar en lugar de servir dicha política
pública. National Railroad Passenger Corporation v.
Boston and Maine Corporation, 850 F.2d 756 (D.C.
Columbra, 1988); véase además, Litton Financial
Printing Div. v. N.L.R.B., 501 U.S. 190, 200 (1991) en
donde se resolvió que: “[N]o obligation to arbitrate a
labor dispute arises solely by operation of law. The
law compels a party to submit his grievance to
arbitration only if he has contracted to do so.”
Es norma de derecho reiterada y establecida que
las disputas sobre la aplicabilidad una cláusula de
arbitraje a un tipo particular de controversia deben
ser resueltas por el Tribunal. Kristlian v. Comcast
Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 39 (lst Cir. 2006), citando a
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 537 U.S. 79, 83
(2002); Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S.CL 2772.
Luego de revisar el derecho y analizar los hechos
en los que las partes fundamentan sus reclamaciones,
concluimos que las reclamaciones de discrimen,
porque la cláusula de arbitraje no es aplicable en las
controversias presentadas. Aún cuando las partes le delegan al
árbitro la autoridad de decidir qué asuntos están sujetos a
arbitraje, el tribunal debe determinar, de entrada, si las
reclamaciones de la disputa caen dentro del alcance
contemplado del acuerdo de las partes. Después de todo el
arbitraje es un asunto estricto de consentimiento, es una
manera de resolver las disputas que las partes han acordado
someter a arbitraje. Granite Rock Co. y. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters,
30 S. Ct 2847 (2010).
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represalia y daños de Jane Doe no están
contempladas en el AO y, por lo tanto, han de ser
resueltas en el foro judicial y no mediante arbitraje.
Esta conclusión cuenta con vasto apoyo en los hechos
presentados por la propia parte demandada.
Notamos que el énfasis principal de la parte
demandada surge de su interpretación general de que
el arbitraje contenido en el AO aplica a toda
reclamación (“any claim”), independientemente de su
naturaleza (“of any nature”). No podemos avalar tal
posición a la luz del lenguaje del AO y la existencia
del ME en su aplicación a los miembros capitales.
Resolvemos que, la delegación al árbitro no puede ser
ilimitada y uno de dichos límites es que la disputa
tenga que ver (“subject matter”) con lo que
contemplaba el acuerdo de arbitraje.
Visibility
Corporation v. Schilling Robotics, LLC, 2011 WL
5075816 (D. Mass. Op. del 25 de octubre de 2011)
citando a Turi v. Main Street Adoption Services, LLP,
633 F.3d 496, 507 (6to Cir. 2011).
Adviértase que desde sus comienzos, la CRL
adoptó un AO (13 de septiembre de 2007) y un ME
(22 de octubre de 2007). Ambos aplican a los
miembros capitales. Sabido es que el Manual de
Empleado es parte del contrato de trabajo. Santiago
v. Kodak Caribbean, Ltd., 129 D.P.R. 763 (1992).
El AO cubre los aspectos de la capacidad
propietaria de los miembros capitales y el ME
aquéllos relativos a su capacidad como empleados.
Aunque los miembros capitales de las Compañías de
Responsabilidad Limitada han recibido diferente
trato por parte de los tribunales anglosajones al
momento de determinar si son empleados, dueños o
ambos para propósitos de la protección en contra del
discrimen y represalias, entendemos que el derecho
en Puerto Rico, y su interpretación jurisprudencial y
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los hechos ante nos, requieren que determinemos que
gozan de tales protecciones. Véase, Constitución de
Puerto Rico, Art 2, secciones 1, 16, 17 y 18.
Nos resulta conflictiva la posición de la CRL
cuando por un lado argumenta que el AO reglamenta
todas las disputas de Jane Doe con la CRL y
cualquier miembro capital, incluyendo aquéllas de
discrimen, represalias y daños que presenta Jane
Doe, mientras del otro lado admite en su solicitud de
arbitraje que dichas reclamaciones no surgen de una
relación de empleo. Además resaltamos la postura de
la parte demandada en su Solicitud de Desestimación
de que Jane Doe no es una empleada y no goza de las
protecciones constitucionales y estatutarias por esta
razón.12
La posición conflictiva de la parte demandada
antes descrita en ambos foros abona a nuestro
convencimiento de que las reclamaciones presentadas
por Jane Doe sobre discrimen, represalia y daños, con
sus respectivos remedios, están fuera del ámbito
(“subject matter”) del AO y su cláusula de arbitraje.
Por surgir estas reclamaciones de la relación de
empleo de Jane Doe con la CRL es que se excluyen de
la solicitud de arbitraje, presentada al amparo del
AO. Es así porque éste reglamenta los aspectos
operacionales y administrativos de la CRL y no in
relación de empleo existente entre los miembros
capitales y la CRL que regula el ME. Concluir que
Jane Doe está obligada a someterse al arbitraje, en
12 Avalar tal argumentación, permitiría que los miembros
capitales decidieran en otro momento utilizar otros criterios
protegidos, como la raza o la religión y utilizarlos de base para
privar a otros miembros capitales de su protección
constitucional. De acuerdo a la interpretación y postura de la
CRL, mediante el AO se delegaría al árbitro resolver la
controversia en un foro totalmente confidencial y sin derecho de
apelación para los afectados.
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nuestra opinión, proveería el imprimatur judicial a
que se ventilen reclamaciones que surgen de una
relación de empleo en un procedimiento invocado por
la propia demandada para resolver disputas que nada
tienen que ver con una relación de empleo. Además,
la legislación protectora de los empleados en Puerto
Rico es de amplio alcance, no restrictiva y la
exclusión de un empleado de los beneficios de la
legislación laboral debe ser clara, debiendo los
tribunales interpretar dichas exclusiones en forma
restrictiva. Malavé Serrano v. Oriental Bank, 2006
TSPR 63.
Al analizar las funciones que Jane Doe realizaba
para la CRL, según surge de los documentos en autos,
parece necesario concluir que ella carecía del control
con el que cuentan los dueños y patronos. Véase,
Acevedo Colora, Legislación Laboral del Trabajo
Comentada, 8va Ed. (2005).
No obstante las partes deberán desfilar su prueba
en relación a sí, a los fines de lo aquí controvertido,
era empleada, propietaria o ambas.
Inclusive,
estamos conscientes que Jane Doe no niega que, como
miembro capital, tuviese intereses propietarios
dentro de la CRL Lo que no podemos perder de vista
es que ambas capacidades, empleada y propietaria de
ser probadas, no son mutuamente excluyentes.
Véase, Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc, 366
U.S. 28, 32 (1961). Deberá apartar prueba sobre el
particular.
De igual forma, nada impide que la CRL en su día
establezca que tiene derecho a sus defensas sobre el
resto de las reclamaciones invocadas en su Demanda
o que Jane Doe cuenta con prueba insuficiente para
probarlas.
Por lo cual en correcta práctica
adjudicativa dictamos la:
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IV. RESOLUCIÓN
A base de los fundamentos precedentemente
expuestos resolvemos que las reclamaciones
presentadas por Jane Doe no están cobijadas bajo la
cláusula de arbitraje del AO, por surgir éstas de su
relación laboral con la parte demandada. Por tanto
determinamos que el Tribunal será quien adjudique
en sus méritos las reclamaciones de discrimen,
represalias y daños presentadas por Jane Doe y no un
árbitro del AAA, así como la solicitud de remedio
interdictal peticionada.
Se mantiene en pie la vista de injunction señalada
para el 5 de junio a las 9:00 a.m. en la cual las partes
tendrán la oportunidad de desfilar su prueba en
relación a la solicitud de remedio interdictal
peticionada, en atención a que el acuerdo entre las
partes relacionado a la paralización del arbitraje se
mantendría hasta que fuera resuelto el asunto sobre
la arbitrabilidad de la controversia. Por lo cual, se
acepta la segunda demanda enmendada que actualiza
e incluye las alegaciones previamente formuladas en
la primera demanda enmendada.
NOTIFIQUESE.
electrónico.
Adelántese
vía
correo
Dada en San Juan, Puerto Rico, a 4 de junio de
2012.
/s/
[signature]
ÁNGEL R. PAGÁN OCASIO
JUEZ SUPERIOR
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APPENDIX B
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
SAN JUAN SUPERIOR PART
JANE DOE,
Plaintiff
v.
DOE, in his personal capacity as employer of JANE
DOE and as co-administrator of the Conjugal
Partnership (“CP”) established with JEAN DOE, who
is sued as co-administrator of the CP established with
John Doe; “CP John and Jean Doe” constituted by
John and Jean Doe; JACK JOE in his personal
capacity as employer of JANE DOE and as coadministrator of the CP established with JACKY
JOE, who is sued as co-administrator of “CP Jack and
Jacky Joe” constituted with Jack Joe; “CP Jack and
Jacky Joe” constituted with Jack and Jacky Joe;
LARRY LOE in his personal capacity as employer of
JANE DOE, and as co-administrator of the CP
constituted with LARISSA LOE, who is sued as coadministrator of the CP constituted with Larry Loe;
“CP Larry and Larissa Loe” constituted by Larry and
Larissa Loe; Unknown Defendants A, B and C;
Unknown Insurance Companies Defendants, X, Y, Z,
Defendants.
___________________
CIVIL No. KPE2012-1204
_________________
Chamber: 904
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RE: Declaratory Judgment and request for
preliminary and permanent injunction; violation of
constitutional rights; retaliation; damages.
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RESOLUTION
I.
The Claim hereunder originated on April 2, 2012
when Plaintiff, “Jane Doe,” filed a Verified Complaint
and Request for Declaratory Judgment and
Preliminary and Permanent Injunction.1
The
original Complaint was submitted together with a
Motion requesting Preliminary and Permanent
Injunction and an Urgent Motion Requesting Order.
In the latter, Jane Doe requested that the
proceedings in this case remain in strict
confidentiality.2
In her Second Amended Verified Complaint, Jane
Doe stated the following causes of action: Request for
Declaratory Judgment, Violation of Public Policy;
Injunction; Violation of Constitutional Rights;
Retaliation.
On two occasions Jane Doe requested amendments to the
Complaint pursuant to Rule 13.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
that are currently in effect. The three Complaints included
Sworn Statements undersigned by Jane Doe where the true
identity of each party was indicated. Defendant opposed the
first amended complaint only. By means of Order issued on
May 23, 2012, we stated that no pronouncement would be made
until considering the mater of the arbitrability of the claims.
See, Clemente González v. Departamento de la Vivienda,
114 D.P.R. 763, 771 (1983).
2 This is the reason why Jane identified all parties with
fictitious names. At the Preliminary Injunction hearing held on
April 11, 2012, both parties agreed that the case would be heard,
at this stage of the proceedings, under strict confidentiality,
upon written agreement by both parties to such effects, at least
throughout this stage of the litigation.
1
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Jane Doe also requested the court to rule the
following:
(1) a. The Operating Agreement (OA) and its
dispute resolution procedure are null and void
inasmuch as if interpreted as expected by the
Defendants, the effect would be the extinguishment
of Jane’s constitutional and statutory rights while
granting a mechanism to eliminate those protections
against discrimination that constitute the Public
Policy of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
b. The OA’s Arbitration Clause is not applicable;
it has been designed to deal with claims resulting
from the operation and administration of the Limited
Liability Company (LLC) and not with claims related
to the employment relationship between LLC and its
employees and members;
c. Jane’s claims are not subject to the OA’s
Arbitration Clause because they arise from her
employment relationship with LLC; and
d. Jane is an employee of the Defendant.
(2) In the alternative, a Judgment declaring that
the arbitration clause is unreasonable and excessive
(unconscionable) as a matter of law and, thus, null
and void;
(3) Issue a Permanent Injunction against
Defendant ordering it to desist with prejudice from
the arbitration demand made before the AAA on
March 22, 2012;
(4) Issue a Permanent Injunction ordering Jane’s
immediate reinstatement as an employee and Capital
Member of LLC, with all lost earnings, otherwise, a
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front pay instead of reinstatement, if the Court
determines that reinstatement is not feasible;
(5) Issue a Permanent Injunction ordering
Defendants and all their agents and employees to
abstain from any discrimination and /or retaliation
against Jane, once reinstated in her employment.
(6) Grant compensatory damages in an amount of
no less than $3,000,000.00;
(7) Grant double damages in accordance with Act
No. 115, of December 20, 1991;
(8) Grant an amount equivalent to 25% of
attorney’s fees, plus a reasonable amount for costs
and expenses of litigation; and
(9) Any other remedy admissible under the law.
According to the allegations, LLC filed a demand
for arbitration and Jane Doe was required to answer
the same as well as participate therein, unless this
Court ordered Defendant to desist from its
arbitration demand for the claims to be heard before
the Court. Jane Doe also requested the Court to
issue a judgment declaring the inapplicability of the
arbitration procedure in accordance with section
14.04 of the Operations Agreement (OA), as it did not
consider the discrimination, retaliation and damages
claims arising from the employment relationship.
She claimed that LLC admitted in its arbitration
request that the claims of discrimination, retaliation
and damages to be arbitrated did not come from an
employment claim.
Jane Doe submitted to the Court that if the
petition for injunctive relief was granted, a stay of the
arbitration process that had already been initiated by
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the LLC must be ordered while the Court determined
if, in effect, arbitration was the obligatory method
chosen by the parties to solve the disagreements.
Until this point in time, all documents have been
filed under seal and the necessary security measures
to ensure the confidentiality requested and agreed
upon by all parties have been taken. Confidentiality
had been protected a priori, and on April 3, 2012 we
ordered Jane Doe to submit justification as to the
reasons such process should be followed. The next
day, per the Court’s orders, Jane Doe explained that
her request for confidentiality at this stage of the
litigation was based on a need to protect herself
against potential allegations by the Defendant of
violations of the confidentiality agreement in the OA
and to prevent further retaliation against her. She
clarified that her only reason for requesting the
confidentiality of the process was the OA’s clause in
section 14.05.
However, she emphasized her
awareness of the prevailing standard, which is that
judicial proceedings must be open except in
extraordinary cases. Fulana de Tal v. Demandado
A, 138 D.P.R. 610, 616 (1995).
On April 3 2012, we issued an order to determine
the merits of the extraordinary remedy and a hearing
was scheduled to be held on April 11 at 9:30 a.m.
Prompt notification was ordered.
Plaintiff was
summoned with copy of the pleadings and orders on
April 4, 2012, through its authorized agent.
The injunctive relief hearing took place on
April 11, 2012.
Parties appeared through their
corresponding attorneys. Parties agreed therein that
the injunctive relief plea would be dropped,
temporarily. Defendant agreed to request a stay in
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the arbitration proceedings before the American
Arbitration Association (AAA), while the Court
adjudicated
the
dispute
regarding
the
arbitrability of Jane Doe’s claims. Also, the
parties agreed to maintain the confidentiality that
had been in force up until that point in time, while
the Court adjudicated the question presented.3 At
the hearing, Jane Doe reiterated her declarations
asserted in her Motion in Compliance with Order
filed on April 4, 2012. Defendant requested that
confidentiality be kept.
Defendant stated to the Court during the hearing
that they would submit their position in writing.
Upon the hearing’s conclusion, Defendants submitted
to Jane Doe with a courtesy copy to the Court, their
Motion to Dismiss due to Lack of Jurisdiction and to
Compel Compulsory Arbitration in View of a Binding
Arbitration Agreement, hereinafter “Motion to
Dismiss,” filed later that same day, and the filing
dates for documents answering the parties’ positions
were established. Furthermore a hearing to present
evidence, if needed, was scheduled for May 10, 2012.4
The first issue to be resolved by the Court would be
the arbitrability of the dispute.. See, Resolution
Minute of April 11, 2012.
In its Motion to Dismiss,5 Defendant put forth
several arguments for the dismissal of the
On April 13, 2012 an Order was issued granting the petition of
Confidentiality throughout this stage of the proceedings, based
on both parties’ request.
4 Later the hearing was rescheduled for June 5, 2012, upon
petition by both parties.
5 Even though in their Motion to Dismiss Defendants argue that
they are not submitting to this Court’s jurisdiction, they had
3
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extraordinary remedy and complaint, to wit: that a
dispute resolution program existed that included the
arbitration and which Jane Doe had signed as a
capital member; that the arbitrator and not the judge
was the one called upon to solve whether the disputes
were arbitrable; that Jane Doe was not an employee
of the LLC but an employer and therefore, “in the
absence of an employment relationship,” no labor
claims existed to shelter her but contractual claims
which were included in the arbitration clause; that
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) required the Court
to enforce the arbitration agreement as to favor the
established public policy and that the field is
preempted, among other allegations.
In its Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss,
hereinafter “Opposition,” Jane Doe adduced, among
already done so through their initial appearance and through
their active participation without reservation, in the April11,
2012 hearing. The Puerto Rico Supreme Court in several
occasions has ruled that a party that appears voluntarily and
materially partakes of an action establishing itself as a party in
the suit is submitting to the jurisdiction of the court. As an
example, in Rodriguez v. Urban Brands, 167 D.P.R. 509
(2006) the Supreme Court stated that: “even though [the party]
has indicated that it appears before the Court of First Instance
without submitting to its jurisdiction to question the summons
and notification of judgment, it is clear that in its written and
oral appearances it presented arguments, on the merits,
regarding the adequacy of the submitted evidence…, therefore,
we believe that the [party] tacitly submitted itself to the court of
first instance’s jurisdiction and waived its position about the
adequacy of the summons.” Pena v. Warren, 162 D.P.R. 764
(2004); Vázquez v. López, 160 D.P.R. 714 (2003); Qume
Caribe Inc. v. Srio. de Hacienda, 153 D.P.R. 700 (2001);
quoted in Cruz González v. Carrera, 2009 TA 3249. See also
Banco Santander v. Fajardo Faros, 141 D.P.R. 237 (1996);
Fernández v. Rodríguez Arroyo, 2009 TA 4677.
64a
other things, that the arbitration clause in the OA
was not applicable to her claims arising from an
employment relationship with the LLC, but that it
applied to issues related to the operations and
administration of the LLC and that the intention of
the parties was not to include these type of claims
under the OA; that the OA itself in its section 14.03
allowed filing the controversy before the Court as
another forum for the resolution of disputes; that she
was an employee for purposes of the claims arising
from her employment relationship with the
defendant, and thus, they were excluded from the
OA’s arbitration clause; and that she had not waived
the arbitration of her claims over constitutional
rights and those arising from her employment
relationship and, thus, the invoked arbitration clause
was null.6 Jane Doe also contended that the LLC’s
Employee Manual (“EM”) was applicable to her and it
did not contain any provision related to the
arbitration of disputes over claims arising from an
employment relationship.
On May 1, 2012 Defendant filed their Reply to
Opposition, hereinafter “Reply,” and Plaintiff filed its
“Plaintiff’s Sur-Reply” (“Sur-Reply”) on May 7, 2012.7
Defendants reiterated their plea that the claims
filed before the Court by Jane Doe emerge from the
Jane Doe also asserted that, should the OA’s arbitration clause
apply, it would be considered unconscionable and thus it would
be null and void, as it would require the arbitrator to adjudicate
her constitutional claims in the absence of an express and
unequivocal waiver of those rights.
7 We granted Defendants the term requested for their answer to
the Sur-Reply. After reviewing the same, Defendants informed
that they would not file additional motions and rested their
case.
6
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OA and therefore, she had a prima facie obligation of
arbitrating the same. However, in their Reply,
Defendants admitted that it is not important to
determine the labor or administrative nature of the
claim, inasmuch as the claim arises in light of the OA
due to disagreements regarding Jane Doe’s
compensation.8 Defendants also argued that Jane
Doe was required to submit to arbitration her alleged
causes of action even if they were of a constitutional
nature and that the LLC’s EM did not neutralize
Jane Doe’s obligation to follow arbitration, nor did it
Finally,
transform her into an employee.9
Defendants argued in their Reply that it was
unnecessary and inappropriate for the Court to rule if
Jane Doe was an employee or an employer.
In Plaintiff’s Sur-Reply, hereinafter “Sur-Reply,”
Jane Doe reiterated that per the LLC’s own
admission, the compulsory arbitration in the OA did
not apply to claims arising from an employment
relationship, and her claims did arise from an
employment relationship with Defendants. To wit,
even validating the existence of said clause in the OA,
it could not be used to force Jane Doe to arbitrate
claims not considered in the OA’s scope, nor in its
Defendant had given importance to the nature of the claim up
until that time, as it had already contended that Jane Doe had
no claim arising from her employment relationship inasmuch as
she was an “employer” and not an “employee.” This arises from
their Demand for Arbitration.
9 Please note that Defendants acknowledge the application of
the Employee Manual to Jane Doe, which clearly arises from the
Manual itself. However, they argue that it applies only in “her
capacity as supervisor.” (A careful review of the documentation
filed did not show that the provisions of the Employee Manual
applied to Jane Doe only in her capacity as supervisor).
8
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arbitration clause.
Jane Doe argued that the
arbitration clause of the OA applies to the
commercial arbitration of operational, commercial
and administrative matters of the LLC.10 Jane Doe
also alleged that the disputes arising from her
employment relationship are covered under the EM
and not under the OA. In fact, she stated that the
OA does not provide for any discrimination,
retaliation or harassment policies. She argues that
the subject of claims over discrimination or
retaliation is not addressed anywhere in the OA.
After a serene, objective and careful analysis of
both parties’ arguments and the totality of the
voluminous file constituting the case record, we
arrive to the following:
II. FINDINGS OF FACT
(1) Jane Doe is and has been an attorney licensed
by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico for 38 years.
(2) The LLC was organized on September 13, 2007
to limit its members’ civil liability, thereafter referred
to as Capital Members. See, Act No. 487 of
September 23, 2004.
(3) Capital Members may have two capacities in
the LLC (1) as owners; and (2) as employees. They
are not mutually exclusive.
(4) The LLC is a limited liability company created
pursuant to the General Law of Corporations of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
Jane Doe emphasized and Defendant did not dispute that the
AAA Rules referenced in the OA are those related to
commercial arbitration and not those promulgated by the
AAA for labor claims.
10
67a
(5) Upon changing its status from Partnership to
corporate entity, the LLC approved an OA, that
governs is operational and administrative aspects.
(6) Jane Doe became a capital member of LLC in
2007, when she signed the OA.
(7) The OA governs internal and administrative
affairs of LLC’s operations and provides for the
establishment of equity accounts, profit and loss
distribution, income tax payments, the LLC’s
administration, the establishment of committees,
members’ and Managing Director’s election,
determination of quorum, members’ termination,
compensation method, salaries and bonuses, internal
accounting
matters,
Managing
Director’s
responsibilities, classification of members and their
responsibilities, fiduciary and loyalty duties,
retirement, suspension and expulsion of members,
mandatory retirement, payments in case of
retirement, expulsion or death, resolution of claims
and others related to the operations of the LLC.
(8) The OA has no provisions related to any claims
arising from an employment relationship such as
discrimination, harassment or retaliation.
(9) The EM applies to capital members.
(10)
The EM contains the policies, practices,
obligations and benefits that are applicable to all
employees and capital members, including policies on
discrimination, sexual harassment, retaliation,
disability, maternity leave, vacations, and illness,
dress code, among others.
(11)
The EM does not consider arbitration as
a method to solve employment relationship disputes.
68a
(12)
The EM was executed after the OA, on
October 22, 2007.
(13)
The OA has an arbitration clause in its
Section 14.04.
(14)
The arbitration clause applies to any
claim filed by a capital member in regard to
operational or administrative affairs of the LLC.
(15)
On March 22, 2012, the LLC filed a
Demand for Arbitration before the AAA under the
rules of commercial arbitration.
(16)
In its demand for arbitration, the LLC
admitted that Jane Doe’s claims of discrimination,
retaliation and damages do not arise from an
employment relationship.
(17)
Since her January 24, 2012 claim, Jane
Doe has challenged the applicability of the OA’s
arbitration clause to her employment claims based on
discrimination, retaliation and damages.
(18)
The arbitration clause of the OA
specifically implements the commercial arbitration
rules of the AAA.
(19)
The AAA has arbitration rules to solve
disputes arising from an employment relationship.
(20)
Jane Doe’s alleged damages are a
consequence of the alleged discrimination and
retaliation resulting from defendants’ alleged actions,
and must be proven.
(21)
Jane Doe did not agree to arbitrate any
claims arising from her employment relationship
with defendant upon signing the OA.
69a
(22)
On March 30, 2012 the LLC removed
Jane Doe from its Policy Committee upon her filing of
the discrimination and retaliation claim on January
24, 2012.
(23)
Jane Doe filed her original Complaint
and Preliminary and Permanent Injunction Claim on
April 2, 2012 to, among other things, render
ineffective the arbitration demanded by Defendant.
(24)
On April 5, 2012, the Policy Committee
of the LLC recommended Jane Doe’s expulsion upon
her filing the civil action suit.
(25)
On April 9, 2012, Jane was dismissed
from the LLC because of the Verified Complaint and
Request for Declaratory Judgment and Preliminary
and Permanent Injunction filed by her.
Based on the aforementioned findings of facts we
arrive at the following:
III. FINDINGS OF LAW
To start with, it is important to point out that the
interpretation of arbitration clauses will be based on
the contractual provisions agreed between the
parties.
The Federal and State venues have
acknowledged that arbitration is a contractual
subject matter.
AT&T Techs., Inc. v.
Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 648
(1986).
“Whether given parties have agreed to
arbitrate a dispute is a matter of contractual
interpretation and, thus, is normally for the Court to
decide.” United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-583, 80 S. Ct. 1347, 4
L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960).
70a
This policy is connected to doctrine about the
autonomy of the contracting parties enunciated in
Article 1207 of the Civil Code, 31 L.P.R.A. sec. 3372.
In Puerto Rico the contractual liberty principle rules.
See Unisis v. Ramallo Brothers, 128 D.P.R. 842,
850 (1991). As part of this norm, “the contracting
parties may make the agreement and establish the
clauses and conditions which they deem advisable,
provided they are not in contravention of law, morals,
or public order.” Art.1207 Civil Code, 31 L.P.R.A.
Sec. 3372.
If the contract between the parties establishes
certain types of specific disputes that will be heard
through arbitration, or if the contract excludes
certain particular controversies, the courts must act
in accordance with what is stipulated in the contract.
Medina Betancourt v. La Cruz Azul de Puerto
Rico, 155 D.P.R. 735 (2001).
Once the clauses and conditions of the agreement
have been established, the Contract is perfected by
mere consent between the parties, and from that time
they are bound, not only with regard to the
fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated, but
also with regard to all the consequences which,
according to their character, are in accordance with
good faith, use, and law. Article 1210 of the Civil
Code, 31 L.P.R.A. Sec. 3375.
This obligation of fulfilling what has been
stipulated is based on the principle of good faith,
which requires not defrauding the trust that other
has placed in a promise or conduct. Unisys v.
Ramalo, supra, and page 852, quoting L. DíezPicazo, Fundamentos de Derecho Civil Patrimonial,
71a
2nd Ed., Madrid. Ed. Tecnos, 1983, Vol. 1, Ch. IV,
page 99.
Case law has established that generally, when the
courts must determine if the parties agreed to
arbitrate an issue, they must use as guidelines the
common principles of state law that govern contracts.
Combined Energies v. CCI, Inc. 514 F. 3rd 168 (1st.
Cir. 2008), quoting First Options of Chicago, Inc.
v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943-944 (1995). A party
may not be required to submit to arbitration any
dispute which he has not agreed so to submit. AT&T
Techs., Inc., 475 U.S., page 648; Combined
Energies, supra; Municipality of San Juan v.
Corporación para el Fomento Económico de la
Ciudad Capital, 415 F 3rd 145, 149 (1st Cir. 2005);
InterGen N.V. v. Grina, 344 F 3rd. 134, 142 (1st Cir.
2003).
On the other hand, the Federal Arbitration Act’s
(“FAA”) main purpose is for the Courts to enforce all
valid arbitration contracts. FAA 9 U.S.C. sec. 1. The
public policy in favor of arbitration as an alternate
method of dispute resolution is not absolute and has
its exceptions.
The general rule under the federal statute is that
the question of arbitrability is undeniably an issue for
judicial determination. AT&T Techs., Inc., 475
U.S., page 649; Apollo Computer, Inc. v. Berg, 886
F 2nd 469, 472 (1st Cir. 1989). The parties may agree
to have the arbitrator decide if a grievance is
arbitrable or not, as well as the merits of the claim.
Id., page 473. But only when the parties have clearly
and unequivocally determined that the arbitrator
must decide if a claim is arbitrable, does it turn into
an issue that must be heard by the arbitrator. Awah
72a
v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 554 F. 3rd 7, 10 (1st. Cir
2009).11 Arbitrators derive their authority to resolve
disputes only because the parties have agreed in
advance to submit such grievances to arbitration.
AT&T
Techs.,
Inc.
supra,
page
648.
Notwithstanding
the
public
policy
favoring
arbitration and its accompanying presumption of
arbitrability, the courts may not override the will of
the parties by giving the arbitration clause greater
coverage than the parties intended, inasmuch as [we]
run the risk of undermining rather than serving that
policy. National Railroad Passenger Corporation
v. Boston and Maine Corporation, 850 F. 2nd 756
(D.C. Columbia, 1988); see also, Litton Financial
Printing Div. v. N.L.R.B., 501 U.S. 190, 200 (1991)
where the Court resolved that: “[N]o obligation to
arbitrate a labor dispute arises solely by operation of
law. The law compels a party to submit his [sic]
grievance to arbitration only if he has contracted to
do so.”
It has been legally reiterated and established that
whether an arbitration clause applies to a particular
dispute is an issue for judicial determination.
Kristian v. Comcast Corp. 446 F 3rd. 25, 39 (1st.
Cir. 2006), quoting Howsam v. Dean Witter
In this particular case, we do not need to determine if the
delegation of jurisdiction to the arbitrator was clear and
unequivocal, inasmuch as the arbitration clause is not
applicable to the disputes at issue. Even when the parties
delegate to the arbitrator the authority to determine which
grievances are arbitrable, the court must determine at once if
the claims under dispute fall within the scope contemplated
under the agreement between the parties. After all, arbitration
is strictly a matter of consent; it is a way of solving disputes that
parties have agreed to submit to arbitration. Granite Rock
Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 30 S. Ct. 2847 (2010).
11
73a
Reynolds, 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002); Rent- A- Center
v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772.
After a review of the law and analysis of the facts
on which the parties have based their claims, we
have concluded that Jane Doe’s discrimination,
retaliation and damages claims are not included in
the OA and therefore, must be resolved in the judicial
forum and not through arbitration. This conclusion is
broadly supported by the facts submitted by the
defendants themselves.
We observed that
defendant’s main emphasis arises from their general
interpretation that the arbitration [clause] of the OA
applies to all claims (“any claim”), independent of
their nature (“of any nature”). We cannot endorse
such stance in light of the OA and the existence of the
EM in its application to capital members.
We
determine that the delegation to the arbitrator is not
unlimited and one of the limitations is that the
dispute needs to have something to do with the
subject matter covered by the arbitration agreement.
Visibility Corporation v. Schilling Robotics,
LLC, 2011 WL 5075816 (D. Mass Op. of October 25,
2011) citing Turi v. Main Street Adoption
Services, LLP, 633 F 3rd 496, 507 (6th Cir. 2011).
It must be noted that since its beginnings the LLC
adopted an OA (September 13, 2007) and an EM
(October 22, 2007). Both apply to Capital Members.
It is well known that the Employee Manual is part of
the employment contract.
Santiago v. Kodak
Caribbean, Ltd., 129 D.P.R. 763 (1992).
The OA covers capital members’ roles as owners
and the EM those as employees. Even though capital
members of LLC’s have received a different
treatment by U.S. courts at the time of determining if
74a
they are employees, owners or both for purposes of a
protection against discrimination and retaliation, we
believe that Puerto Rico’s laws and their judicial
interpretation together with the facts before us,
require that we determine that they enjoy said
protections. See, Constitution of Puerto Rico, Art. 2,
Sections 1, 16, 17 and 18.
We find a conflicting position when the LLC on
the one hand argues that the OA governs all of Jane
Doe’s disputes against the LLC and any capital
member, including those asserting discrimination,
retaliation and damages, as claimed by Jane Doe, and
on the other hand admits in its arbitration demand
that said claims do not arise from an employment
relationship. We also highlight defendants’ stance in
their Motion to Dismiss when they state that Jane
Doe is not an employee and because of this, does not
posses the statutory and constitutional protections.12
The above-described conflicting stance by
defendants in both forums lends weight to our
conviction that the discrimination, retaliation and
damages claims by Jane Doe, with their
corresponding remedies, are outside the scope
(“subject matter”) of the OA and its arbitration
clause.
Because these claims arise from the
employment relationship between Jane Doe and LLC
they are excluded from the arbitration demand filed
To endorse said argument would be to authorize capital
members in other instances the use of other protected criteria,
such as race or religion, as basis to deprive other capital
members of their constitutional protection. Per LLC’s
interpretation and stance, through the OA, the arbitrator is
delegated to resolve the disagreement in a completely
confidential forum with no right of appeal for the affected
parties.
12
75a
under the OA. This is because it [the OA] governs
the operational and administrative aspects of the
LLC and not the existing employment relationship
between the capital members and the LLC that is
regulated by the EM. To conclude that Jane Doe has
the obligation to submit to arbitration, in our opinion,
would be granting a judicial imprimatur to hear
claims arising from an employment relationship at a
proceeding which the defendant itself has determined
is intended to solve grievances that have nothing to
do with an employment relationship. Furthermore,
the scope of the legislation that protects employees in
Puerto Rico is broad and non-restrictive and the
exclusion of an employee from the benefits of the
labor law must be clear, since the courts have the
obligation to interpret said exclusions restrictively.
Malavé Serrano v. Oriental Bank, 2006 TSPR 63.
Upon analyzing Jane Doe’s duties at the LLC, per
the documents in the file, it seems necessary to
conclude that she lacked the control typical of owners
and employers. See, Acevedo Colom, Legislación
Laboral del Trabajo Comentada, 8th. Ed. (2005).
However the parties must present evidence
regarding whether, in regards to the matters at issue
herein, she was an employee, owner or both. We are
aware of the fact that Jane Doe does not deny that, as
a capital member, she had ownership rights within
the LLC. What we must not lose sight of is that both
roles, employee and owner, if confirmed, are not
mutually exclusive. See, Goldberg v. Whitaker
House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 32 (1961). Evidence
to this effect must be submitted.
In the same way, nothing hinders the LLC from,
in due course, ascertaining their right to a defense
76a
against the remaining claims in the Complaint or
that Jane Doe does not have enough evidence to
prove them.
Therefore, in compliance with the
adjudicative process we issue the following:
IV. RESOLUTION
Based on the aforesaid grounds, we find that the
OA’s Arbitration Clause does not cover the claims
submitted by Jane Doe because they arise from her
employment relationship with defendants. Therefore,
we find that the Court and not an arbitrator from the
AAA will adjudicate in its merits the discrimination,
retaliation and damages claim filed by Jane Doe, as
well as the requested injunction.
The injunction hearing scheduled for June 5 at
9:00 a.m. will still take place, wherein the parties will
have the opportunity to submit evidence related to
the requested injunction, inasmuch as the agreement
between the parties regarding the arbitration stay
would be effective until the arbitrability issue were
solved. Consequently, the second amended complaint
updating and including all prior allegations from the
first amended complaint is admitted.
NOTIFY.
mail.
Forward in advance by electronic
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, June 4, 2012.
/s/
[signature]
ÁNGEL R. PÁGAN OCASIO
SUPERIOR JUDGE
77a
1123 Broadway
New York, NY 10010
Tel. 212 447 6060
Fax 212 447 6257
LanguageWorks
STATE OF NEW YORK
)
) ss:
CERTIFICATION
issued by Court of First Instance of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico on June 4, 2012,
completed on October 29, 2012.
/s/
Kevin Rees
President
October, 2012
/s/
Notary Public
78a
APPENDIX C
EN EL TRIBUNAL SUPREMO DE PUERTO RICO
JANE DOE,
Recurrida,
v.
COMPAÑÍA DE RESPONSABILIDAD LIMITADA (“CRL”);
FULANO DE TAL, PERSONALMENTE, EN SU CARÁCTER DE
PATRONO DE JANE DOE Y COMO CO-ADMINISTRADOR DE
LA SOCIEDAD LEGAL DE BIENES GANANCIALES (“SLG”)
CONSTITUIDA CON FULANA DE TAL, ET AL.,
Peticionarios.
___________
CC-2012-0532
___________
Certiorari
79a
Sala de Verano integrada por el Juez Presidente
señor Hernández Denton y los Jueces Asociados señor
Martínez Torres y señor Estrella Martínez,
RESOLUCIÓN
SAN JUAN, Puerto Rico, a 7 de septiembre de 2012.
A la petición de certiorari, no ha lugar.
Lo acordó el Tribunal y certifica la Secretaria del
Tribunal Supremo. El Juez Asociado señor Martínez
Torres expediría.
/s/
[signature]
Ana Oquendo Graulau
Secretaria del Tribunal
Supremo
[seal]
SUPREME COURT
SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE
80a
APPENDIX C
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PUERTO RICO
JANE DOE,
Respondent
v.
Limited Liability Company (“LLC”); JOHN DOE, in
his personal capacity and as employer of JANE DOE
and as co-administrator of the Conjugal Partnership
(“CP”) constituted with JEAN DOE, et al.
Petitioners
___________
CC-2012-0532
___________
Certiorari
Summer Session Panel formed by Chief Judge
Hernandez Denton, and Associate Judges Martínez
Torres and Estrella Martínez.
81a
RESOLUTION
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, September 7, 2012.
The petition for certiorari is denied.
the Supreme Court. The Associate Judge Martínez
Torres would have issued the petition for certiorari.
/s/
[signature]
Aida Ileana Oquendo Graulau
Clerk of the Supreme Court
[seal]
SUPREME COURT
82a
1123 Broadway
New York, NY 10010
Tel. 212 447 6060
Fax 212 447 6257
LanguageWorks
STATE OF NEW YORK
)
) ss:
CERTIFICATION
issued by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico dated
September 7, 2012, completed on November 5, 2012.
/s/
Brett Gianna Hyatt
Senior Account Executive
November, 2012
/s/
Notary Public
83a
APPENDIX D
SALA III
JANE DOE,
Recurrida,
v.
COMPAÑÍA DE RESPONSABILIDAD LIMITADA (“CRL”), ET
AL.,
Peticionarios.
____________
Núm. CC-2012-0532
84a
Sala de Despacho integrada por la Juez Asociada
señora Rodríguez Rodríguez como Presidenta, el Juez
Asociado señor Kolthoff Caraballo y el Juez Asociado
señor Estrella Martínez
RESOLUCIÓN
San Juan, Puerto Rico, a 5 de octubre de 2012.
Atendida la primera moción de reconsideración
presentada por la parte peticionaria Compañía de
Responsabilidad Limitada, se provee no ha lugar.
Lo acordó el Tribunal y certifica la Secretaria del
Tribunal Supremo.
/s/
[signature]
Secretaria del Tribunal Supremo
[seal]
SUPREME COURT
85a
APPENDIX D
PANEL III
JANE DOE
Respondent
v.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY (“LLC”), et al.
Petitioners
__________
CC-2012-0532
_________
Issuance Panel formed by Associate Judge Rodríguez
Rodriguez as President, Associate Judge Kolthoff
Caraballo and Associate Judge Estrella Martínez.
86a
RESOLUTION
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, on October 5, 2012.
The first motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner LLC is denied.
the Supreme Court.
/s/
[signature]
Clerk of the Supreme Court
[seal]
SUPREME COURT
87a
1123 Broadway
New York, NY 10010
Tel. 212 447 6060
Fax 212 447 6257
LanguageWorks
STATE OF NEW YORK
)
) ss:
CERTIFICATION
issued by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico dated
October 5, 2012, completed on November 5, 2012.
/s/
Brett Gianna Hyatt
November, 2012
/s/
Notary Public
88a
APPENDIX E
01DE 01
TRIBUNAL GENERAL DE JUSTICIA
TRIBUNAL SUPREMO
JANE DOE
Recurrido
vs
COMPAÑIA DE RESPONSABILIDAD LIMITADA
Peticionario
______________________
CASO.: CC-2012-0532
CASO ORI.: K PE201201204
CASO CIR.: KLCE2012 0 0 821
______________________
PROCEDIMIENTOS ESPECIALES
GONZALEZ ACEVEDO, FRANK M.
ACCION CIVIL O DELITO
PO BOX 9282
SAN JUAN, PR 00908-0282
89a
NOTIFICACION
CERTIFICO QUE EN RELACION CON EL/LA
SEGUNDA MOCION DE RECONSIDERACION EL
TRIBUNAL DICTO EL/LA RESOLUCION QUE SE
ACOMPAÑA :
PORRO VIZCARRA MANUEL [LIC.]
CAPARRA HEIGHTS
382 AVE ESCORIAL
SAN JUAN, PR 00920
GONZALEZ MUNOZ JUAN R [LIC.]
PO BOX 9024055
SAN JUAN, PR 00902-4055
MENDOZA MENDEZ ENRIQUE J [LIC.]
P O BOX 9282
SAN JUAN, PR 00908-0282
SAN JUAN , PUERTO RICO A 03 DE DICIEMBRE
DE 2012
LCDA. AIDA ILEANA
OQUENDO GRAULAU
/s/
SECRETARIA DEL TRIBUNAL
SUPREMO
ROSALIA PABON RIVERA
/s/
SECRETARIO AUXILIAR
90a
JANE DOE
Recurrida
v.
COMPAÑÍA DE RESPONSABILIDAD LIMITADA (“CRL”);
FULANO DE TAL, PERSONALMENTE EN SU CARÁCTER DE
PATRONO DE JANE DOE Y COMO CO-ADMINISTRADOR DE
LA SOCIEDAD LEGAL DE BIENES GANANCIALES (“SLG”)
CONSTITUIDA CON FULANA DE TAL, ET AL
Peticionarios
_______________
CC- 2 012-0532
_______________
91a
RESOLUCIÓN
En San Juan, Puerto Rico, a 30 de noviembre de
2012.
A la segunda moción de reconsideración
presentada por la parte peticionaria, no ha lugar.
Aténgase a lo resuelto.
Lo acordó el Tribunal y lo certifica la Secretaria
del Tribunal Supremo.
El Juez Asociado señor
Martínez Torres, la Jueza Asociada señora Pabón
Charneco y los Jueces Asociados señor Rivera García
y señor Feliberti Cintrón reconsiderarían.
/s/
Aida I. Oquendo Graulau
Secretaria del Tribunal Supremo
[seal]
GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE
SUPREME COURT
92a
APPENDIX E
01DE 01
SUPREME COURT
JANE DOE
RESPONDENT
V.
COMPAÑIA DE RESPONSABILIDAD LIMITADA
[Limited liability company]
PETITIONER
CASE: CC-2012-0532
CASE ORI.: K PE201201204
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
CASE CIR.: KLCE201200821
CIVIL ACTION OR CRIME
GONZALEZ ACEVEDO, FRANK M.
PO BOX 9282
SAN JUAN, PR 00908-0282
NOTIFICATION
I CERTIFY THAT IN RELATION TO THE SECOND
MOTION FOR CONSIDERATION THE COURT
HAS ENTERED THE ATTACHED RESOLUTION:
PORRO VIZCARRA MANUEL (LIC.)
CAPARRA HEIGHTS
382 AVE ESCORIAL
SAN JUAN, PR 00920
93a
GONZALEZ MUNOZ JUAN R (LIC.)
PO BOX 9024055
SAN JUAN, PR 00902-4055
MENDOZA MENDEZ, ENRIQUE J. (LIC.)
PO BOX 9282
SAN JUAN, PR 00908-0282
SAN JUAN, PUERTO RICO, ON
DECEMBER 3, 2012
AIDA ILEANA OQUENDO
GRAULAU, ESQ.
/s/
CLERK OF THE SUPREME
COURT
ROSALIA PABON RIVERA
[initials]
/s/
ASSISTANT CLERK
94a
Jane Doe
Respondent
v.
Compania de Responsabilidad Limitada (“CRL”
[Limited liability company]); John Doe, personally, in
his capacity as employer of Jane Doe and as comember of the Sociedad Legal de Bienes Gananciales
(“SLG” [statutory community of marital property])
formed with Jane Doe, et al.
Petitioners
______________
No. CC-2012-0532
______________
95a
RESOLUTION
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, on November 30, 2012.
The second motion for reconsideration submitted
by Petitioners is hereby denied. Peitioners must
abide by this ruling.
So decided by the Court and certified by the Clerk
of the Supreme Court. Associate Judge Mr. Martínez
Torres, Associate Judge Mrs. Pabón Charneco, and
Associate Judges Mr. Rivera García and Mr. Feliberti
Cintrón would have reconsidered.
/s/
[signature]
Aida I. Oquendo Graulau
Office of the Clerk of the Supreme
Court
[seal]
SUPREME COURT
96a
The LanguageWorks,Inc.
1123 Broadway
New York, NY 10010
Tel. 212 447 6060
Fax 212 447 6257
LanguageWorks
STATE OF NEW YORK
)
) ss:
CERTIFICATION
translation from Spanish into English of two
Resolutions issued by the Supreme Court of Puerto
Rico on November 30, 2012, completed on December
5, 2012.
/s/
Amy Stoyko
December, 2012
/s/
Notary Public
97a
APPENDIX F
TRIBUNAL DE PRIMERA INSTANCIA
CENTRO JUDICIAL DE SAN JUAN
SALA SUPERIOR
JANE DOE,
Demandante,
v.
COMPAÑÍA DE RESPONSABILIDAD LIMITADA; FULANO
DE TAL, en su carácter personal y como patrono de
JANE DOE; SUTANO DE CUAL, en su carácter personal
y como patrono de JANE DOE; ESPERENCEJO MÁS
CUAL, en su carácter personal y como patrono de JANE
DOE,
Demandados.1
___________
CIVIL NÚM. KPE 2012-1204 (904)
___________
Sobre: Sentencia Declaratoria e Injunction
___________
Por razones de estricta confidencialidad las partes de este
pleito no están identificadas con sus respectivos nombres. En la
Declaración Jurada Bajo Sello de la Demandante sometida
junto con la Demanda que da lugar a este pleito, ésta identificó a
cada una de las partes con sus respectivos nombres, direcciones
y teléfonos.
1
98a
SOLICITUD DE DESESTIMACIÓN POR FALTA
DE JURISDICCIÓN Y PARA COMPELER
ARBITRAJE COMPULSORIO EN VISTA DE
ACUERDO VINCULANTE DE ARBITRAJE
99a
AL HONORABLE TRIBUNAL:
Comparecen los demandados de epígrafe,
Compañía de Responsabilidad Limitada (“CRL”),
Fulano de Tal, Sutano de Cual y Esperencejo Más
Cual, sin someterse a la jurisdicción de este
Honorable
Tribunal,
por
conducto
de
la
representación
legal
que
suscribe,
y
muy
respetuosamente exponen que la Demanda Jurada y
Solicitud de Sentencia Declaratoria e Injunction
Preliminar y Permanente de epígrafe (“Demanda")
debe ser desestimada en su totalidad bajo la Regla
10.2 de Procedimiento Civil, 32 L.P.R.A. Ap. V y el
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (“FAA”),
debido a la existencia de un acuerdo de arbitraje
válido, otorgado voluntariamente v el cual constituye
la ley entre las partes. Veamos.
I. INTRODUCCIÓN
El 2 de abril de 2012, Jane Doe presentó ante este
Tribunal una Demanda y una Moción Solicitando
Injunction Preliminar y Permanente solicitando que
este Tribunal emita una Sentencia Declaratoria en la
que se declare la inaplicabilidad de la cláusula de
arbitraje contenida en el Operating Agreement
(“Acuerdo”) suscrito entre ésta, los demás Miembros
Capitales de CRL y CRL.2 Jane Doe predica su
Además, Jane Doe solicita que este Tribunal ordene la
paralización del caso de arbitraje presentado por CRL a la
American Arbitration Association el 22 de marzo de 2012. Dicho
proceso de arbitraje pretende que se diluciden y resuelvan las
mismas alegadas controversias que Jane Doe ha traído a la
atención de este Tribunal mediante la presente acción judicial.
2
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solicitud en la proposición de que sus alegados
reclamos no están cubiertos por dicha cláusula de
arbitraje por tratarse de reclamos laborales que
surgen de una relación patrono-empleado. Es decir,
Jane Doe sostiene que el convenio de arbitraje
suscrito por ella no alcanza las controversias del caso
de epígrafe. Como veremos más adelante, no le asiste
la razón a Jane Doe. La cláusula de resolución de
reclamaciones (Sección 14, “Resolution of Claim”) del
Acuerdo es extremadamente amplia y deja claro que
la intención de todas las partes era que cualquier
reclamación ("claim”) fuera resuelta mediante los
procedimientos provistos en dicha cláusula:
Intent and Purpose - It is the intent and purpose of
the Firm and any Claimant to resolve any Claim by
mediation or arbitration. The Claimant expressly
agrees that the Claim shall be settled or resolved
through the procedures set forth herein, and shall not
in any way circumvent or otherwise challenge in any
way these proceedings relative to mediation and
arbitration.
(Sección 14.01 del Acuerdo.)
Por otro lado, el Acuerdo define reclamación
("claim") como “any action, suit, complaint or demand
of whatever nature and for whatever relief or remedy
against the Firm or any of its Members or employees.”
(Sección 1.06 del Acuerdo.) De manera que bajo el
Acuerdo suscrito por Jane Doe, sus socios y CRL, una
“reclamación” es cualquier tipo de acción, caso,
demanda o reclamación de cualquier naturaleza y
sobre cualquier tipo de remedio o auxilio en contra de
Jane Doe tiene que contestar dicha solicitud de arbitraje en o
antes del 23 de abril de 2012.
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la Firma (CRL) o cualquiera de sus Miembros o
empleados. No cabe duda que Jane Doe se obligó con
sus socios a someter al procedimiento descrito en la
Sección 14 del Acuerdo (incluyendo arbitraje)
cualquier tipo de reclamación, no importa la
naturaleza de la misma.
Por ende, procede la
desestimación de la Demanda en el caso de epígrafe,
como muy respetuosamente se solicita.
Como veremos, estamos ante una controversia
sobre arbitrabilidad sustantiva. Específicamente, la
obligación que tienen las partes de arbitrar todo tipo
de controversia entre sí. La pregunta de umbral es
qué Foro tiene jurisdicción para determinar el
alcance de la cláusula de arbitraje contenida en el
Acuerdo suscrito por Jane Doe, el cual rige la relación
entre los Miembros Capitales de CRL y entre los
Miembros Capitales y CRL. E Como tal, el hecho
operativo que da base a la reclamación de epígrafe es
precisamente una decisión tomada con respecto a la
compensación de Jane Doe como Miembro Capital.
Un asunto, que como veremos, se rige por el Acuerdo
que ésta suscribió y que suscribieron todos los
Miembros Capitales de CRL, y que bajo el Acuerdo se
tiene que someter a arbitraje.
Por las razones que consignamos a continuación,
los comparecientes muy respetuosamente sostienen
que la controversia sobre arbitrabilidad sustantiva
tal y como se presenta en las circunstancias
específicas de este caso es materia que le corresponde
dirimir al árbitro y no a este Honorable Tribunal.
Asimismo, los comparecientes sostienen que procede
compeler a las partes a resolver todo reclamo entre
ellos mediante el procedimiento de arbitraje pactado
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que ya fue iniciado ante el American Arbitration
Association (“AAA"). Veamos.
II. ARGUMENTACIÓN
A. El Acuerdo entre Jane Doe v CRL Establece un
Programa de Resolución de Disputas gue
Incluye el Arbitraje
En todo momento pertinente a esta moción, Jane
Doe fue Miembro Capital de CRL. (Véase Demanda, ¶
2.) El Acuerdo firmado por Jane Doe y por todos los
Miembros Capitales de CRL establece, en su parte
relevante, que sus signatarios constituyen todos los
Miembros Capitales a esa fecha de la sociedad civil
[...] dedicada a la práctica del derecho. (Véase pág. 1
del Acuerdo, Anejo 1.)3 Dicho Acuerdo fue otorgado
por los Miembros Capitales de CRL, incluyendo a
Jane Doe, el 13 de septiembre de 2007. (Id., en la pág.
38-39.)
En lo que nos es pertinente, el Acuerdo provee un
mecanismo de resolución de disputas para qué
cualquiera de sus signatarios, incluyendo Jane Doe,
pueda encauzar cualquier reclamación o controversia
contra CRL y/o contra cualquier otro Miembro
Capital de CRL. (Id., págs. 33-34.) A tales efectos, la
Sección 14.01 del Acuerdo establece que “es la
intención y el propósito de [CRL] y cualquier
reclamante resolver cualquier reclamación
mediante mediación y arbitraje.” (Id., pág. 33)
(énfasis y traducción nuestra). Dicha Sección añade
que “el reclamante acuerda expresamente que su
reclamación será transigida o resuelta a través del
Con el propósito de mantener estricta confidencialidad, se
someten las copias citadas del Acuerdo como Anejo 1 en un sobre
sellado.
3
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procedimiento [allí] establecido, y que en ninguna
manera soslayará o retará estos procedimientos
relacionados a mediación y arbitraje.” (Id.)
Cónsono con lo anterior, el Acuerdo establece un
esquema de tres pasos para resolver disputas entre
un Miembro Capital de CRL y CRL, y entre
Miembros Capitales de CRL.
El primer paso
consiste en presentar una reclamación por escrito al
ente directivo de CRL, indicando en ella la naturaleza
del reclamo y el remedio solicitado. Dicho paso se
establece en la Sección 14.02 del Acuerdo. (Id., págs.
33-34.) Jane Doe se sometió voluntariamente a este
primer paso. (Demanda, ¶14.) El segundo paso
consiste en intentar resolver la reclamación de forma
amigable y de buena fe a través de un procedimiento
de mediación administrado por la AAA.
Véase
Sección 14.03 del Acuerdo. (Id., pág. 34.) Jane Doe se
sometió voluntariamente a este segundo paso.
(Demanda,¶¶ 15-19.) De no poderse resolver la
reclamación durante el segundo paso, el Acuerdo
establece inequívocamente la obligación de las partes
de someter la controversia a arbitraje compulsorio. A
esos efectos, la Sección 14.04 del Acuerdo al
cristalizar el tercer paso, dispone:
If mediation fails, the Claim shall be settled by
jurisdiction thereof. [...]
(Id.)
De lo anterior se colige que al firmar el Acuerdo,
las partes -incluyendo Jane Doe y los comparecientesacordaron contractualmente resolver todas sus
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desavenencias a través del antedicho proceso interno
de resolución de disputas, el cual culmina con el
arbitraje.
Como cuestión de realidad, Jane Doe participó de
los primeros dos (2) pasos del esquema contractual de
resolución de disputas. En primer término, el 24 de
enero de 2012, presentó una reclamación interna ante
el ente directivo de CRL alegando que, inter alia, se
violó el Acuerdo y se discriminó contra ella a base de
sexo y edad al reducir su compensación. (Demanda, ¶
14; Reclamación Extrajudicial del 24 de enero de
2012, sometida bajo sello como Anejo 3.) En segundo
término, las partes se sometieron al proceso de
mediación, aceptando CRL al mediador sugerido por
Jane Doe. Dicho proceso de mediación culminó sin
éxito el 20 de marzo de 2012. (Demanda, ¶¶ 15-23.)
Así las cosas, y con el propósito de cumplir con la
Sección 14.04 del Acuerdo, CRL presentó una
solicitud de arbitraje, Demand for Arbitration, ante la
AAA, el 22 de marzo de 2012. (Demanda, ¶ 24.) Es
este proceso de arbitraje el que Jane Doe pretende
soslayar bajo el pretexto de que sus reclamos no son
arbitrables bajo el Acuerdo por tratarse de
reclamaciones constitucionales, discrimen en el
empleo, represalias, interdicto, y daños y perjuicios.
(Demanda ¶25.)
Jane Doe no tiene razón. Como cuestión de
umbral hay que puntualizar que entre Jane Doe y los
comparecientes no existe una relación de patronoempleado.4 Sin embargo, si asumimos para fines de
Según elaboraremos más adelante, durante el término
relevante a la controversia de autos, Jane Doe fue Miembro
Capital de CRL, y tuvo un interés propietario en CRL, así como
lo tiene Fulano de Tal y Esperencejo Más Cual, y como lo tuvo
4
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argumentación que exista tal relación (cosa que no
aceptamos), ello no exime a las partes de someter sus
reclamos al foro arbitral. Ello es así, pues la cláusula
de arbitraje es amplia, clara y libre de toda
ambigüedad y exige que se someta a arbitraje
(Sección 14.01 del Acuerdo), significando “claim” "...
any action, suit, complaint or demand of
whatever nature and for whatever relief or
remedy against the Firm or any of its Members
or employees.” (Sección 1.06 del Acuerdo.)
Hay
que
reiterar,
no
obstante,
que
independientemente del matiz que Jane Doe pretende
darle ahora a su relación con los comparecientes, lo
cierto es que por virtud del Acuerdo, ésta aceptó que
cualquier reclamación (“any claim’) sea resuelta a
través del proceso de resolución de disputas, el cual
incluye el arbitraje compulsorio.
Según adelantamos, el Acuerdo define el concepto
de “reclamación” (“claim”) de forma abarcadora, de
suerte que cubre reclamaciones de cualquier
naturaleza. A tales efectos, la Sección 1.06 del
Acuerdo establece que una “reclamación” significa "...
any action, suit, complaint or demand of whatever
nature and for whatever relief or remedy against
Sutano de Cual, quien es un Miembro Capital de CRL retirado.
Más aún, por los pasados casi tres años, Jane Doe fue miembro
del ente directivo de CRL siendo éste el organismo rector de la
firma, que aprueba asuntos neurálgicos tales como la
compensación de los miembros y el presupuesto operacional de
CRL, entre otros. Es decir, la relación que existe entre Jane Doe
y los comparecientes no surge de un contrato de empleo sino del
Acuerdo. Como tal, Jane Doe no puede ahora obviar
acomodaticiamente su condición de co-propietaria de CRL con el
fin de no cumplir con el Acuerdo y caracterizar sus reclamos
como obrero-patronales para no arbitrarlos.
106a
the Firm or any of its Members or employees.” (Véase
pág. 2 del Acuerdo, Anejo 1) (énfasis nuestro).
Del anterior texto, surge con meridiana claridad
que toda reclamación, con independencia de su
naturaleza o el remedio solicitado, queda cubierta por
la cláusula de arbitraje contenida en el Acuerdo.
Jane Doe no puede escapar esta realidad con
subterfugios y entuertos. El Acuerdo constituye la ley
entre las partes y éstas vienen obligadas a ceñirse
por el mismo. Véase Art. Art. 1044 del Código Civil,
31 L.P.R.A. § 2994.
Contrario a lo que argumenta Jane Doe en su
Demanda, los comparecientes no pretenden interferir
con el ejercicio de los alegados derechos de ésta y la
vindicación de sus reclamos. Lo que sí sostienen los
comparecientes es que los reclamos de Jane Doe,
aunque patentemente frívolos e inmeritorios, deben
ventilarse a través del arbitraje -el método acordado
entre las partes, y de manera confidencial según
también pactado.
En nuestra jurisdicción rige el principio de
libertad de contratación. Véase Art. 1207 del Código
Civil, 31 L.P.R.A. § 3372. Así, los contratantes
pueden establecer los pactos, cláusulas y condiciones
que tengan por convenientes, siempre que no sean
contrarios a las leyes, a la moral y al orden público.
Id. Como corolario del principio de autonomía
contractual, las obligaciones que nacen de los
contratos tienen fuerza de ley entre las partes y
deben cumplirse. Art. 1044 del Código Civil, 31
L.P.R.A. § 2994.
Como resultado del axioma jurídico citado, las
partes acordaron, además, que es el árbitro
quien decidirá sobre su propia jurisdicción,
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incluyendo
cualesquiera
objeciones
con
respecto a la existencia, alcance o validez del
acuerdo de arbitraje. Ello es así, toda vez que las
partes incorporaron por referencia a la cláusula de
arbitraje contenida en el Acuerdo, las Reglas de
Arbitraje Comercial de la AAA, las cuales proveen
para que sea el árbitro quien determine
arbitrabilidad, o sea, su propia jurisdicción. (Véase
Sección 14.04 del Acuerdo, pág. 34, Anejo 1.)
Así pues, en todo caso, la frívola y temeraria
controversia sobre arbitrabilidad que Jane Doe ha
creado mediante la presentación de la Demanda de
epígrafe, es materia que le corresponde al árbitro
resolver.
B. Le Corresponde al Árbitro Determinar si las
Controversias del Caso de Autos son
Arbitrables
Según ha reconocido el Tribunal Supremo de
Puerto Rico, citando a National R.R. Passenger Corp.
v. Boston S. Maine Corp., 850 F.2d 756 (D.C. Cir.
1988), la controversia sobre arbitrabilidad comporta
tres (3) modalidades. Véase Méndez Acevedo v.
Nieves Rivera, 179 D.P.R. 359, 367-68 (2010);
Municipio Mayagüez v. Lebrón, 167 D.P.R. 713, 72021 (2006). Puede referirse a (i) si existe un convenio
de arbitraje; (ii) el alcance de un convenio de arbitraje
(“si tal convenio alcanza determinada controversia”);
(iii) y si tal convenio alcanza una disputa sobre la
duración o expiración del contrato. Méndez Acevedo,
supra; Municipio de Mayagüez, supra; World Films,
Inc. v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 125 D.P.R. 352
(1990). Es sobre la modalidad número dos (2) que
trata la controversia de autos.
108a
Sobre el particular, nuestro más Alto Foro
Judicial ha precisado, como regla general que admite
excepciones, que la determinación de si un acuerdo
crea el deber de las partes de arbitrar determinada
controversia es tarea judicial. Méndez Acevedo,
supra; World Films, Inc., supra, en la pág. 361. No
obstante lo anterior, el asunto de la
arbitrabilidad no será de competencia judicial
si las partes pactaron en el convenio de
arbitraje que tal facultad se delega al árbitro.
Es decir, convenido en un acuerdo de arbitraje que es
el árbitro quien resolverá las cuestiones de
arbitrabilidad, procede que sea éste y no el tribunal el
que determine si existe la obligación de arbitrar
determinada controversia. U.G.T. v. Corp. Difusión
Pub., 168 D.P.R. 674. 684 (2006) (“De ordinario y
salvo que el convenio colectivo disponga otra
cosa, los asuntos de arbitrabilidad sustantiva deben
ser resueltos por los tribunales...”) (énfasis nuestro).
Dicho de otra manera, la norma esbozada por el
Tribunal Supremo es una regla de defecto que opera
sólo en ausencia de una delegación expresa pactada
en el acuerdo de arbitraje a los efectos de que la
determinación de arbitrabilidad es de la jurisdicción
del árbitro.
Y es que otra no puede ser la
interpretación, puesto que el mecanismo de arbitraje
se utilizará no tan sólo si las partes así lo pactaron,
sino en la forma en que lo han pactado. Véase Crufon
Const, v. Aut. Edif. Púbs., 156 D.P.R. 197, 205 (2002).
Consistente con lo anterior, es un principio bien
sentado en el ámbito federal y bajo el FAA que
cualquier impugnación a la validez de un acuerdo de
arbitraje, incluyendo cualquier controversia sobre
arbitrabilidad (si determinada controversia es
109a
arbitrable o no), debe ser referida al árbitro si hay
evidencia clara e inequívoca (“clear and unmistakable
evidence”) de que las partes así lo pactaron -de que
esa fue su intención. First Options of Chicago. Inc. v.
Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995).
Esta es
precisamente la situación que presenta el caso de
autos.
En la cláusula de arbitraje contenida en el
Acuerdo, Jane Doe, así como todos los Miembros
Capitales de CRL, se comprometieron a que el tercer
paso del proceso de resolución de disputas, el
arbitraje, se conduzca bajo las Reglas de Arbitraje
Comercial de la AAA. (Sección 14.04 del Acuerdo, pág.
34, Anejo 1.) A su vez, la Regla 7(a) del cuerpo de
Reglas de Arbitraje Comercial de la AAA dispone:
“[t]he arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or
her own jurisdiction, including any objections with
arbitration agreement.” (Commercial Arbitration
Rules de la AAA, Regla 7(a), pág. 23, Anejo 2) (énfasis
nuestro).
Según ha resuelto cada tribunal federal que ha
tenido ante sí esta controversia, cuando las partes
incorporan a sus acuerdos o cláusulas de arbitraje
reglas institucionales de entidades como la AAA en
las que se delega al árbitro la facultad de decidir
sobre su propia jurisdicción -decidir arbitrabilidadello constituye evidencia suficiente en Derecho (clara
e inequívoca) de que esa era la intención de las
partes. Véase Contec Corp. v. Remote Solution Co.,
398 F.3d 205, 208 (2nd Cir. 2005) (“When...parties
explicitly incorporate rules that empower an
arbitrator to decide issues of arbitrability, the
incorporation serves as clear and unmistakable
110a
evidence of the parties’ intent to delegate such issues to
an arbitrator, Sleeper Farms v. Agway. Inc., 211 F.
Supp. 2d 197 (D. Me. 2002) (“[Since the AAA rules
constitute] a clear and unmistakable delegation of
scope-determining authority to an arbitrator, [the
court refers this dispute [to the arbitrator] to
determine [...] what issues [...] are covered by the
arbitration clause.”)
Véase, además; Terminix Int’l. Co. v. Palmer
Ranch Ltd., 432 F.3d 1327, 29, 33-34 (11th Cir. 2005)
(Resolviendo que toda vez que las Reglas de Arbitraje
de la AAA delegan al árbitro la determinación de
arbitrabilidad, la reclamación del demandante de que
el acuerdo de arbitraje lo despojaba ilegalmente de
varios remedios estatutarios, era materia a ser
adjudicada por el árbitro, no por el tribunal);
Qualcomm Inc. v. Nokia Corp., 466 F.3d 1366, 1373
(Fed. Cir. 2006); Apollo Computer, Inc. v. Berg, 886
F.2d 469, 473 (1st Cir. 1989).
Lo resuelto por el Tribunal Supremo de Estados
Unidos en First Options., supra, así como la
casuística federal citada, es consistente con el
ordenamiento jurídico local en materia de contratos.
A fin de cuentas, “el arbitraje es una figura jurídica
inherentemente contractual.” Méndez Acevedo,
supra, en la pág. 367; Municipio Mayaqüez. supra);
U.C.P.R. v. Triangle Engineering Corp., 136 D.P.R.
133, 144 (1994); véase, además, Granite Rock Co. v.
Int'l Broth. of Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2857 (2010)
(“[Where] parties concede that they have agreed to
arbitrate some matters pursuant to an arbitration
clause, the “law's permissive policies in respect to
arbitration” counsel that “ ‘any doubts concerning the
111a
scope of arbitral issues should be resolved in favor of
arbitration.’”)
Por lo tanto, en materia de arbitraje puede
exigirse el cumplimiento de aquello que se haya
pactado por escrito. Véase Crufon Const., supra, en la
pág. 204; Municipio de Ponce v. Gobernador, 136
D.P.R. 776, 783 (1994). A su vez, cuando los términos
de un contrato son claros y no presentan ambigüedad,
sus disposiciones se aplicarán según el sentido literal
que le dieron las partes. Art. 1233 del Código Civil,
supra, § 3471. Una vez se determina qué fue lo que
las partes acordaron, el juzgador debe resolver las
controversias entre las partes de conformidad con lo
estipulado. Véase C. F.S.E. v. Unión de Médicos, 170
D.P.R. 443 (2007).
En resumen, en el presente caso, la cláusula de
arbitraje incorpora por referencia expresamente las
Reglas de Arbitraje Comercial de la AAA, las cuales a
su vez delegan en el árbitro -de forma clara e
inequívoca- la autoridad para determinar su propia
jurisdicción. Por tanto, conforme a las autoridades
aquí citadas, procede que este Honorable Tribunal
ordene a Jane Doe continuar con el procedimiento de
arbitraje que pactó, de suerte que sea el árbitro el que
resuelva si tiene autoridad para entender en los
méritos las reclamaciones de ésta. Así lo pactaron las
partes, sin ambigüedad alguna, y ello constituye la
ley entre las partes. Véase HIETEL v. Puerto Rico
Telephone Company, 2011 T.S.P.R. 100.
C. En la Alternativa, las Controversias del Caso
de Autos son Arbitrables, Toda Vez que Entre
Jane Doe y los Comparecientes No Existe una
Relación de Empleado-Patrono y la Cláusula
de Arbitraje Alcanza Sus Reclamaciones
112a
En la alternativa, de este Honorable Tribunal
entender que tiene jurisdicción para determinar la
arbitrabilidad de las reclamaciones de Jane Doe, lo
que negamos, procede que emita una orden
compeliendo el arbitraje. Según hemos adelantado,
Jane Doe fundamenta su posición en la premisa de
que es empleada de los comparecientes y, en
consecuencia, sus reclamos quedan excluidos de la
cláusula de arbitraje por ser ésta sólo de índole
comercial y no laboral. Jane Doe no tiene razón.
En primer término, Jane Doe era una Miembro
Capital de CRL desde 1987 y en esa capacidad ha
sido co-propietaria de CRL por cerca de veinticinco
(25) años, es decir, durante el término relevante a su
reclamación. Asimismo, Jane Doe fue miembro del
ente directivo de CRL desde el 2009 hasta el 2012, el
comité de más alta jerarquía en el esquema
organizacional de CRL. (Véase Reclamación
Extrajudicial del 24 de enero de 2012, pág. 5, Anejo 3,
sometida bajo sello.)
Como miembro del ente directivo, Jane Doe era
una de siete (7) miembros capitales de CRL a cargo
de, entre otras funciones, formular las políticas y los
planes estratégicos a largo plazo de CRL, supervisar
las funciones de su Director General, aprobar los
presupuestos
anuales,
aprobar
criterios
de
compensación, y aprobar la compensación de los
miembros. (Véase Secciones 4.06 y 4.07del Acuerdo,
pág. 13, Anejo 1.)
En vista de lo anterior es forzoso Concluir que
Jane Doe no tiene razón para alegar que es empleada
de CRL. Sencillamente, tal alegación es una sinrazón
jurídica.
Así lo establecen los principios
jurisprudenciales discutidos a continuación, que
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apuntan tajantemente a que Jane Doe es
propiamente “patrono” y no “empleada” para fines de
la legislación social protectora del trabajador que
invoca en su Demanda.
El Tribunal Supremo de Estados Unidos ha
elaborado seis (6) criterios para guiar y facilitar la
determinación de si un individuo es “patrono” o
“empleado”, a saber: (i) facultad para contratar y
despedir empleados; (ii) supervisión de empleados;
(iii) supervisión por otros individuos; (iv) capacidad
de ejercer influencias sobre la organización; (v)
intención de las partes; (vi) y participación del
individuo en las ganancias, pérdidas y obligaciones de
la
organización.
Clackamas
Gastroenterology
Associates. P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 449-50 (2003).
Ningún factor es decisivo. Id., en la pág.451. Según
el máximo Foro Federal, un “patrono” “es la persona o
grupo de personas que son propietarios y administran
la organización.” Id., en la pág. 450 (traducción
nuestra).
A priori es razonable concluir que como Miembro
Capital de CRL por más de dos (2) décadas, y
miembro del máximo cuerpo rector de CRL por tres
años, Jane Doe está necesariamente dentro del
“grupo de personas que son propietarios y
administran la organización.” Id. Como cuestión de
realidad, y a modo ilustrativo, en el año 2010 Jane
Doe —como miembro del ente directivo de CRLaprobó reducciones en compensación para dos (2)
miembros capitales de CRL a base de su rendimiento.
Asimismo, en el 2011 Jane Doe aprobó reducciones o
congelamientos en compensación para varias
personas, incluyendo a otra Miembro Capital de CRL.
Los hechos anteriores hacen patentemente evidente
114a
que Jane Doe no se conducía como una “empleada”
según alega, sino como un “patrono”., o lo que es lo
mismo, una de las co-propietarias de CRL.
Al aplicar los factores de Clackamas, supra, el
Tercer Circuito de Apelaciones federal sostuvo la
determinación de un tribunal de distrito de que un
accionista-director de un bufete de abogados no era
“empleado” para fines del Título VII. Véase Kirleis v.
Dickie. McCamev & Chilcote. P.C., 09-4498, 2010 WL
2780927 (3rd Cir. 2010) (Refiérase a copia del caso
que se incluye como Anejo 4.) Aunque la demandante
en el citado caso argumentó que el Comité Ejecutivo
(del cual ella no era parte) tomaba las decisiones de
compensación y ejercía otras funciones de
administración, el Tribunal determinó que ésta no
era empleada.
Razonó el Tribunal que la allí demandante tenía
la facultad de participar en la dirección del bufete, el
derecho a no ser expulsada por causa sin el voto de 3/4
partes de la Junta de Directores y el derecho a
participar de un porciento de las ganancias, pérdidas
y obligaciones del bufete.
Id., en la pág. 2.
Igualmente, Jane Doe ha tenido la facultad de
participar de la dirección de CRL, no podía ser
expulsada sin el voto de 3/4 partes de otros miembros
capitales y tuvo derecho a participar de las
ganancias, pérdidas y obligaciones de CRL durante el
periodo relevante a su reclamación. (Véase Acuerdo,
Secciones .) Más aún, distinto a la demandante en el
caso de Kirleis, supra, Jane Doe fue miembro del ente
directivo desde el 2009 hasta el 2012 —el cuerpo
directivo de mayor poder decisional en CRL- lo que
milita de forma más contundente todavía a una
115a
determinación de que Jane Doe es realmente “dueña”
y no “empleada”.
Aunque resuelto previo a la decisión del Tribunal
Supremo federal en Clackamas, supra, lo
determinado por el Primer Circuito de Apelaciones en
Serapión v. Martínez, 119 F.3d 982 (1st Cir. 1997), es
también altamente persuasivo. En este caso, el
Tribunal concluyó que un socio capital de un bufete
de abogados era inelegible para reclamar bajo el
Título VII, toda vez que dicho estatuto ofrecía
protección sólo a empleados. Al así concluir, el
Tribunal examinó los siguientes criterios: (i) interés
propietario; (ii) remuneración; (iii) y gerencia. Id., en
la pág. 990. Estos factores son consistentes con los
criterios esbozados por el Tribunal Supremo en
Clackamas, supra, y sostenidos por el sentido común.
Jane Doe, así como la demandante en Serapión,
supra, tiene un interés propietario en CRL, su
compensación depende sustancialmente de las
ganancias de CRL y disfrutó de derechos de voto en el
principal cuerpo rector de CRL. En otras palabras,
Jane Doe, así como la demandante en el citado caso,
Margarita Serapión, no puede ser considerada como
una “empleada”.5
Merece precisarse que distinto sería el caso si Jane Doe no
fuera una Miembro Capital. En ese escenario ficticio, Jane Doe
podría ser considerada como una “empleada” para fines de las
leyes que invoca, conforme a lo resuelto por el Tribunal Supremo
en Belk Arce v. Martínez v Otros. 146 D.P.R. 215 (1998). (Acción
de discrimen bajo la Ley 100 de 30 de junio de 1959, según
enmendada, presentada por un abogado que no era socio capital
de un bufete de abogados.) No obstante, este caso no aplica a la
situación de autos, toda vez que Jane Doe fue Miembro Capital
de CRL y, por ende, “patrono” conforme a las autoridades aquí
citadas.
5
116a
En virtud de lo anterior, la posición de Jane Doe al
efecto de que las reclamaciones en el presente caso
son de naturaleza laboral y como tales quedan
excluidas de la cláusula de arbitraje del Acuerdo es
insostenible. Ausente una relación de empleo, no
cabe hablar de reclamaciones laborales. Jane Doe se
desempeñó como co-propietaria de CRL y su relación
con los comparecientes se rigió por el Acuerdo.
Jane Doe intenta tirar una cortina de humo con el
único propósito de encubrir una controversia
verdaderamente contractual entre co-propietarios que
surge bajo el Acuerdo por desavenencias y diferencias
entre ésta y el ente rector. Eso es todo. Y es que ello
persigue el único objetivo de disfrazar de “discrimen
en el empleo” una reclamación de naturaleza
contractual entre miembros capitales que obligaría a
Jane Doe prima facie a arbitrar el asunto conforme a
la cláusula de arbitraje contenida en el Acuerdo.
La compensación de los miembros de CRL se rige
por el Acuerdo. Específicamente, las secciones 5.015.06 del mismo. (Véase Acuerdo, págs. 20-22, Aenejo
1.) Así, cualquier desavenencia o diferencia surgida
con respecto a la compensación de un miembro
capital es materia que queda cubierta por la
obligación de arbitrar sus reclamos que las partes
pactaron mediante el Acuerdo. Jane Doe no puede
escapar esta realidad y pretender borrar de un
plumazo su obligación de arbitrar toda controversia
entre ésta y CRL y los otros miembros capitales de
CRL.
El Acuerdo suscrito entre Jane Doe y CRL
constituye la ley entre ellos. Jane Doe está impedida
de litigar sus reclamos contra CRL y otros Miembros
Capitales de CRL ante los tribunales, pues así lo
117a
pactó libre y voluntariamente. Pacta Sunt Servanda
es el principio que tutela la obligación de arbitrar que
tienen las partes, en virtud del Acuerdo.
Conformemente, los tribunales no pueden relevar a
una parte de cumplir con lo que se obligó a realizar
mediante un contrato, cuando éste es legal, válido y
no contiene vicio alguno. Véase Mercado Rivera v.
U.C.P.R., 143 D.P.R. 610 (1997); Cervecería Corona v.
Commonwealth Ins. Co., 115 D.P.R. 345 (1984).
Nuestro Tribunal Supremo ha sido consecuente en
expresar que existe una vigorosa política pública en
Puerto Rico favoreciendo el arbitraje como método
alterno para la solución de disputas. Véase Pain
Webber v. Service Concepts, Inc., 151 D.P.R. 307
(2000). Pactado en un contrato la obligación de
arbitrar, los tribunales recurren a “una política
vigorosa en favor del arbitraje... y [t]oda duda que
pueda existir debe ser resuelta a favor del arbitraje”.
Id.
Asimismo, el Tribunal Supremo de Puerto Rico ha
puntualizado que las cláusulas de arbitraje a tenor
con el FAA serán válidas e irrevocables y los
tribunales carecen de discreción respecto a la eficacia
de las mismas. Medina Betancourt v. La Cruz Azul,
155 D.P.R. 732 (2001). Por lo tanto, cuando se
establece un pacto en el cual dos partes se
comprometen a llevar a un foro arbitral las disputas
que puedan surgir del mismo, los tribunales deben,
respetar la voluntad de las partes y hacer valer el
acuerdo ordenando que el asunto se resuelva primero
en arbitraje.” Id.
Cónsono con lo anterior, y siguiendo el modelo
federal, el Tribunal Supremo de Puerto Rico ha hecho
un llamado a la judicatura al efecto de que ante un
118a
acuerdo de arbitraje, lo prudencial es la abstención
judicial. Lo anterior, toda vez que una vez acordado
el arbitraje, los tribunales carecen de discreción
respecto a su eficacia y tienen que dar cumplimiento
al arbitraje acordado. Méndez Acevedo, supra, en la
pág. 368.
Por otro lado, en Puerto Rico hay una política que
favorece el agotamiento de los procedimientos de
arbitraje. Véase Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo v.
Junta de Administración del Muelle del Municipio de
Ponce, 122 D.P.R. 318 (1988). Como cuestión de
realidad, nuestro más Alto Tribunal de Justicia no ha
titubeado al determinar que las partes deben agotar
los remedios contractuales antes de acudir a los
tribunales, salvo que exista justa causa para
obviarlos. Véase Pagán v. Fundación Hospital Dr.
Pila, 114 D.P.R. 224 (1983).
Lo cierto es que si Jane Doe se obligó
voluntariamente a arbitrar, no puede ahora reclamar
el derecho de acudir al tribunal. Jane Doe tiene que
cumplir con lo pactado y someter su reclamación al
árbitro, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el
Acuerdo, y no puede evadir sus obligaciones
contractuales utilizando el foro judicial como
subterfugio ni categorizar como “discrimen en el
empleo” reclamaciones que surgen por razón de
diferencias entre co-propietarios de CRL.
Por los fundamentos antes expuestos, los
comparecientes sostienen que de este Tribunal
entender que tiene jurisdicción para determinar la
arbitrabilidad de los reclamos de Jane Doe, lo que
negamos -pues entendemos que le corresponde al
árbitro decidirlo-, procede que ordene que ésta
continúe el arbitraje que voluntariamente pactó y que
119a
CRL ya puso en marcha. Jane Doe debe estar
obligada a cumplir con el Acuerdo y someter su
posición al árbitro -según lo pactado.
D. El FAA y su Aplicación al Presente Caso
Dos (2) casos recientes del Tribunal Supremo de
los Estados Unidos (“TSEU”) impiden a Jane Doe
evadir su obligación de arbitrar sus reclamaciones
(“any Claim”) contra los co-demandados. El año
pasado, el TSEU se reafirmó en que el FAA desplaza
(“preempts”) toda ley estatal que constituya un
obstáculo al objetivo del Congreso de que se pongan
en vigor los contratos de arbitraje. AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepción, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753
(2011)(“Concepción”). Además, el TSEU indicó que
los Estados no pueden requerir procedimientos que
sean inconsistentes con el FAA, aún si ello resultare
deseable por otras razones. Id., en la pág. 1753. Por
el contrario, los tribunales deben poner en vigor los
pactos de arbitraje conforme a sus propios términos.
Id., en la pág. 1742. Por otro lado, en Marmet Health
Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012)
(“Marmet”), el TSEU resolvió que el FAA ocupa el
campo y desplaza toda aquella política pública estatal
que prohíba el arbitraje de ciertos tipos de casos de
negligencia.
Los referidos casos, sin duda alguna, requieren
que este Honorable Tribunal ponga en vigor el pacto
de sumisión a arbitraje de la Sección 14 del Acuerdo
suscrito entre las partes.
Aun en instancias donde las partes no han
acordado
el
someter
las
controversias
de
arbitrabilidad sustantivas al foro arbitral, los
tribunales tienden a dejar la controversia para que
sea resuelta inicialmente por el árbitro cuando la
120a
arbitrabilidad no puede ser determinada sin entrar
en los méritos de la controversia. Elkouri & Elkouri,
How Arbitrations Works, (BNA Books, 6ta Edición
2003), en la pág. 281. (“However, even though the
agreement does not expressly leave the determination
of arbitrability to the arbitrator, and in spite of the
fact that the parties have first gone to court, courts
have left the initial determination to the arbitrator.
This was the result, for instance, where arbitrability
could not be determined without delving into the
merits...”)
Así, en Camden Indus. Co. v. Carpenters Local
1688, 353 F.3d 178 (1st Cir. 1969), el Primer Circuito
de Apelaciones resolvó:
In these circumstances we believe the matter
should proceed to arbitration, where the arbitrator
may determine the subsidiary facts upon which
depend both the merits of the controversy and his
jurisdiction to decide it. A finding of jurisdiction,
unlike a finding on the merits when jurisdiction is not
in question... will not be insulated from subsequent
judicial review... We believe full recognition of the
role of labor arbitration requires court intervention in
a case such as this only when it has become absolutely
necessary, viz., on a petition to vacate or enforce the
award.
Id.
Esta es precisamente la situación que nos ocupa.
La invitación que Jane Doe le hace al Honorable
Tribunal es que entre a dilucidar los méritos de la
controversia de si ella es o no empleada como cuestión
previa a adjudicar la arbitrabilidad de sus reclamos.
Claramente, un asunto que a todas luces le
corresponde al árbitro resolver.
121a
E. El FAA Reconoce una Fuerte Política Pública a
Favor del Arbitraje que Requiere Poner en
Vigor los Pactos de Arbitraje Tal y Como
Pactados
Este Honorable Tribunal debe compeler a Jane
Doe a presentar sus reclamos en el foro acordado por
las partes -arbitraje ante la AAA. Ello, en vista de
que existe una fuerte política pública federal a favor
del arbitraje, lo cual requiere que los acuerdos de
arbitraje se presuman válidos y ejecutables.6 Sobre
Los acuerdos de arbitraje llevan consigo una fuerte presunción
de validez:
Where a written contract contains an arbitration clause, there is
a presumption of arbitrability in the sense that a request for an
order compelling arbitration should not be denied by the Court,
unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration
clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the
asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage.
Codecom, Inc. v. Alcatel Standard. S.A., 103 F.Supp.2d 65, 68-69
(D.P.R. 2000); Véase además, Jorae-Colon v. Mandara Spa
Puerto Rico, 685 F.Supp. 2d 280, 283 (D.P.R. 2010)(“[Q]uestions
of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the
federal policy favoring arbitration ... and as a matter of federal
law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should
be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand
is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation
of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability” (comillas
internas omitidas)); PaineWebber Inc. v. Elahi, 87 F.3d 589, 595
(1er Cir. 1996)("the Supreme Court has established a broad
presumption of arbitrability)-, Brennan v. Kina, 139 F.3d 258,
264 (1 er Cir. 1998)(“In FAA cases, the Supreme Court precedents
instruct courts to use a particular hermeneutic principle for
interpreting the breadth of the agreement, viz., the presumption
of arbitrability (comillas internas omitidas)); World Films. Inc.
v. Paramount Piet. Corp., 125 D.P.R. 352, 362 (1990)(“Existe ...
una presunción de 'arbitrabilidad' cuando el contrato tiene una
cláusula de arbitraje”).
6
122a
esta fuerte política pública, el TSEU ha expresado lo
siguiente:
[The FAA] is a congressional declaration of a
liberal policy favoring arbitration agreements,
notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural
policies to the contrary.
****
[I]n enacting § 2 of the federal Act, Congress
declared a national policy favoring arbitration and
withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial
forum for the resolution of claims which the
contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.
Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987) (citas y
comillas internas omitidas).
Véase además,
Concepción, 131 S. Ct. 1745, 1748 (“The FAA was
enacted in 1925 in response to widespread judicial
hostility to arbitration agreements....
The
overarching purpose of the FAA, evident in the text of
§§ 2, 3, and 4, is to ensure the enforcement of
arbitration agreements according to their terms so as
to facilitate streamlined proceedings.”)(comillas
internas omitidas y énfasis suplido).
F. El FAA Ocupa el Campo y Desplaza Toda Ley
Estatal que Constituya un Obstáculo a la
Puesta en Vigor de los Pactos de Arbitraje
Conforme a los Términos del Acuerdo.
Jane Doe alega que no debe ser compelida a
arbitrar sus reclamos. Específicamente, ésta alega lo
siguiente:
24. El 22 de marzo de 2012, la CRL presentó una
solicitud de arbitraje (“Demand for Arbitration”) ante
la AAA ....
123a
25. Mediante dicha solicitud, la CRL pretende
interferir con el ejercicio de la jurisdicción del
Tribunal para atender la demanda. De prevalecer,
lograría impedirle a JANE vindicar sus derechos
mediante la presentación de una demanda ante este
Honorable Tribunal exponiendo sus reclamaciones de
violación a derechos constitucionales, discrimen en el
empleo y represalias; injunction; y daños y perjuicios
bajo la constitución y leyes del [ELA].
Demanda, en la pág. 4.
El referido intento de Jane Doe de evadir su
obligación de arbitrar sus reclamos contra los codemandados es contrario a la política pública federal
establecida mediante el FAA y no se ajusta a
Derecho. Veamos.
El TSEU estableció claramente en Concepción que
el FAA ocupa el campo y desplaza toda ley de los
Estados que impida que se cumplan los objetivos del
Congreso de hacer valor los pactos de arbitraje. 131 S.
Ct., en la pág. 1753. Ello pues, el propósito general
del FAA es garantizar la puesta en vigor de los
acuerdos de arbitraje conforme a sus propios
términos a los fines de facilitar procedimientos más
eficientes. Id. en la pág. 1748. Dado que el arbitraje
es materia contractual, el FAA requiere que los
tribunales honren las expectativas de las partes. Id.
en la pág. 1752. Toda esta fuerte política en favor del
arbitraje impide que los acuerdos de arbitraje sean
invalidados mediante defensas que aplican sólo a
arbitrajes o que derivan su significado del hecho de
que está en juego un pacto de arbitraje. Id. en la pág.
1746.
Hace apenas un mes y medio, el TSEU en
Marmet, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012), resolvió que el
124a
Tribunal Supremo de Virginia Occidental había
errado al aplicar la política pública de ese Estado, la
cual prohíbe dar validez a una cláusula de arbitraje
contenida en un acuerdo de admisión a un asilo de
ancianos suscrita previo a la ocurrencia de un evento
de negligencia que resulte en muerte o daños
corporales.
Específicamente, el TSEU citando a
Concepción indicó lo siguiente:
[W]hen state law prohibits outright the arbitration
of a particular type of claim, the analysis is
straightforward: The conflicting rule is displaced by
the FAA. ... West Virginia’s prohibition against
predispute agreements to arbitrate personal-injury or
wrongful-death claims against nursing home is a
categorical rule prohibiting arbitration of a particular
type of claim, and that rule is contrary to the terms
and coverage of the FAA.
Id. en las págs. 1203-04 (citas y comillas internas
omitidas).
Conforme lo anterior, no hay duda de que el FAA
desplaza cualquier disposición legal estatutaria o bajo
la Constitución de Puerto Rico que no haga valer y
reconozca el compromiso asumido por las partes de
resolver toda reclamación (“any Claim”) mediante el
procedimiento de arbitraje pactado en la Sección 14
del Acuerdo.
A esos efectos, procede que este
Honorable Tribunal ordene a Jane Doe arbitrar sus
reclamos contra los co-demandados.
G. El FAA Aplica a los Contratos en el Comercio
Interestatal y. en Consecuencia, el Acuerdo
Queda Tutelado por Ella
“[A] trial court evaluating a contract connected to
some economic or commercial activity would rarely,
125a
if ever, refuse to compel arbitration on the ground
that the transactions lacked ‘involvement’ in interstate
commerce’’
SCI v. Fulmer, 883 So.2d 621,629 (Ala. 2003) (énfasis
suplido).
Es norma establecida que el FAA es de aplicación
a los contratos en el comercio interestatal. Véase § 2
del FAA7; World Films. Inc., supra, en la pág. 357 (El
FAA “aplica a contratos en el comercio
interestatal...”.). El Acuerdo es un contrato en el
comercio interestatal, pues, entre otras razones, el
mismo gobierna el interés propietario de las partes y
las operaciones de CRL en Puerto Rico y en sus
oficinas fuera de Puerto Rico. Véase, SCI v. Fulmer.
883 So.2d 621, 629 (Ala 2003)(“[l]t would be
difficult indeed to give an example of an
economic or commercial activity that one could
... declare beyond the reach of Congress’s power
under the Commerce Clause, and, by extension,
under the FAA’)(énfasis nuestro).8 Además, la gran
La § 2 del FAA, en lo pertinente, dispone como sigue:
A written provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract... shall be valid
irrevocable, and enforceable ....
9USCA § 2 (énfasis suplido).
8 Véase además, Thomas H. Oehmke, Commercial Arbitration §
3:6 (2011)(contract needs only the slightest nexus to interstate
commerce to apply the FAA.”): 21 Willinston on Contracts § 57:
(4thed. 2011)("Consistent with the broad approach to
interpreting the term ‘involving commerce’ in the [FAA], it has
been said that a contract containing an arbitration
provision need only be related to commerce to fall within
the coverage of the Act")(énfasis suplido); Bowen v. Security
Pest Control. Inc., 879 So.2d 1139, 1142 (Ala. 2003)(resuelve que
la transacción envolvía el comercio interestatal, en parte, porque
7
126a
mayoría de sus clientes están ubicados fuera de
Puerto Rico (principalmente en los Estados Unidos),
lo cual requiere que CRL y sus clientes mantengan
comunicación constantemente como parte de sus
operaciones mediante el uso del correo, Internet,
teléfono y otros medios de comunicación interestatal.
Igualmente, resulta significativo sobre este particular
la naturaleza económica del Acuerdo y que los
siguientes estatutos federales, entre otros, aplican a
la relación de CRL con aquellos que son propiamente
considerados empleados: 1) Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78; 2) Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654; 3)
Family Medical Leave Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e
to 2000e-17; 4) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964; y 5) Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34. Por ende, resulta claro
que al igual que los contratos en los casos de AlliedBruce y Citizens, el Acuerdo es un contrato en el
comercio interestatal al que le es de aplicación el
FAA.
Por ende, el FAA, por virtud de la Cláusula de
Supremacía de la Constitución de los Estados
desplaza cualquier disposición legal
Unidos,9
una de las partes en la transacción realizaba negocios en dos
Estados). De hecho, el poder del Congreso bajo la Cláusula de
Comercio de la Constitución de los Estados Unidos es tan amplio
que en los pasados 75 años sólo dos casos del TSEU han resuelto
que el Congreso excedió sus poderes bajo la referida Cláusula de
Comercio. Véanse U.S. v. López, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); US v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). Nótese que ninguno de los
estatutos en controversia en dichos casos iba dirigido a regular
transacciones puramente económicas, sino conducta criminal de
naturaleza no económica.
9 En Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) el
Tribunal Supremo de los Estados Unidos resolvió que cuando
127a
estatutaria o bajo la Constitución de Puerto Rico que
no haga valer y reconozca el compromiso asumido por
las partes en este caso de resolver toda reclamación
(“any Claim”) mediante el procedimiento de arbitraje
pactado en la Sección 14 del Acuerdo.
Dicho
procedimiento dio inicio el 22 de marzo de 2012
mediante la presentación del Demand for Arbitration
ante la AAA. Ante esa situación, el FAA ordena que
dicho procedimiento siga su curso sin mayor
intervención de este Honorable Tribunal que la
necesaria para compeler el arbitraje.
III. CONCLUSIÓN
Los comparecientes han ofrecido a este Honorable
Tribunal fundamentos de peso y vinculantes que
sostienen su posición al efecto de que es de la
jurisdicción
del
árbitro
el
determinar
las
controversias cubiertas por el Acuerdo; que entre
Jane Doe y los comparecientes no existe una relación
de empleado-patrono; que ello no es más que un
intento de Jane Doe para esquivar sus obligaciones
contractuales bajo el Acuerdo; que sus reclamaciones
son arbitrables bajo el Acuerdo; que el Acuerdo está
cubierto por el FAA] y que se debe ordenar el
arbitraje compulsorio pactado por las partes.
EN MERITO DE LO CUAL, los comparecientes
respetuosamente solicitan de este Honorable
Tribunal que, a tenor con los fundamentos esbozados
en el presente escrito, desestime la Demanda por
falta de jurisdicción y compela a Jane Doe al
arbitraje. Asimismo, los comparecientes solicitan
muy respetuosamente que se le imponga a Jane Doe
una ley estatal conflige directamente con la § 2 del FAA, ello
viola la Cláusula de Supremacía.
128a
y/o a sus abogados el pago de costas, gastos y
honorarios de abogado que correspondan.
En San Juan, Puerto Rico, hoy 11 de abril de
2012.
RESPETUOSAMENTE SOMETIDA.
CERTIFICO: Que en esta misma fecha he
entregado a la mano y enviado por correo regular una
copia fiel y exacta del presente escrito a los abogados
de Jane Doe, el Ledo. Juan R. González Muñoz,
González Muñoz Law Office, P.S.C., P.O. Box
9024055, San Juan, PR 00902-4055 y el Lcdo.
Manuel Porro Vizcarra, Manuel Porro Vizcarra Law
Offices, 382 Ave. Escorial, Urb. Caparra Heights, San
Juan, PR 00920.
MENDOZA LAW OFFICES
Abogado de los demandados
PO Box 9282
San Juan, Puerto Rico 009080282
Tel. (787) 722-5522; 5530; 5540
Fax (787) 723-7057
Correo electrónico:
[email protected]
/s/
Enrique J. Mendoza Méndez
TSPR-8304
129a
APPENDIX F
[rubber stamp:]
RECEIVED,
SUBMITTALS DEPARTMENT,
SAN JUAN JUDICIAL CENTER,
APRIL 11, 2012, 12:27 PM
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
SAN JUAN JUDICIAL CENTER
SUPERIOR COURT
JANE DOE,
Plaintiff
Vs.
COMPANIA DE RESPONSABILIDAD LIMITADA (CRL)
[limited liability company]; JOHN DOE, in his
personal capacity and as employer of JANE DOE;
JACK JOE, in his personal capacity and as employer
of JANE DOE; LARRY LOE, in his personal capacity
and as employer of JANE DOE,
Defendants1.
__________________
CIVIL No. KPE 2012-1204 (904)
__________________
Re: Declaratory Judgment and Injunction
For the purposes of strict confidentiality, the parties in this
case are not identified by their respective names. In the
Affidavit Under Seal of the Plaintiff filed in conjunction with the
Complaint that commenced this action, [Plaintiff] identified
each of the parties by their respective names, addresses, and
telephone numbers.
1
130a
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF
JURISDICTION AND TO COMPEL
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION IN LIGHT OF
BINDING ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
131a
TO THE HONORABLE COURT:
Now appears the defendants referenced above,
Companía de Responsabilidad Limitada (“CRL”)
[Limited Liability Company (“LLC)], John Doe, Jack
Joe and Larry Loe, without submitting to the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, through the
undersigned legal representative, and they do very
respectfully state that the Verified Complaint and
Request for Declaratory Judgment and for
Preliminary and Permanent Injunction in the instant
case (“Complaint”) should be dismissed in its entirety
under Rule 10.2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, 32
L.P.R.A. App. V, and the Federal Arbitration Act, 9
U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (“FAA”), due to the existence of a
valid arbitration agreement that was entered into
voluntarily and which constitutes the law between
the parties, as demonstrated below.
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 2, 2012, Jane Doe filed with this Court a
Complaint and a Petition Requesting Preliminary and
Permanent Injunction asking this Court to issue a
Declaratory
Judgment
to
determine
the
inapplicability of the arbitration clause contained in
the Operating Agreement (“Agreement”) signed
between her, the other Capital Members of CRL and
CRL2. Jane Doe predicates her request on the
Jane Doe also asks that this Court order the stay of the
arbitration case brought by CRL before the American
Arbitration Association on March 22, 2012. The intention of this
arbitration proceeding is the presentation and resolution of the
same alleged controversies as those that Jane Doe has brought
to the attention of this Court by means of the present judicial
2
132a
proposition that her alleged claims are not covered by
that arbitration clause because they are labor claims
that arise under an employer-employee relationship.
That is, Jane Doe maintains that the arbitration
agreement signed by her does not apply to the
controversies in the case at bar. As we shall see
below, Jane Doe is incorrect. The claims resolution
clause (Section 14, in English “Resolution of Claim”)
in the Agreement is extremely broad and it makes
clear that the intention of all of the parties was that
any claim (in English, “claim”) is to be resolved by the
processes provided for in that clause:
[English:]
Intent and Purpose - It is the intent and
purpose of the Firm and any Claimant to
resolve any Claim by mediation or arbitration.
The Claimant expressly agrees that the Claim
shall be settled or resolved through the
procedures set forth herein, and shall not in
any way circumvent or otherwise challenge in
any way these proceedings relative to
mediation and arbitration.
(Section 14.01 of the Agreement)
Furthermore, the Agreement defines a “claim” as,
in English, “any action, suit, complaint or demand of
whatever nature and for whatever relief or remedy
against the Firm or any of its Members or
employees.” (Section 1.06 of the Agreement.) Thus,
under the Agreement signed by Jane Doe, her
partners, and CRL, a “claim” is any type of action,
case, complaint or claim of whatever nature and for
action. Jane Doe must answer this request for arbitration on or
before April 23, 2012.
133a
whatever relief or remedy against the Firm (CRL) or
any of its Members or employees. There is no doubt
that Jane Doe has committed before her partners to
submitting any type of claim to the process described
in Section 14 of the Agreement (including arbitration)
no matter what the nature of the claim may be.
Consequently, it is proper that the Complaint in the
case at bar be dismissed, as very respectfully
requested.
As demonstrated below, this is a controversy
regarding substantive arbitrability. It specifically
concerns the obligation borne by the parties to
arbitrate any type of controversy among them. The
threshold issue is which forum has jurisdiction to
determine the scope of the arbitration clause
contained in the Agreement signed by Jane Doe,
which governs the relations among the Capital
Members of CRL and between the Capital Members
and CRL. That being the case, the operative fact that
provides the basis for the claim in the case at bar is,
specifically, a decision made with regard to Jane
Doe’s compensation as a Capital Member. This is an
issue that, as will be demonstrated below, is governed
by the Agreement that she signed, and which was
signed by all of the Capital Members of CRL, an issue
that, under the Agreement, must be submitted to
arbitration.
For reasons that we shall further set forth below,
the appearing parties very respectfully maintain that
the controversy regarding substantive arbitrability,
as presented in the specific circumstances of this
case, is an issue that is proper to decide in arbitration
and not before this Honorable Court. Furthermore,
the appearing parties maintain that it is proper to
134a
compel the parties to resolve any claim raised
between them by means of the arbitration process
agreed to, which has already commenced before the
American Arbitration Association (“AAA”), as
discussed below.
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Agreement between Jane Doe and CRL
Establishes an Alternate Dispute Resolution
Program that Includes Arbitration
At all times pertinent to this petition, Jane Doe
has been a Capital Member of CRL. (See the
Complaint, paragraph 2). The Agreement signed by
Jane Doe and by all of the Capital Members of CRL
establishes, in its pertinent part, that its signatories
as of that date were all Capital Members of the civil
partnership (…), devoted to the practice of law. (See
page 1 of the Agreement, Exhibit 13.) This Agreement
was entered into by the Capital Members of CRL,
including Jane Doe, on September 13, 2007. (Id., on
pages 38-39.)
With regard to what is pertinent here, the
Agreement provides a mechanism for resolving
controversies so that any of its signatories, including
Jane Doe, may raise any claim or controversy in
opposition to CRL and/or against any other Capital
Member of CRL. (Id., pages 33-34.) For such
purposes, Section 14.01 of the Agreement establishes
that “it is the intention and purpose of [CRL] and any
claimant to resolve any claim by mediation and
arbitration.” (Id., page 33) (emphasis and translation
For the purpose of maintaining strict confidentiality, the
mentioned copies of the Agreement that are referred to as
Exhibit 1 are in a sealed envelope.
3
135a
ours). This Section adds that “the claimant expressly
agrees that the claim thereof is to be settled or
resolved by means of the process established [there],
and that such claimant shall not bypass or challenge
such
proceedings
involving
mediation
and
arbitration.” (Id.)
In line with that set forth above, the Agreement
establishes a three-step process for resolving
controversies between a Capital Member of CRL and
CRL and among Capital Members of CRL. The first
step consists of submitting a written claim to the
management board of CRL indicating the nature of
the claim and the relief sought.
This step is
established in Section 14.02 of the Agreement. (Id.,
pages 33-34.) Jane Doe voluntarily submitted to this
first step. (Complaint, paragraph 14.) The second
step consists of attempting to resolve the claim
amicably and in good faith by means of a mediation
process administered by the AAA. See Section 14.03
of the Agreement. (Id., page 34.) Jane Doe voluntarily
submitted to this second step. (Complaint,
paragraphs 15-19.) If the claim cannot be resolved in
the second step, the Agreement clearly establishes
that it is the obligation of the parties to submit the
controversy to compulsory arbitration. For these
purposes, Section 14.04 of the Agreement provides as
follows in outlining the third step:
[English:]
lf mediation fails, the Claim shall be settled by
arbitration administered by the American
Arbitration Association under its Commercial
Arbitration Rules, and judgment on the award
rendered by the arbitrator(s) may be entered in
any court having jurisdiction thereof. [...]
136a
(Id.)
That set forth above signifies that, when signing
the Agreement, the parties – including Jane Doe and
the appearing parties – contractually agreed to
resolve all of their differences by means of the
aforementioned internal dispute process, which
culminates in arbitration.
As a factual matter, Jane Doe has participated in
the first two (2) steps of the contractual process for
dispute resolution. First of all, on January 24, 2012,
she submitted an internal claim to the management
board of CRL alleging that, among other things, there
was a breach of the Agreement and there was
discrimination against her, based on sex and age, by
reducing her compensation. (Complaint, paragraph
14; Extrajudicial Claim of January 24, 2012,
submitted under seal as Exhibit 3). Secondly, the
parties submitted themselves to the mediation
process, with CRL accepting the mediator suggested
by Jane Doe.
That mediation process ended
unsuccessfully on March 20, 2012. (Complaint,
paragraphs 15-23.)
Under those circumstances, with the purpose of
complying with Section 14.04 of the Agreement, CRL
submitted a request for arbitration (in English,
Demand for Arbitration) before the AAA on March
22, 2012. (Complaint, paragraph 24.) It is this
arbitration process that Jane Doe intends to
circumvent under the pretext that her claims are not
subject to arbitration under the Agreement because
they involve constitutional claims, employment
discrimination, retaliation, injunction, and damages.
(Complaint, paragraph 25.)
137a
Jane Doe is incorrect. As a threshold issue, it
should be pointed out that no employer-employee
relationship exists between Jane Doe and the
appearing parties4. However, if we assume, for
argument purposes, that such relationship were to
exist (something that we do not accept), this would
still not discharge the parties from having to submit
their claims to arbitration. This is so, given that the
arbitration clause is broad, clear, and devoid of all
ambiguity, and requires that “any claim” be
submitted to arbitration (Section 14.01 of the
Agreement), with “claim” meaning, in English, “any
action, suit, complaint or demand of whatever
nature and for whatever relief or remedy
against the Firm or any of its Members or
employees.” (Section 1.06 of the Agreement.)
It should be reiterated, however, regardless of the
context in which Jane Doe may now desire to view
her relationship with the appearing parties, the truth
of the matter is that, by virtue of the Agreement, she
accepted that any claim (in English, “any claim”) is to
As we further discuss below, during the period pertinent to
this controversy Jane Doe was a Capital Member of CRL and
had an ownership interest in CRL, as did John Doe and Larry
Loe, as did Jack Joe, who is a retired Capital Member of CRL.
Moreover, for nearly the past three years Jane Doe has been a
member of the management board of CRL, the body that directs
the firm and approves important matters such as the
compensation of the members and the operating budget of CRL,
among other things. So, the relationship that exists between
Jane Doe and the appearing parties does not arise from an
employment contract but, rather, from the Agreement.
Therefore, Jane Doe cannot now conveniently conceal her
position as co-owner of CRL in order to breach the Agreement
and characterize her claims as employment claims so that they
will not be submitted to arbitration.
4
138a
be resolved by means of the dispute resolution
process, which includes compulsory arbitration.
As we have maintained, the Agreement defines the
concept of “claim” in an all-inclusive manner so that
claims of any nature are covered. Thus, Section 1.06
of the Agreement establishes that a “claim” means, in
English, “…any action, suit, complaint or demand of
remedy against the Firm or any of its Members or
employees.” (See page 2 of the Agreement, Exhibit 1)
(emphasis ours).
The text set forth above makes it perfectly clear
that any claim, whatever its nature or whatever the
relief requested, is covered by the arbitration clause
contained in the Agreement. Jane Doe cannot escape
this reality by the use of subterfuges and distortions.
The Agreement constitutes the law among the parties
and they are required to comply with it. See Article
[sic] 1044 of the Civil Code, 31 L.P.R.A. § 2994.
Contrary to what is argued by Jane Doe in her
Complaint, the appearing parties do not intend to
interfere with the exercise of her alleged rights and
the vindication of her claims. What the appearing
parties do indeed maintain is that Jane Doe’s claims,
although blatantly frivolous and groundless, should
be decided by arbitration, the method agreed to
among the parties, and in a confidential manner, as
has also been agreed.
The principle of freedom of contract governs our
court system. See Article 1207 of the Civil Code, 31
L.P.R.A. § 3372.
Thus, contracting parties can
establish covenants, clauses, and conditions, as they
may see fit provided that they do not violate the laws,
morals, and public order. Id. As a corollary to the
139a
principle of contractual freedom, the obligations that
arise from contracts have the force of law between the
parties and they must be complied with. Article 1044
of the Civil Code, 31 L.P.R.A. § 2994.
As a result of the mentioned legal axiom, the
parties may furthermore agree that it is the
arbitrator that is to decide with regard to his
own jurisdiction, including any defenses
relating to the existence, scope, or validity of
the arbitration agreement. This is the case,
inasmuch as the parties incorporated by reference to
the arbitration clause contained in the Agreement the
Commercial Arbitration Rules of the AAA, which
provide that it shall be the arbitrator who decides
arbitrability, that is, his own jurisdiction. (See
Section 14.04 of the Agreement, page 34, Exhibit 1.)
Therefore, in any event, the frivolous and bold
controversy that Jane Doe has created regarding
arbitrability by filing the Complaint in the abovereferenced case is an issue that pertains to the
arbitrator to resolve.
B. It Pertains to the Arbitrator to Determine
Whether the Issues in the Case at Bar are
Subject to Arbitration
As recognized by the Puerto Rico Supreme Court,
citing National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston S.
Maine Corp., 850 F.2d 756 (D.C. Cir. 1988), a
controversy regarding arbitrability has (3) kinds. See
Méndez Acevedo v. Nieves Rivera, 179 D.P.R. 359,
367-68 (2010); Município Mayaguez v. Lebrón, 167
D.P.R. 713, 720-21 (2006). Attention may be drawn
to (i) whether an arbitration agreement exists, (ii) the
scope of an arbitration agreement (“whether such
agreement covers a given controversy”), and (iii)
140a
whether such agreement covers a controversy
regarding the duration or expiration of the contract.
Méndez Acevedo, supra, Município de Mayagüez,
supra; World Films, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures
Corp., 125 D.P.R. 352 (1990). The issue in the case at
bar concerns the second (2nd) kind mentioned.
In this regard, our highest judicial authority has
specified, as a general rule that allows for exceptions,
that the determination of whether an agreement
creates an obligation on the part of the parties to
arbitrate a given controversy is a judicial task.
Méndez Acevedo, supra, World Films, Inc., supra, at
page 361. That notwithstanding, the issue of
arbitrability is not to pertain to the authority of
the court if the parties agreed, in the
arbitration agreement, that such authority is to
be delegated to the arbitrator. That is, when it is
agreed to in arbitration agreement that it is the
arbitrator that is to resolve the issues of arbitrability
it is proper that the arbitrator and not the court
determine whether an obligation to arbitrate a given
controversy exists. U.G.T. v. Corp. Difusión Pub., 168
D.P.R. 674. 684 (2006) (“Ordinarily, and unless the
collective bargaining agreement provides
otherwise, issues of substantive arbitrability are to
be resolved by the courts….”) (emphasis ours).
In other words, the rule outlined by the Supreme
Court is a default rule that only applies in the
absence of an express delegation agreed to in the
arbitration agreement to the effect that the
determination of arbitrability pertains to the
jurisdiction of the arbitrator. The interpretation
cannot be otherwise, given that the mechanism of
arbitration is to be used not only just if the parties
141a
have agreed to it, but it also must be used in the form
that they have agreed to. See Crufon Const. v. Aut.
Edif. Púbs., 156 D.P.R. 197, 205 (2002).
In line with that set forth above, it is a well
settled principle within the federal jurisdiction and
under the FAA that any challenge against the
validity of an arbitration agreement, including any
controversy regarding arbitrability (whether a given
controversy is or is not subject to arbitration) must be
referred to the arbitrator if there is clear and
unequivocal evidence (in English, “clear and
unmistakable evidence”) that the parties so agreed,
that this was their intent. First Options of Chicago,
Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995). This is the
very situation that has arisen in the case at bar.
In the arbitration clause contained in the
Agreement, Jane Doe, as well as all of the Capital
Members of CRL, undertook that the third step of the
dispute resolution process, the arbitration, would be
conducted under the Commercial Arbitration Rules of
the AAA. (See Section 14.04 of the Agreement, page
34, Exhibit 1.) In turn, Rule 7(a) of the text of the
Commercial Arbitration Rules of the AAA provides as
follows, in English: “[t]he arbitrator shall have the
power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including
any objections with respect to the existence, scope or
validity of the arbitration agreement.” (Commercial
Arbitration Rules of the AAA, Rule 7(a), page 23,
Exhibit 2) (emphasis ours).
As held by every federal court that has had this
issue before it, when parties incorporate, in their
arbitration clauses or agreements, the institutional
rules of entities such as the AAA, in which the
arbitrator is delegated the authority to decide on his
142a
own jurisdiction – to decide on arbitrability – this
constitutes sufficient evidence in law (clear and
unequivocal) that this was the intent of the parties.
See Contec Corp. v. Remote Solution Co., 398 F.3d
205, 208 (2nd Cir. 2005) (in English, “When.. parties
an arbitrator”); Sleeper Farms v. Agway. Inc., 211 F.
Supp. 2d 197 (D. Me. 2002) (in English, “[Since the
AAA rules constitute] a clear and unmistakable
delegation of scope-determining authority to an
arbitrator, [the court] refers this controversy [to the
arbitrator] to determine [...] what issues [...] are
covered by the arbitration clause.”)
See, also: Terminix Int’l. Co. v. Palmer Ranch
Ltd., 432 F.3d 1327, 29, 33-34 (11th Cir. 2005)
(holding that, whereas the AAA Arbitration Rules
delegate to the arbitrator the determination
regarding arbitrability, the plaintiff’s claim that the
arbitration agreement unlawfully deprives the
plaintiff of various statutory remedies was an issue to
be adjudicated by the arbitrator, not by the court);
Qualcomm Inc. v. Nokia Corp., 466 F.3d 1366, 1373
(Fed. Cir. 2006); Apollo Computer. Inc. v. Berg, 886
F.2d 469, 473 (1st Cir. 1989).
The holding of the United States Supreme Court
in First Options, supra, and the federal case law cited
are consistent with the holdings of the local legal
system on the subject of contracts. Ultimately,
“arbitration is an inherently contractual legal
concept.” Méndez Acevedo, supra, at page 367;
Município Mayagüez, supra, U.C.P.R. v. Triangle
143a
Engineering Corp., 136 D.P.R. 133, 144 (1994); see,
also, Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Broth. of Teamsters,
130 S. Ct. 2847, 2857 (2010) (in English, “[Where]
parties concede that they have agreed to arbitrate
some matters pursuant to an arbitration clause, the
“law’s permissive policies in respect to arbitration”
counsel that “any doubts concerning the scope of
arbitral issues should be resolved in favor of
arbitration.”)
Thus, with respect to arbitration, compliance with
what has been agreed to in writing may be
demanded. See Crufon Const., supra, at page 204;
Município de Ponce v. Gobernador, 136 D.P.R. 776,
783 (1994). In turn, when the terms of a contract are
clear and do not present any ambiguity, the
provisions thereof are to be applied according to the
literal meaning given to them by the parties. See
Article 1233 of the Civil Code, supra, § 3471. Once it
is determined that this is what the parties agreed to,
the adjudicator must resolve the controversies
between the parties in compliance with what has
been stipulated. See C. F.S.E. v. Unión de Médicos,
170 D.P.R. 443 (2007).
To summarize, in the case at bar, the arbitration
clause incorporates, by express reference, the
Commercial Arbitration Rules of the AAA, which, in
turn, delegate to the arbitrator – in a clear and
unequivocal manner – the authority to determine his
own jurisdiction. Therefore, to follow the authorities
cited here, it is proper for this Honorable Court to
order Jane Doe to proceed with the arbitration
proceeding that she agreed to, as it is the arbitrator
that is to decide whether he has authority to hear her
claims on the merits.
144a
It was so agreed to by the parties, with no
ambiguity whatsoever, and this constitutes the law
between the parties. See HIETEL v. Puerto Rico
Telephone Company, 2011 T.S.P.R. 100.
C. In the Alternative, the Issues in the Case at Bar
Are Subject to Arbitration Given that There Is
No Employer-Employee Relationship Between
Jane Doe and the Appearing Parties and the
Arbitration Clause Covers Her Claims
In the alternative, if this Honorable Court holds
that it has jurisdiction to determine the arbitrability
of Jane Doe’s claims, which we refute, it is still proper
that an order be issued compelling arbitration. As we
have maintained, Jane Doe bases her position on the
premise that she is an employee of the appearing
parties and, therefore, her claims are not covered by
the arbitration clause because it only relates to
commercial matters and not to labor. Jane Doe is
incorrect.
First of all, Jane Doe has been a Capital Member
of CRL since 1987 and, in such capacity, she has been
a co-owner of CRL for about twenty-five (25) years,
that is, during the period relevant to her claim.
Furthermore, Jane Doe was a member of the
management board of CRL from 2009 to 2012, the
committee at the highest point of the hierarchy in the
organizational chart of CRL. (See the Extrajudicial
Claim of January 24, 2012, page 5, Exhibit 3,
submitted under seal.)
As a member of the management board, Jane Doe
was one of seven (7) capital members of CRL in
charge of – among other functions – formulating CRL
long-term strategic plans and policies, supervising
the functions of its General Manager, approving the
145a
annual budgets, approving criteria for compensation,
and approving the compensation of the members. (See
Sections 4.06 and 4.07 of the Agreement, page 13,
Exhibit 1.)
In view of that, it must be concluded that Jane
Doe has no grounds to allege that she is an employee
of CRL. Such allegation is simply a legal absurdity.
It is so deemed by the principles of case law discussed
below, which decisively characterize Jane Doe as an
“employer” herself, and not an “employee,” for the
purposes of the social legislation for the protection of
workers that she invoked in her Complaint.
The United States Supreme Court has set forth
six (6) criteria for guiding and facilitating a
determination regarding whether an individual is an
“employer” or “employee,” to wit: (i) the ability to hire
and discharge employees; (ii) supervision of
employees; (iii) supervision by other individuals; (iv)
ability to have influence on the organization; (v)
intent of the parties; (vi) and the sharing by the
individual in the profits, losses, and obligations of the
organization.
Clackamas
Gastroenterology
Associates, P.C, v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 449-50 (2003).
None of these factors is decisive. Id., at page 451.
According to the highest federal court, an “employer”
“is the person or group of persons who are the owners
and manage the organization.” Id., at page 450
(translation ours).
A priori, it is reasonable to conclude that, as a
Capital Member of CRL for more than two (2)
decades and a member of the highest directing body
of CRL for three years, Jane Doe necessarily belongs
to the “group of persons who are the owners and
manage the organization.” Id. As a factual matter,
146a
in illustration, in 2010 Jane Doe – as a member of the
management board of CRL – approved reductions in
the compensation for two (2) capital members of CRL,
on the basis of their performance. Also, in 2011 Jane
Doe approved compensation freezes and reductions
for various persons, including another Capital
Member of CRL. These facts make it patently
evident that Jane Doe did not act as an “employee” as
she has alleged, but rather as an “employer” or, what
amounts to the same thing, one of the co-owners of
CRL.
In applying the factors from Clackamas, supra,
the Third Circuit of the Federal Court of Appeals
upheld the determination of a district court that a
shareholder and manager of a law firm was not an
“employee” for the purposes of Title VII. See Kirleis
v. Dickie, McCarney & Chilcote, P.C., 09-4498, 2010
WL 2780927 (3rd Cir. 2010) (Refer to the copy of the
case attached as Exhibit 4.) Even though the plaintiff
in that case argued that the Executive Committee (to
which she did not belong) made the decisions on
compensation and exercised other management
functions, the Court determined that she was not an
employee.
The Court reasoned that the plaintiff in that case
had the ability to participate in the management of
the firm, the right not to be removed for cause
without the vote of ¾ of the Board of Directors, and
the right to share in a percentage of the profits,
losses, and obligations of the firm. Id., at page 2.
Likewise, Jane Doe had the authority to participate
in the management of CRL, could not be removed
without the vote of ¾ of the other capital members,
and had the right to share in the profits, losses, and
147a
obligations of CRL during the period pertinent to her
claim. (See the Agreement, Sections [blank].)
Moreover, unlike the plaintiff in Kirleis, supra, Jane
Doe was a member of the management board, the
directing body with the greatest decision-making
authority in CRL, from 2009 to 2012, and this is what
most convincingly argues in favor of determining that
Jane Doe is actually an “owner” and not an
“employee.”
Although preceding the decision by the Federal
Supreme Court in Clackamas, supra, what the First
Circuit Court of Appeals determined in Serapión v.
Martínez. 119 F.3d 982 (1st Cir. 1997), is also highly
persuasive. In that case the Court concluded that an
equity partner of a law firm was ineligible to raise
claim under Title VII given that the mentioned
statute only offered protection to employees. In so
holding, the Court examined the following criteria: (i)
proprietary interest; (ii) remuneration; (iii) and
management. Id., at page 990. These factors are in
line with the criteria outlined by the Supreme Court
in Clackamas, supra, and are supported by common
sense. Jane Doe, like the plaintiff in Serapión, supra,
has a proprietary interest in CRL, her compensation
depends substantially on the profits of CRL, and she
enjoyed voting rights within the main directing body
of CRL. In other words, Jane Doe, like the plaintiff in
the mentioned case, Margarita Serapión, cannot be
considered an “employee”5.
It is worth mentioning that the case would be otherwise if Jane
Doe were not a Capital Member. In such hypothetical scenario,
Jane Doe could be considered an “employee” for the purposes of
the laws that she invokes, as held by the Supreme Court in Belk
Arce v. Martinez y Otros, 146 D.P.R. 215 (1998). (This was an
5
148a
By virtue of that set forth above, Jane Doe’s
position that the claims herein are of a labor nature
and, as such, are excluded from the arbitration clause
in the Agreement is untenable.
Absent an
employment relationship, a discussion of labor claims
is irrelevant. Jane Doe acted as co-owner of CRL and
her relationship with the appearing parties was
governed by the Agreement.
Jane Doe is trying to create a smokescreen, with
the sole purpose of disguising a controversy that is
truly contractual, arising between co-owners, under
the Agreement, and deriving from rifts and
differences between her and the directing body. That
is all it is. And her sole objective is to concoct
“employment discrimination” from a claim of a
contractual nature between capital members that
would require Jane Doe, prima facie, to arbitrate the
matter in accordance with the arbitration clause
contained in the Agreement.
Compensation of the members of CRL is governed
by the Agreement. Specifically, Sections 5.01 to 5.06
thereof. (See the Agreement, pages 20-22, Exhibit 1.)
So, any rift or difference that may have arisen with
regard to the compensation of a capital member is a
subject matter covered by the obligation to arbitrate
her claims, as the parties agreed to by means of the
Agreement. Jane Doe cannot escape this reality and
pretend to erase, in one bold stroke, her obligation to
action decided under Law 100 of June 30, 1959, as amended,
brought by an attorney at law who was not an equity partner of
a law firm.) However, this case does not apply to the issue in the
case at bar, given that Jane Doe was a Capital Member of CRL
and, therefore, an “employer” pursuant to the authorities cited
here.
149a
arbitrate any controversy between her and CRL and
the other capital members of CRL.
The Agreement signed between Jane Doe and CRL
constitutes the law between them. Jane Doe is
prevented from litigating her claims against CRL and
the other Capital Members of CRL before the courts,
given that it has been so freely and voluntarily
agreed. Pacta Sunt Servanda is the principle that
safeguards the obligation of arbitration that the
parties have under the Agreement. Therefore, the
courts cannot discharge one party from what such
party has undertaken to perform by means of a
contract when the contract is lawful, valid, and does
not contain any defect. See Mercado Rivera v.
U.C.P.R., 143 D.P.R. 610 (1997); Cervecería Corona v.
Commonwealth Ins. Co., 115 D.P.R. 345 (1984).
Our Supreme Court has been consistent in
expressing that a strong public policy exists in Puerto
Rico in favor of arbitration as an alternative method
for disputes resolution. See Pain Webber v. Service
Concepts, Inc., 151 D.P.R. 307 (2000). When there is
an agreement in a contract regarding an obligation to
arbitrate, the courts refer to “a strong public policy in
favor of arbitration … and [a]ny doubt that may exist
should be resolved in favor of arbitration.” Id.
In addition, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court has
emphasized that arbitration clauses in line with the
FAA are valid and irrevocable and the courts do not
have discretion with regard to their effectiveness.
Medina Betancourt v. La Cruz Azul, 155 D.P.R. 732
(2001). Therefore, when a covenant is made where
the parties undertake to submit to arbitration such
controversies as may arise under it the courts must
“respect the intent of the parties and implement the
150a
agreement, ordering that the matter be resolved first
in arbitration.” Id.
In line with that, and following the federal model,
the Puerto Rico Supreme Court has called upon the
judiciary to take the prudent course of refraining
from judicial involvement when an arbitration
agreement is present. That applies once arbitration
has been agreed to and the courts lack discretion
regarding the effectiveness thereof and must allow
implementation of the arbitration agreed to. Méndez
Acevedo, supra, at page 368.
Furthermore, there is a policy in Puerto Rico that
favors the exhaustion of arbitration procedures. See
Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo v. Junta de
Administración del Muelle del Municipio de Ponce,
122 D.P.R. 318 (1988). As a factual matter, our
highest court has not hesitated to hold that parties
must exhaust contractual remedies before resorting
to the courts unless due cause for ignoring them
exists. See Pagán v. Fundación Hospital Dr. Pila, 114
D.P.R. 224 (1983).
The fact is, if Jane Doe voluntarily committed
herself to arbitration, she cannot now claim the right
to bring the matter before the court. Jane Doe must
comply with what was agreed to and submit her
claim to arbitration as provided for in the Agreement
and she cannot evade her contractual obligations by
making use of the courts as a subterfuge and nor can
she characterize as “employment discrimination”
claims that arise from differences between co-owners
of CRL.
Upon the grounds set forth above the appearing
parties maintain that if this Court holds that it has
jurisdiction to determine the arbitrability of Jane
151a
Doe’s claims, which eventuality we refute as we
maintain that it pertains to the arbitrator to decide
this, it is proper that it order that she proceed with
the arbitration that she voluntarily agreed to and
that has already been commenced by CRL. Jane Doe
should be required to comply with the Agreement and
submit her allegations to the arbitrator, as was
agreed.
D. FAA and Its Application in to Present Case
Two (2) recent cases from the United States
Supreme Court prevent Jane Doe from avoiding her
obligation to arbitrate her claims (in English, “any
Claim”) against the co-defendants. Last year the
United States Supreme Court reaffirmed that the
FAA preempts any state law that constitutes an
obstacle to the objective of Congress of allowing
implementation of arbitration agreements. AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepción, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753
(2011) (“Concepción”).
Furthermore, the United
States Supreme Court indicated that the States
cannot require proceedings that are inconsistent with
the FAA even if their result would be desirable for
other reasons. Id., at page 1753. On the contrary,
courts must implement arbitration agreements
according to their own terms. Id., at page 1742.
Furthermore, in Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v.
Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012) (“Marmet”), the United
States Supreme Court held that the FAA holds the
field and preempts any state public policy that may
prohibit arbitration in certain types of negligence
cases.
Without doubt, the mentioned cases require that
this Honorable Court implement the covenant of
152a
submission to arbitration in Section 14 of the
Agreement signed by the parties.
Even in instances where the parties have not
agreed to submit to arbitration controversies
regarding substantive arbitrability, courts are
tending to allow the controversy to be resolved
initially by the arbitrator when arbitrability cannot
be determined without going into the merits of the
controversy. Elkouri & Elkouri, How Arbitrations
Works, (BNA Books, 6th Edition 2003), at page 281.
(“However, even though the agreement does not
expressly leave the determination of arbitrability to
the arbitrator, and in spite of the fact that the parties
have first gone to court, courts have left the initial
determination to the arbitrator. This was the result,
for instance, where arbitrability could not be
determined without delving into the merits....”)
Thus, in Camden Indus. Co. v. Carpenters Local
1688, 353 F.3d 178 (1st Cir. 1969),
the First Circuit Court of Appeals held:
[English:]
should proceed to arbitration, where the
arbitrator may determine the subsidiary facts
upon which depend both the merits of the
controversy and his jurisdiction to decide it. A
finding of jurisdiction, unlike a finding on the
merits
when
jurisdiction
is
not
in
question...will
not
be
insulated
from
subsequent judicial review... We believe full
recognition of the role of labor arbitration
requires court intervention in a case such as
this only when it has become absolutely
153a
necessary, viz., on a petition to vacate or
enforce the award.
Id.
This is the very situation that has arisen in the
case at bar. What Jane Doe is inviting the Honorable
Court to do is to hear the merits of the controversy
regarding whether or not she is an employee as an
issue preliminary to adjudicating the arbitrability of
her claims. Clearly, this is an issue that, from all
perspectives, pertains to the arbitrator to resolve.
E. The FAA Recognizes a Strong Public Policy in
Favor of Arbitration that Requires the
Implementation of Arbitration as and to the
Extent Agreed To
This Honorable Court should compel Jane Doe to
submit her claims in the forum agreed to by the
parties, that is, arbitration before the AAA. This is
the case, given that a strong federal public policy
exists in favor of arbitration requiring that
arbitration agreements are to be presumed valid and
enforceable6. The United States Supreme Court has
Arbitration agreements are accorded a strong presumption of
validity:
6
[English] Where a written contract contains an
arbitration clause, there is a presumption of
arbitrability in the sense that a request for an order
compelling arbitration should not be denied by the
Court, unless it may be said with positive assurance
that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an
interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.
Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage.
Codecom, Inc. v. Alcatel Standard. S.A., 103 F.Supp.2d 65, 68-69 (D.P.R.
2000); See, also, Jorge-Colon v. Mandara Spa Puerto Rico, 685 F.Supp. 2d
154a
stated the following with regard to this strong public
policy:
[English:]
notwithstanding any state substantive or
procedural policies to the contrary.
****
declared a national policy favoring arbitration
and withdrew the power of the states to
require a judicial forum for the resolution of
claims which the contracting parties agreed to
resolve by arbitration.
Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
See, also, Concepción, 131 S. Ct. 1745, 1748 ([English]
“The FAA was enacted in 1925 in response to
widespread
judicial
hostility
to
arbitration
280, 283 (D.P.R. 2010) (“[Q]uestions of arbitrability must be
addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring
arbitration... and as a matter of federal law, any doubts
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in
favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the
construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of
waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); PaineWebber Inc. v. Elahi, 87 F.3d 589, 595 (1st Cir. 1996)
(“the Supreme Court has established a broad presumption of
arbitrability”); Brennan v. King, 139 F.3d 258, 264 (1st Cir. 1998) (“In FAA
cases, the Supreme Court precedents instruct courts to use a
particular hermeneutic principle for interpreting the breadth of
the agreement, viz., the presumption of arbitrability” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); World Films, Inc. v. Paramount Pict. Corp., 125
D.P.R. 352, 362 (1990) (“There is ... a presumption of “arbitrability”
when the contract has an arbitration clause.”)
155a
agreements.... The overarching purpose of the FAA,
evident in the text of §§ 2, 3, and 4, is to ensure the
enforcement of arbitration agreements according to
their terms so as to facilitate streamlined
proceedings.”) (internal quotation marks omitted and
emphasis added).
F. The FAA Preempts and Outlaws Any State Law
that Constitutes an Obstacle to Implementing
Covenants for Arbitration Pursuant to the
Terms of the Agreement
Jane Doe alleges that she should not be compelled
to arbitrate her claims. Specifically, she alleges the
following:
24. On March 22, 2012, CRL submitted a request
for arbitration (in English, “Demand for
Arbitration”) to the AAA …. .
25. By means of that request, CRL intends to
interfere with the exercise of the jurisdiction of
the Court to hear the complaint. If it were to
prevail, it would succeed in preventing JANE
DOE from exercising her rights to submit a
complaint before this Honorable Court setting
forth her claims of violation of constitutional
rights, occupational discrimination, and
retaliations, as well as injunction and damages
under the Constitution and laws of the [ELA].
See the Complaint, at page 4.
This intention on the part of Jane Doe to avoid her
obligation to arbitrate her claims against the codefendants is contrary to the federal public policy
established by means of the FAA and is not in
compliance with the law, as demonstrated below.
156a
The United States Supreme Court clearly
established in Concepción that the FAA preempts
and displaces all laws of the States impeding
achievement of the objectives of Congress in favor of
the implementation of covenants for arbitration. See
131 S. Ct., at page 1753. This is the case, considering
the fact that the general purpose of the FAA is to
ensure the implementation of arbitration agreements
in accordance with their own terms for the purposes
of facilitating more efficient proceedings. Id., at page
1748. Given that arbitration is a contractual matter,
the FAA requires that courts honor the expectations
of the parties. Id., at page 1752. This whole policy
strongly in favor of arbitration prevents arbitration
agreements from being invalidated by defenses that
apply only to arbitration and derive their significance
from the fact that a covenant for arbitration is
involved. Id., at page 1746.
Just one and a half months ago the United States
Supreme Court, in Marmet, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012),
held that the West Virginia Supreme Court had erred
in applying the public policy of that State, which
prohibits upholding the validity of an arbitration
clause contained in an old-age home membership
agreement signed prior to the occurrence of an
instance of negligence resulting in bodily injury or
death. Specifically, the United States Supreme Court
indicated the following, citing Concepción:
[English:]
[W]hen state law prohibits outright the
arbitration of a particular type of claim, the
analysis is straightforward: The conflicting
rule is displaced by the FAA. ...
West
Virginia’s prohibition against predispute
157a
agreements to arbitrate personal-injury or
wrongful-death claims against nursing home is
a categorical rule prohibiting arbitration of a
particular type of claim, and that rule is
contrary to the terms and coverage of the FAA.
Id., at pages 1203-04 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
Based on that, there can be no doubt that the FAA
preempts any statutory provision or provision under
the Constitution of Puerto Rico that fails to
implement and recognize a commitment made by the
parties to resolve “any Claim” by means of the
arbitration procedure agreed to in Section 14 of the
Agreement. It is thus proper for this Honorable Court
to order Jane Doe to arbitrate her claims against the
co-defendants.
G. The FAA Applies to Contracts in Interstate
Commerce and Therefore the Agreement Is
Covered by It
[English:]
“[A] trial court evaluating a contract connected to
some economic or commercial activity would
rarely, if ever, refuse to compel arbitration on
the ground that the transactions lacked
“involvement” in interstate commerce”
SCI v. Fulmer, 883 So.2d 621,629 (Ala. 2003)
(emphasis added).
It is an established rule that the FAA applies to
contracts in interstate commerce. See § 2 of the
FAA7; World Films, Inc., supra, at page 357 (the FAA
7
§ 2 of the FAA, to the extent pertinent, provides as follows:
[English:]
158a
“applies to contracts in interstate commerce….”).
Indeed, the Agreement is a contract in interstate
commerce because, among other reasons, it governs
the proprietary interests of the parties and the
operations of CRL in Puerto Rico and at its offices
outside of Puerto Rico. See SCI v. Fulmer, 883 So.2d
621, 629 (Ala 2003) ([English] “[I]t would be
economic or commercial activity that one
could...declare beyond the reach of Congress’s
power under the Commerce Clause, and, by
extension, under the FAA.”) (emphasis ours)8.
Furthermore, a great majority of its clients are
A written provision in...a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to
settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of
such contract...shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable ....
9 USCA § 2 (emphasis added).
8 See, also, Thomas H. Oehmke, Commercial Arbitration § 3:6
(2011) (“A contract needs only the slightest nexus to interstate
commerce to apply the FAA.”); 21 Willinston on Contracts § 57:
(4th ed. 2011) (“Consistent with the broad approach to
interpreting the term “involving commerce” in the (FAA), it has
been said that a contract containing an arbitration provision
need only be related to commerce to fall within the coverage of the
Act.”) (emphasis added); Bowen v. Security Pest Control, Inc.,
879 So.2d 1139, 1142 (Ala. 2003) (holding that the transaction
involved interstate commerce, in part because one of the parties
to the transaction did business in the two States). In fact, the
authority of Congress under the Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution is so broad that, in the last 75 years, only
two cases before the United States Supreme Court have held
that Congress exceeded its powers under the mentioned
Commerce Clause. See U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); US v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). Note that none of the statutes at
issue in these cases was aimed at governing transactions of a
purely economic nature but, rather, criminal conduct of a noneconomic nature.
159a
located outside of Puerto Rico (mainly in the United
States), which requires that CRL and its clients
maintain constant communications as part of the
operations thereof by means of the use of mail, the
internet, telephone, and other means of interstate
communications. Also of significance in this regard
are the economic nature of the Agreement and the
fact that the following federal statutes, among others,
apply to the relationship between CRL and those who
are appropriately considered employees: 1) Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78; 2)
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29
U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654; 3) Family Medical Leave Act of
2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17; 4) Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964; and 5) Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621-34. So, it is clear that, like the contracts in
the Allied-Bruce and Citizens cases, the Agreement is
a contract in interstate commerce to which the FAA
is applicable.
Therefore, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of
the United States Constitution9, the FAA preempts
any statutory provision or provision under the
Constitution of Puerto Rico that fails to implement
and recognize a commitment made by the parties to
resolve “any Claim” by means of the arbitration
procedure agreed to in Section 14 of the Agreement.
Such procedure commenced on March 22, 2012, by
means of the submittal of the [English:] Demand for
Arbitration to the AAA. In view of this circumstance,
In Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984), the
United States Supreme Court held that when a state law
directly conflicts with § 2 of the FAA it violates the Supremacy
Clause.
9
160a
the FAA requires that this procedure proceed without
further intervention from this Honorable Court than
what may be necessary in order to compel
arbitration.
III. CONCLUSION
The appearing parties have provided to this
Honorable Court weighty and decisive grounds in
support of their position that it is within the
jurisdiction of the arbitrator to decide the
controversies covered by the Agreement, that no
employee-employer relationship exists between Jane
Doe and the appearing parties, that this is nothing
more than an attempt on the part of Jane Doe to
shirk her contractual obligations under the
Agreement, that her claims are susceptible to
arbitration under the Agreement, that the Agreement
is covered by the FAA, and that the compulsory
arbitration agreed to by the parties should be ordered
to take place.
UPON WHICH GROUNDS the appearing
parties respectfully request that this Honorable
Court, in accordance with the grounds outlined
herein, dismiss the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction
and that it compel Jane Doe to submit to arbitration.
Furthermore, the appearing parties respectfully
request that Jane Doe and/or her attorneys at law be
ordered to pay the costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees
applicable.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, today, April 11, 2012.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
I DO CERTIFY: That, on this same date, I have
personally delivered and sent by regular mail a true
and accurate copy of the present document to Jane
161a
Doe’s attorneys at law Juan R. González Muñoz, Esq.,
González Muñoz Law Office, P.S.C., P.O. Box
9024055, San Juan, PR 00902-4055 and Manuel
Porro Vizcarra, Esq., Manuel Porro Vizcarra Law
Offices, 382 Ave. Escorial, Urb. Caparra Heights, San
Juan, PR 00920.
MENDOZA LAW OFFICES
Attorney for the Defendants
PO Box 9282
San Juan, Puerto Rico 00908-0282
Tel. (787) 722-5522; 5530; 5540
Fax (787) 723-7057
email: [email protected]
/s/
TSPR-8304
162a
1123 Broadway
New York, NY 10010
Tel. 212 447 6060
Fax 212 447 6257
LanguageWorks
STATE OF NEW YORK
)
) ss:
CERTIFICATION
translation from Spanish into English of a Motion to
Compel filed in the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico by
Enrique J. Mendoza Mendez, Esq. on April 11, 2012,
completed on December 12, 2012.
/s/
Christine Muller
Vice President
December, 2012
/s/
Notary Public
163a
APPENDIX G
TRIBUNAL DE APELACIONES
REGIÓN JUDICIAL DE SAN JUAN
JANE DOE,
Demandante- Recurrida
v.
COMPAÑÍA
DE
RESPONSABILIDAD
LIMITADA
(“CRL”);
FULANO
DE
TAL,
personalmente, en su carácter de patrono de JANE
DOE y como co-administrador de la Sociedad Legal
de Bienes Gananciales (“SLG”) constituida con
FULANA DE TAL, quien es demandada como coadministradora de la SLG constituida con Fulano de
Tal; “SLG Fulano y Fulana de Tal” constituida por
Fulano y Fulana de Tal; SUTANO DE CUAL
DOE y como co-administrador de la SLG constituida
con SUTANA DE CUAL, quien es demandada como
co-administradora de la “SLG Sutano y Sutana de
Cual” constituida con Sutano de Cual; “SLG Sutano y
Sutana” constituida por Sutano y Sutana de Cual;
ESPERENCEJO MAS CUAL personalmente, en su
carácter de patrono de JANE DOE y como coadministrador
de
la
SLG
constituida
con
ESPERENCEJA MAS CUAL, quien es demandada
como co-administradora de la SLG constituida con
Esperencejo Mas Cual; “SLG Esperencejo Y
Esperenceja Mas Cual” constituida por Esperencejo Y
Esperenceja Más Cual; Demandados Desconocidos A,
164a
B y C; Demandadas Compañías Aseguradoras,
Desconocidas X, Y, Z,
Demandados-– Peticionarios.
___________
NÚM.CASO TA.:
___________
NÚM.CASO TPI: KPE 2012-1204 (904)
SALA DE SAN JUAN
___________
CONFIDENCIAL
165a
MOCIÓN SOMETIENDO BAJO SELLO
“SOLICITUD DE CERTIORARI” Y SOLICITUD
AL AMPARO DE LA REGLA 70(D)
COMPARECEN
los
demandados-peticionarios,1
Fulano de Tal y la Sociedad Legal de Bienes
Gananciales (“SLG”) constituida con Fulana de Tal,
Sutano de Cual y la SLG constituida con Sutana de
Cual y Esperencejo Más Cual y la SLG constituida
con
Esperenceja
Más
Cual
y
respetuosamente
someten bajo sello su Solicitud de Certiorari y una
Solicitud al Amparo de la Regla 70(d) para la
Aceptación de Solicitud de Certiorari Que Excede el
Máximo de Páginas Reglamentarias y solicitan del
Tribunal que los documentos, y los procedimientos
apelativos así iniciados, se mantengan confidenciales
y bajo sello por los fundamentos expuestos a
continuación:
Declaración Jurada Bajo Sello de la demandante-recurrida
sometida junto con la Demanda y las subsiguientes enmiendas,
dicha parte identificó a cada uno de los demandados recurridos
con sus respectivos nombres, direcciones y teléfonos. (Apéndice
Solicitud de Certiorari (“Ap. TA”, págs. 12-13; 303-305; y 506.)
1
166a
1.
El recurso de certiorari de epígrafe tiene su
origen en un pleito de sentencia declaratoria e
injunction incoado por Jane Doe, quien fue Miembro
Capital de la demandada CRL. Según se explica en
la Solicitud de Certoriari, media entre las partes una
cláusula de arbitraje que requiere que cualquier
disputa entre las partes se ventile de forma
confidencial. (Ap. TA., págs. 97-98.) Además los
Miembros Capitales presentes y pasados de CRL
tienen un deber de mantener confidencial toda
información relacionada a los asuntos de la firma
(“business of the firm”). (Ap. TA., pág. 93.)
2.
De
conformidad
confidencialidad
con
impuesta
la
por
la
obligación
de
cláusula
de
arbitraje, la demandante- recurrida, Jane Doe,
comenzó los procedimientos ante el Tribunal de
Primera Instancia (“TPI”) bajo sello y los mismos se
han mantenido confidenciales hasta la fecha. (Ap.
TA., págs. 132-133.)
3.
En cumplimiento de sus obligaciones de
confidencialidad, CRL y los demás demandados por
este medio someten su Solicitud de Certiorari y una
Solicitud al Amparo de la Regla 70(d) para la
167a
Aceptación de Solicitud de Certoriari Que Excede el
Máximo de Páginas Reglamentarías y solicitan del
Tribunal que los documentos, y los procedimientos
apelativos así iniciados, se mantegan confidenciales y
bajo sello.
4.
Anejo la portada de la Solicitud de Certiorari,
la cual incluye toda la información requerida por las
Reglas
de
este
Honorable
Tribunal
y
el
correspondiente sello de Rentas Internas.
POR TODO LO CUAL, los demandados-peticionarios,
con
Esperenceja
Más
Cual
y
respetuosamente
someten bajo sello su Solicitud de Certiorari y
solicitan
del
Tribunal
que
los
documentos
y
procedimientos apelativos así iniciados se mantengan
confidenciales.
Respetuosamente sometido.
CERTIFICO que he notificado copia fiel y exacta del
presente
escrito,
simultáneamente
con
su
168a
presentación, por correo electrónico y mensajero a los
abogados de la parte demandante-recurrida, el Lcdo.
Juan R. González Muñoz, González Muñoz Law
Office, 261 Tetuán, San Juan, Puerto Rico 009011916; [email protected]; y el Lcdo. Manuel Porro
Vizcarra, Manuel Porro Vizcarra Law Offices, 382
Ave. Escorial, Urb. Caparra Heights, San Juan, PR
00920; [email protected].
En San Juan, Puerto Rico, hoy 12 de junio de 2012.
MENDOZA LAW OFFICES Abogados de los
Demandados-Peticionarios PO Box 9282
Teléfonos: (787) 722-5522; 5530; 5540
Fax: (787) 723-7057
Por:
/s/
Enrique J. Mendoza Mérrdez
TSPR-8304
[email protected]
169a
REGIÓN DE SAN JUAN
JANE DOE,
v.
COMPAÑÍA
DE
RESPONSABILIDAD
LIMITADA
(“CRL”);
FULANO
DE
TAL,
de
la
SLG
constituida
con
170a
___________
NÚM.CASO TA.:
___________
NÚM.CASO TPI: KPE 2012-1204 (904)
SALA DE SAN JUAN
___________
CONFIDENCIAL
Naturaleza:
Certiorari Civil
Materia:
Sentencia Declaratoria; Injunction
Preliminar
y
Permanente;
Violación a la Política Pública y
Derechos
Constitucionales;
Represalias; Daños y Perjuicios
Asunto:
Denegación de Resolución de
Referir
Caso
a
Arbitraje
Validamente Pactado
171a
Abogados de la
DemandanteRecurrida Jane Doe:
Lcdo. Juan Rafael
González Muñoz
TSPR-8185
GONZALEZ MUÑOZ
LAW OFFICE,
P.S.C.
PO Box 9024055
San Juan, P.R. 009024055
Tel. (787)766-5052
Fax: (787)766-5551
[email protected]
[email protected]
m
Lcdo. Manuel Porro
Vizcarra
TSPR-7994
MANUEL PORRO
VIZCARRA LAW
OFFICES
382 Avenida Escorial
Urb. Caparra Heights
San Juan, P.R. 00920
Tel. (787)774-8200
Fax: (787)774-8297
[email protected]
Abogados de los
DemandadosPeticionarios
Lcdo. Enrique J.
Mendoza Méndez
TSPR-8304
MENDOZA LAW
OFFICES
PO Box 9282
San Juan, P.R. 009080282
Tel. (787)7225522;5530;5540
Fax: (787)723-7057
[email protected]
172a
JANE DOE,
v.
COMPAÑÍA
DE
RESPONSABILIDAD
LIMITADA
(“CRL”);
FULANO
DE
TAL,
de
la
SLG
constituida
con
173a
___________
NÚM.CASO TA.:
___________
NÚM.CASO TPI: KPE 2012-1204 (904)
SALA DE SAN JUAN
___________
SOLICITUD DE AUTORIZACIÓN BAJO LA
REGLA 70(D) PARA LA ACEPTACIÓN DE
SOLICITUD DE CERTIORARI QUE EXCEDE
DEL MÁXIMO DE PÁGINAS
REGLAMENTARIAS
AL HONORABLE TRIBUNAL DE APELACIONES:
COMPARECEN
los
demandados-peticionarios,
con Esperenceja Más Cual, y respetuosamente
solicitan permiso para presentar su Solicitud de
Certoriari en exceso de tres (3) páginas por los
fundamentos expuestos a continuación.
1.
La Regla 34(D) del Reglamento del Tribunal de
Apelaciones dispone que la solicitud de Certoriari no
174a
excederá de veinticinco (25) páginas. 4 L.P.R.A. Ap.
XXII-B R. 34(D)
2.
La Regla 70(D) establece que “[c]uando estas
reglas dispongan un número máximo de páginas para
un escrito, no se aceptará escrito alguno en exceso de
dicho máximo a menos que venga acompañado de
una moción por separado en la que solicite al
tribunal permiso para excederse del máximo
prescrito y se demuestre justa causa”. 4 L.P.R.A.
Ap. XXII-B R. 70. (Énfasis suplido.)
3.
Los comparecientes solicitan respetuosamente
que este Honorable Tribunal le exima de cumplir con
el
requisito
de
número
máximo
de
páginas
establecido. A pesar del interés de los comparecientes
de conformar su escrito a la Regla antes citada, la
exposición adecuada y suficiente de los hechos y el
Derecho hizo necesario el que nos excediéramos por
tan sólo tres (3) págs.
4.
Exponer en tan sólo veinticinco (25) páginas el
contenido de la Solicitud de Certoriari socavaría
insalvablemente su sentido, claridad y coherencia y
podría dejar fuera argumentos importantes y de peso.
En vista de ello, muy respetuosamente solicitamos
175a
que se autorice que la parte demandada-peticionaria
se exceda en el número de páginas de su escrito,
permitiendo así que los planteamientos que este
Honorable Tribunal de Apelaciones ha de considerar
estén argumentados de una forma clara, completa y
responsable. Ese es el único fin perseguido por los
comparecientes.
POR
TODO
LO
CUAL,
la
parte
demandada-
peticionaria muy respetuosamente solicita que este
Ilustrado
Tribunal
de
Apelaciones
autorice
la
presentación de la Solicitud de Certoriari con un total
de páginas en exceso de lo contemplado por el
Reglamento del Tribunal.
RESPETUOSAMENTE SOMETIDO.
presente
escrito,
simultáneamente
con
su
Office, 261 Tetuán, San Juan, Puerto Rico 00901-
176a
1916; [email protected]; y el Lcdo. Manuel Porro
MENDOZA LAW OFFICES
Abogados de los demandados-peticionarios
PO Box 9282
Teléfonos: (787) 722-5522; 5530; 5540
Fax: (787) 723-7057
Correo elecrónico:
[email protected]
/s/
TSPR-8304
177a
JANE DOE,
v.
COMPAÑÍA
DE
RESPONSABILIDAD
LIMITADA
(“CRL”);
FULANO
DE
TAL,
de
la
SLG
constituida
con
178a
___________
NÚM.CASO TA.:
___________
NÚM.CASO TPI: KPE 2012-1204 (904)
SALA DE SAN JUAN
___________
CONFIDENCIAL
Naturaleza:
Certiorari Civil
Materia:
Sentencia Declaratoria; Injunction
Preliminar
y
Permanente;
Violación a la Política Pública y
Derechos
Constitucionales;
Represalias; Daños y Perjuicios
Asunto:
Denegación de Resolución de
Referir
Caso
a
Arbitraje
Validamente Pactado
179a
Abogados de la
DemandanteRecurrida Jane Doe:
Lcdo. Juan Rafael
González Muñoz
TSPR-8185
GONZALEZ MUÑOZ
LAW OFFICE,
P.S.C.
PO Box 9024055
San Juan, P.R. 009024055
Tel. (787)766-5052
Fax: (787)766-5551
[email protected]
[email protected]
m
Lcdo. Manuel Porro
Vizcarra
TSPR-7994
MANUEL PORRO
VIZCARRA LAW
OFFICES
Tel. (787)774-8200
Fax: (787)774-8297
[email protected]
Abogados de los
DemandadosPeticionarios
Lcdo. Enrique J.
Mendoza Méndez
TSPR-8304
MENDOZA LAW
OFFICES
PO Box 9282
San Juan, P.R. 009080282
Tel. (787)7225522;5530;5540
Fax: (787)723-7057
[email protected]
180a
JANE DOE,
v.
COMPAÑÍA
DE
RESPONSABILIDAD
carácter de patrono de JANE DOE y como coadministrador de la SLG constituida con
Esperenceja Mas Cual” constituida por Esperencejo
Y Esperenceja Más Cual; Demandados Desconocidos
A, B y C; Demandadas Compañías Aseguradoras,
181a
___________
NUM.CASO TA.:
___________
NUM.CASO TPI: KPE 2012-1204 (904)
Sala De San Juan
___________
SOLICITUD DE CERTIORARI
AL HONORABLE TRIBUNAL DE APELACIONES:
COMPARECEN
los
demandados2-peticionarios,
solicitan la expedición del auto de Certoriari para
revocar la Resolución emitida por el Tribunal de
Primera Instancia (“TPI”) el 4 de junio de 2012 que
dicha parte identificó a cada uno de los demandados- recurridos
con sus respectivos nombres, direcciones y teléfonos. (Apéndice
Solicitud de Certoriari (“Ap. TA”, págs. 12-13; 303-305; y 506.)
2
182a
negó compeler a la parte demandante-recurrida a
arbitrar sus reclamos.
I. INTRODUCCIÓN
Mediante la Resolución recurrida en esta Solicitud de
Certiorari, el TPI ha avalado que Jane Doe, una
abogada sofisticada con estudios post-graduados en
Derecho y con 38 años de experiencia en el litigio
comercial y el derecho laboral, incumpla con su
obligación de arbitrar y ventilar confidencialmente
cualquier reclamación o demanda contra CRL. CRL
es
una
compañía
de
responsabilidad
limitada
organizada bajo las leyes del Estado Libre Asociado
de Puerto Rico, con oficinas principales en San Juan y
una oficina fuera de Puerto Rico que provee servicios
a una clientela foránea y local. (Ap. TA., págs. 38126.)
La demandante-recurrida contrajo la obligación de
arbitrar
y
ventilar
confidencialmente
cualquier
reclamación o demanda contra CRL en la Sección 14
del Acuerdo Operativo (“Acuerdo”) que suscribió con
los otros Miembros Capitales de CRL, quiénes
también contrajeron dicha obligación. (Ap. TA., págs.
183a
97-99.) La Sección 14 del Acuerdo reza en su primer
párrafo:
It is the intent and purpose of the Firm and any
Claimant to resolve any claim by mediation or
arbitration. The Claimant expressly agrees that the
Claim shall be settled or resolved through the
procedures set forth herein, and shall not in any way
circumvent or otherwise challenge in any way these
proceedings relative to mediation and arbitration.
(Ap. TA., pág. 97.) A pesar del amplísimo alcance de
esta cláusula de arbitraje que abarca “any Claim”, es
decir
“cualquier
reclamación”,3
la Resolución
recurrida concluyó que Jane Doe no tiene que
someter a arbitraje sus reclamos de represalias,
daños, y discrimen y que las mismas deberán ser
adjudicadas por el Tribunal. (Ap.TA., págs. 484-498.)
Por los fundamentos resumidos a continuación, y
explicados
en
detalle
en
esta
solicitud,
los
demandados-peticionarios solicitan de este Honorable
El Acuerdo define “Claim” como “any action, suit, complaint or
demand of whatever nature and for whatever relief against the
Firm or any of its Members or employees.” (“cualquier acción,
pleito, demanda o reclamación de cualquier naturaleza y para
cualquier reparación o remedio en contra de la Firma o
cualquiera de sus Miembros o empleados.)
3
184a
Tribunal que expida el recurso de certiorari y revoque
la Resolución recurrida.
Primero, el TPI erróneamente asumió jurisdicción
sobre la controversia de si Jane Doe está obligada a
arbitrar sus reclamos contra CRL y los demás codemandados. La cláusula de arbitraje pactada por
Jane Doe y todos los Miembros Capitales de CRL
dispone que el arbitraje ha de regirse por las Reglas
de Arbitraje Comercial de la American Arbitration
Association (“AAA”), las cuales a su vez delegan en el
árbitro la potestad de determinar su jurisdicción y el
alcance
de
la
cláusula
de
arbitraje.
Bajo
la
jurisprudencia aplicable ello es evidencia suficiente
en Derecho (clara e inequívoca) de que la intención de
las partes es confiar al árbitro las decisiones sobre
arbitrabilidad, y no a los tribunals.
Segundo,
jurisdicción
habiendo
sobre
la
asumido
disputa
erróneamente
en
cuanto
a
arbitrabilidad, el TPI resolvió incorrectamente la
misma. Para ello tuvo que hacer caso omiso de la
letra clara de la Sección 14.01 del Acuerdo donde los
Miembros Capitales de CLR acordaron someter a
arbitraje cualquier reclamación (“any claim”) sin
185a
importar su naturaleza o el remedio solicitado. Al
actuar así, el TPI desacató la norma de interpretación
prescrita por la Ley Federal de Arbitraje (“FAA”) y su
jurisprudencia interpretativa que requiere que las
dudas sobre arbitrabilidad sean resueltas a favor del
arbitraje. Asimismo, el TPI desacató el principio
elemental de interpretación de contratos bajo el
derecho puertorriqueño de que cuando los términos
de un contrato son claros y no presentan ambigüedad,
sus disposiciones se aplicarán según el sentido literal
que le dieron las partes. Art. 1233 del Código Civil, 31
L.P.R.A. § 3471.
Tercero, y por último, el TPI erró al denegar el
arbitraje pactado por las partes debido a la supuesta
naturaleza “de empleo” o “laboral” y “constitucional”
de
los
alegados
reclamos
de
Jane
Doe.
Esta
determinación del TPI viola el FAA, la Cláusula de
Supremacía de la Constitución de los Estados Unidos
y la jurisprudencia interpretativa de ambas que
desplazan (“preempt”) cualquier intento de prohibir el
arbitraje de ciertos tipos de reclamaciones.
186a
II. JURISDICCIÓN
La jurisdicción de este Honorable Tribunal de
Apelaciones (“TA”) para entender en esta Solicitud de
Certoriari surge del Artículo 4.006(b) de la Ley de la
Judicatura del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico
(2003), 4 L.P.R.A. § 24y(b); las Reglas 31, 32(D), 3334 y 40 del Reglamento del TA, 4 L.P.R.A. Ap. XXIIB, R. 33-34 y 40; y las Reglas 52.1 y 52.2(b) de
Procedimiento Civil de Puerto Rico, 32 L.P.R.A. Ap.
V, R. 52.1 y 52.2(b).
III. DECISIÓN CUYA REVISIÓN SE SOLICITA
CRL y los demás demandados solicitan la revocación
de la Resolución emitida por el TPI en el caso, Jane
Doe v. Compañía de Responsabilidad Limitada et al.,
KPE 2012-1204 (904) (Hon. Juez Ángel R. Pagán
Ocasio), Sala de San Juan, el 4 de junio de 2012, y
enviada a las partes por correo electrónico ese mismo
día (en adelante “Resolución”). (Ap. TA., págs. 484498.)
La
Resolución
denegó
la
Solicitud
de
Desestimación por Falta de Jurisdicción y para
Compeler Arbitraje Compulsorio en Vista de Acuerdo
Vinculante
de
Arbitraje
presentada
por
los
demandados-peticionarios el 11 de abril de 2012 (en
187a
adelante “Solicitud de Desestimación”) (Ap. TA., págs.
38- 126.)
Dado que la Resolución del TPI se notificó el 4 de
junio, el término de 30 días que tienen los
comparecientes para presentar el presente recurso
vence el 5 de julio de 2012.4 Este recurso ha sido
presentado a tiempo y el Tribunal tiene jurisdicción
para entender en el mismo.
Al presente no existe otro recurso sobre este caso
pendiente ante este Tribunal ni ante el Tribunal
Supremo de Puerto Rico.
IV. PROCEDENCIA DE LA EXPEDICIÓN DEL
RECURSO
El presente recurso cumple con los criterios de la
Regla 52.1 de Procedimiento Civil, supra, (“Regla
En atención a la naturaleza de la Resolución recurrida -que
deniega una solicitud para compeler arbitraje según pactado por
las partes- y el hecho de que el TPI tiene plena intención de
continuar con los procedimientos ante sí, para lo cual ha
ordenado la consolidación del injunction preliminar con el
permanente y ordenó a las partes a someter estipulaciones el
pasado 8 de junio de 2012, CRL y los demás demandados han
presentado junto a esta Solicitud de Certoriari una Moción
Urgente en Auxilio de Jurisdicción. En dicha moción se solicita
respetuosamente de este Honorable Tribunal que, en auxilio de
su jurisdicción, ordene la paralización de los procedimientos del
TPI y que se mantenga la confidencialidad de los expedientes e
identidad de las partes.
4
188a
52.1”) y la Regla 40 del Reglamento del TA, supra,
(“Regla 40”) para su expedición.
La Resolución del TPI denegó la moción dispositiva y
para
compeler
arbitraje
demandados-peticionarios.
presentada
En
dicha
por
los
moción
se
planteó que el TPI no tenía jurisdicción sobre la
acción instada por Jane Doe (“Jane”) dado que entre
las partes existe un acuerdo claro e inequívoco que
requiere
que
las
partes
sometan
cualquier
reclamación entre ellas a arbitraje y que sea el
árbitro el que resuelva cualquier controversia sobre si
las reclamaciones de Jane son arbitrables o no.
Además,
los
demandados-peticionarios
argumentaron, en la alternativa, que conforme al
pacto de sumisión en cuestión procede que el TPI
ordene a Jane a arbitrar sus reclamos contra éstos.
La Resolución del TPI denegó dichos argumentos y
resuelve, en violación a la fuerte política pública
establecida en la § 2 del FAA y la Ley de Arbitraje de
Puerto Rico (“LAPR”), que: (a) es al TPI al que le
corresponde
resolver
la
controversia
sobre
arbitrabilidad, y; (b) que Jane no viene obligada a
arbitrar sus reclamaciones de alegado discrimen
189a
laboral, represalias y daños por no estar éstas
cobijadas por la cláusula de arbitraje suscrita por las
partes. (Ap. TA., págs. 484-498.) El TPI llegó a la
referida conclusión a pesar de que la cláusula de
arbitraje requiere que Jane dilucide toda reclamación
(“any Claim”) contra los demandados-peticionarios
mediante
el
procedimiento
de
arbitraje
independientemente de la naturaleza de la
misma.
(Ap.
TA.,
págs.
66
(“Claim”);
97-98
(“Resolution of Claim’’).)
Como veremos más adelante, la Resolución del TPI
adolece de la hostilidad hacia el arbitraje que el FAA
pretende
erradicar.
AT&T
Mobility
LLC
v.
Concepción, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011)(“The FAA
was enacted ... in response to widespread judicial
hostility to arbitration agreements.”)
La Regla 52.1, en lo pertinente, dispone que el
recurso de certiorari solamente será expedido por este
Honorable Tribunal: (1) cuando se recurra de la
denegatoria de una moción de carácter dispositivo, (2)
en casos que revistan interés público o (3) en
cualquier otra situación en la cual esperar a la
apelación constituiría un fracaso irremediable de la
190a
justicia. Las tres excepciones están presentes en este
caso.
La primera excepción de la Regla 52.1 es de
aplicación, pues, como vimos, la Resolución del TPI
denegó la moción dispositiva5 de los demandadospeticionarios que establece la improcedencia de la
acción judicial instada por Jane dado que las
controversias sobre arbitrabilidad deben ser resueltas
por el propio árbitro y que Jane viene obligada
contractualmente a tramitar todos sus reclamos
mediante un procedimiento confidencial de arbitraje.
La
segunda
excepción
también
se
satisface
plenamente, pues no existe duda alguna de que tanto
bajo la LAPR como bajo el FAA el arbitraje es materia
revestida del más alto interés público. Perry v.
Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987) (“[l]n enacting § 2
of [FAA], Congress declared a national policy
favoring
arbitration...”)
(Énfasis
nuestro);
Constructora Estelar v. Aut. Edif. Pub., 2011 T.S.P.R.
139, pág. 13, 183 D.P.R.____ (“[E]n Puerto Rico existe
una
vigorosa
política
pública
a
favor
del
Véase Solicitud de Desestimación por Falta de Jurisdicción y
para Compeler Arbitraje Compulsorio en Vista de Acuerdo
Vinculante de Arbitraje. (Ap. TA., págs. 38-126.)
5
191a
arbitraje como método alterno para la solución de
disputas y toda duda sobre si procede o no el arbitraje
debe resolverse a favor de éste conforme ha sido
pactado.”) (Énfasis Nuestro.)
Igualmente, la tercera excepción es de aplicación.
Sería
impráctico
y
constituiría
un
fracaso
irremediable de la justicia tener que esperar hasta la
resolución final del caso en el foro judicial para poder
presentar
una
apelación
ante
este
Honorable
Tribunal y plantear como error que los reclamos
planteados por Jane debieron ser adjudicados en un
procedimiento confidencial de arbitraje. A manera de
derecho comparado, en Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Westighouse Elec. Corp., 861 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1988)
(caso resolviendo que las denegatorias de órdenes
compeliendo
el
arbitraje
son
apelables
interlocutoriamente), el Tribunal de Apelaciones de
los Estados Unidos para el Cuarto Circuito reconoció
que las órdenes denegando arbitraje pueden causar
daño
irreparable
si
no
son
revisadas
interlocutoriamente:
[o]rders denying arbitration do have an injunctive
effect and have ‘serious, perhaps, irreparable,
192a
consequence’. The order is injunctive because it
enjoins proceedings in another tribunal. It has
serious
consequences
‘irreparable
harm
because
that
of
exists
the
when
arbitration is denied ab initio...’ If a party
must undergo the expense and delay of trial before
being able to appeal, the advantages of arbitrationspeed and economy-are lost forever.
Véase 861 F.2d, en la pág. 422; Véase además City of
Meridian Miss, v. Algernon Blair. Inc.. 721 F.2d 525,
529 (5t0 Cir. 1983) (un injunction paralizando un
arbitraje constituye daño irreparable debido a los
costos de litigar). Evidentemente, de este Honorable
Tribunal
no
intervenir
en
esta
etapa
de
los
procedimientos, los remedios solicitados por los
demandados-peticionarios se tornarían académicos.
Por otro lado, de no expedirse el auto de Certoriari, se
le estaría permitiendo a Jane burlar su obligación de
someter a arbitraje confidencial toda reclamación, de
cualquier naturaleza, que pudiera tener en contra de
los demandados, obligación que contrajo libre y
voluntariamente.
193a
Además, como veremos a continuación, los criterios
de la Regla 40 para la expedición del recurso de
Certoriari se satisfacen en el presente caso.6 Veamos.
Según se discute a lo largo del presente escrito, la
Resolución del TPI es contraria a derecho y, en
particular,
a
las
normas
sobre
arbitraje
e
interpretación de contratos, pues resuelve que Jane
no está obligada a seguir el procedimiento de
arbitraje que dio inicio el 22 de marzo de 2012 ante el
American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) a pesar de
que el acuerdo entre las partes requiere que Jane
presente en el arbitraje todos sus reclamos contra los
demandados
(“resolve
any
Claim
by
...
arbitration”) independiente de la naturaleza de los
Dichos criterios son:
(A) Si el remedio y la disposición de la decisión recurrida, a
diferencia de su fundamentos, son contrario a derecho.
(B) Si la situación de hechos planteada es la más indicada
para el análisis del problema.
(C) Si ha mediado perjuicio, parcialidad o error craso y
manifiesto en la apreciación de la prueba por el [TPI].
(D) ....
(E) Si la etapa del procedimiento en que se presenta el caso es
la más propicia para su consideración.
(F) Si la expedición del auto o de la orden de mostrar causa no
causan un fraccionamiento indebido del pleito y una dilación
indeseable en la solución final del litigio.
(G) Si la expedición del auto o de la orden de mostrar causa
evita un fracaso de la justicia.
6
194a
mismos (“any action ... of whatever nature ...
against the Firm or any of its Members...”), En
consecuencia, procede expedir el recurso de Certoriari
de conformidad con el inciso (A) de la Regla 40.
El TPI cometió un error craso en su interpretación y
apreciación de la cláusula de arbitraje. Ello, pues, del
texto de la cláusula de arbitraje en cuestión surge
claramente que es el árbitro quien tiene la obligación
de resolver las controversias planteadas por Jane
ante el foro judicial. En consecuencia, procede expedir
recurso de Certoriari de conformidad con el inciso (C)
de la Regla 40.
Tampoco existe duda de que, de conformidad con el
inciso (B) de la Regla 40, la situación de hechos que
se plantea es la más indicada para el análisis de la
controversia ante este Ilustrado Tribunal, pues para
su resolución sólo se requiere que el Tribunal
interprete la cláusula de arbitraje pactada de
conformidad
con
el
FAA
y
las
normas
de
interpretación contractual.
La intervención del Honorable Tribunal en esta etapa
es la más propicia para su consideración, pues de no
paralizarse los trámites ante el TPI, se tornará
195a
académica la obligación de Jane de ventilar sus
reclamos ante el foro arbitral y se causaría daño
irreparable a los demandados-peticionarios al verse
incumplidos los compromisos pactados de llevar a
cabo un procedimiento de arbitraje confidencial.
En consecuencia, a los fines de evitar un fracaso de la
justicia procede expedir el recurso de Certoriari de
conformidad con los incisos (G)-(l) de la Regla 40.
V. RELACIÓN DE HECHOS PROCESALES Y
SUSTANTIVOS MATERIALES DEL CASO
A. Relación de Hechos Procesales.
1. El 2 de abril de 2012, Jane presentó ante el TPI
Demanda
Jurada
y
Solicitud
de
Sentencia
Declaratoria e Injunction Preliminar y Permanente
(“Demanda”). Jane alegó en la Demanda que no le es
de aplicación la cláusula de arbitraje del “Operating
Agreement”
o
Acuerdo
Operacional
de
CRL
(“Acuerdo”) arguyendo que ese contrato sólo regula
las operaciones comerciales y administrativas de
CRL. Jane Doe alegó además que sus reclamaciones
son de índole laboral y que éstas están cobijadas por
la Constitución de Puerto Rico, la Ley Núm. 100 de
30 de junio de 1959 (edad), la Ley Núm. 69 de 6 de
196a
julio de 1985 (sexo y represalias), la Ley Núm. 115 de
20 de diciembre de 1991 (represalias) y el Manual de
Empleados de CRL (“Manual”), el cual no contiene
cláusula de arbitraje. A esos efectos, Jane solicitó que
el TPI declare inaplicable la cláusula de arbitraje del
Acuerdo a sus alegadas reclamaciones laborales y que
se ordene a CRL a que solicite la paralización del
arbitraje bajo la Regla 57 de Procedimiento Civil en lo
que el TPI resuelve la controversia planteada sobre
arbitrabilidad. (Ap. Ta., págs. 1-13.) Como se expone
en la relación de hechos materiales, las alegaciones
de Jane a los efectos de que el Acuerdo no tiene
pertinencia
a
sus
reclamos
son
abiertamente
contradictorias a la reclamación extrajudicial que
hizo
Jane
al
Consejo
Directo
de
CRL
donde
expresamente enmarcó los mismos reclamos como
violaciones al Acuerdo. (Ap. TA., págs. 119-123.)
2. Junto con la Demanda, Jane presentó una Moción
Solicitando injunction Preliminar y Permanente
(“Solicitud
de
Injunction”),
en
la
que
solicitó
igualmente una orden para paralizar el arbitraje en
lo que el TPI resuelve la Sentencia Declaratoria, pero
con el pedido de que una vez la misma sea resuelta a
197a
favor de Jane dicho foro convierta la orden de
paralización en permanente y proceda a resolver en
los méritos las controversias planteadas. (Ap. TA.,
págs. 14-19.)
3. Además, Jane presentó una Moción Urgente en
Solicitud de Orden a los fines de que todos los
procedimientos
se
mantengan
estrictamente
confidenciales. (Ap. TA., págs. 20-21.)
4. El 3 de abril de 2012, el TPI emitió una Orden
señalando una vista para el 11 de abril de 2012, para
dilucidar la procedencia del recurso extraordinario
solicitado. (Ap. TA., págs. 23.)
5. El 11 de abril de 2012, los demandadospeticionarios
Desestimación,
presentaron
en
la
una
Solicitud
de
que
esencialmente
argumentaron que el Acuerdo es un contrato en el
comercio interestatal, por lo que es de aplicación el
FAA, que conforme a la cláusula de arbitraje del
Acuerdo toda controversia sobre si los reclamos de
Jane son arbitrables o no le corresponde resolverla al
propio árbitro y no al TPI y que, en la alternativa,
procede que el TPI reconozca que mediante la Sección
14.04 del Acuerdo Jane se obligó a tramitar todos su
198a
reclamos
mediante
(“any
el
Claim”)
de forma
procedimiento
confidencial
de
arbitraje
independientemente de la naturaleza de los reclamos
o si éstos surgen bajo el Acuerdo. Además, los
demandados-peticionarios argumentaron que bajo la
Cláusula de Supremacía de la Constitución de los
Estados Unidos, independientemente de la alegada
naturaleza
constitucional
y
laboral
de
las
reclamaciones de Jane, la § 2 del FAA requiere que
dichos reclamos sean adjudicados en el procedimiento
de arbitraje iniciado ante la AAA. (Ap. TA., págs. 38126.)
6. Ese mismo día se celebró una vista en la cual se
acordó que los demandados-peticionarios paralizarían
sus gestiones en el caso de arbitraje en lo que el TPI
resolvía
las
mociones
presentadas
sobre
arbitrabilidad, que se mantendría la confidencialidad
del expediente y que todo documento se presentaría
bajo sello. Además, el TPI indicó que el primer asunto
a resolver será la arbitrabilidad de los reclamos de
Jane. Finalmente, el TPI señaló una vista de
injunction preliminar para el 10 de mayo de 2012, de
199a
ser necesario el desfile de prueba.7 (Ap. TA., págs.
127-128.)
7. El 23 de abril de 2012, Jane presentó su
Oposición a la Solicitud de Desestimación. En dicha
Oposición Jane alegó, entre otras cosas, que la
cláusula de arbitraje del Acuerdo no aplica a sus
alegados reclamos de índole laboral pues dicho
documento sólo aplica a asuntos relacionados con la
administración de CRL, máxime cuando los reclamos
de Jane son de rango constitucional. Además, Jane
alegó que es el TPI el llamado a resolver todos sus
reclamos.8 (Ap. TA., págs. 134-278.)
8. Luego de la presentación de varios escritos por las
partes
9
y que Jane presentara una Segunda
El 8 de mayo de 2012, dicha vista fue re-señalada para el 5 de
junio. (Ap. TA., págs. 450-451.)
8 Ese mismo día, Jane presentó una Demanda Enmendada y
Jurada a los fines de incluir como demandadas a las cónyuges
de los demandados en calidad de co-administradoras de las
respectivas Sociedades Legales de Gananciales y enmendar sus
causas de acción. (Ap. TA., págs. 279-305.) El 1 de mayo de 2012,
los demandados se opusieron a la referida enmienda. (Ap. TA.,
págs. 306-313.)
9 El 1 de mayo de 2012, los demandados-peticionarios
presentaron su Réplica a ‘Oposición a la Solicitud de
Desestimación por Falta de Jurisdicción y para Compeler
Arbitraje Compulsorio en Vista de Acuerdo Vinculante de
Arbitraje’. (Ap. TA., págs. 314-416.) Por su parte, el 7 de mayo
7
200a
Demanda Enmendada, el 4 de junio de 2012, a las
11:41 a.m., el TPI notificó vía correo electrónico la
Resolución objeto del presente recurso, la cual, como
mencionamos, resuelve contrario al FAA y su
jurisprudencia interpretativa que es a dicho foro al
que le compete resolver la controversia sobre
arbitrabilidad y que, además, Jane no viene obligada
a arbitrar sus reclamaciones de alegado discrimen
laboral, represalias y daños por éstas no estar
cobijadas por la cláusula de arbitraje del Acuerdo.
(Ap. TA., págs. 484-498.) En la nota al calce 12 de la
Resolución, el TPI hace las siguientes expresiones
que
hacen
procedimiento
evidente
de
su
arbitraje:
hostilidad
“De
hacia
acuerdo
a
el
la
interpretación y postura de la CRL, mediante el
[Acuerdo] se delegaría al árbitro resolver la
controversia en un foro totalmente confidencial
y sin derecho de apelación para los afectados.”
(Ap. TA., pág. 497; énfasis nuestro.)
9. Además, el TPI indicó que se mantendría en pie
la vista de injunction señalada para el día siguiente
en donde las partes tendrán que presentar prueba en
de 2012, Jane presentó un escrito intitulado Dúplica de la
Demandante. (Ap. TA., págs. 414-449.)
201a
relación
a
la
solicitud
de remedio interdictal.
Igualmente, autorizó la presentación de la Segunda
Demanda Enmendada. (Ap. TA., pág. 498.) Debemos
señalar que de un análisis del formato, tipografía y
estilo de la Resolución se puede razonablemente
inferir que la misma probablemente es producto de
un borrador de proyecto de Resolución sometido por
Jane, por lo que, de ser ello correcto, ésta habría
tenido conocimiento de la determinación del TPI
mucho antes que los demandados- peticionarios.
10. De hecho, sorpresivamente, a tan sólo cuatro (4)
horas de notificarse la Resolución, Jane presentó ante
el
TPI
una
Solicitud
de
Orden
Sobre
la
Confidencialidad de los Procedimientos Ulteríores
alegando que en vista de lo resuelto horas antes por
el TPI no existía razón para que los procedimientos
continuaran tramitándose de forma confidencial. (Ap.
TA., págs. 499-504.) Además, Jane presentó bajo sello
una Tercera Demanda Enmendada y Jurada donde
se identifica a los demandados con sus respectivos
nombres. (Ap. TA., págs. 505-528.)
11. Además, justo antes de que iniciara la vista
señalada para el 5 de junio de 2012, Jane presentó en
202a
el TPI a las 8:47 a.m., una Solicitud de Reinstalación
Como Remedio Adicional al Amparo de la Regla 59.4
de Procedimiento Civil mediante la cual solicita que
se dicte Sentencia Parcial ordenando mediante un
injunction preliminar y permanente su reinstalación
a CRL. (Ap. TA., págs. 529-535.) Copia de esta
Solicitud le fue entregada al abogado de los
demandado-peticionarios al momento de entrar a la
Sala del TPI para la vista.
12. Minutos más tarde, las partes comparecieron a la
vista de injunction preliminar señalada para ese día.
A pesar de que no habían transcurrido ni tan siquiera
24 horas desde que los demandados-peticionarios
advinieron en conocimiento de que la acción judicial
de Jane no sería desestimada para que procediera el
arbitraje, el TPI pretendía que éstos presentarán
prueba sobre las alegaciones del caso para poder
entrar a resolverlo en los méritos. En vista de lo
atropellado
que
pretendía
ser
el
proceso,
los
demandados-peticionarios objetaron el proceder del
TPI amparándose en argumentos de razonabilidad y
de Debido Proceso de Ley, entre otros. El TPI
concedió entonces hasta el 8 de junio para que Jane
203a
presentara la propuesta de estipulaciones de hechos
que no habían sido aceptadas por los demandadospeticionarios, para que los demandados presentaran
propuestas de hechos y para que ambas partes
presentaran
los
documentos
que
deberían
ser
considerados por el TPI. Además, el TPI consolidó la
vista de injunction preliminar con la de injunction
permanente e indicó que de ser necesario el desfile de
prueba
las
partes
serán
notificadas
sobre
la
celebración de la vista.10 (Ap. TA, págs. 548-551 y
552-617.)
B. Relación de Hechos Materiales.
1. En noviembre de 1979, Jane se unió a CRL como
abogada luego de haber obtenido una Maestría en
Derecho y haber comenzado a ejercer la profesión.
(Ap. TA., págs. 1-13 y 38-126.)
2. En el momento en que Jane se unió a CRL, CRL
era una sociedad civil. En aquel entonces y al
presente CRL provee servicios a una clientela
El TPI también concedió 10 días para que los demandadospeticionarios presenten su posición en cuanto a la solicitud de
Jane de que se deje sin efecto la orden de confidencialidad y 15
días para que se expresen sobre la solicitud de reinstalación de
Jane a CRL. (Ap. TA., págs. 548-551.)
10
204a
foránea, mayormente de Estados Unidos, y local. (Ap.
TA., págs. 38-126.)
3. En septiembre de 1987, Jane fue promovida como
socia capital de CRL. (Ap. TA., págs. 1-13 y 38-126.)
4. El 13 de septiembre de 2007, CRL se convirtió en
una compañía de responsabilidad limitada bajo las
leyes de Puerto Rico. De conformidad con el referido
cambio, Jane advino Miembro Capital de CRL. (Ap.
TA., págs. 1-13 y 38-126.)
5. Ese mismo día, Jane y los demás Miembros
Capitales
intitulado
de
CRL
suscribieron
Operating
un
documento
Agreement
(“Acuerdo
Operacional” o “Acuerdo”).11 (Ap. TA., págs. 60-115 y
338-353.)
6. En lo pertinente, dicho Acuerdo provee en sus
Secciones relevantes lo siguiente:
1.
Definitions. For the purposes of this
Agreement, the following terms shall have the
meaning set forth below:
El Acuerdo establece que su fecha de efectividad se retrotrae
al 1 de junio de 2007.
11
205a
1.06 “Claim” means any action, suit, complaint or
demand of whatever nature and for whatever
relief or remedy against the Firm or any of its
Members or employees. ….
1.07 “Claimant” means any Member or Former
Member asserting a Claim.
5.
Compensation.12
5.02 Salaries of Members- Each Capital Member shall
be entitled to such annual salary as shall be
determined pursuant to section 5.01 of this
Agreement, to be paid in one (1) or more installments.
….
10.Fiduciary Duty and Duty of Loyalty of
Members.
10.1
Fiduciary Duties of Members- Members owe
the Firm and each other a fiduciary duty and a duty
of loyalty, which requires each Member, among other
things:
(f)
To treat all Firm Documents as confidential
‘trade secrets’, except to the extent such Firm
Para el resto de las cláusulas relevantes sobre compensación
véase la Sección 5 del Acuerdo. (Ap. TA, págs. 84-86.)
12
206a
Documents are publicly available other than as a
result of any violation of this or any other
confidentiality obligation... and to treat as
confidential all information relating to the
deliberations of the Members and the business of the
Firm while such Member is a Member of the Firm
and, in the event the Member leaves the Firm, after
such Member’s departure.
12. Withdrawal, Retirement, Suspension,
Expulsion ... of a Member.
12.02 Suspension and/or Expulsion- The Firm may,
upon the recommendation of the Policy Committee
and the affirmative vote of three-fourths (3/4) of the
Capital Members, ...(b) expel any Member at any date
specified by the Policy Committee with or without
cause or prior notice to such Member. In the case of
any such expulsion, the Member so expelled shall
cease to be a Member on the date specified by the
Policy Committee.
14. Resolution of Claim.
14.01 Intent and Purpose - It is the intent and
207a
The Claimant expressly agrees that the Claim shall
be settled or resolved through the procedures set
forth herein, and shall not in any way circumvent
or otherwise challenge in any way these
proceedings relative to mediation and
arbitration.
14.04 Arbitration - If mediation fails, the Claim
shall be settled by arbitration administered by
the [AAA] under its Commercial Arbitration Rules,
jurisdiction thereof. ...
14.05 Confidentiality - The Claimant and the Firm
agree that the underlying purpose of the provisions
set forth in section 14 of this Agreement is to provide
a mechanism by which any Claim shall be
resolved in a confidential manner, without
publicity and the attendant distractions. .... The
parties agree to maintain the confidentiality of
such meetings and hearings, and of the
documents produced or created in such
meetings and hearings. Any and all actions
taken by the parties shall be in conformity with
208a
the underlying purpose set forth in section 14
of this Agreement.
Nótese que es un hecho no disputado por Jane que el
Acuerdo es un contrato en el comercio interestatal a
los fines del FAA. (Ap. TA., págs. 1-3; 38-126; 134278;
314-416;
y
417-449.)
Tampoco
está
en
controversia la validez de la cláusula de arbitraje de
la Sección 14 del Acuerdo. (Id.)
209a
7. El 22 de octubre de 2007, entró en vigor el
Manual de Empleados de CRL el cual aplica a todos
sus empleados y a los Miembros de CRL. No obstante,
dicho Manual no convierte a un Miembro en
empleado. Por el contrario, el Manual claramente
mantiene la diferencia entre la clasificación de
“Miembro” y “empleado”. (Ap. TA., págs. 191-257.) El
Manual tampoco establece las políticas relacionadas
a la compensación de los Miembros, ni el proceso de
terminación de su relación con CRL, ni el método
para resolver disputas entre los Miembros y CRL.
Dichas políticas están contenidas en las Secciones 5,
12 y 14 del Acuerdo, respectivamente. (Ap. TA., págs.
84-86 y 94-98.)
8. CRL tiene oficinas en Puerto Rico y fuera de
Puerto Rico. Además, la gran mayoría de sus clientes
están ubicados fuera de Puerto Rico (principalmente
en los Estados Unidos), lo cual requiere que CRL y
sus clientes mantengan comunicación constante como
parte de sus operaciones mediante el uso del correo,
Internet, teléfono y otros medios de comunicación
interestatal. Igualmente, resulta significativo en
cuanto al hecho de que el Acuerdo es un contrato en
210a
el comercio interestatal y la naturaleza económica del
mismo, el que los siguientes estatutos federales, entre
otros, aplican a la relación de CRL con aquellos que
son propiamente considerados empleados: 1) Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78; 2)
2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17; 4) Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964; y 5) Age Discrímination in
Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34. (Ap.
TA., págs. 38-126.)
9. A mediados del 2009, Jane fue electa al Consejo
Directivo de CRL, el cual es el organismo rector de
mayor jerarquía de CRL.
10. La compensación de Jane tuvo que ser reducida
por razones de negocio. Como resultado de ello, el 24
de enero de 2012, Jane presentó una reclamación
extrajudicial a los Miembros del Consejo Directo de
CRL, según requerido por la Sección 14.02 del
Acuerdo. En su reclamación extrajudicial, Jane alegó
en síntesis que su compensación había sido reducida
en violación al Acuerdo. En ninguna parte de su
reclamación Jane mencionó que se hubiera violado el
211a
Manual. De hecho, el único contrato escrito que Jane
alega fue violado es el Acuerdo. En lo pertinente, la
recurrida específicamente alegó amparándose en el
Acuerdo lo siguiente:
...[L]es solicito formalmente que reconsideren la
decisión de [Fulano de Tal] y pauten, lo más rápido
posible y antes de los próximos 15 días, una reunión
del Consejo Directivo a tenor con la cláusula 14 y
siguiente del “Operating Agreement”, de manera
que yo como Miembro Capital presente mi posición y
objeciones. Quiero dejar claro que el someterme al
procedimiento de la cláusula 14 no debe entenderse
como una renuncia de los derechos que me amparan
bajo las leyes locales y federales.
Procedo a reseñar brevemente mis objeciones:
1.
La reducción de mi salario y beneficios se
hizo (sic) infringe el “Operating Agreement” y el
acuerdo entre [Fulano de Tal] y yo, y está en
contravención con el acuerdo particular establecido
conmigo.
2.
... Evidentemente, el procedimiento seguido fue
inadecuado y en violación al “Operating
Agreement”, a las decisiones del Consejo Directivo
aprobadas al 31 de mayo de 2011 y la decisión del 20
de diciembre de 2011.
16. Igualmente me sentí ofendida cuando [Sutano de
Cual] en una reunión del Consejo dijo que ‘para
sentarse en esa mesa hay que traer negocio’ y nadie
212a
le aclaró lo impropio de su comentario. ¿Es ese un
requisito en el Operating Agreement? ....
(Ap. TA., págs. 119-123; énfasis nuestro.)
11. De conformidad con la Sección 14.03 del Acuerdo,
el 20 de marzo de 2012 las partes se sometieron al
proceso de mediación el cual culminó sin lograrse
acuerdo alguno.
12. Ante el fracaso de la mediación, el 22 de marzo de
2012, CRL presentó ante la AAA una Demanda de
Arbitraje contra Jane para darle curso a la cláusula
de arbitraje de la Sección 14.04 del Acuerdo que
requiere que toda disputa (“any Claim”) entre las
partes independientemente de su naturaleza o de si
surge o no bajo el Acuerdo sea resuelta mediante
dicho método de resolución de disputas y de forma
confidencial. (Ap. TA., págs. 259-260.)
VI.
SEÑALAMIENTOS DE ERRORES
PRIMER SEÑALAMIENTO DE ERROR: ERRÓ
MANIFIESTAMENTE
EL
TPI
AL
ASUMIR
JURISDICCION SOBRE LA CONTROVERSIA DE
SI JANE DOE ESTÁ OBLIGADA A ARBITRAR SUS
SUPUESTOS RECLAMOS: JANE DOE Y CRL
INEQUIVOCAMENTE
PACTARON
QUE
EL
213a
ÁRBITRO
TIENE
DETERMINAR
LA
EL
FACULTAD
ALCANCE
DE
DE
SU
JURISDICCIÓN.
SEGUNDO SEÑALAMIENTO DE ERROR: ERRÓ
MANIFIESTAMENTE EL TPI AL CONCLUIR QUE
JANE DOE NO TIENE QUE ARBITRAR SUS
SUPUESTOS RECLAMOS CONTRA CRL Y LOS
DEMÁS
DEMANDADOS-PETICIONARIOS
PUESTO QUE LA CLÁUSULA DE ARBITRAJE
DEL ACUERDO ES AMPLIA, CLARA Y ABARCA
CUALQUIER RECLAMO ENTRE LAS PARTES.
TERCER SEÑALAMIENTO DE ERROR: ERRÓ
MANIFIESTAMENTE EL TPI AL EXIMIR A JANE
DOE DE ARBITRAR SUS RECLAMOS POR LA
ALEGADA
NATURALEZA
“DE
EMPLEO”
O
“LABORAL” Y “CONSTITUCIONAL” DE ÉSTOS YA
QUE EL FAA DESPLAZA (“PREEMPTS’) TODA
POLITICA
ESTATAL
CONTRARIA
AL
ARBITRAJE.
VII. DISCUSIÓN DE LOS ERRORES
SEÑALADOS
A. PRIMER
SEÑALAMIENTO
DE
ERROR:
ERRÓ MANIFIESTAMENTE EL TPI AL ASUMIR
214a
JURISDICCION SOBRE LA CONTROVERSIA DE
SI JANE DOE ESTÁ OBLIGADA A ARBITRAR SUS
SUPUESTOS RECLAMOS: JANE DOE Y CRL
INEQUIVOCAMENTE
PACTARON
ÁRBITRO
LA
TIENE
DETERMINAR
EL
QUE
FACULTAD
ALCANCE
EL
DE
DE
SU
JURISDICCIÓN.
El TPI erró manifiestamente al asumir jurisdicción
para decidir si Jane Doe tiene que arbitrar sus
supuestos
reclamos
contra
CRL
y
los
demás
demandados- peticionarios. A pesar de que el TPI
reconoció que las partes pueden pactar que sea el
árbitro quien decida si una disputa es arbitrable así
como los méritos de la misma cuando así se ha
pactado clara e inequívocamente (Ap. TA., pág.
495.),13 dicho foro decidió que “no hay que determinar
si la delegación de jurisdicción al árbitro es clara e
inequívoca porque la cláusula de arbitraje no es
aplicable a las controversias presentadas.” (Id.) En
otras
palabras
el
TPI
descansó
en
un
argumento rotundamente circular para hacer
caso omiso del lenguaje claro de la amplia
Véase First Options of Chicago. Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938,
945 (1995).
13
215a
cláusula
de
arbitraje
del
Acuerdo,
las
disposiciones del FAA y su jurisprudencia
interpretativa, y la normativa puertorriqueña
sobre interpretación de contratos. Todas esas
normas requerían referir al árbitro el asunto de si los
reclamos de Jane Doe son arbitrables bajo la Sección
14 del Acuerdo.
Como cuestión preliminar, es menester hacer una
exposición breve del FAA ya que fue oportunamente
invocado por los demandados-peticionarios, Jane Doe
no disputó su aplicación al asunto que nos ocupa y
dicha ley es dispositiva de este recurso. (Ap. TA.,
págs. 52-58.) EL FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. aplica a
contratos en el comercio interestatal y aplica tanto en
los tribunales federales como en los estatales. World
Films. Inc. v. Paramount Pict. Corp., 125 D.P.R. 352,
357 y 364 (1990). La sección 2 de la FAA dispone que:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or
a
contract
evidencing
a
transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract
or transaction or the refusal to perform the whole
or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to
submit to arbitration an existing controversy
arising out of such a contract, transaction or
216a
refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, save upon such
grounds as exist in law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (Énfasis nuestro.)
El FAA refleja una política federal contundente, bien
establecida y ampliamente reconocida a favor del
arbitraje. Véase Méndez Acevedo v. Nieves Rivera,
179 D.P.R. 359 (2010); KKW Enterprises v. Gloria
Jean’s Gourmet Coffees Franchising Corp., 184 F.3d
42, 50 (1st Cir. 1999); citando Vimar Seguros v
Reaseguros. S.A., v. M/V SKY Reefer. 29 F.3d 727,
730 (1st Cir.); confirmado en 515 U.S. 528 (1995).
Sobre esta fuerte política pública, el Tribunal
Supremo
de
los
Estados
Unidos
(“TSEU”)
expresado lo siguiente:
****
[l]n enacting § 2 of the federal Act, Congress
ha
217a
claims which the contracting parties agreed
to resolve by arbitration.
Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987) (citas y
comillas internas omitidas) (énfasis nuestro). En
otras palabras, el FAA aplica sin acepción de políticas
estatales procesales o sustantivas al contrario y le
quitó el poder a los Estados de requerir un foro
judicial para resolver reclamaciones que las partes
contratantes acordaron resolver mediante arbitraje.
El FAA fue promulgado precisamente como respuesta
a la hostilidad que tradicionalmente los Tribunales
han mostrado hacia los acuerdos de arbitraje. Véase
Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 111
(2001) (resolviendo que los contratos de empleo en el
comercio
interestatal
salvo
aquellos
de
ciertos
empleados de transportación están cubiertos por el
FAA). El Tribunal Supremo de Puerto Rico ha
reconocido sin ambages la política pública encarnada
en el FAA al expresar que dicha ley dispone que:
... las cláusulas de arbitrajes en esos contratos son
válidas, irrevocables y mandatorias. Una vez
acordado el arbitraje, los tribunales carecen de
discreción en cuanto a su eficacia y tienen que dar
cumplimiento al arbitraje acordado. Según esta ley,
218a
v la jurisprudencia federal interpretativa de la
misma, cualquier duda sobre el alcance de las
controversias que pueden ser llevadas a
arbitraje debe resolverse en favor del arbitraje.
Esto aplica tanto a los tribunales federales como a los
estatales.
Véase Painewebber Incorporated of Puerto Rico v.
Service Concepts. Inc., 151 D.P.R. 307, 311-12 (2000)
(énfasis nuestro); Southland Corp. v. Keatinq, 465
U.S.1, 16 (1984).
Las controversias sobre arbitrabilidad comportan tres
(3) modalidades: (i) si existe un convenio de arbitraje;
(ii) el alcance de un convenio de arbitraje (“si tal
convenio alcanza determinada controversia”); (iii) y si
tal convenio alcanza una disputa sobre la duración o
expiración del contrato. Véase Méndez Acevedo v.
Nieves Rivera, supra, en las págs. 367-68; Municipio
de Mavaoüez v. Lebrón. 167 D.P.R. 713, 720-21
(2006); World Films. Inc. v. Paramount Pictures
Corp., supra.
Como regla general, la determinación de si un
acuerdo crea el deber de las partes de arbitrar
determinada controversia es tarea judicial. Méndez
Acevedo, supra; World Films. Inc., supra, en la pág.
219a
361. No obstante lo anterior, el asunto de la
el
árbitro
quien
resolverá
las
cuestiones
de
Pub., 168 D.P.R. 674, 684 (2006) (“De ordinario y
ser resueltos por los tribunales...”) (énfasis nuestro).
arbitrabilidad
(si
determinada
controversia
es
evidence”) de que las partes así lo pactaron-de que esa
fue su intención. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v.
Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995). La anterior es
220a
autos. El FAA aplica al Acuerdo entre Jane Doe y
CRL y las partes delegaron al foro arbitral la
determinación de arbitrabilidad por lo que el TPI erró
al asumir jurisdicción.
El FAA aplica al Acuerdo entre Jane Doe y CRL
ya que se trata de un contrato que involucra el
comercio interestatal. Para determinar si existe
una
transacción
que
involucra
el
comercio
interestatal, el Tribunal debe examinar entre otras
cosas el contrato y las operaciones comerciales de las
partes. Véase Ideal Services Corp. v. Swift-Eckrich,
Inc., 727 F. Supp. 75, 76 (D.P.R. 1989).
En Allied Bruce Terminix v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265,
282 (1995), el TSEU resolvió que al promulgar el FAA
el Congreso de los Estados Unidos quiso utilizar su
poder constitucional bajo la Cláusula de Comercio al
máximo:
Thus, the Court interpreted the words
“involving commerce” as broadly as the words
“affecting commerce”; and, as we have said,
these latter words normally mean a full exercise
of constitutional power. At the same time, the
Court’s opinion does not discuss the
221a
implications of the “interstate” facts to which
the respondents now point. For these reasons,
Bernhardt does not require us to narrow the
scope of the word “involving.” And, we
conclude that the word “involving,” like
“affecting,” signals an intent to exercise
Congress’ commerce power to the full.
513 U.S. en la pág. 277. En Allied Bruce, la disputa
giraba en torno a una cláusula de arbitraje en un
contrato
de
servicios
de
exterminación
a
una
residencia. El TSEU determinó que el contrato
envolvía el comercio interestatal para propósitos del
FAA ya que los pesticidas fueron manufacturados
fuera del estado y el demandado tenía operaciones en
múltiples estados.
El Acuerdo es un contrato que involucra el
comercio interestatal. Entre otras razones, el
Acuerdo gobierna el interés propietario de las partes
y las operaciones de CRL en Puerto Rico y en su
oficina fuera de Puerto Rico. Véase, SCI v. Fulmer,
883 So.2d 621, 629 (Ala 2003) (“[I]t would be
222a
under the FAA.”) (énfasis nuestro).
14
Además, la
gran mayoría de los clientes de CRL están ubicados
fuera de Puerto Rico (principalmente en los Estados
Unidos), lo cual requiere que CRL y sus clientes
mantengan comunicación constantemente como parte
de sus operaciones mediante el uso del correo,
interestatal. Igualmente, resulta significativo sobre
este particular la naturaleza económica del Acuerdo y
que los siguientes estatutos federales, entre otros,
aplican a la relación de CRL con aquellos que son
propiamente considerados empleados: 1) Fair Labor
Vease ademas, Thomas H. Oehmke, Commercial Arbitration §
3:6 (2011)(“A contract needs only the slightest nexus to interstate
commerce to apply the FAA.”); 21 Willinston on Contracts § 57:
(41 ed. 2011)(“Consistent with the broad approach to interpreting
the term ‘involving commerce’ in the [FAA], it has been said that
a contract containing an arbitration provision need only
be related to commerce to fall within the coverage of the
Act.”)(énfasis suplido); Bowen v. Security Pest Control. Inc., 879
So.2d 1139, 1142 (Ala. 2003) (resuelve que Ia transacción
envolvía el comercio interestatal, en parte, porque una de las
partes en la transacción realizaba negocios en dos Estados). De
hecho, el poder del Congreso bajo la Cláusula de Comercio de la
Constitución de los Estados Unidos es tan amplio que en los
pasados 75 años sólo dos casos del TSEU han resuelto que el
Congreso excedió sus poderes bajo la referida Cláusula de
Comercio. Véanse U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); US v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). Nótese que ninguno de los
14
223a
Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78; 2)
2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17; 4) Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964; y 5) Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34.
Además, y según señalamos previamente, Jane Doe
no disputó la aplicación del FAA a la cláusula de
arbitraje del Acuerdo y, por ende, ésta renunció
cualquier argumento al contrario. Véase Caguas
Satellite Corp. v. Echostar Satellite LLC, F.Supp.2d ,
2011 WL 5517037, n. 2 (D. P.R.)(“Plaintiffs [the party
opposing arbitration,] ...do not make any arguments
about whether or not the agreement involves interstate
commerce and therefore waive this argument’).
Dado el lenguaje claro de la Sección 14 del
Acuerdo, el TPI erró manifiestamente al asumir
jurisdicción sobre la controversia de si los
reclamos de Jane Doe son arbitrables o no. En
la cláusula de arbitraje contenida en el Acuerdo, Jane
se comprometió a que el arbitraje se condujera bajo
224a
las Reglas de Arbitraje Comercial de la AAA.15 La
Sección 14.04 del Acuerdo dispone en lo pertinente
“[i]f mediation fails, the Claim shall be settled by
arbitration
under
its
Commercial
Arbitration
Rules...”. A su vez, la Regla 7(a) de dicho cuerpo de
Reglas dispone: “[t]he arbitrator shall have the power
to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any
objections with respect to the existence, scope or
Arbitration Rules de la AAA, Regla 7(a), Ap. TA.,
págs.
116-118.)
(énfasis
nuestro).
Ante
la
incorporación en la cláusula de arbitraje entre Jane
Doe y CRL de un cuerpo de reglas de arbitraje que
delega al árbitro la facultad de determinar, era claro
que no le competía al TPI determinar si los reclamos
de Jane Doe eran arbitrables.
Cada tribunal federal que ha tenido ante sí esta
controversia ha resuelto que cuando las partes
incorporan a sus acuerdos o cláusulas de arbitraje
reglas institucionales de entidades como la AAA en
las que se delega al árbitro la facultad de decidir
Las Reglas de Arbitraje Comercial de la AAA gozan de la
misma generalidad que las Reglas de Procedimiento Civil de
Puerto Rico.
15
225a
sobre su propia jurisdicción -decidir arbitrabilidadello constituye evidencia suficiente en Derecho (clara
e inequívoca) de que esa era la intención de las
explicitly
incorporate
rules
that
empower
an
an arbitrator”); Sleeper Farms v. Agway, Inc., 211 F.
court] refers this dispute [to the arbitrator] to
arbitration clause.”) 16
Véase, además; Terminix Int’l. Co. v. Palmer Ranch Ltd., 432
F.3d 1327, 29, 33-34 (11th Cir. 2005) (Resolviendo que toda vez
que las Reglas de Arbitraje de la AAA delegan al árbitro la
determinación de arbitrabilidad, la reclamación del demandante
de que el acuerdo de arbitraje lo despojaba ilegalmente de varios
remedios estatutarios, era materia a ser adjudicada por el
árbitro, no por el tribunal); Qualcomm Inc. v. Nokia Corp.. 466
F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Apollo Computer, Inc. v. Berq,
886 F.2d 469, 473 (1st Cir. 1989)(“Ordinarily, [Plaintiff] would be
entitled to have these issues resolved by a court. [...] By
contracting to have all disputes resolved according to the Rules of
the ICC, however, [Plaintiff] agreed to be bound by Articles 8.3
16
226a
De hecho, aun en instancias donde las partes no han
acordado
el
arbitrabilidad
someter
sustantivas
las
al
controversias
de
foro
los
arbitral,
tribunales tienden a dejar la controversia para que
sea resuelta inicialmente por el árbitro cuando la
arbitrabilidad no puede ser determinada sin entrar
en los méritos de la controversia. Elkouri & Elkouri,
How Arbitrations Works, (BNA Books, 6ta Edición
2003), en la pág. 281. (“However, even though the
merits...”)
Así, en Camden Indus. Co. v. Carpenters Local 1688,
353 F.3d 178, 180 (1st Cir. 1969), el Primer Circuito
de Apelaciones resolvió:
and 8.4. These provisions clearly and unmistakably allow the
arbitrator to determine her own jurisdiction when, as here, there
exists a prima facie agreement to arbitrate whose continued
existence and validity is being questioned.”).
227a
fínding of jurisdiction, unlike a finding on the
merits when jurisdiction is not in question...
will not be insulated from subsequent judicial
review... We believe full recognition of the role
of labor arbitration requires court intervention
in a case such as this only when it has become
absolutely necessary, viz., on a petition to
vacate or enforce the award.
La casuística federal citada es consistente con el
ordenamiento jurídico local en materia de contratos.
inherentemente
contractual.”
Méndez
Acevedo,
supra, en la pág. 367; Municipio de Mayaaüez. supra;
133, 144 (1994).
Por lo tanto, en materia de arbitraje puede exigirse el
cumplimiento de aquello que se haya pactado por
escrito. Véase Crufon Const, v. Aut. Edif. Púbs.. 156
D.P.R. 197, 204 (2002); Municipio de Ponce v.
Gobernador, 136 D.P.R. 776, 783 (1994). A su vez,
228a
cuando los términos de un contrato son claros y no
presentan ambigüedad, sus disposiciones se aplicarán
según el sentido literal que le dieron las partes. Art.
1233 del Código Civil, supra, § 3471. Una vez se
determina qué fue lo que las partes acordaron, el
juzgador debe resolver las controversias entre las
partes de conformidad con lo estipulado. Véase
C.F.S.E. v. Unión de Médicos, 170 D.P.R. 443 (2007).
su vez delegan en el árbitro de forma clara e
inequívoca la autoridad para determinar su propia
jurisdicción. Por tanto, conforme a las autoridades
aquí citadas, procede que este Honorable Tribunal
revoque la Resolución del TPI y ordene a Jane
continuar con el procedimiento de arbitraje que pactó,
de suerte que sea el árbitro el que resuelva si tiene
autoridad
para
entender
en
los
méritos
las
reclamaciones de ésta. Así lo pactaron las partes, sin
ambigüedad alguna, y ello constituye la ley entre las
partes. Véase HIETEL v. PRTC, 2011 T.S.P.R. 100.
En la alternativa, de este Honorable Tribunal
229a
entender que el TPI no cometió el primer error
señalado, debe pasar considerar los próximos dos (2)
señalamientos de error.
B. SEGUNDO SEÑALAMIENTO DE ERROR:
ERRÓ
MANIFIESTAMENTE
EL
TPI
AL
CONCLUIR QUE JANE DOE NO TIENE QUE
ARBITRAR
SUS
SUPUESTOS
RECLAMOS
CONTRA CRL Y LOS DEMÁS DEMANDADOSPETICIONARIOS PUESTO QUE LA CLÁUSULA
DE ARBITRAJE DEL ACUERDO ES AMPLIA,
CLARA
Y
ABARCA
CUALQUIER
RECLAMO
ENTRE LAS PARTES.
El TPI también erró manifiestamente al resolver que
las reclamaciones presentadas por Jane Doe no están
cobijadas por la cláusula de arbitraje del Acuerdo
porque éstas son supuestamente de naturaleza “de
empleo” o “laboral” y “constitucional”. (Ap. TA., págs.
486-498.) Esencialmente, el TPI fundamentó su
decisión en la conclusión errada de que el Manual de
Empleados de CRL rige la relación entre CRL y Jane
Doe para fines de la presente acción judicial. (Ap.
TA., pág. 496-497.) Para llegar a este resultado, el
TPI tuvo que imponer por fíat una limitación
230a
insostenible al alcance de la cláusula de arbitraje del
Acuerdo, la cual según su texto literal es claramente
amplia y cubre toda reclamación (“any claim”) entre
las partes - incluyendo aquellas que no surgen del
Acuerdo. Al así hacerlo, el TPI no tan sólo erró, sino
que hizo manifiesta una marcada hostilidad al foro
arbitral, contrariando así los postulados del FAA y su
jurisprudencia interpretativa.
De la faz de la Resolución surge que el TPI hizo caso
omiso al lenguaje amplio de la cláusula de arbitraje
compulsorio contenida en el Acuerdo. Muestra de
ello, es el hecho de que ni siquiera el texto
íntegro de la cláusula fue citado en el cuerpo de
la Resolución como parte del análisis del TPI.
Para facilitar la labor de este Tribunal, reproducimos
la sección relevante del Acuerdo, que evidencia sin
lugar a dudas que el TPI debió haber compelido a
Jane Doe a arbitrar sus reclamos:
Intent and Purpose - It is the intent and purpose of
the Firm and any Claimant to resolve any Claim
by mediation or arbitration. The Claimant
expressly agrees that the Claim shall be settled or
resolved through the procedures set forth herein,
and shall not in any way circumvent or otherwise
231a
challenge in any way these proceedings relative to
mediation and arbitration.
Véase Sección 14.01 del Acuerdo (énfasis suplido).
(Ap. TA., pág. 97.)
La Sección 14.01 del Acuerdo antes transcrita
demuestra que era la intención y el propósito de las
partes, incluyendo Jane Doe y los comparecientes, el
resolver cualquier reclamación (“any Claim”)
mediante mediación y arbitraje. Más revelador aún es
el hecho de que en el Acuerdo se define “Claim” como
“... any action, suit, complaint or demand of
or employees.” (Sección 1.06 del Acuerdo; énfasis
suplido.) (Ap. TA., pág. 66.) En otras palabras, el
término “any claim” significa literalmente cualquier
reclamación, queja, demanda o pleito de cualquier
naturaleza v solicitando cualquier remedio.
Dado el texto de la Sección 14.01 y la definición de
“Claim” del propio Acuerdo, “any Claim” no puede
significar
otra
cosa
que
no
sea
“cualquier
reclamación”, y ello abarca todo tipo de reclamo y
solicitud de remedio presentado por Jane. O sea,
232a
según los antedichos términos (y sin necesidad de
interpretación alguna), cualquier tipo de acción, caso,
CRL o cualquiera de sus Miembros o empleados está
cubierta
por
señalamos
la
cláusula
de
anteriormente,
arbitraje.
bajo
el
Según
derecho
puertorriqueño cuando los términos de un contrato
son
claros
y
no
presentan
ambigüedad,
sus
disposiciones se aplicarán según el sentido literal que
le dieron las partes. Art. 1233 del Código Civil, supra,
§ 3471. Sobre este particular, en Marcial v. Tome, 144
D.P.R. 522 (1997), el Tribunal Supremo reconoció que
se debe seguir la letra clara del contrato, cuando la
misma refleja inequívocamente la voluntad de las
partes.
Aún si hubiera alguna duda sobre el alcance de la
cláusula de arbitraje y el significado de “any Claim”,
lo cual se niega, el FAA requiere que la duda sea
resuelta a favor del arbitraje. Véase Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hosp. v. Mercurv Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
24-25 (1983)(“The [FAA] establishes that, as a matter
of federal law, any doubts conceming the scope of
233a
arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of
arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the
construction of the contract language itself or an
allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to
arbitrability.”)] Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Broth. of
Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2857 (2010) (igual);
Painewebber Incorporated of Puerto Rico v. Service
Concepts, Inc., 151 D.P.R. 307, 311-12 (2000).
En mérito de lo anterior, no importa para la
determinación de arbitrabilidad si el reclamo es de
naturaleza laboral o administrativo, contractual,
extracontractual,
estatutario
o
constitucional.
Tampoco importa si los Miembros Capitales de CRL
pueden clasificarse como dueño o empleados o ambos.
Se trata pues de una cláusula de arbitraje amplísima
que el TPI debió avalar conforme a sus términos bajo
el FAA. Estos principios fueron crasamente ignorados
por el TPI al emitir la Resolución de la cual se
recurre.
La conclusión de que Jane Doe tiene que
arbitrar sus reclamos se impone aún si este
Tribunal estuviese inclinado a ir más allá del
texto de la Sección 14 y las definiciones del
234a
Acuerdo para determinar el alcance de la
obligación
de
arbitrar
de
los
Miembros
Capitales (presentes y antiguos) de CRL. Ello es
así, toda vez que lo que Jane Doe cuestiona e
impugna fundamentalmente es su compensación
como
Miembro
Capital
de
CRL
(por
alegado
discrimen), y su expulsión del ente directivo de CRL y
como Miembro Capital de CRL (por alegadas
represalias). Véase las distintas alegaciones que Jane
Doe ha presentado como parte de este caso, desde su
reclamación interna, hasta la Tercera Demanda
Enmendada y Jurada. (Ap. TA., págs. 119-123; 1-13;
279-305; 456-481; y 505-528.)
Todos estos son aspectos de la relación de Jane Doe
con CRL que están regidos expresamente por el
Acuerdo. De hecho, así surge de las propias
determinaciones
de
hecho
del
Tribunal.
Véase
Determinación de Hecho Número 7, Resolución. (Ap.
TA., pág. 492.) Ello se traduce en que para poder
adjudicar los reclamos de Jane Doe de alegado
discrimen o de represalia, el foro correspondiente - el
arbitral tendrá que necesariamente referirse al
Acuerdo.
235a
Según
surge
fehacientemente
del
récord,
la
compensación de los Miembros Capitales de CRL se
rige por las secciones 5.01-5.06 del Acuerdo. (Ap. TA.,
págs. 84- 86.) Basta una lectura de dichas secciones
para constatarlo. Tan es así, que la propia Jane Doe
admitió ante el TPI que “el mecanismo mediante el
cual se determina la compensación lo rige el
[Acuerdo]”. (Véase Oposición, en la pág. 9, nota al pie
12., Ap. TA., pág. 144.)
Como cuestión de realidad, el TPI omitió considerar
el hecho que desde la reclamación interna que Jane
Doe presentó ante el ente directivo de CRL, ésta
alegó, entre otras cosas, violaciones al Acuerdo. (Ap.
TA., págs. 119-123.) (Véase Sección V(B), párrafo 10,
supra.
Conforme a lo anterior, el TPI erró al no referir a
arbitraje
los
reclamos
de
Jane
Doe.
Según
argumentamos ante el TPI, Jane Doe no puede
escapar la realidad de que sus reclamos se originan
en virtud de una alegada violación al Acuerdo, sea
por razones discriminatorias o no. Precisamente, ello
es lo que le compete al Árbitro dirimir.
236a
De la misma manera sucede con la alegada expulsión
en represalias de Jane Doe como Miembro del ente
directivo de CRL y Miembro Capital de CRL. La
expulsión de un Miembro del ente directivo de CRL
está regida por la cláusula 4.15 del Acuerdo; mientras
que la expulsión de un Miembro Capital de CRL está
regida por la cláusula 12.2 del Acuerdo. (Ap. TA.,
págs. 83 y 94-95.) Por tanto, cualquier reclamación o
impugnación
de
dichos
procedimientos
debe
atenderse mediante el proceso de resolución de
disputas de la cláusula 14 del Acuerdo, el cual incluye
el arbitraje compulsorio que las partes pactaron. Ese
fue el compromiso suscrito por Jane Doe y erró el TPI
al permitir que Jane Doe no cumpliera con lo pactado.
Para concluir, ni del lenguaje claro y amplio de la
cláusula de arbitraje, ni del contexto provisto por las
materias gobernadas por el Acuerdo y los reclamos de
Jane Doe, se puede interpretar como que la obligación
de arbitrar se limita a reclamaciones sobre asuntos
operativos o administrativos de CRL. El TPI no sólo
asumió
jurisdicción
erróneamente
sobre
la
controversia de arbitrabilidad sino que la resolvió de
forma completamente contraria a derecho.
237a
C. TERCER
SEÑALAMIENTO
DE
ERROR:
ERRÓ MANIFIESTAMENTE EL TPI AL EXIMIR A
JANE DOE DE ARBITRAR SUS RECLAMOS POR
LA ALEGADA NATURALEZA “DE EMPLEO” O
“LABORAL” Y “CONSTITUCIONAL” DE ÉSTOS YA
QUE EL FAA DESPLAZA (“PREEMPTS”) TODA
POLÍTICA
ESTATAL
CONTRARIA
AL
ARBITRAJE.
Además de hacer caso omiso de la letra clara de la
clausula de arbitraje pactada en la sección 14 del
Acuerdo, el TPI amparó su determinación en la
alegada
naturaleza
“de
empleo”
o
“laboral”
y
“constitucional” de los reclamos de Jane Doe para
eximirla de tener que arbitrarlos. De acuerdo al TPI:
...la legislación protectora de los empleados en Puerto
Rico es de amplio alcance, no restrictiva, y la
exclusión de un empleado de los beneficios de la
legislación laboral debe ser clara, debiendo los
tribunales interpretar dichas exclusiones en forma
restrictiva.
Véase Resolución, en la pág. 12. (Ap. TA., pág. 497.)
Más aún el TPI expresó su preocupación de que
acoger la “argumentación” de los demandadospeticionarios
238a
...permitiría que los miembros capitales decidieran en
otro momento utilizar otros criterios protegidos como
la raza o la religión para privar a otros miembros
capitales de su protección constitucional. De acuerdo
a la interpretación y postura de la CRL, mediante el
AO [el Acuerdo] se delegaría al árbitro resolver la
controversia en un foro confidencial y sin derecho de
apelación para los afectados.17
Véase
Resolución,
en
la
pág.
12.
(Id.)
Estas
determinaciones del TPI están impregnadas de la
hostilidad al arbitraje que el FAA vino a erradicar y
demuestran
que
dicho
foro
se
amparó
en
la
naturaleza de los alegados reclamos de Jane Doe así
como en supuestas políticas estatales para rehusarse
a compeler el arbitraje. Al así proceder, el TPI actuó
en abierta contradicción al FAA y a la Cláusula de
Supremacía de la Constitución de los Estados Unidos.
Nuevamente, el TPI erró manifiestamente.
Como
se
desprende
transcribimos
en
la
de
su
§
discusión
2,
la
del
cual
primer
señalamiento de error, el FAA no establece
distinción alguna entre la arbitrabilidad de
derechos
estatutarios
o
derechos
Vale mencionar que bajo el FAA, los tribunales pueden revisar
la decisión del árbitro si se entendiera que éste se excedió en su
jurisdicción. Véase 9 U.S.C.A. § 10.
17
239a
constitucionales.18 Todo lo que el FAA requiere es
que los pactos de arbitraje se pongan en vigor
conforme a sus propios términos. Véase Concepción.
131 S. Ct. 1745 (“courts must place arbitration
agreements on an equal footing with other contracts,
[...] and enforce them according to their terms”)(citas
omitidas). Es decir, lo importante no es la naturaleza
del reclamo en cuestión, sino si las partes acordaron
arbitrar dicho reclamo.19 Como el FAA no distingue
entre la arbitrabilidad de derechos estatutarios o
derechos constitucionales el TPI no podía crear dicha
distinción
por
fiat
judicial
al
amparo
de
su
interpretación del derecho puertorriqueño.
Es un principio elemental de derecho que cuando una
norma federal está en conflicto con una norma
En cuanto a jurisprudencia del TSEU indicativa de que no se
deben incluir requisitos para arbitrar controversias que no
surjan del texto de la § 2 del FAA, véase Rent-A-Center v.
Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2778, n. 1 (“[§ 2] grounds do not
include ... any requirement that its lack of unconscionability
must be ‘clear and unmistakable.’”); Marmet v. Brown, 132 S. Ct.
1201, 1203 (2012)(‘‘[The FAA’s] text includes no exception for
personal-injury or wrongful-death claims. It ‘requires courts to
enforce the bargain of the parties to arbitrate.’“)(cita omitida).
19 Como hemos discutido anteriormente, el alegado reclamo
constitucional de Jane está cobijado dentro de la cláusula de
arbitraje del Acuerdo que requiere que Jane Doe presente en
arbitraje todos sus reclamos contra los demandados (“any
Claim”).
18
240a
estatal, incluso de rango constitucional, la norma
estatal queda desplazada por la federal por virtud de
la Cláusula de Supremacía de la Constitución de los
Estados Unidos. La Cláusula de Supremacía dispone
que:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States ..., shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
Const. E.U.A., Art. VI, cl. 2 (énfasis nuestro). Sobre
este particular el Profesor Gorrín Peralta expresa lo
siguiente:
[U]na ley federal prevalece sobre lo dispuesto en
la Constitución del [ELA] de Puerto Rico. ... En
cualquier situación en que conflija una
norma jurídica puertorriqueña con la ‘Ley
Suprema,’ es decir con la Constitución de [EU],
[o] con una ley ... federal aplicable en Puerto Rico,
... siempre debe prevalecer el Derecho federal
sobre el puertorriqueño.
Carlos I. Gorrín Peralta, Fuentes y proceso de
investigación jurídica 43 (1991)(énfasis suplido).
Véase además, U.S. v. Georgia Public Service Comm.,
371 U.S. 285, 293 (1983)(“a State is without power by
241a
reason of the Supremacy Clause to provide the
conditions on which the Federal Government will
effectuate its policies.”); U.S. v. Pérez, 465 F.Supp.
1284, 1286 (D.P.R. 1979) (“[The Constitution of Puerto
Rico] cannot provide conditions on which Congress
will effectuate its policies as to matters well within its
province”).20
Como consecuencia de estos principios, es
norma
establecida
y
consistentemente
reiterada que cuando un Estado requiere que
cierto
tipo
de
reclamo
se
dilucide
exclusivamente en los tribunales, a pesar de
que las partes acordaron arbitrar sus disputas,
dicha norma estatal queda desplazada por el
FAA. Ello fue resuelto específicamente por el TSEU
Véase además Dowling v. Davis, 840 F.Supp. 731, 734 (E.D.
Cal.)(“The Supremacy Clause does not permit federal law to be
superseded by state law, including state constitutional
provisions.”); U.S. v. Spencer, 160 F.3d 413, 414 (7th Cir.
1998)(¡gual); Keaveney v. Town of Brookline, 937 F.Supp. 975,
982 (D. Mass. 1996)(igual). El Prof. Gorrín Peralta también
expresa sobre este particular lo siguiente: “Las fuentes legales
en Puerto Rico son, pues: (1) la Constitución de EE.UU.; (2) las
leyes federales ...; …(5) la Constitución del [ELA] de Puerto
Rico; (6) las leyes ordinarias aprobadas por la Asamblea
Legislativa [de Puerto Rico]; . . .” Gorrín Peralta, supra, en la
pág. 43.
20
242a
en Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), al
indicar lo siguiente:
In enacting § 2 of the [FAA], Congress declared a
national
policy
favoring
arbitration
and
withdrew the power of the states to require a
judicial forum for the resolution of claims
which the contracting parties agreed to
Id. en la pág. 10 (énfasis nuestro).21
Recientemente, el TSEU reafirmó esta norma en
Marmet Health Care Center. Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct.
1201 (res. el 21 de febrero 2012). En Marmet Health
Care Center, el TSEU, citando a Concepción, 131 S.
Ct. 1740, 1747 (2011), resolvió lo siguiente:
straightforward: The conflicting rule is displaced
by the FAA. ... West Virginia’s prohibition against
predispute agreements to arbitrate personal-injury
or wrongful-death claims against nursing home is
particular type of claim, and that rule is contrary
to the terms and coverage of the FAA.
Véase Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 491 (“This clear federal
policy places § 2 of the Act in unmistakable conflict with
California’s § 229 requirement that litigants be provided a
judicial forum for resolving wage disputes.”)
21
243a
omitidas). En Marmet el TSEU resolvió que el
Tribunal Supremo de West Virginia había errado al
aplicar la política pública de ese Estado, la cual
prohíbe dar validez a una cláusula de arbitraje
contenida en un acuerdo de admisión a un asilo de
ancianos suscrita previo a la ocurrencia de un evento
de negligencia que resulte en muerte o daños
corporales. En el caso que nos ocupa, el TPI ha
pretendido relevar de su obligación de Arbitrar a una
abogada con 38 años de experiencia, y todo ello sin
que ni tan siquiera exista una legislación de Puerto
Rico para requerir que los reclamos de Jane se tengan
que resolver por un tribunal, lo cual también estaría
en contravención del FAA. De manera que, si el FAA
desplaza cualquier legislación estatal que conflija con
las disposiciones del FAA, es aún más claro que
cualquier determinación de un tribunal (como la
Resolución recurrida) que atente contra el FAA
también se tiene que dejar sin efecto.
El Tribunal Supremo de Puerto Rico es plenamente
consciente de estos principios. En World Films. Inc. v.
Paramount Pict. Corp., supra, el Tribunal Supremo
244a
reconoció que las leyes estatales que limitan las
clausula
de
arbitraje
quedan
desplazadas
(“preempted”) por el FAA. La controversia en World
Films giraba en torno a si la aplicación del Artículo 3B de la Ley 75, 10 L.P.R.A. § 278b-2, que establecía la
nulidad de cualquier estipulación en un contrato de
distribución que obligue a un distribuidor a arbitrar
fuera de Puerto Rico cualquier controversia que surja
de dicho contrato, había de prevalecer por encima de
la LFA. El Tribunal Supremo de Puerto Rico
determinó que en la medida que el Artículo 3-B de la
Ley 75 conflija en su aplicación con la FAA,
prevalecerá esta última. Id., pág. 364. El Tribunal
Supremo en efecto determinó que ante el FAA, el
Artículo 3-B era inoficioso y contrario a derecho. Al
resolver de esta manera, se revocó de manera expresa
los pronunciamientos de Walborg Corp. v. Tribunal
Superior, 104 D.P.R. 184 (1975), en el cual había
determinado que los tribunales estatales no venían
obligados a aplicar la LFA. En Walborq, el Tribunal
había resuelto que no podía concedérsele a una
cláusula de arbitraje mayor fuerza que la política
establecida en la Ley 75, y que los tribunales
245a
estatales no estaban obligados a aplicar la LFA.
Dicha doctrina quedó revocada por World Films.
Conforme lo anterior, no hay duda de que el TPI erró
al denegar el arbitraje basado en la supuesta
naturaleza “constitucional” y “laboral” de los reclamos
de Jane Doe. El FAA desplaza cualquier disposición
legal estatutaria o bajo la Constitución de Puerto Rico
que no haga valer y reconozca el compromiso asumido
por Jane Doe y CRL de resolver toda reclamación
(“any Claim”) mediante el procedimiento de arbitraje
pactado en la Sección 14 del Acuerdo.
VIII. CONCLUSIÓN Y SÚPLICA
Jane Doe inició los procedimientos ante el TPI en
violación a los términos de la cláusula compulsoria de
arbitraje que pactaron todos los Miembros Capitales
de CRL en el Acuerdo. El dictamen del TPI debe ser
revocado por contravenir los términos claros de la
Sección 14 del Acuerdo, las disposiciones del Ley
Federal de Arbitraje, la Claúsula de Supremacía de la
Constitución
de
los
Estados
Unidos
y
su
EN
MÉRITO
DE
LO
ANTERIORMENTE
EXPUESTO, muy respetuosamente solicitamos de
246a
este Honorable Tribunal que expida la presente
Solicitud de Certiorari, revoque la Resolución del TPI,
ordene a Jane Doe a presentar sus reclamos en el
arbitraje iniciado ante la AAA y desestime la
Demanda.
presente
escrito,
simultáneamente
con
su
Office, 261 Tetuán, San Juan, Puerto Rico 009011916; [email protected]; y el Lcdo. Manuel Porro
MENDOZA LAW OFFICES Abogados de los
Demandados-Peticionarios PO Box 9282
Tel. (787) 722-5522; 5530; 5540
247a
Fax: (787) 723-7057
Correo elecrónico
[email protected]
/s/
TSPR-8304
248a
APPENDIX G
COURT OF APPEALS
JANE DOE,
Plaintiff – Respondent,
v.
John Doe; “CP John and Jean Doe”; JACK JOE in
his personal capacity and as employer of Jane Doe
and as co-administrator of the “CP” constituted with
as employer of Jane Doe, and as co-administrator of
the CP constituted with LARISSA LOE, who is sued
as co-administrator of the CP constituted with Larry
Loe; “CP Larry and Larissa Loe” constituted by Larry
and Larissa Loe; Unknown Defendants A, B and C;
Unknown Insurance Companies Defendants, X,Y,Z,
Defendants – Petitioners.
249a
[stamp:]
KLCE20 [hw:] 1200821
TA [COURT OF APPEALS] CASE NO.:
TPI [TRIAL COURT] CASE NO.:
___________
KPE 2012-1204 (904)
___________
San Juan Part
CONFIDENTIAL
[stamp:]
[2 illegible lines]
COURT OF APPEALS
___________
2012 JUN 12 AM 9:46
___________
250a
MOTION SUBMITTING UNDER
SEAL “PETITION FOR CERTIORARI” AND
APPLICATION UNDER RULE 70(D)
APPEAR defendants-petitioners,1 Limited Liability
Company (“LLC”), John Doe and the conjugal
partnership (“CP”) established with Jean Doe, Jack
Joe and the CP established with Jacky Joe, and Larry
Loe and the CP established with Larissa Loe, and
very respectfully submit under seal their Petition for
Certiorari and an Application under Rule 70(d) to
Accept a Petition for Certiorari that Exceeds the
Maximum Number of Pages According to the Rules
and ask the Court to have the documents and appeal
proceedings so instituted remain confidential and
under seal for the reasons stated below:
1.
The petition for certiorari of reference has its
origin in an action for declaratory judgment and
injunction filed by Jane Doe, who was a Capital
Member of defendant LLC. As explained in the
Petition for Certiorari, there is an arbitration clause
between the parties that requires that any dispute
between the parties be heard confidentially. (Ap.
TA., pgs. 97-98.) Furthermore, the past and present
Capital Members of LLC have a duty to keep all
information related to the affairs of the firm
(“business of the firm”) confidential. (Ap. TA., pg. 93.)
For reasons of strict confidentiality the parties to this action
are not identified by their respective names. In the Affidavit
under Seal by the plaintiff-respondent submitted with the
Complaint and the subsequent amendments, such party
identified each one of the defendants-appellees [sic] using their
respective names, addresses, and telephone numbers.
(Appendix Petition for Certiorari (“Ap. TA.,” pgs. 12-13; 303-305;
and 506.)
1
251a
2.
According to the confidentiality obligation
imposed by the arbitration clause, plaintiffrespondent Jane Doe commenced the proceedings
before the Court of First Instance (trial court or
“TPI”) under seal and they have remained
confidential to date. (Ap. TA., pgs. 132-133.)
3.
Pursuant to their confidentiality obligations,
LLC and the other defendants hereby submit their
Petition for Certiorari and an Application under Rule
70(d) to Accept a Petition for Certiorari that Exceeds
the Maximum Number of Pages According to the
Rules and ask the Court to have the documents and
appeal proceedings so instituted remain confidential
and under seal.
4.
Attached is the cover of the Petition for
Certiorari, which includes all of the information
required by the Rules of this Honorable Court and
the corresponding Internal Revenue stamp.
WHEREFORE,
defendants-petitioners,
Limited
Liability Company (“LLC”), John Doe and the CP
established with Jean Doe, Jack Joe and the CP
established with Jacky Joe, and Larry Loe and the
CP established with Larissa Loe and they very
respectfully submit under seal their Petition for
Certiorari and they ask the Court to have the
documents and appeals proceedings so instituted
remain confidential.
I CERTIFY that I have notified a true and exact copy
of this writing, simultaneously with its submission,
by electronic mail and messenger to the attorneys for
the plaintiff-respondent, Juan R. González, Esq.,
González Muñoz Law Office, 261 Tetuán, San Juan,
252a
Puerto Rico 00901-1916; [email protected]; and
Manuel Porro Vizcarra, Esq., Manuel Porro Vizcarra
Law Offices, 382 Ave. Escorial, Urb. Caparra
Heights, San Juan, PR 00920; [email protected].
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, today, June 12, 2012
MENDOZA LAW OFFICES
Attorney for the Defendants-Petitioners
PO Box 9282
Tel. (787) 722-5522; 5530; 5540
Fax: (787) 723-7057
/s/
By: Enrique J. Mendoza Méndez, Esq.
TSPR-8304
[email protected]
253a
COURT OF APPEALS
SAN JUAN REGION
JANE DOE,
v.
254a
[stamp:]
KLCE20 [hw:] 1200821
___________
KPE 2012-1204 (904)
___________
SAN JUAN PART
CONFIDENTIAL
[stamp:]
[2 illegible lines]
COURT OF APPEALS
___________
2012 JUN 12 AM 9:46
___________
255a
[Internal Revenue Tax
Stamp:]
Nature:
Civil Certiorari
Subject:
Declaratory Judgment;
Preliminary and
Permanent Injunction;
Violation of Public Policy
and Constitutional
Rights; Retaliation;
Damages and Injuries
Matter:
Denial of Decision to
Refer Case to Validly
Agreed Arbitration
256a
Attorneys for the
Plaintiff
– Respondent Jane
Doe:
Attorneys for the
Defendants –
Petitioners
Juan Rafael González
Muñoz, Esq.
TSPR-8185
GONZALEZ MUÑOZ
LAW OFFICE,
P.S.C.
PO Box 9024055
San Juan, P.R.
00902-4055
Tel. (787) 766-5052
Fax: (787) 766-5551
Enrique J. Mendoza
Méndez, Esq.
TSPR-8304
MENDOZA LAW
OFFICES
PO Box 9282
San Juan, P.R.
00908-0282
Tel. (787) 722-5522; 5530;
5540
Fax: (787) 723-7057
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
Manuel Porro Vizcarra,
Eq.
TSPR-7994
MANUEL PORRO
VIZCARRA LAW
OFFICES
Tel. (787)774-8200
Fax: (787)774-8297
[email protected]
257a
COURT OF APPEALS
JANE DOE,
v.
258a
___________
KPE 2012-1204 (904)
___________
San Juan Part
CONFIDENTIAL
259a
TO ACCEPT A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
THAT EXCEEDS THE
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF PAGES ACCORDING
TO THE RULES
TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:
APPEAR defendants-petitioners, Limited Liability
very respectfully ask leave to submit their Petition for
Certiorari in excess of three (3) pages for the reasons
stated below.
1.
Rule 34(D) of the Rules of the Court of Appeals
stipulates that a petition for certiorari shall not
exceed twenty-five (25) pages. 4 L.P.R.A. Ap. XXII-B
R. 34(D)
2.
Rule 70(D) establishes that “[w]hen these rules
stipulate a maximum number of pages for a brief, no
brief whatsoever shall be accepted in excess of such
maximum unless it is accompanied by a separate
motion in which the court is asked leave to
exceed the maximum prescribed and just cause
is shown.” 4 L.P.R.A. Ap. XXI—B R. 70. (Emphasis
added.)
3.
Appearers respectfully request that this
Honorable Court exempt them from complying with
the maximum number of pages requirement
established. Despite the interest of the appearers in
conforming their brief to the aforementioned Rule, an
adequate and sufficient statement of the facts and
260a
the Law made it necessary for us to exceed it by just
three (3) pages.
4.
To state the content of the Petition for
Certiorari in just twenty-five (25) pages would
incurably undermine its meaning, clarity, and
coherence, and it might leave out significant and
weighty arguments.
In view thereof, we very
respectfully ask that authorization be given for the
defendant-petitioner to exceed the number of pages in
its brief, thus allowing the arguments that this
Honorable Court of Appeals must consider to be
argued clearly, completely, and reasonably. That is
the only purpose pursued by the appearers.
WHEREFORE, defendant-petitioner very respectfully
requests that this Honorable Court of Appeals
authorize the submission of the Petition for Certiorari
with a total number of pages in excess of that allowed
by the Rules of the Court.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, today June 12, 2012.
of this brief, simultaneously with its submission, by
electronic mail and messenger to the attorneys for
261a
MENDOZA LAW OFFICES
Attorney for the defendants-petitioners
PO Box 9282
Tel. (787) 722-5522; 5530; 5540
Fax: (787) 723-7057
Electronic mail:
[email protected]
/s/
Enrique J. Mendoza Méndez, Esq.
TSPR-8304
262a
COURT OF APPEALS
SAN JUAN REGION
JANE DOE,
v.
263a
___________
KPE 2012-1204 (904)
___________
SAN JUAN PART
CONFIDENTIAL
Nature:
Civil Certiorari
Subject:
Preliminary and
and Constitutional
Rights; Retaliation;
Damages and Injuries
Matter:
Denial of Decision to
Refer Case to Validly
Agreed Arbitration
264a
Attorneys for the
Plaintiff
– Respondent Jane
Doe:
Attorneys for the
Defendants –
Petitioners
Muñoz, Esq.
TSPR-8185
GONZALEZ MUÑOZ
LAW OFFICE,
P.S.C.
PO Box 9024055
San Juan, P.R.
00902-4055
Tel. (787) 766-5052
Fax: (787) 766-5551
Enrique J. Mendoza
Méndez, Esq.
TSPR-8304
MENDOZA LAW
OFFICES
PO Box 9282
San Juan, P.R.
00908-0282
Tel. (787) 722-5522; 5530;
5540
Fax: (787) 723-7057
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
Manuel Porro Vizcarra,
Eq.
TSPR-7994
MANUEL PORRO
VIZCARRA LAW
OFFICES
Tel. (787)774-8200
Fax: (787)774-8297
[email protected]
265a
COURT OF APPEALS
JANE DOE,
v.
266a
___________
KPE 2012-1204 (904)
___________
San Juan Part
267a
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
Company (“LLC”), John Doe and the conjugal estate
(“CP”) established with Jean Doe, Jack Joe and the
CP established with Jacky Joe, and Larry Loe and
the CP established with Larissa Loe, and very
respectfully request the issuance of a writ of
certiorari to overturn the Decision entered by the
Court of First Instance (trial court or “TPI”) on June
4, 2012, which refused to compel plaintiff-respondent
to arbitrate her claims.
I. INTRODUCTION
Through the Decision appealed in this Petition for
Certiorari the TPI has supported that Jane Doe, a
sophisticated attorney with a postgraduate education
in Law and 38 years of experience in commercial
litigation and labor law, can default on her obligation
to arbitrate and hear confidentially any claim or
demand against LLC. LLC is a limited liability
company organized under the laws of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, with main offices in
San Juan and one office outside of Puerto Rico that
provides services to foreign and local clientele. (Ap.
TA, pgs. 38-126.)
Plaintiff-respondent contracted the obligation to
arbitrate and hear confidentially any claim or
and 506.)
2
268a
complaint against the LLC in Section 14 of the
Operating Agreement (“Agreement”) that she signed
with the other Capital Members of LLC, who also
contracted such obligation. (Ap. TA., pgs. 97-99.)
The first paragraph of section 14 of the Agreement
reads as follows:
Claimant to resolve any claim by mediation or
arbitration. The Claimant expressly agrees that
the Claim shall be settled or resolved through the
procedures set forth herein, and shall not in any
way circumvent or otherwise challenge in any way
these proceedings relative to mediation and
arbitration.
(Ap. TA., pg. 97.) Despite the very broad scope of this
arbitration clause that includes “any claim”3, the
appealed Decision concluded that Jane Doe does not
need to submit her claims for retaliation, damages,
and discrimination to arbitration, and that they
should be adjudicated by the Court. (Ap. TA., pgs.
484-498.)
For the reasons summarized below, and explained in
detail in this petition, defendants-petitioners ask this
Honorable Court to issue the petition for certiorari
and to overturn the appealed decision.
First, the TPI erroneously assumed jurisdiction over
the controversy of whether Jane Doe is obligated to
arbitrate her claims against LLC and the other codefendants. The arbitration clause agreed by Jane
Doe and all of the Capital Members of LLC stipulates
The Agreement defines “Claim” as “any action, suit, complaint
or demand of whatever nature and for whatever relief against the
Firm or any of its Members or employees.”
3
269a
that the arbitration must be governed by the Rules of
Commercial Arbitration of the American Arbitration
Association (“AAA”), which in turn delegate to the
arbitrator the authority to determine his jurisdiction
and the scope of the arbitration clause. Under the
applicable case law that is sufficient evidence in Law
(clear and unequivocal) that the intention of the
parties is to entrust to the arbitrator decisions on
arbitrability, and not to the courts.
Second, having erroneously assumed jurisdiction over
the controversy insofar as arbitrability, the TPI
incorrectly decided it. For that it had to ignore the
clear letter of Section 14.01 of the Agreement where
the Capital Members of LLC agreed to submit “any
claim” to arbitration regardless of the nature thereof
or the remedy requested. By acting thus, the TPI did
not adhere to the interpretative rule prescribed by
the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) and its
interpretative case law that requires that questions
of arbitrability be resolved in favor of arbitration.
Likewise, the TPI did not adhere to the elemental
principle of interpretation of contracts under Puerto
Rican law that when the terms of a contract are clear
and are no ambiguous, its provisions will be applied
according to the literal sense that the parties gave to
it. Art. 1233 of the Civil Code, 31 L.P.R.A. § 3471.
Third, and finally, the TPI erred by denying the
arbitration agreed by the parties due to the alleged
“employment” or “labor” and “constitutional” nature
of Jane Doe’s alleged claims. This decision by the TPI
infringes the FAA, the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution of the United States and the
interpretative case law of both that displace
270a
(“preempt”) any intent to prohibit the arbitration of
certain types of claims.
II. JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of this Honorable Court of Appeals
(“TA”) to entertain this Petition for Certiorari arises
from Article 4.006(b) of the Judiciary Act of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (2003), 4. L.P.R.A. §
24(b); Rules 31, 32(D), 33-34, and 40 of the Rules of
the TA, 4 L.P.R.A. Ap. XXI-B, R. 33-34 and 40; Rules
52.1 and 52.2(b) of Civil Procedure of Puerto Rico, 32
L.P.R.A. Ap. V. R. 52.1 and 52.2(b).
III. DECISION OF WHICH REVIEW IS SOUGHT
LLC and the other defendants requested that the
Decision issued by the TPI in the case Jane Doe v.
Compañía de Responsabilidad Limitada et al., KPE
2012-1204 (904) (Hon. Judge Ángel R. Pagán Ocasio),
San Juan Part, June 4, 2012, and sent to the parties
by electronic mail on that same day (hereinafter
“Decision”) be overturned. (Ap. TA., pgs. 484-498.)
The Decision denied the Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Jurisdiction and to Compel Compulsory Arbitration
in Light of Binding Arbitration Agreement submitted
by the defendants-petitioners on April 11, 2012
(hereinafter “Motion to Dismiss”) (Ap. TA., pgs. 38126.)
Given that the TPI’s Decision was notified on June 4,
the 30-day period that the appearers have to submit
this petition expires on July 5, 2012.4 This petition
In view of the nature of the appealed Decision – which denies a
motion to compel arbitration as agreed by the parties – and the
fact that the TPI has the full intention to continue with the
proceedings before it, for which it has ordered the consolidation
of the preliminary injunction with the permanent one and
4
271a
has been submitted on time and the Court has
jurisdiction to entertain it.
At present there is no other appeal of this case
pending before this Court or before the Supreme
Court of Puerto Rico.
IV. GROUNDS FOR GRANTING THIS
PETITION
This petition complies with the criteria of Rule 52.1 of
Civil Procedure, supra, (“Rule 52.1”) and Rule 40 of
the TA’s Rules, supra, (“Rule 40”), for it to be issued.
The Decision by the TPI denied the dispositive motion
and motion to compel arbitration filed by the
defendants-petitioners. Such motion set forth that
the TPI did not have jurisdiction over the action
instituted by Jane Doe (“Jane”) given that there is a
clear and unequivocal agreement between the parties
that requires that the parties submit any claim
between them to arbitration and that the arbitrator
be the one to decide any controversy over whether
Jane’s claims are arbitrable or not. Furthermore, the
defendants-petitioners argued, in the alternative,
that according to the submission agreement in
question, it is appropriate for the TPI to order Jane to
arbitrate her claims against them. The Decision by
the TPI denied such arguments and decided, in
violation of the strong public policy established in § 2
of the FAA and the Arbitration Act of Puerto Rico
ordered the parties to submit stipulations last June 8, 2012,
LLC and the other defendants have submitted an Urgent Motion
in Aid of Jurisdiction with this Petition for Certiorari. That
motion respectfully asks this Honorable Court, in aid of its
jurisdiction, to order a stay of the TPI’s proceedings and to
maintain the confidentiality of the record and the identities of
the parties.
272a
(“LAPR”) that: (a) the TPI is the one that should
decide the controversy on arbitrability; and (b) that
Jane is not obligated to arbitrate her claims of alleged
employment discrimination, retaliation, and damages
because they are not covered by the arbitration clause
signed by the parties. (Ap. TA., pgs. 484-498.)
The TPI reached the aforementioned conclusion
despite the fact that the arbitration clause requires
that Jane settle “any claim” against the defendantspetitioners through the arbitration proceeding
regardless of the nature thereof. (Ap. TA., pgs. 66
(“Claim”); 97-98 (“Resolution of Claim”).)
As we shall see below, the TPI’s Decision suffers from
hostility to the arbitration that the FAA seeks to
eradicate. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepción, 131
S.Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011) (“The FAA was enacted ... in
response to widespread judicial hostility to arbitration
agreements.”)
Rule 52.1, insofar as pertinent, stipulates that a
petition for certiorari will only be granted by this
Honorable Court: (1) when the denial of a motion of a
dispositive nature is being appealed; (2) in cases that
are in the public interest; or (3) in any other situation
in which waiting for an appeal would constitute an
irreparable miscarriage of justice.
The three
exceptions are present in this case.
The first exception of Rule 52.1 is applicable because,
as we saw, the TPI’s Decision denied the dispositive
motion5 of the defendants-petitioners that establishes
the impropriety of the court action instituted by Jane
See Motion for Dismissal due to Lack of Jurisdiction and to
Compel Binding Arbitration in View of a Binding Arbitration
Agreement. (Ap. TA., pgs. 38-126.)
5
273a
given that disputes on arbitrability must be resolved
by the arbitrator himself and Jane is contractually
obligated to prosecute all of her claims through a
confidential arbitration proceeding.
The second exception is also fully satisfied, because
there is no question whatsoever that both under the
LAPR and the FAA arbitration is a matter that is in
the highest public interest. Perry v. Thomas, 482
U.S. 483, 489 (1987) (“[I]n enacting § 2 of [FAA],
Congress declared a national policy favoring
arbitration ... “) (Emphasis added); Constructora
Estelar v. Aut. Edif. Pub., 2011 T.S.P.R. 139, pg. 13,
183 D.P.R. ___ (“[I]n Puerto Rico there is a vigorous
public policy in favor of arbitration as an
alternate method of dispute resolution and all
disputes on whether or not arbitration is appropriate
must be resolved in favor of it as it has been agreed.”)
(Emphasis Added.)
Likewise, the third exception is applicable. It would
be impractical and it would constitute an
irremediable miscarriage of justice to have to wait for
the final resolution of the case in a judicial forum to
be able to present and appeal to this Honorable Court
and set forth as an error that the claims made by
Jane should have been adjudicated in a confidential
arbitration proceeding. By way of comparative law,
in Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 861 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1988) (a case
determining that the denials of orders compelling
arbitration are appealable on an interlocutory basis),
the Court of Appeals of the United State for the
Fourth Circuit recognized that orders denying
arbitration can cause irreparable harm if they are not
reviewed on an interlocutory basis:
274a
[o]rders denying arbitration do have an injunctive
effect and have ‘serious, perhaps, irreparable,
consequence.’ The order is injunctive because it
enjoins proceedings in another tribunal. It has
serious consequences because of the
irreparable
harm
that
exists
when
arbitration is denied ab initio…’ If a party
must undergo the expense and delay of trial before
being able to appeal, the advantages of
arbitration-speed and economy-are lost forever.
See 861 F.2d, at pg. 422; See also City of Meridian
Miss. v. Algernon Blair, Inc., 721 F.2d 525, 529 (5th
Cir. 1983) (an injunction staying arbitration
constitutes irreparable harm due to the costs of
litigating). It is evident that if this Honorable Court
does not intervene in this phase of the proceedings,
the remedies requested by the defendants-petitioners
would become moot.
Moreover, if the writ of
certiorari is not issued, Jane would be allowed to
defeat her obligation to submit to arbitration all
claims, of any nature, that she might have against
the defendants, which obligation she contracted
freely and voluntarily.
Furthermore, as we shall see below, the criteria of
Rule 40 for the granting of the writ of certiorari are
met in the instant case. 6 Let us see.
The relevant criteria are:
(A) If the remedy and the dispositive part of the judgment or
decision appealed, unlike the bases thereof, infringe the
law.
(B) If the facts stated present a situation more indicative for an
analysis of the problem put forth.
6
275a
As discussed throughout this brief, the Decision of the
TPI infringes the law and, in particular, the rules on
arbitration and the interpretation of contracts,
because it determines that Jane is not obligated to
use the arbitration proceeding that commenced on
March 22, 2012 before the American Arbitration
Association (“AAA”) despite the fact that the
agreement between the parties requires that Jane
submit to arbitration all of her claims against the
defendants
(“resolve
any
Claim
by
…
arbitration”) regardless of the nature thereof (“any
action … of whatever nature … against the Firm
or any of its Members…”). Consequently, it is
appropriate to grant the petition for certiorari
pursuant to part (A) of Rule 40.
The TPI committed a gross error in their
interpretation and evaluation of the arbitration
clause. That, inasmuch as from the text of the
arbitration clause in question, it is clearly seen that it
is the arbitrator who has the obligation of resolving
the controversies put forth by Jane in the judicial
forum. As a result, it is appropriate to grant the
petition for certiorari pursuant to part (C) of Rule 40.
(C) If there has been prejudice, partiality, or a gross and
manifest error in the evaluation of the evidence by the
[TPI].
(D) …
(E) If the phase that the case is in is the most appropriate one
for its consideration.
(F) If the issuance of the writ or the order to show cause do not
cause an improper division of the action and an undesirable
delay with respect to the final resolution of the litigation.
(G) If the issuance of the writ or the order to show cause
prevent a miscarriage of justice.
276a
Nor is there a question that, pursuant to part (B) of
Rule 40, the factual situation that is established is
the one most indicative for an analysis of the
controversy before this Honorable Court, because for
it to be decided only requires that the Court interpret
the arbitration clause agreed pursuant to the FAA
and the rules of contract interpretation.
The intervention of the Honorable Court at this
phase is most propitious, because if the proceedings
before the TPI stayed, Jane’s obligation to prosecute
her claims before the arbitration forum would become
moot and irreparable harm would be caused to the
defendants-petitioners because the commitments
made to undertake a confidential arbitration
proceeding would not be complied with.
As a result, in order to avoid a miscarriage of justice
it is necessary to grant the petition for certiorari
pursuant to parts (G)-(I) of Rule 40.
V. LIST OF PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE
FACTS MATERIAL TO THE CASE
A.
List of Procedural Facts
1. On April 2, 2012, Jane submitted a Verified
Complaint and Application for Declaratory Judgment
and Preliminary and Permanent Injunction
(“Complaint”) with the TPI. Jane claimed in the
Complaint that the arbitration clause of the
“Operating Agreement” of the LLC (“Agreement”) is
not applicable to her, arguing that that agreement
only regulates the commercial and administrative
operations of the LLC. Jane Doe further claimed that
her claims are of a labor nature and that they are
covered by the Constitution of Puerto Rico, Law No.
100 of June 30, 1959 (age), Law No. 69 of July 6, 1985
277a
(sex and retaliation), Law No. 115 of December 20,
1991 (retaliation) and the LLC’s Employee Manual
(“Manual”), which does not contain an arbitration
clause. To that end, Jane asked the TPI to declare
the arbitration clause of the Agreement inapplicable
to her alleged labor claims and that the LLC be
ordered to cease the arbitration under Rule 57 of
Civil Procedure until the TPI can resolve the
controversy set forth on arbitrability. (AP. TS., pgs.
1-13) As stated in the list of material facts, Jane’s
claims that the Agreement is not pertinent to her
claims are in open contradict with the extrajudicial
claim that Jane made to the LLC Managing Board
where she expressly set them forth as violations of
the Agreement. (Ap. TA., pgs. 119-123.)
2. Together with the Complaint, Jane submitted a
Motion Requesting a Preliminary and Permanent
Injunction (“Motion for Injunction”), in which she
likewise requested an order to stay the arbitration
until the TPI could decide on the Declaratory
Judgment, but with the request that once it was
decided in favor of Jane that such forum make the
cease and desist order permanent and proceed to
decide on the merits of the controversies set forth.
(Ap. TA., pgs. 14-19.)
3. Jane also submitted an Emergency Motion in
Request of an Order in order for all the proceedings to
remain strictly confidential. (Ap. TA., pgs. 20-21.)
4. On April 3, 2012, the TPI issued an Order setting
a hearing for April 11, 2012, to determine the
appropriateness of the extraordinary motion
requested. (Ap. TA., pgs. 23.)
5. On April 11, 2012, the defendants-petitioners
submitted a Motion to Dismiss, in which they
278a
essentially argued that the Agreement is a contract in
the interstate commerce, and therefore the FAA is
applicable to it, that pursuant to the arbitration
clause of the Agreement all disputes on whether
Jane’s claims are arbitrable or not are up to the
arbitrator himself to decide and not the TPI and that,
in the alternative, it would be appropriate for the TPI
to recognize that through Section 14.04 of the
Agreement Jane undertook to prosecute all of her
claims (“any Claim”) confidentially through the
arbitration procedure regardless of the nature of the
claims or whether they arise under the Agreement.
Furthermore, the defendants-petitioners argued that
under the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution, regardless of the alleged constitutional
and labor nature of the Jane’s claims, § 2 of the FAA
requires that such claims be adjudicated under the
arbitration proceeding initiated before the AAA. (Ap.
TA., pgs. 38-126.)
6. On that same day a hearing was held in which it
was agreed that the defendants-petitioners would
stay their actions in the arbitration case until the TPI
could resolve the motions submitted on arbitrability,
that the confidentiality of the case would be
maintained and that all documents would be
submitted under seal.
Furthermore, the TPI
indicated that the first matter to be decided would be
the arbitrability of Jane’s claims. Finally, the TPI set
a preliminary injunction hearing for May 10, 2012, if
the production of evidence would be necessary.7 (Ap.
TA., pgs. 127-128.)
On May 8, 2012, that hearing was rescheduled for June 5. (Ap.
TA., pgs. 450-451.)
7
279a
7. On April 23, 2012, Jane submitted her Opposition
to the Motion to Dismiss. In that Opposition Jane
claimed, among other things, that the arbitration
clause of the Agreement was not applicable to her
alleged claims of a labor nature because that
document only applies to matters related to the
management of the LLC, especially because Jane’s
claims are constitutional in nature. Furthermore,
Jane claimed that the TPI is the one that must
resolve all of her claims.8 (Ap. TA., pgs. 134-278.)
8. After the submission of several memoranda by
the parties,9 and the submission by Jane of a Second
Amended Complaint, on June 4, 2012, at 11:41 a.m.,
the TPI notified by electronic mail the Decision under
appeal which, as we stated, decides in violation of the
FAA and its interpretative case law that that forum
is the one that has jurisdiction to decide the
controversy on arbitrability and that, furthermore,
Jane does not have to arbitrate her claims of alleged
of the Agreement. (Ap. TA., pgs. 484-498). In
footnote 12 of the Decision, the TPI makes the
On that same day, Jane submitted an Amended Verified
Complaint in order to include the spouses of the defendants as
defendants themselves, in their capacities as co-managers of the
respective conjugal partnerships, and to amend her causes of
action. (Ap. TA., pgs. 279-305.) On May 1, 2012, defendants
opposed the aforementioned amendment. (Ap. TA., pgs. 306313.)
9 On May 1, 2012, defendants-petitioners submitted their Reply
to ‘Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss Due to Lack of
Jurisdiction and to Compel Binding Arbitration in View of a
Binding Arbitration Agreement.’ (Ap. TA., pgs. 314-416.) For
her part, on May 7, 2012, Jane submitted a brief called
Plaintiff’s Sur-reply. (Ap. TA., pgs. 414-449.)
8
280a
following statements that make evident its hostility
toward the arbitration proceeding: “According to the
interpretation and position of the LLC, through the
[Agreement] the arbitrator would be delegated
a decision on the dispute in a completely
confidential forum without a right for the
affected parties to appeal.” (Ap. TA., pg. 497;
emphasis ours.)
9. Furthermore, the TPI indicated that it would
keep the injunction hearing scheduled for the next
day would, where the parties would have to submit
evidence in relation to the application for injunctive
relief. Likewise, it authorized the submission of the
Second Amended Complaint. (Ap. TS., pg. 541.)
From an analysis of the format, typography, and style
of the Decision it can be reasonably inferred that it is
most likely the result of a draft Decision submitted by
Jane, and if that is correct, she would have had
knowledge of the decision by the TPI significantly in
advance of the defendants-petitioners.
10. Indeed, surprisingly, only four (4) hours after the
Decision was notified, Jane submitted to the TPI a
Motion for an Order on the Confidentiality of Further
Proceedings, claiming that in view of the decision
hours earlier by the TPI there was no reason for the
proceedings
to
continue
to
be
prosecuted
confidentially. (Ap. TA., pgs. 499-504.) Also, Jane
submitted a Third Amended Verified Complaint
under seal, which identifies the defendants with their
respective names. (Ap. TA., pgs. 505-528.)
11. Furthermore, right before the hearing set for
June 5, 2012 was to begin, Jane submitted to the TPI,
at 8:47 a.m., a Request for Reinstatement as an
Additional Remedy under the Scope of Rule 59.4 of
281a
Civil Procedure by means of which she asked that she
be reinstated at the LLC through a Partial Decision
to be issued by means of a preliminary and
permanent injunction. (Ap. TA., pgs. 529-535.) A
copy of this Request was delivered to the attorney for
the defendant-petitioners as he was entering the TPI
Courtroom for the hearing.
12. Minutes later, the parties appeared at the
preliminary injunction hearing set for that day.
Although not even 24 hours had elapsed from the
time the defendants-petitioners became aware that
Jane’s legal action would not be dismissed to proceed
to arbitration, the TPI asked them to submit evidence
on the claims in the case to be able to begin to decide
it on the merits. In view of how hurried the
proceeding was becoming, the defendants-petitioners
objected to the action by the TPI using arguments of
reasonability and Due Process of Law, among others.
The TPI then granted until June 8 for Jane to submit
the proposed stipulations of fact that had not been
accepted by the defendants-petitioners, for the
defendants to submit proposed facts and for both
parties to submit the documents that should be
considered by the TPI.
consolidated the preliminary injunction hearing with
the permanent injunction hearing and it indicated
that if it was necessary to produce evidence the
parties would be notified on the holding of the
hearing.10 (Ap. TA., pgs. 548-551 and 552-617.)
The TPI also granted 10 days for the defendants-petitioners to
present their position regarding Jane’s request to vacate the
order of confidentiality and 15 days to state [their position] on
the request for reinstatement of Jane at the LLC. (Ap. TA., pgs.
548-551.)
10
282a
B.
List of Material Facts
1. In November 1979, Jane joined the LLC as an
attorney after having obtained a Master’s in Law and
having started to practice the profession. (Ap. TA.,
pgs. 1-13 and 38-126.)
2. When Jane joined LLC, LLC was a civil-law
partnership. At that time and now LLC provides
services to foreign clientele, mainly in the United
States, and locally. (Ap. Ta., pgs. 38-126.)
3. In September 1987, Jane was promoted to Equity
Partner of the LLC. (Ap. TA., pgs. 1-13 AND 38-159.)
4. On September 13, 2007, LLC became a limitedliability company under the laws of Puerto Rico. As a
result of the aforementioned change, Jane became a
Capital Member of LLC. (Ap. TA., pgs. 1-13, and 38126.)
5. On that same day, Jane and the other LLC
Capital Members signed a document titled Operating
Agreement (“Operating Agreement” or “Agreement”). 11
Ap. TA., pgs. 60-115 and 338-353.)
6. Insofar as pertinent, such Agreement stipulates
the following in its relevant Sections:
1.
demand of whatever nature and for whatever
Members or employees…
The Agreement establishes that its effectiveness is retroactive
to June 1, 2007.
11
283a
Member asserting a Claim.
5.
Compensation.12
5.02 Salaries of Members – Each Capital Member
shall be entitled to such annual salary as shall be
determined pursuant to section 5.01 of this
Agreement, to be paid in one (1) or more
installments.....
10.
Fiduciary Duty and Duty of Loyalty of
Members.
10.1 Fiduciary Duties of Members – Members owe
the Firm and each other a fiduciary duty and a duty
of loyalty, which requires each Member, among other
things:
(f)
To treat all Firm Documents as confidential
confidentiality obligation ... and to treat as
deliberations of the Members and the business of the
Firm while such Member is a Member of the Firm
and, in the event the Member leaves the Firm, after
such Member’s departure.
12.
Withdrawal.
Retirement.
Expulsion ... of a Member.
Suspension.
12.02 Suspension and/or Expulsion – The Firm
may, upon the recommendation of the Policy
Committee and the affirmative vote of three-fourths
(%) of the Capital Members, ... (b) expel any Member
For the rest of the relevant clauses on compensation see
Section 5 of the Agreement. (Ap. TA., pgs. 84-86.)
12
284a
at any date specified by the Policy Committee with or
without cause or prior notice to such Member. In the
case of any such expulsion, the Member so expelled
shall cease to be a Member on the date specified by the
Policy Committee.
14.
Resolution of Claim.
14.01 Intent and Purpose – It is the intent and
purpose of the Firm and any Claimant to resolve
any Claim by mediation or arbitration. The
Claimant expressly agrees that the Claim shall be
settled or resolved through the procedures set forth
herein, and shall not in any way circumvent or
otherwise challenge in any way these
proceedings
relative
to
mediation
and
arbitration.
14.04 Arbitration – If mediation fails, the Claim
shall be settled by arbitration administered by the
[AAA] under its Commercial Arbitration Rules, and
judgment on the award rendered by the arbitrator(s)
may be entered in any court having jurisdiction
thereof. ...
14.05 Confidentiality – The Claimant and the Firm
agree that the underlying purpose of the provisions set
forth in section 14 of this Agreement is to provide a
mechanism by which any Claim shall be resolved
in a confidential manner, without publicity and
the attendant distractions. ... The parties agree
to maintain the confidentiality of such meetings
and hearings, and of the documents produced or
created in such meetings and hearings. Any and
all actions taken by the parties shall be in
conformity with the underlying purpose set forth
in section 14 of this Agreement.
285a
Note that Jane does not dispute that the Agreement is
a contract in the interstate commerce for purposes of
the FAA. (Ap. TA., pgs. 1-3; 38-126; 134-278; 314416; and 417-449.)
Nor is the validity of the
arbitration clause in Section 14 of the Agreement in
dispute. (Id.)
8. On October 22, 2007, the LLC’s Employee Manual
took effect which applies to all employees and
Members of LLC. However, such Manual does not
make a Member an employee. Rather, the Manual
clearly maintains the difference between the
classification of “Member” and “employee.” (Ap. TA.,
pgs. 191-257.) The Manual also does not establish
the policies related to the compensation of Members,
or the process of terminating their relationship with
LLC, or the method to resolve disputes between
Members and LLC. Those policies are contained in
Sections 5, 12, and 14 of the Agreement, respectively.
(Ap. TA., pgs. 84-86 and 94-98.)
9. LLC has offices within and outside of Puerto Rico.
Furthermore, the great majority of its clients are
located outside of Puerto Rico (principally in the
United States), which requires that LLC and its
clients remain in constant communication as part of
its operations through the use of mail, Internet,
telephone
and
other
means
of
interstate
communications. Likewise, it is significant insofar as
the Agreement is a contract in the interstate
commerce, and due to the economic nature thereof,
the following federal statutes, among others, apply to
the relationship of LLC with those who are deemed
employees per se: 1) Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78; 2) Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654; 3) Family
286a
Medical Leave Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e17; 4) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; and 5)
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29
U.S.C. §§ 621-34. (Ap. TA., pgs. 38-126.)
9. In the middle of 2009, Jane was elected to the
Managing Board of LLC, which is the highest
governing body of LLC.
10. Jane’s compensation had to be reduced for
business reasons. As a result of that, on January 24,
2012, Jane filed an extrajudicial claim against the
Members of LLC’s Managing Board, as required
under Section 14.02 of the Agreement.
In her
extrajudicial claim, Jane alleged in sum that her
compensation had been reduced in violation of the
Agreement. In no part of her claim did Jane
mention that the Manual had been violated. Indeed,
the only written contact that Jane claimed was
violated was the Agreement. Insofar as pertinent, the
appellee specifically claimed the following, based on
the Agreement:
…I formally ask you to reconsider the decision by
[John Doe] and to schedule, as soon as possible and
within the next 15 days, a meeting of the Managing
Board under the tenor of Clause 14 et seq. of the
“Operating Agreement,” such that I as a Capital
Member can present my position and objections. I
want to make clear that subjecting myself to the
procedure under Clause 14 should not be construed
as a waiver of the rights that protect me under local
and federal laws.
I will now proceed to summarize my objections
briefly.
287a
1.
The reduction in my salary and benefits
was done (sic) violates the “Operating
Agreement” and the agreement between [John Doe]
and me, and it violates the specific agreement
established with me.
2.
…Evidently, the procedure followed was
inadequate and in violation of the “Operating
Agreement,” the decisions by the Managing Board
approved on May 31, 2011, and the decision of
December 20, 2011.
16.
Likewise I was offended when [Jack Joe], in a
meeting of the Board stated that “to sit at that desk
means having to bring in business” and no one
clarified the impropriety of his comment. Is that a
requirement in the Operating Agreement?...
(Ap. TA., pgs. 119-123; emphasis ours.)
11. Pursuant to Section 14.03 of the Agreement, on
March 20, 2012 the parties subjected themselves to
the mediation process which ended without achieving
any agreement whatsoever.
12. Faced with the failure of mediation, on March 22,
2012, LLC submitted an Arbitration Complaint
against Jane with the AAA in execution of the
arbitration clause of Section 14.04 of the Agreement
which requires that all disputes (“any Claim”)
between the parties regardless of the nature thereof
or whether or not it arises under the Agreement shall
be resolved through such dispute resolution method,
and confidentially. (Ap. TA., pgs. 259-260.)
VI. INDICATIONS OF ERROR
FIRST INDICATION OF ERROR:
THE TPI
MANIFESTLY
ERRED
BY
ASSUMING
288a
JURISDICTION OVER THE CONTROVERSY ON
WHETHER JANE DOE IS OBLIGATED TO
ARBITRATE HER ALLEGED CLAIMS: JANE DOE
AND LLC UNMISTAKABLY AGREED THAT THE
DETERMINE THE SCOPE OF HIS JURISDICTION.
SECOND INDICATION OF ERROR: THE TPI
MANIFESTLY ERRED BY CONCLUDING THAT
JANE DOE DOES NOT HAVE TO ARBITRATE
HER ALLEGED CLAIMS AGAINST LLC AND THE
OTHER DEFENDANTS-PETITIONERS GIVEN
THAT THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE OF THE
AGREEMENT IS BROAD, CLEAR, AND IT
COVERS ANY CLAIM BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
THIRD INDICATION OF ERROR: THE TPI
MANIFESTLY ERRED BY EXEMPTING JANE DOE
FROM ARBITRATING HER CLAIMS BECAUSE OF
THEIR ALLEGED “EMPLOYMENT” OR “LABOR”
AND CONSTITUTIONAL” NATURE BECAUSE
THE FAA DISPLACES (“PREEMPTS”) ALL STATE
POLICY CONTRARY TO ARBITRATION.
VII. DISCUSSION OF THE ERRORS
INDICATED
A.
FIRST INDICATION OF ERROR: THE TPI
MANIFESTLY
ERRED
BY
ASSUMING
The TPI manifestly erred on assuming jurisdiction to
decide whether Jane Doe has to arbitrate her alleged
289a
claims against LLC and the other defendantspetitioners.
Despite the fact that the TPI
acknowledged that the parties can agree to have the
arbitrator be the one to decide whether a dispute is
arbitrable as well as the merits thereof when it has
been clearly and unmistakably been agreed (Ap. TA.,
pg. 495.),13 that forum decided that “it is not
necessary to determine whether the delegation of
jurisdiction to the arbitrator is clear and
unmistakable because the arbitration clause is not
applicable to the controversies presented.” (Id.) In
other words the TPI rested on a completely
circular argument to ignore the clear language
of the broad arbitration clause in the
Agreement, the provisions of the FAA and its
interpretative case law, and Puerto Rican rules
on the interpretation of contracts. All of these
precepts required referring the matter of whether
Jane Doe’s claims are arbitrable under Section 14 of
the Agreement to the arbitrator.
As a preliminary matter, it is necessary to make a
brief statement on the FAA because [as] was
appropriately claimed by the defendants-petitioners,
Jane Doe did not dispute its application to the matter
that concerns us and such law is dispositive on this
petition. (Ap. TA., pgs. 52-58.) The FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 1
et seq. applies to contracts in the interstate commerce
and it applies both in the federal and the state courts.
World Films, Inc. v. Paramount Pict. Corp., 125
D.P.R. 352, 357 and 364 (1990). Section 2 of the FAA
stipulates that:
See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945
(1995).
13
290a
A written provision in any maritime
transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out
of such contract or transaction or the refusal to
perform the whole or any part thereof, or an
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration
an existing controversy arising out of such a
contract, transaction or refusal, shall be valid,
irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist in
law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (Emphasis ours).
The FAA reflects a clear, well established and broadly
recognized federal policy in favor of arbitration. See
Méndez Acevedo v. Nieves Rivera, 179 D.P.R. 359
(2010); KKW Enterprises v. Gloria Jean’s Gourmet
Coffees Franchising Corp, 184 F.3d 42, 50 (1st Cir.
1999); citing Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v.
M/V SKY Reefer, 29 F.3d 727, 730 (1st Cir.) ;
confirmed in 515 U.S. 528 (1995). On this strong
public policy, the Supreme Court of the United States
(“SCOTUS”) has stated the following:
****
291a
claims which the contracting parties agreed
to resolve by arbitration.
Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987) (internal
citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
In other words, the FAA applies without accepting
state procedural or substantive policies otherwise and
it removed the power of the States to require a
judicial forum to resolve claims that the contracting
parties agreed to resolve through arbitration.
The FAA was passed precisely as a response to the
hostility that the Courts have traditionally shown
toward arbitration agreements. See Circuit City
Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 111 (2011) (deciding
that employment contracts in the interstate
commerce except those of certain transportation
employees are covered by the FAA). The Supreme
Court of Puerto Rico has recognized outright the
public policy contained in the FAA by stating that
such law stipulates that:
…the arbitration clauses in these contracts are valid,
irrevocable and mandatory.
Once arbitration is
agreed, the courts lack discretion regarding their
efficacy and they have to enforce the arbitration
agreed. According to this law, and the federal
case law interpreting it, any question about the
scope of the disputes that may be taken to
arbitration must be resolved in favor of
arbitration. This applies to both the federal courts
and the state courts.
See Painewebber Incorporated of Puerto Rico v.
Service Concepts, Inc., 151 D.P.R. 307, 311-12 (2000)
(emphasis ours); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465
U.S. 1, 16 (1984).
292a
Disputes on arbitrability take three (3) forms: (i)
whether there is an arbitration agreement; (ii) the
agreement covers a certain dispute”); (iii) and
whether such agreement covers a dispute on the
duration or expiration of the contract. See Méndez
Acevedo v. Nieves Rivera, 179 D.P.R. 359, 367-68
(2010); Municipio de Mayagüez v. Lebrón, 167 D.P.R.
713, 720-21 (2006); World Films, Inc. v. Paramount
Pictures Corp., supra.
As a general rule, the determination of whether an
agreement creates the duty of the parties to arbitrate
a certain dispute is a judicial task. Méndez Acevedo,
supra; World Films, Inc., supra. Notwithstanding
the foregoing, the matter of arbitrability shall
not be under the jurisdiction of a court if the
parties agreed in the arbitration agreement
that such authority is delegated to the
arbitrator. That is to say, if it is agreed in an
arbitration agreement that the arbitrator is the one
who will decide matters of arbitrability, it is
appropriate that he, and not the court, be the one to
determine whether there is an obligation to arbitrate
a certain dispute. U.G.T. v. Corp. Difusión Pub., 168
D.P.R. 674, 684 (2006) (“Ordinarily and except if the
collective agreement stipulates otherwise,
matters of substantive arbitrability must be resolved
by the courts…”) (emphasis ours).
Consistent with the foregoing, it is a well-settled
principle in the federal jurisdiction and under the
FAA that a challenge to the validity of an arbitration
agreement, including any dispute over arbitrability
(if a certain dispute is arbitrable or not), must be
referred to the arbitrator if there is “clear and
293a
unmistakable evidence” that the parties so agreed –
that that was their intention. First Options of
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995).
The foregoing is precisely the situation in the case at
bar. The FAA is applicable to the Agreement between
Jane and LLC and the parties delegated the
determination of arbitrability to the arbitral forum
and therefore the TPI erred in assuming jurisdiction.
The FAA is applicable to the Agreement
between Jane Doe and LLC because it is a
contract that involves interstate commerce. To
determine whether there is a transaction that
involves interstate commerce, the Court must
examine the contract and the commercial
transactions of the parties, among other things. See
Ideal Services Corp. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 727
F.Supp. 75, 76 (D.P.R. 1989).
In Allied Bruce Terminix v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265,
282 (1995), the SCOTUS decided that when the
Congress of the United States passed the FAA it
wanted to use its constitutional power under the
Commerce Clause to the utmost:
“involving commerce” as broadly as the words
“affecting commerce”; and, as we have said,
these latter words normally mean a full
exercise of constitutional power. At the same
time, the Court’s opinion does not discuss the
implications of the “interstate” facts to which
the respondents now point. For these reasons,
Bernhardt does not require us to narrow the
scope of the word “involving.” And, we
conclude that the word “involving,” like
294a
“affecting,” signals an intent to exercise
Congress’ commerce power to the full.
513 U.S. at pg. 277. In Allied Bruce, the dispute was
around an arbitration clause in an extermination
services agreement for a residence. The SCOTUS
determined that the contract involved interstate
commerce for the purposes of the FAA because the
pesticides were manufactured outside of the state and
the defendant had operations in multiple states.
The Agreement is a contract that involves
interstate commerce. Among other reasons, the
Agreement governs the proprietary interest of the
parties and the LLC’s operations in Puerto Rico and
in its office outside of Puerto Rico. See, SCI v.
Fulmer, 883 So.2d 621, 629 (Ala 2003) ((“[I]t would
be difficult indeed to give an example of an
under the FAA.”) (emphasis added).14 Furthermore,
See also, Thomas H. Oehmke, Commercial Arbitration § 3:6
(2011) (2011) (“A contract needs only the slightest nexus
to interstate commerce to apply the FAA.”); 21 Willinston on
Contracts §57: (4th ed. 2011) (“Consistent with the broad
approach to interpreting the term ‘involving commerce’
in the [FAA], it has been said that a contract containing
an arbitration provision need only be related to
commerce to fall within the coverage of the Act “)
(emphasis added); Bowen v. Security Pest Control, Inc., 879
So.2d 1139, 1142 (Ala. 2003) (decides that the transaction
involved interstate commerce, in part, because one of the parties
to the transaction engaged in business in two States). Indeed,
the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause of the
United States is so broad that in the last 75 years only two
SCOTUS cases have decided that Congress exceeded its powers
under the aforementioned Commerce Clause. See U.S. v. Lopez,
14
295a
the great majority of LLC’s clients are located outside
of Puerto Rico (principally in the United States),
which means that the LLC and its clients must
remain in constant communication as part of its
operations through the use of mail, Internet,
telephone,
and
other
means
of
interstate
communications. Likewise, the economic nature of
the Agreement and the fact that the following federal
statutes, among others, apply to the relationship of
LLC with those who are considered employees per se,
is significant: 1) Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,
29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78; 2) Occupational Safety and
Medical Leave Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to
2000e-17; 4) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964;
and 5) Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34. Furthermore, and as we
indicated above, Jane did not dispute the application
of the FAA to the arbitration clause of the Agreement
and, therefore, she waived any right to the contrary.
See Caguas Satellite Corp. v. Echostar Satellite LLC,
_ F.Supp.2d _, 2011 WL 5517037, n. 2 (D.P.R.)
(“Plaintiffs [, the party opposing arbitration,] ... do not
make any arguments about whether or not the
agreement involves interstate commerce and therefore
waive this argument”).
Given the clear language of Section 14 of the
Agreement, the TPI manifestly erred by
assuming jurisdiction over the dispute of
whether Jane Doe’s claims are arbitrable or
514 U.S. 549 (1995); US v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). Note
that none of the statutes in dispute in those cases was aimed at
regulating purely economic transactions, but rather criminal
conduct of a noneconomic nature.
296a
not. In the arbitration clause contained in the
Agreement, Jane agreed that the arbitration would be
the AAA.15 Section 14.04 of the Agreement stipulates
insofar as pertinent: “[i]f mediation fails, the Claim
shall be settled by arbitration under its Commercial
Arbitration Rules ....” In turn, Rule 7(a) of that body
of rules stipulates: [t]he arbitrator shall have the
Arbitration Rules of the AAA, Rule 7(a), Ap. TA. pgs.
116-118.) (emphasis ours). In view of the inclusion
within the arbitration clause between Jane and LLC,
of a body of arbitration rules that delegates the
authority to determine to the arbitrator, it was clear
that it was not up to the TPI to determine whether
Jane’s claims were arbitrable.
Every federal court that has had this dispute before it
has decided that when the parties incorporate
institutional rules such as those of the AAA into their
arbitration agreement or clauses, which delegate to
the arbitrator the authority to decide on his own
jurisdiction – to decide arbitrability – that constitutes
sufficient (clear and unmistakable) evidence in
law that that was the intention of the parties. See
Contec Corp. v. Remote Solution Co., 398 F.3d 205,
208 (2nd Cir. 2005) See Contec Corp. v. Remote
Solution Co., 398 F.3d 205, 208 (2nd Cir. 2005)
(“When … parties explicitly incorporate rules that
empower an arbitrator to decide issues of
arbitrability, the incorporation serves as clear and
The AAA’s Rules of Commercial Arbitration enjoy the same
generalness as the Rules of Civil Procedure of Puerto Rico.
15
297a
unmistakable evidence of the parties’ intent to
delegate such issues to an arbitrator’); Sleeper Farms
v. Agway, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 197 (D. Me. 2002)
(“[Since the AAA rules constitute] a clear and
unmistakable
delegation
of
scope-determining
authority to an arbitrator, [the court] refers this
dispute to the arbitrator [to determine [...] what issues
[...] are covered by the arbitration clause.”)16
Indeed, even when the parties have not agreed to
submit substantive disputes on arbitrability to the
arbitration forum, the courts tend to leave the
dispute to be resolved initially by the arbitrator when
the arbitrability cannot be determined without
entering into the merits of the dispute. Elkouri &
Elkouri, How Arbitrations Works, (BNA Books, 6th
Edition 2003), at pg. 281. (“However, even though the
See, also: Terminix Int’l Col. v. Palmer Ranch Ltd., 432 F.3d
1327, 29, 33-34 (11th Cir. 2005) (Deciding that because the AAA’s
Rules of Arbitration delegate the determination of arbitrability
to the arbitrator, the plaintiff’s claim that the arbitration
agreement illegally denied him of several statutory remedies,
was a matter to be adjudicated by the arbitrator, not by the
court); Qualcomm Inc. v. Nokia Corp., 466 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed.
Cir. 2006); Apollo Computer. Inc. v. Berg, 886 F.2d 469, 473 (1st
Cir. 1989) (“Ordinarily, [Plaintiff] would be entitled to have these
issues resolved by a court. [...] By contracting to have all disputes
resolved according to the Rules of the ICC, however, [Plaintiff]
agreed to be bound by Articles 8.3 and 8.4. These provisions
clearly and unmistakably allow the arbitrator to determine her
own jurisdiction when, as here, there exists a prima facie
agreement to arbitrate whose continued existence and validity is
being questioned.”).
16
298a
merits ...”).
1688, 353 F.3d 178, 180 (1st Cir. 1969), the First
Court of Appeals decided:
unlike a finding on the merits when jurisdiction is
not in question ... will not be insulated from
subsequent judicial review... We believe full
recognition of the role of labor arbitration requires
court intervention in a case such as this only when
it has become absolutely necessary, viz., on a
petition to vacate or enforce the award.
The federal case law cited is consistent with our local
law as regards contracts. At the end of the day,
concept.”
Méndez Acevedo, supra, at pg. 367;
Municipio de Mayagüez, supra; U.C.P.R. v. Triangle
Engineering Corp., 136 D.P.R. 133, 144 (1994).
Therefore, in terms of arbitration compliance with
what has been agreed in writing can be enforced. See
Crufon Const. v. Aut. Edif. Púbs., 156 D.P.R. 197, 204
(2002); Municipio de Ponce v. Gobernador, 136 D.P.R.
776, 783 (1994). In turn, when the terms of a
contract are clear and unambiguous, its provisions
will be applied according to the literal meaning that
was given to it by the parties. Art. 1233 of the Civil
Code, supra, §3471. Once it is determined what it
was that the parties agreed, the court must decide
299a
the disputes between the parties as stipulated. See
In summary, in the instant case, the arbitration
clause expressly incorporates by reference the AAA’s
Commercial Rules of Arbitration, which in turn
delegate to the arbitrator – clearly and unmistakably
– the authority to determine his own jurisdiction.
Therefore, according to the authorities herein cited, it
is appropriate for this Honorable Court to vacate the
Decisions by the TPI and order Jane to continue with
the arbitration proceeding that she agreed to, such
that the arbitrator will be the one who decides
whether he has authority to hear her claims on the
merits. This is what the parties agreed, without any
ambiguity whatsoever, and that constitutes the law
between the parties. See HIETEL v. PRTC, 2011
T.S.P.R. 100. In the alternative, if this Honorable
Court believes that the TPI did not commit the
second error indicated, it must proceed to consider
the next two (2) indications of errors.
B.
SECOND INDICATION OF ERROR: THE
TPI MANIFESTLY ERRED BY CONCLUDING
THAT JANE DOE DOES NOT HAVE TO
ARBITRATE HER ALLEGED CLAIMS AGAINST
LLC
AND
THE
OTHER
DEFENDANTSPETITIONERS GIVEN THAT THE ARBITRATION
CLAUSE OF THE AGREEMENT IS BROAD,
CLEAR, AND IT COVERS ANY CLAIM BETWEEN
THE PARTIES.
The TPI also manifestly erred in deciding that the
claims presented by Jane are not covered by the
arbitration clause in the Agreement because they are
allegedly of an “employment” or “labor” and
“constitutional” nature. (Ap. TA., pgs. 486-498.)
300a
Essentially, the TPI based its decision on the
erroneous conclusion that the Agreement does not
govern the relationship between LLC and Jane for
the purposes of the instant judicial action. (Ap. TA.,
pgs. 496-497.) To reach that result the TPI had to
impose by fiat an unsustainable limitation on the
scope of the arbitration clause in the Agreement,
which according to its literal text is clearly broad and
covers “any Claim” between the parties – including
those that do not arise from the Agreement. By doing
so, the TPI not only erred, but it also made manifest
a marked hostility to the arbitration forum, thus
violating the postulates of the FAA and its case law
interpretation.
From the face of the Decision it can be seen that the
TPI ignored the broad language of the binding
arbitration clause contained in the Agreement. An
example of this is that not even the full text of
the clause was quoted in the Decision as part of
the TPI’s analysis. To facilitate the work of this
Court, we reproduce the relevant section of the
Agreement, which unquestionably evidences that the
TPI should have compelled Jane to arbitrator her
claims:
Intent and Purpose – It is the intent and purpose
of the Firm and any Claimant to resolve any
Claim by mediation or arbitration. The
Claimant expressly agrees that the Claim shall be
settled or resolved through the procedures set
forth herein, and shall not in any way circumvent
or otherwise challenge in any way these
See Section 14.01 of the Agreement (emphasis
provided). (Ap. TA., pg. 97.)
301a
Section 14.01 of the Agreement transcribed above
shows that it was the intent and purpose of the
parties, including Jane and the appearers, to resolve
“any Claim” through mediation and arbitration.
More revealing still is the fact that in the Agreement
“Claim” is defined as, “any action, suit, complaint
or demand of whatever nature and for whatever
Members or employees.” (Section 1.06 of the
Agreement; emphasis added.) (Ap. TA. pg. 66). In
other words, the term “any Claim” literally means
any claim, complaint, demand, or action of any
nature and requesting any remedy.
Given the text of Section 14.01 and the definition of
“Claim” in the Agreement itself, “any Claim” can
mean nothing other than “any claim,” and that
includes all types of claims or requests for relief
presented by Jane.
That is, according to the
foregoing terms (and without need of any
interpretation whatsoever), any type of action, case,
demand, or claim of any nature and on any type of
relief or aid against LLC or any of its Members or
employees is covered by the arbitration clause. As we
indicated above, under Puerto Rican law when the
terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, its
provisions will be applied according to the literal
meaning that the parties gave to it. Art. 1233 of the
Civil Code, supra, §3471. On this matter, in Marcial
v. Tome, 144 D.P.R. 522 (1997), this Supreme Court
recognized that the clear letter of the contract had to
be followed, when it unmistakably reflects the will of
the parties.
Even if there were any doubts on the scope of the
arbitration clause and the meaning of “any Claim,”
302a
which is denied, the FAA requires that the doubt be
resolved in favor of arbitration. See Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
24-25 (1983) (“The [FAA] establishes that, as a matter
of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of
arbitrability.”); Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Broth. of
Teamsters, 130 S.Ct. 2847, 2857 (2010) (likewise);
Concepts, Inc., 151 D.P.R. 307, 311-12 (2000).
Therefore, for the determination of arbitrability it
does not matter if the claim is of a labor or
administrative,
contractual,
extracontractual,
statutory or constitutional nature. Nor does it matter
if the Capital Members of LLC can be classified as
owners or employees or both. This is a very broad
arbitration clause that the TPI should have backed
pursuant to its terms under the FAA.
These
principles were grossly ignored by the TPI when it
entered its Decision which is being appealed.
The conclusion that Jane must arbitrate her
claims is necessary even if this Court were
inclined to go beyond the text of Section 14 and
the definitions of the Agreement to determine
the scope of the obligation of the Capital
Members (present and former) of LLC to
arbitrate. That is so, inasmuch as what Jane
basically
questions
and
challenges
is
her
compensation as a Capital Member of LLC (because
of alleged discrimination), and her expulsion from the
management body of LLC and as a Capital Member
303a
of LLC (for alleged retaliation). See the different
claims that Jane has presented as part of this case,
from her internal claim to the Third Amended
Verified Complaint. (Ap. TA. pgs. 119-123; 1-13; 279305; 456-481; and 505-528).
All of these are aspects of the relationship of Jane
with LLC that are expressly governed by the
Agreement. Indeed, such can be seen by the very
determinations of fact by the Court. See Conclusion
of Fact Number 7, Decision. (Ap. TA., pg. 492.) That
translates into the fact that to be able to adjudicate
Jane’s claims of alleged discrimination and
retaliation, the corresponding forum – the arbitral
forum – will necessarily have to refer to the
Agreement.
As can certifiably be seen from the record, the
compensation of the Capital Members of LLC is
governed by sections 5.01-5.06 of the Agreement. (Ap.
TA., pgs. 184-86.) A reading of such sections is
enough to prove it. So much so that Jane herself
admitted to the TPI that “the mechanism by which
compensation is determined is governed by the
[Agreement].” (See Opposition, at pg. 9, footnote 12,
Ap. TA., pg. 144).
As a matter of reality, the TPI failed to consider the
fact that from the internal claim that Jane Doe made
before the managing body of LLC, she fundamentally
claimed some alleged violations of the Agreement.
(Ap. TA., pgs. 119-123.)
(See Section VI(B),
paragraph 10, supra.)
Pursuant to the above, the TPI erred by not referring
Jane Doe’s claims to arbitration. As we argued before
the TPI, Jane Doe cannot escape the reality that her
claims arise from alleged violations of the Agreement,
304a
whether for discriminatory reasons or not. Precisely,
that is what it is up to the Arbitrator to settle.
The same thing happens with the alleged expulsions
in retaliation against Jane as a Member of the
managing body of LLC and a Capital Member of LLC.
The expulsion of a Member of the managing body of
LLC is governed by section 4.15 of the Agreement;
whereas the expulsion of a Capital Member of LLC is
governed by Section 12.02 of the Agreement. (Ap.
TA., pgs. 83 and 94-95.) Therefore, any claim or
challenge to those procedures must be handled
through the dispute resolution process of Clause 14 of
the Agreement, which includes the binding
arbitration that the parties agreed. That was the
undertaking signed by Jane Doe and the TPI erred by
allowing Jane Doe not to comply with what was
agreed.
To conclude, neither the clear and broad language of
the arbitration clause, nor the context provided by
the matters governed by the Agreement and Jane
Doe’s claims, can be interpreted as the obligation to
arbitrate being limited to claims on the operational or
administrative matters of LLC. The TPI not only
erroneously assumed jurisdiction over the dispute on
arbitrability but it also decided it in a manner
completely contrary to the law.
305a
C.
THIRD INDICATION OF ERROR: THE
TPI MANIFESTLY ERRED BY EXEMPTING JANE
DOE FROM ARBITRATING HER CLAIMS
BECAUSE OF THEIR ALLEGED “EMPLOYMENT”
OR “LABOR” AND CONSTITUTIONAL” NATURE
BECAUSE THE FAA DISPLACES (“PREEMPTS”)
ALL
STATE
POLICY
CONTRARY
TO
ARBITRATION.
Beyond ignoring the clear letter of the arbitration
clause agreed in Section 14 of the Agreement, the TPI
based its decision on the alleged “employment” or
“labor” or “constitutional” nature of Jane Doe’s claims
to exempt her from having to arbitrate them.
According to the TPI:
…the law protecting employees in Puerto Rico is
broad and unrestrictive in scope, and the exclusion of
an employee from the benefits of labor law must be
clear, and the courts must interpret those exclusions
restrictively.
See Decision, at pg. 12. (Ap. TA., pg. 497.0 Moreover
the TPI stated its concern that if it accepted the
“arguments” of the defendants-petitioners:
…it would allow the capital members to decide at
another time to use protected criteria such as race or
religion to deprive other capital members from their
constitutional protection. According to the
OA [the Agreement] it would be delegated to the
arbitrator to decide the dispute in a confidential
306a
forum without a right to appeal for the affected
parties. 17
See Decision, at pg. 12. (Id.) These determinations
by the TPI are impregnated with the hostility toward
arbitration that the FAA came to eradicate and show
that that forum based itself on the nature of Jane
Doe’s alleged claims as well as on alleged state
policies to refuse to compel arbitration. By acting
thus, the TPI acted in open contradiction to the FAA
and the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution. Once again, the TPI manifestly erred.
As can be seen from its § 2, of which we
transcribe its pertinent text in footnote 11, the
FAA does not establish any distinction
whatsoever between the arbitrability of
statutory rights or constitutional rights.18 All
that the FAA requires is that the arbitration
agreements be enforced pursuant to their own terms.
See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct.
1745 (“courts must place arbitration agreements on an
equal footing with other contracts, […] and enforce
them according to their terms”) (citations omitted).
That is to say, what is important is not the nature of
It is worth mentioning that under the FAA, the courts can
review the decision of the arbitrator if it is believed that he
exceeded his jurisdiction. See 9 U.S.C.A. § 10.
18 Insofar as SCOTUS case law that requirements to arbitrate
disputes that do not arise from the text of § 2 of the FAA, see
Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S.Ct. 2772, 2778, n. 1 (“[§ 2]
grounds do not include ... any requirement that its lack of
unconscionability must be ‘clear and unmistakable.’”); Marmet v.
Brown, 132 S.Ct. 1201, 1203 (2012) (“[The FAA’s] text includes
no exception for personal-injury or wrongful-death claims. It
‘requires courts to enforce the bargain of the parties to arbitrate.”)
(citation omitted).
17
307a
the claim in question, but rather whether the parties
agreed to arbitration such claim.19 Because the FAA
does not differentiate between the arbitrability of
statutory rights or constitutional rights, the TPI
could not create that distinction by judicial fiat under
the scope of their interpretation of Puerto Rican law.
It is an elemental principle of law that when a federal
law is in conflict with a state law, including one of a
constitutional nature, the state law is displaced by
the federal one by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of
the United States Constitution. The Supremacy
Clause stipulates that:
States…, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in very State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis ours). On this
matter Professor Gorrín Peralta states the following:
[A] federal law takes precedence over the
provisions of the Constitution of the [Commonwealth]
of Puerto Rico. … In any situation in which a
Puerto Rican legal precept conflicts with the
“Supreme Law,” that is to say the [US]
Constitution, [or] with a federal … law applicable in
Puerto Rico, the federal Law must always take
precedence over the Puerto Rican one.
Carlos I. Gorrin Peralta, Fuentes y proceso de
investigación juridical 43 (1991) (emphasis supplied).
As we have discussed above, Jane’s alleged constitutional
claim is covered within the arbitration clause of the Agreement
that requires that Jane Doe submit all of her claims (“any
claim”) to arbitration.
19
308a
See also, U.S. v. Georgia Public Service Comm., 371
U.S. 285, 293 (1983) (“a State is without power by
province”).20
As a result of these principles, it is an
established and consistently repeated principle
that when a State requires that a certain type
of claim be settled exclusively in the courts,
despite the fact that the parties agreed to
arbitrate their disputes, such state rule is
displaced by the FAA.
That was specifically
resolved by the SCOTUS in Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), by indicating the
following:
national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew
the power of the states to require a judicial
forum for the resolution of claims which the
See also Dowling v. Davis, 840 F.Supp. 731, 734 (E.D. Cal.)
(“The Supremacy Clause does not permit federal law to be
provisions.”); U.S. v. Spencer, 160 F.3d 413, 414 (7th Cir. 1998)
(likewise); Keaveny v. Town of Brookline, 937 F.Supp. 975, 982
(D. Mass. 1996) (likewise). Prof. Gorrín Peralta also states the
following regarding this matter: “The sources of law in Puerto
Rico are, then: (1) The U.S. Constitution; (2) the federal laws…;
(5) the Constitution of the [Commonwealth] of Puerto Rico; (6)
the ordinary laws approved by the Legislative Assembly [of
Puerto Rico];….” Gorrín Peralta, supra, at pg. 43.
20
309a
contracting
arbitration.
parties
agreed
to
resolve
by
Id. at pg. 10 (emphasis ours). 21
Recently, the SCOTUS reaffirmed this principle in
Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, 132 S.Ct.
(Op. of February 21, 2012). In Marmet, the SCOTUS,
citing Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1747 (2011),
decided the following:
rule is displaced by the FAA. ... West Virginia's
prohibition against predispute agreements to
arbitrate personal-injury or wrongful death
claims against nursing home is a categorical
rule prohibiting arbitration of a particular type
of claim, and that rule is contrary to the terms
Id. at pgs. 1203-04 (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted). In Marmet the SCOTUS decided
that the Supreme Court of West Virginia had erred
by applying the public policy of that State, which
prohibits enforcement of an arbitration clause
contained in an admission agreement to an old-age
home signed prior to the occurrence of an event of
negligence that results in death or bodily injury. In
the case that concerns us, the TPI has sought to
relieve an attorney with 38 years of experience from
her obligation to arbitrate, and all of that without
See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 491 (“This clear federal
California's § 229 requirement that litigants be provided a
21
310a
there even being a law in Puerto Rico to require that
Jane’s claims be decided by a court, which would also
infringe the FAA. Such that, if the FAA displaces any
state legislation that conflicts with its provisions, it is
even more clear that any decision by a court (such as
the appealed Decision) that infringes the FAA also
must be vacated.
This Supreme Court is fully aware of these principles.
In World Films, Inc. v. Paramount Pict. Corp., supra,
it recognized that the state laws that limit arbitration
clauses are displaced (“preempted”) by the FAA. The
dispute in World Films was whether the application
of Article 3-B of Law 75, 10 L.P.R.A. 278b-2, which
established the nullity of any stipulation in a
distribution contract that forced a distributor to
arbitrate outside of Puerto Rico any dispute that
arose from such contract, had to take precedence over
the FAA.
This Supreme Court of Puerto Rico
determined that insofar as Article 3-B of Law 75
conflicted in its application with the FAA, the latter
would take precedence. Id., pg. 364. Indeed, the
Supreme Court in effect determined that faced with
the FAA, Article 3-B was ineffective and illegal. By
deciding thus, the provisions of Walborg Corp. v.
Tribunal Superior, 104 D.P.R. 184 (1975), which had
determined that the state courts were not obligated
to apply the LFA, were expressly revoked.
In
Walborg, the court had decided that an arbitration
clause could not be given greater force than the policy
established in Law 75, and that the state courts were
not obligated to apply the LFA. That doctrine was
revoked by World Films.
Pursuant to the above, there is no question that the
TPI erred by denying the arbitration based on the
311a
alleged “constitutional” and “labor” nature of Jane
Doe’s claims. The FAA displaces any statutory legal
precept or precept under the Constitution of Puerto
Rico that does not enforce and recognize the
commitment assumed by Jane Doe and LLC to
resolve all claims (“any Claim”) through the
arbitration procedure agreed in Section 14 of the
Agreement.
VIII.CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Jane Doe commenced the proceedings with the TPI in
violation of the terms of the binding arbitration
clause that all of the Capital Members of LLC agreed
to in the Agreement. The TPI’s ruling must be
overturned because it infringes the clear terms of
Section 14 of the Agreement, the provisions of the
Federal Arbitration Act, the Supremacy Clause of the
United State Constitution and its interpretative case
law.
WHEREFORE, we very respectfully ask that this
Honorable Court grant this Petition for Certiorari,
overturn the TPI’s Decision, order Jane Doe to submit
her claims to the arbitration commenced before the
AAA, and dismiss the Complaint.
of this brief, simultaneously with its submission, by
electronic mail and messenger to the attorneys for
the plaintiff-respondent, Juan R. González, Esq.
312a
MENDOZA LAW OFFICES
Attorney for the defendants-petitioners
PO Box 9282
Tel. (787) 722-5522; 5530; 5540
Fax: (787) 723-7057
Electronic mail:
[email protected]
/s/
TSPR-8304
313a
1123 Broadway
New York, NY 10010
Tel. 212 447 6060
Fax 212 447 6257
Language Works
STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK
)
)
)
ss:
CERTIFICATION
translation from Spanish into English of a Certiorari
filed in the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico by Enrique
J. Mendoza Méndez, Esq. on June 12, 2012,
completed on December 12, 2012.
______________________
Christine Muller
Vice President
December, 2012
_________________________
Notary Public
314a
COURT OF APPEALS
JUDICIAL REGION
OF SAN JUAN
JANE DOE
Plaintiff – Respondent
v.
LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANY (LLC);
JOHN DOE, in his
personal capacity and
as employer of JANE
DOE and as coadministrator of the
Conjugal Partnership
(“CP”) constituted with
JEAN DOE, who is
sued as coadministrator of the CP
constituted with John
Doe; “CP John and
Jean Doe”; JACK JOE
in his personal capacity
and as employer of
Jane Doe and as coadministrator of the
“CP” constituted with
JACKY JOE, who is
sued as coadministrator of the
“CP Jack and Jacky
Joe” constituted by
Jack and Jacky Joe;
LARRY LOE in his
[stamp:]
1200821
KLCE20 [hw:]
TA [COURT OF APPEALS]
CASE NO.:
TPI [TRIAL COURT] CASE
NO.: KPE 2012-1204 (904)
San Juan Part
CONFIDENTIAL
[stamp:]
[2 illegible lines]
COURT OF
APPEALS
2012 JUN 12 AM
9:46
315a
as employer of Jane
Doe, and as coadministrator of the CP
constituted with
LARISSA LOE, who is
constituted with Larry
Loe; “CP Larry and
Larissa Loe”
constituted by Larry
and Larissa Loe;
Unknown Defendants
A, B and C; Unknown
Insurance Companies
Defendants, X,Y,Z,
Defendants –
Petitioners
MOTION SUBMITTING UNDER SEAL “PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI” AND
Company (“LLC”), John Doe and the conjugal partnership
(“CP”) established with Jean Doe, Jack Joe and the CP
and 506.)
1
316a
established with Jacky Joe, and Larry Loe and the CP
established with Larissa Loe, and very respectfully submit
under seal their Petition for Certiorari and an Application
under Rule 70(d) to Accept a Petition for Certiorari that
Exceeds the Maximum Number of Pages According to the
Rules and ask the Court to have the documents and
appeal proceedings so instituted remain confidential and
under seal for the reasons stated below:
1.
The petition for certiorari of reference has its origin
in an action for declaratory judgment and injunction filed
by Jane Doe, who was a Capital Member of defendant
LLC. As explained in the Petition for Certiorari, there is
an arbitration clause between the parties that requires
that
any
dispute
between
the
parties
be
heard
confidentially. (Ap. TA., pgs. 97-98.) Furthermore, the
past and present Capital Members of LLC have a duty to
keep all information related to the affairs of the firm
(“business of the firm”) confidential. (Ap. TA., pg. 93.)
317a
2.
According to the confidentiality obligation imposed
by the arbitration clause, plaintiff-respondent Jane Doe
commenced the proceedings before the Court of First
Instance (trial court or “TPI”) under seal and they have
remained confidential to date. (Ap. TA., pgs. 132-133.)
3.
Pursuant to their confidentiality obligations, LLC
and the other defendants hereby submit their Petition for
Certiorari and an Application under Rule 70(d) to Accept a
Petition for Certiorari that Exceeds the Maximum Number
of Pages According to the Rules and ask the Court to have
the documents and appeal proceedings so instituted
remain confidential and under seal.
4.
Attached is the cover of the Petition for Certiorari,
which includes all of the information required by the Rules
of this Honorable Court and the corresponding Internal
Revenue stamp.
WHEREFORE,
defendants-petitioners,
Limited
Liability Company (“LLC”), John Doe and the CP
established with Jean Doe, Jack Joe and the CP
318a
established with Jacky Joe, and Larry Loe and the CP
established with Larissa Loe and they very respectfully
submit under seal their Petition for Certiorari and they
ask the Court to have the documents and appeals
proceedings so instituted remain confidential.
Respectfully submitted.
I CERTIFY that I have notified a true and exact
copy of this writing, simultaneously with its submission,
by electronic mail and messenger to the attorneys for the
plaintiff-respondent, Juan R. González, Esq., González
Muñoz Law Office, 261 Tetuán, San Juan, Puerto Rico
00901-1916;
[email protected];
and
Manuel
Porro
Vizcarra, Esq., Manuel Porro Vizcarra Law Offices, 382
Ave. Escorial, Urb. Caparra Heights, San Juan, PR 00920;
[email protected].
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, today, June 12, 2012
MENDOZA LAW OFFICES
Attorney for the
Defendants-Petitioners
PO Box 9282
319a
San Juan, Puerto Rico
00908-0282
Tel. (787) 722-5522; 5530;
5540
Fax: (787) 723-7057
/s/
By: Enrique J. Mendoza
Méndez, Esq.
TSPR-8304
[email protected]
320a
COURT OF APPEALS
SAN JUAN REGION
JANE DOE
Plaintiff –
Respondent
v.
LIMITED
LIABILITY
COMPANY
(LLC); JOHN
DOE, in his
personal capacity
and as employer of
JANE DOE and
as coadministrator of
the Conjugal
Partnership (“CP”)
constituted with
JEAN DOE, who
is sued as coadministrator of
the CP constituted
with John Doe;
“CP John and
Jean Doe”; JACK
JOE in his
personal capacity
and as employer of
[stamp:]
1200821
KLCE20 [hw:]
CASE NO.:
NO.: KPE 2012-1204
(904)
SAN JUAN PART
CONFIDENTIAL
[stamp:]
APPEALS
9:46
[2 illegible lines]
COURT OF
2012 JUN 12 AM
[Internal Revenue Tax Stamp:]
321a
Jane Doe and as
co-administrator
of the “CP”
constituted with
JACKY JOE, who
the “CP Jack and
Jacky Joe”
constituted by
Jack and Jacky
Joe; LARRY LOE
in his personal
capacity and as
employer of Jane
Doe, and as coadministrator of
the CP constituted
with LARISSA
LOE, who is sued
the CP constituted
with Larry Loe;
“CP Larry and
Larissa Loe”
constituted by
Larry and Larissa
Loe; Unknown
Defendants A, B
and C; Unknown
Insurance
Companies
Defendants, X,Y,Z,
Defendants –
322a
Petitioners
Nature:
Civil Certiorari
Subject:
Preliminary and
and Constitutional Rights;
Retaliation; Damages and
Injuries
Matter:
Denial of Decision to Refer
Case to Validly Agreed
Arbitration
323a
Attorneys for the Plaintiff
– Respondent Jane Doe:
Muñoz, Esq.
TSPR-8185
GONZALEZ MUÑOZ LAW
OFFICE,
P.S.C.
PO Box 9024055
San Juan, P.R. 00902-4055
Tel. (787) 766-5052
Attorneys for the
Defendants –
Petitioners
Enrique J. Mendoza
Méndez, Esq.
TSPR-8304
MENDOZA LAW
OFFICES
PO Box 9282
San Juan, P.R. 009080282
Fax: (787) 766-5551
Tel. (787) 722-5522;
5530; 5540
[email protected]
Fax: (787) 723-7057
[email protected]
[email protected]
Manuel Porro Vizcarra, Eq.
TSPR-7994
MANUEL PORRO
VIZCARRA LAW
OFFICES
Tel. (787)774-8200
Fax: (787)774-8297
[email protected]
324a
COURT OF APPEALS
JANE DOE
v.
CASE NO.:
LIMITED LIABILITY
NO.: KPE 2012-1204 (904)
COMPANY (LLC);
San Juan Part
JOHN DOE, in his
as employer of JANE
CONFIDENTIAL
JEAN DOE, who is
Doe; “CP John and
and as employer of
JACKY JOE, who is
325a
Jack and Jacky Joe;
LARRY LOE in his
as employer of Jane
constituted with
LARISSA LOE, who is
Larissa Loe”
and Larissa Loe;
Unknown Defendants
A, B and C; Unknown
Insurance Companies
Defendants, X,Y,Z,
Defendants –
Petitioners
TO ACCEPT A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
THAT EXCEEDS THE
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF PAGES ACCORDING
TO THE RULES
APPEAR defendants-petitioners, Limited Liability
326a
very respectfully ask leave to submit their Petition for
Certiorari in excess of three (3) pages for the reasons
stated below.
1.
Rule 34(D) of the Rules of the Court of Appeals
stipulates that a petition for certiorari shall not
exceed twenty-five (25) pages. 4 L.P.R.A. Ap. XXII-B
R. 34(D)
2.
Rule 70(D) establishes that “[w]hen these rules
stipulate a maximum number of pages for a brief, no
brief whatsoever shall be accepted in excess of such
maximum unless it is accompanied by a separate
motion in which the court is asked leave to
exceed the maximum prescribed and just cause
is shown.” 4 L.P.R.A. Ap. XXI—B R. 70. (Emphasis
added.)
3.
Appearers respectfully request that this
Honorable Court exempt them from complying with
the maximum number of pages requirement
established. Despite the interest of the appearers in
conforming their brief to the aforementioned Rule, an
adequate and sufficient statement of the facts and
the Law made it necessary for us to exceed it by just
three (3) pages.
4.
To state the content of the Petition for
Certiorari in just twenty-five (25) pages would
incurably undermine its meaning, clarity, and
coherence, and it might leave out significant and
weighty arguments.
In view thereof, we very
respectfully ask that authorization be given for the
defendant-petitioner to exceed the number of pages in
its brief, thus allowing the arguments that this
Honorable Court of Appeals must consider to be
327a
argued clearly, completely, and reasonably. That is
the only purpose pursued by the appearers.
WHEREFORE,
defendant-petitioner
very
respectfully requests that this Honorable Court of
Appeals authorize the submission of the Petition for
Certiorari with a total number of pages in excess of
that allowed by the Rules of the Court.
copy of this brief, simultaneously with its submission,
MENDOZA LAW OFFICES
Attorney for the defendantspetitioners
PO Box 9282
Tel. (787) 722-5522; 5530; 5540
Fax: (787) 723-7057
Electronic mail:
[email protected]
/s/
[signature]
TSPR-8304
328a
COURT OF APPEALS
SAN JUAN REGION
JANE DOE
v.
LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANY (LLC);
JOHN DOE, in his
as employer of JANE
JEAN DOE, who is
Doe; “CP John and
and as employer of
JACKY JOE, who is
CASE NO.:
NO.: KPE 2012-1204
(904)
SAN JUAN PART
CONFIDENTIAL
329a
Jack and Jacky Joe;
LARRY LOE in his
as employer of Jane
constituted with
LARISSA LOE, who is
Larissa Loe”
and Larissa Loe;
Unknown Defendants
A, B and C; Unknown
Insurance Companies
Defendants, X,Y,Z,
Defendants –
Petitioners
Nature:
Civil Certiorari
Subject:
Preliminary and
and Constitutional Rights;
330a
Retaliation; Damages and
Injuries
Matter:
Denial of Decision to Refer
Case to Validly Agreed
Arbitration
331a
Attorneys for the Plaintiff
– Respondent Jane Doe:
Muñoz, Esq.
TSPR-8185
GONZALEZ MUÑOZ LAW
OFFICE,
P.S.C.
PO Box 9024055
San Juan, P.R. 00902-4055
Tel. (787) 766-5052
Attorneys for the
Defendants –
Petitioners
Enrique J. Mendoza
Méndez, Esq.
TSPR-8304
MENDOZA LAW
OFFICES
PO Box 9282
San Juan, P.R. 009080282
Fax: (787) 766-5551
Tel. (787) 722-5522;
5530; 5540
[email protected]
Fax: (787) 723-7057
[email protected]
[email protected]
Manuel Porro Vizcarra, Eq.
TSPR-7994
MANUEL PORRO
VIZCARRA LAW
OFFICES
Tel. (787)774-8200
Fax: (787)774-8297
[email protected]
332a
COURT OF APPEALS
JUDICIAL REGION OF
SAN JUAN
JANE DOE
TA [COURT OF
APPEALS] CASE NO.:
v.
LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANY (LLC);
JOHN DOE, in his
personal capacity and as
employer of JANE DOE
and as co-administrator of
the Conjugal Partnership
JEAN DOE, who is sued
as co-administrator of the
CP constituted with John
Doe; “CP John and Jean
Doe”; JACK JOE in his
personal capacity and as
employer of Jane Doe and
JACKY JOE, who is sued
“CP Jack and Jacky Joe”
TPI [TRIAL COURT]
CASE NO.: KPE 20121204 (904)
San Juan Part
333a
constituted by Jack and
Jacky Joe; LARRY LOE
and as employer of Jane
constituted with
LARISSA LOE, who is
sued as co-administrator
of the CP constituted with
Larry Loe; “CP Larry and
Larissa Loe” constituted
by Larry and Larissa Loe;
Unknown Defendants A,
B and C; Unknown
Insurance Companies
Defendants, X,Y,Z,
Defendants –
Petitioners
Limited
APPEAR
defendants-petitioners,1
Liability Company (“LLC”), John Doe and the
1
334a
conjugal estate (“CP”) established with Jean Doe,
Jack Joe and the CP established with Jacky Joe, and
Larry Loe and the CP established with Larissa Loe,
and very respectfully request the issuance of a writ of
certiorari to overturn the Decision entered by the
Court of First Instance (trial court or “TPI”) on June
4, 2012, which refused to compel plaintiff-respondent
to arbitrate her claims.
I. INTRODUCTION
Through the Decision appealed in this Petition for
Certiorari the TPI has supported that Jane Doe, a
sophisticated attorney with a postgraduate education
in Law and 38 years of experience in commercial
litigation and labor law, can default on her obligation
to arbitrate and hear confidentially any claim or
demand against LLC. LLC is a limited liability
company organized under the laws of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, with main offices in
San Juan and one office outside of Puerto Rico that
provides services to foreign and local clientele. (Ap.
TA, pgs. 38-126.)
Plaintiff-respondent contracted the obligation to
arbitrate and hear confidentially any claim or
complaint against the LLC in Section 14 of the
Operating Agreement (“Agreement”) that she signed
with the other Capital Members of LLC, who also
contracted such obligation. (Ap. TA., pgs. 97-99.)
The first paragraph of section 14 of the Agreement
reads as follows:
It is the intent and purpose of the Firm
and any Claimant to resolve any claim
and 506.)
335a
by mediation or arbitration. The
Claimant expressly agrees that the Claim
shall be settled or resolved through the
procedures set forth herein, and shall not
in any way circumvent or otherwise
challenge in any way these proceedings
relative to mediation and arbitration.
(Ap. TA., pg. 97.) Despite the very broad scope of this
arbitration clause that includes “any claim”2, the
appealed Decision concluded that Jane Doe does not
need to submit her claims for retaliation, damages,
and discrimination to arbitration, and that they
should be adjudicated by the Court. (Ap. TA., pgs.
484-498.)
For the reasons summarized below, and explained
in detail in this petition, defendants-petitioners ask
this Honorable Court to issue the petition for
certiorari and to overturn the appealed decision.
First, the TPI erroneously assumed jurisdiction
over the controversy of whether Jane Doe is obligated
to arbitrate her claims against LLC and the other codefendants. The arbitration clause agreed by Jane
Doe and all of the Capital Members of LLC stipulates
that the arbitration must be governed by the Rules of
Commercial Arbitration of the American Arbitration
Association (“AAA”), which in turn delegate to the
arbitrator the authority to determine his jurisdiction
and the scope of the arbitration clause. Under the
applicable case law that is sufficient evidence in Law
(clear and unequivocal) that the intention of the
The Agreement defines “Claim” as “any action, suit, complaint or demand of
whatever nature and for whatever relief against the Firm or any of its Members
or employees.”
2
336a
parties is to entrust to the arbitrator decisions on
arbitrability, and not to the courts.
Second, having erroneously assumed jurisdiction
over the controversy insofar as arbitrability, the TPI
incorrectly decided it. For that it had to ignore the
clear letter of Section 14.01 of the Agreement where
the Capital Members of LLC agreed to submit “any
claim” to arbitration regardless of the nature thereof
or the remedy requested. By acting thus, the TPI did
not adhere to the interpretative rule prescribed by
the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) and its
interpretative case law that requires that questions
of arbitrability be resolved in favor of arbitration.
Likewise, the TPI did not adhere to the elemental
principle of interpretation of contracts under Puerto
Rican law that when the terms of a contract are clear
and are no ambiguous, its provisions will be applied
according to the literal sense that the parties gave to
it. Art. 1233 of the Civil Code, 31 L.P.R.A. § 3471.
Third, and finally, the TPI erred by denying the
arbitration agreed by the parties due to the alleged
“employment” or “labor” and “constitutional” nature
of Jane Doe’s alleged claims. This decision by the TPI
infringes the FAA, the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution of the United States and the
interpretative case law of both that displace
(“preempt”) any intent to prohibit the arbitration of
certain types of claims.
II. JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of this Honorable Court of
Appeals (“TA”) to entertain this Petition for Certiorari
arises from Article 4.006(b) of the Judiciary Act of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (2003), 4. L.P.R.A. §
24(b); Rules 31, 32(D), 33-34, and 40 of the Rules of
337a
the TA, 4 L.P.R.A. Ap. XXI-B, R. 33-34 and 40; Rules
52.1 and 52.2(b) of Civil Procedure of Puerto Rico, 32
L.P.R.A. Ap. V. R. 52.1 and 52.2(b).
III. DECISION OF WHICH REVIEW IS
SOUGHT
LLC and the other defendants requested that the
Decision issued by the TPI in the case Jane Doe v.
Compañía de Responsabilidad Limitada et al., KPE
2012-1204 (904) (Hon. Judge Ángel R. Pagán Ocasio),
San Juan Part, June 4, 2012, and sent to the parties
by electronic mail on that same day (hereinafter
“Decision”) be overturned. (Ap. TA., pgs. 484-498.)
The Decision denied the Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Jurisdiction and to Compel Compulsory Arbitration
in Light of Binding Arbitration Agreement submitted
by the defendants-petitioners on April 11, 2012
(hereinafter “Motion to Dismiss”) (Ap. TA., pgs. 38126.)
Given that the TPI’s Decision was notified on June
4, the 30-day period that the appearers have to
submit this petition expires on July 5, 2012.3 This
petition has been submitted on time and the Court
has jurisdiction to entertain it.
In view of the nature of the appealed Decision – which denies a
motion to compel arbitration as agreed by the parties – and the
fact that the TPI has the full intention to continue with the
proceedings before it, for which it has ordered the consolidation
of the preliminary injunction with the permanent one and
ordered the parties to submit stipulations last June 8, 2012,
LLC and the other defendants have submitted an Urgent Motion
in Aid of Jurisdiction with this Petition for Certiorari. That
motion respectfully asks this Honorable Court, in aid of its
jurisdiction, to order a stay of the TPI’s proceedings and to
maintain the confidentiality of the record and the identities of
the parties.
3
338a
At present there is no other appeal of this case
pending before this Court or before the Supreme
Court of Puerto Rico.
IV. GROUNDS FOR GRANTING THIS
PETITION
This petition complies with the criteria of Rule
52.1 of Civil Procedure, supra, (“Rule 52.1”) and Rule
40 of the TA’s Rules, supra, (“Rule 40”), for it to be
issued.
The Decision by the TPI denied the dispositive
motion and motion to compel arbitration filed by the
defendants-petitioners. Such motion set forth that
the TPI did not have jurisdiction over the action
instituted by Jane Doe (“Jane”) given that there is a
clear and unequivocal agreement between the parties
that requires that the parties submit any claim
between them to arbitration and that the arbitrator
be the one to decide any controversy over whether
Jane’s claims are arbitrable or not. Furthermore, the
defendants-petitioners argued, in the alternative,
that according to the submission agreement in
question, it is appropriate for the TPI to order Jane to
arbitrate her claims against them. The Decision by
the TPI denied such arguments and decided, in
violation of the strong public policy established in § 2
of the FAA and the Arbitration Act of Puerto Rico
(“LAPR”) that: (a) the TPI is the one that should
decide the controversy on arbitrability; and (b) that
Jane is not obligated to arbitrate her claims of alleged
signed by the parties. (Ap. TA., pgs. 484-498.)
The TPI reached the aforementioned conclusion
despite the fact that the arbitration clause requires
339a
that Jane settle (“any claim”) against the
defendants-petitioners through the arbitration
proceeding regardless of the nature thereof. (Ap.
TA., pgs. 66 (“Claim”); 97-98 (“Resolution of Claim”).)
As we shall see below, the TPI’s Decision suffers
from hostility to the arbitration that the FAA seeks to
eradicate. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepción, 131
S.Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011) (“The FAA was enacted ... in
response to widespread judicial hostility to arbitration
agreements.”)
Rule 52.1, insofar as pertinent, stipulates that a
petition for certiorari will only be granted by this
Honorable Court: (1) when the denial of a motion of a
dispositive nature is being appealed; (2) in cases that
are in the public interest; or (3) in any other situation
in which waiting for an appeal would constitute an
irreparable miscarriage of justice.
The three
exceptions are present in this case.
The first exception of Rule 52.1 is applicable
because, as we saw, the TPI’s Decision denied the
dispositive motion4 of the defendants-petitioners that
establishes the impropriety of the court action
instituted by Jane given that disputes on arbitrability
must be resolved by the arbitrator himself and Jane
is contractually obligated to prosecute all of her
claims through a confidential arbitration proceeding.
The second exception is also fully satisfied,
because there is no question whatsoever that both
under the LAPR and the FAA arbitration is a matter
that is in the highest public interest. Perry v.
See Motion for Dismissal due to Lack of Jurisdiction and to
Compel Binding Arbitration in View of a Binding Arbitration
Agreement. (Ap. TA., pgs. 38-126.)
4
340a
Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987) (“[I]n enacting § 2
favoring arbitration ... “) (Emphasis added);
Constructora Estelar v. Aut. Edif. Pub., 2011 T.S.P.R.
139, pg. 13, 183 D.P.R. ___ (“[I]n Puerto Rico there is
a vigorous public policy in favor of arbitration
as an alternate method of dispute resolution and all
disputes on whether or not arbitration is appropriate
must be resolved in favor of it as it has been agreed.”)
(Emphasis Added.)
Likewise, the third exception is applicable. It
would be impractical and it would constitute an
irremediable miscarriage of justice to have to wait for
the final resolution of the case in a judicial forum to
be able to present and appeal to this Honorable Court
and set forth as an error that the claims made by
Jane should have been adjudicated in a confidential
arbitration proceeding. By way of comparative law,
in Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 861 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1988) (a case
determining that the denials of orders compelling
arbitration are appealable on an interlocutory basis),
the Court of Appeals of the United State for the
Fourth Circuit recognized that orders denying
arbitration can cause irreparable harm if they are not
reviewed on an interlocutory basis:
[o]rders denying arbitration do have an
injunctive effect and have ‘serious,
perhaps, irreparable, consequence.’ The
order is injunctive because it enjoins
proceedings in another tribunal. It has
serious consequences because of the
irreparable harm that exists when
arbitration is denied ab initio…’ If a
341a
party must undergo the expense and
delay of trial before being able to appeal,
the advantages of arbitration-speed and
economy-are lost forever.
See 861 F.2d, at pg. 422; See also City of Meridian
Miss. v. Algernon Blair, Inc., 721 F.2d 525, 529 (5th
Cir. 1983) (an injunction staying arbitration
constitutes irreparable harm due to the costs of
litigating). It is evident that if this Honorable Court
does not intervene in this phase of the proceedings,
the remedies requested by the defendants-petitioners
would become moot.
Moreover, if the writ of
certiorari is not issued, Jane would be allowed to
defeat her obligation to submit to arbitration all
claims, of any nature, that she might have against
the defendants, which obligation she contracted
freely and voluntarily.
Furthermore, as we shall see below, the criteria of
Rule 40 for the granting of the writ of certiorari are
met in the instant case.5 Let us see.
The relevant criteria are:
(A) If the remedy and the dispositive part of the judgment or
law.
(B) If the facts stated present a situation more indicative for an
(C) If there has been prejudice, partiality, or a gross and
[TPI].
(D) ….
(E) If the phase that the case is in is the most appropriate one
(F) If the issuance of the writ or the order to show cause do not
5
342a
As discussed throughout this brief, the Decision of
the TPI infringes the law and, in particular, the rules
on arbitration and the interpretation of contracts,
because it determines that Jane is not obligated to
use the arbitration proceeding that commenced on
March 22, 2012 before the American Arbitration
defendants
(“resolve
any
Claim
by
…
or any of its Members…”). Consequently, it is
appropriate to grant the petition for certiorari
pursuant to part (A) of Rule 40.
The TPI committed a gross error in their
interpretation and evaluation of the arbitration
clause. That, inasmuch as from the text of the
arbitration clause in question, it is clearly seen that it
is the arbitrator who has the obligation of resolving
the controversies put forth by Jane in the judicial
forum. As a result, it is appropriate to grant the
petition for certiorari pursuant to part (C) of Rule 40.
Nor is there a question that, pursuant to part (B)
of Rule 40, the factual situation that is established is
the one most indicative for an analysis of the
controversy before this Honorable Court, because for
it to be decided only requires that the Court interpret
the arbitration clause agreed pursuant to the FAA
and the rules of contract interpretation.
(G) If the issuance of the writ or the order to show cause
343a
phase is most propitious, because if the proceedings
before the TPI stayed, Jane’s obligation to prosecute
her claims before the arbitration forum would become
moot and irreparable harm would be caused to the
defendants-petitioners because the commitments
made to undertake a confidential arbitration
proceeding would not be complied with.
As a result, in order to avoid a miscarriage of
justice it is necessary to grant the petition for
certiorari pursuant to parts (G)-(I) of Rule 40.
V. LIST OF PROCEDURAL AND
SUBSTANTIVE FACTS MATERIAL TO THE
CASE
A.
List of Procedural Facts
1.
On April 2, 2012, Jane submitted a Verified
and Preliminary and Permanent Injunction
(“Complaint”) with the TPI. Jane claimed in the
Complaint that the arbitration clause of the
“Operating Agreement” of the LLC (“Agreement”) is
not applicable to her, arguing that that agreement
only regulates the commercial and administrative
operations of the LLC. Jane Doe further claimed that
her claims are of a labor nature and that they are
covered by the Constitution of Puerto Rico, Law No.
100 of June 30, 1959 (age), Law No. 69 of July 6, 1985
(sex and retaliation), Law No. 115 of December 20,
1991 (retaliation) and the LLC’s Employee Manual
(“Manual”), which does not contain an arbitration
clause. To that end, Jane asked the TPI to declare
the arbitration clause of the Agreement inapplicable
to her alleged labor claims and that the LLC be
ordered to cease the arbitration under Rule 57 of
344a
Civil Procedure until the TPI can resolve the
controversy set forth on arbitrability. (AP. TA., pgs.
1-13) As stated in the list of material facts, Jane’s
claims that the Agreement is not pertinent to her
claims are in open contradict with the extrajudicial
claim that Jane made to the LLC Managing Board
where she expressly set them forth as violations of
the Agreement. (Ap. TA., pgs. 119-123.)
2.
Together with the Complaint, Jane submitted
a Motion Requesting a Preliminary and Permanent
(Ap. TA., pgs. 14-19.)
3.
Jane also submitted an Emergency Motion in
remain strictly confidential. (Ap. TA., pgs. 20-21.)
4.
On April 3, 2012, the TPI issued an Order
setting a hearing for April 11, 2012, to determine the
requested. (Ap. TA., pgs. 23.)
5.
On April 11, 2012, the defendants-petitioners
submitted a Motion to Dismiss, in which they
essentially argued that the Agreement is a contract in
the interstate commerce, and therefore the FAA is
applicable to it, that pursuant to the arbitration
clause of the Agreement all disputes on whether
Jane’s claims are arbitrable or not are up to the
arbitrator himself to decide and not the TPI and that,
in the alternative, it would be appropriate for the TPI
345a
to recognize that through Section 14.04 of the
Agreement Jane undertook to prosecute all of her
claims (“any Claim”) confidentially through the
arbitration procedure regardless of the nature of the
claims or whether they arise under the Agreement.
Furthermore, the defendants-petitioners argued that
under the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution, regardless of the alleged constitutional
and labor nature of the Jane’s claims, § 2 of the FAA
requires that such claims be adjudicated under the
arbitration proceeding initiated before the AAA. (Ap.
TA., pgs. 38-126.)
6.
On that same day a hearing was held in which
it was agreed that the defendants-petitioners would
submitted under seal.
TA., pgs. 127-128.)
7.
On April 23, 2012, Jane submitted her
Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss.
In that
Opposition Jane claimed, among other things, that
the arbitration clause of the Agreement was not
applicable to her alleged claims of a labor nature
because that document only applies to matters
related to the management of the LLC, especially
because Jane’s claims are constitutional in nature.
TA., pgs. 450-451.)
6
346a
Furthermore, Jane claimed that the TPI is the one
that must resolve all of her claims.7 (Ap. TA., pgs.
134-278.)
8.
After the submission of several memoranda by
appeal which, as we stated, decides in violation of the
FAA and its interpretative case law that that forum
is the one that has jurisdiction to decide the
controversy on arbitrability and that, furthermore,
Jane does not have to arbitrate her claims of alleged
of the Agreement. (Ap. TA., pgs. 484-498). In
footnote 12 of the Decision, the TPI makes the
following statements that make evident its hostility
toward the arbitration proceeding: “According to the
[Agreement] the arbitrator would be delegated
a decision on the dispute in a completely
confidential forum without a right for the
respective conjugal partnerships, and to amend her causes of
action. (Ap. TA., pgs. 279-305.) On May 1, 2012, defendants
opposed the aforementioned amendment. (Ap. TA., pgs. 306313.)
Binding Arbitration Agreement.’ (Ap. TA., pgs. 314-416.) For
her part, on May 7, 2012, Jane submitted a brief called
Plaintiff’s Sur-reply. (Ap. TA., pgs. 414-449.)
7
347a
affected parties to appeal.”
emphasis ours.)
(Ap. TA., pg. 497;
9.
Furthermore, the TPI indicated that it would
keep the injunction hearing scheduled for the next
day would, where the parties would have to submit
evidence in relation to the application for injunctive
relief. Likewise, it authorized the submission of the
Second Amended Complaint. (Ap. TS., pg. 541.)
From an analysis of the format, typography, and style
of the Decision it can be reasonably inferred that it is
most likely the result of a draft Decision submitted by
Jane, and if that is correct, she would have had
knowledge of the decision by the TPI significantly in
advance of the defendants-petitioners.
10.
Indeed, surprisingly, only four (4) hours after
the Decision was notified, Jane submitted to the TPI
a Motion for an Order on the Confidentiality of
Further Proceedings, claiming that in view of the
decision hours earlier by the TPI there was no reason
for the proceedings to continue to be prosecuted
confidentially. (Ap. TA., pgs. 499-504.) Also, Jane
respective names. (Ap. TA., pgs. 505-528.)
11.
Furthermore, right before the hearing set for
to be issued by means of a preliminary and
permanent injunction. (Ap. TA., pgs. 529-535.) A
copy of this Request was delivered to the attorney for
348a
the defendant-petitioners as he was entering the TPI
Courtroom for the hearing.
12.
Minutes later, the parties appeared at the
time the defendants-petitioners became aware that
proceeding was becoming, the defendants-petitioners
objected to the action by the TPI using arguments of
accepted by the defendants-petitioners, for the
considered by the TPI.
hearing.9 (Ap. TA., pgs. 548-551 and 552-617.)
B.
1.
In November 1979, Jane joined the LLC as an
attorney after having obtained a Master’s in Law and
having started to practice the profession. (Ap. TA.,
pgs. 1-13 and 38-126.)
The TPI also granted 10 days for the defendants-petitioners to
order of confidentiality and 15 days to state [their position] on
the request for reinstatement of Jane at the LLC. (Ap. TA., pgs.
548-551.)
9
349a
2.
When Jane joined LLC, LLC was a civil-law
partnership. At that time and now LLC provides
services to foreign clientele, mainly in the United
States, and locally. (Ap. Ta., pgs. 38-126.)
3.
In September 1987, Jane was promoted to
Equity Partner of the LLC. (Ap. TA., pgs. 1-13 AND
38-126.)
4.
On September 13, 2007, LLC became a limitedliability company under the laws of Puerto Rico. As a
result of the aforementioned change, Jane became a
Capital Member of LLC. (Ap. TA., pgs. 1-13, and 38126.)
5.
On that same day, Jane and the other LLC
Agreement (“Operating Agreement” or “Agreement”).10
(Ap. TA., pgs. 60-115 and 338-353.)
6.
Insofar as pertinent, such Agreement stipulates
the following in its relevant Sections:
1. Definitions. For the purposes of this
1.06
“Claim” means any action, suit,
complaint or demand of whatever nature and
for whatever relief or remedy against the
Firm or any of its Members or employees…
1.07
“Claimant” means any
Former Member asserting a Claim.
Member
or
to June 1, 2007.
10
350a
5. Compensation.11
5.02
Salaries of Members – Each Capital
Member shall be entitled to such annual salary as
shall be determined pursuant to section 5.01 of this
installments.....
10.
Fiduciary Duty and Duty of Loyalty
of Members.
10.1
Fiduciary Duties of Members – Members
owe the Firm and each other a fiduciary duty and
a duty of loyalty, which requires each Member,
among other things:
(f) To treat all Firm Documents as confidential
deliberations of the Members and the business of
the Firm while such Member is a Member of the
Firm and, in the event the Member leaves the
Firm, after such Member’s departure.
12.
Withdrawal, Retirement.
Suspension, Expulsion ... of a Member.
12.02
Suspension and/or Expulsion – The
Firm may, upon the recommendation of the Policy
Committee and the affirmative vote of threefourths (%) of the Capital Members, ... (b) expel
any Member at any date specified by the Policy
Committee with or without cause or prior notice to
Section 5 of the Agreement. (Ap. TA., pgs. 84-86.)
11
351a
such Member. In the case of any such expulsion,
the Member so expelled shall cease to be a Member
on the date specified by the Policy Committee.
14.
14.01
Intent and Purpose – It is the intent
and purpose of the Firm and any Claimant to
shall be settled or resolved through the procedures
set forth herein, and shall not in any way
circumvent or otherwise challenge in any
way these proceedings relative to mediation
and arbitration.
14.04
Arbitration – If mediation fails, the
Claim shall be settled by arbitration
administered by the [AAA] under its Commercial
rendered by the arbitrator(s) may be entered in any
court having jurisdiction thereof. ...
14.05 Confidentiality – The Claimant and the
Firm agree that the underlying purpose of the
provisions set forth in section 14 of this Agreement
is to provide a mechanism by which any Claim
shall be resolved in a confidential manner,
without
publicity
and
the
attendant
distractions. ... The parties agree to maintain
the confidentiality of such meetings and
hearings, and of the documents produced or
created in such meetings and hearings. Any
and all actions taken by the parties shall be
in conformity with the underlying purpose set
forth in section 14 of this Agreement.
352a
Note that Jane does not dispute that the
Agreement is a contract in the interstate commerce
for purposes of the FAA. (Ap. TA., pgs. 1-3; 38-126;
134-278; 314-416; and 417-449.) Nor is the validity of
the arbitration clause in Section 14 of the Agreement
in dispute. (Id.)
7.
On October 22, 2007, the LLC’s Employee
Manual took effect which applies to all employees
and Members of LLC. However, such Manual does
not make a Member an employee. Rather, the
Manual clearly maintains the difference between the
classification of “Member” and “employee.” (Ap. TA.,
pgs. 191-257.) The Manual also does not establish
the policies related to the compensation of Members,
or the process of terminating their relationship with
Sections 5, 12, and 14 of the Agreement, respectively.
(Ap. TA., pgs. 84-86 and 94-98.)
8.
LLC has offices within and outside of Puerto
Rico. Furthermore, the great majority of its clients
are located outside of Puerto Rico (principally in the
telephone
and
other
means
of
interstate
communications. Likewise, it is significant insofar as
the Agreement is a contract in the interstate
commerce, and due to the economic nature thereof,
the following federal statutes, among others, apply to
the relationship of LLC with those who are deemed
employees per se: 1) Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78; 2) Occupational Safety and
353a
Medical Leave Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e17; 4) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; and 5)
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29
U.S.C. §§ 621-34. (Ap. TA., pgs. 38-126.)
9.
In the middle of 2009, Jane was elected to the
10.
Jane’s compensation had to be reduced for
business reasons. As a result of that, on January 24,
2012, Jane filed an extrajudicial claim against the
Members of LLC’s Managing Board, as required
under Section 14.02 of the Agreement.
In her
extrajudicial claim, Jane alleged in sum that her
compensation had been reduced in violation of the
Agreement. In no part of her claim did Jane
mention that the Manual had been violated. Indeed,
the only written contact that Jane claimed was
violated was the Agreement. Insofar as pertinent, the
appellee specifically claimed the following, based on
the Agreement:
…I formally ask you to reconsider the
decision by [John Doe] and to schedule,
as soon as possible and within the next
15 days, a meeting of the Managing
Board under the tenor of Clause 14 et
seq. of the “Operating Agreement,”
such that I as a Capital Member can
present my position and objections. I
want to make clear that subjecting
myself to the procedure under Clause
14 should not be construed as a waiver
of the rights that protect me under local
and federal laws.
354a
I will now proceed to summarize my
objections briefly.
1.
The reduction in my salary
and benefits was done (sic) violates
the “Operating Agreement” and the
agreement between [John Doe] and me,
and it violates the specific agreement
2.
…Evidently,
the
procedure
followed was inadequate and in violation
of the “Operating Agreement,” the
decisions by the Managing Board
approved on May 31, 2011, and the
decision of December 20, 2011.
…
16.
Likewise I was offended when
[Jack Joe], in a meeting of the Board
stated that “to sit at that desk means
having to bring in business” and no one
clarified the impropriety of his comment.
Is that a requirement in the Operating
Agreement?...
(Ap. TA., pgs. 119-123; emphasis ours.)
11.
Pursuant to Section 14.03 of the Agreement, on
March 20, 2012 the parties subjected themselves to
the mediation process which ended without achieving
any agreement whatsoever.
12.
Faced with the failure of mediation, on March
22, 2012, LLC submitted an Arbitration Complaint
arbitration clause of Section 14.04 of the Agreement
355a
and confidentially. (Ap. TA., pgs. 259-260.)
VI. INDICATIONS OF ERROR
FIRST INDICATION OF ERROR: THE TPI
MANIFESTLY
ERRED
BY
ASSUMING
SECOND INDICATION OF ERROR: THE TPI
MANIFESTLY ERRED BY CONCLUDING THAT
JANE DOE DOES NOT HAVE TO ARBITRATE
HER ALLEGED CLAIMS AGAINST LLC AND THE
OTHER DEFENDANTS-PETITIONERS GIVEN
THAT THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE OF THE
AGREEMENT IS BROAD, CLEAR, AND IT
COVERS ANY CLAIM BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
THIRD INDICATION OF ERROR: THE TPI
MANIFESTLY ERRED BY EXEMPTING JANE DOE
FROM ARBITRATING HER CLAIMS BECAUSE OF
THEIR ALLEGED “EMPLOYMENT” OR “LABOR”
AND CONSTITUTIONAL” NATURE BECAUSE
THE FAA DISPLACES (“PREEMPTS”) ALL STATE
POLICY CONTRARY TO ARBITRATION.
VII. DISCUSSION OF THE ERRORS
INDICATED
A.
FIRST INDICATION OF ERROR:
THE TPI MANIFESTLY ERRED BY
356a
ASSUMING JURISDICTION OVER
THE CONTROVERSY ON WHETHER
JANE DOE IS OBLIGATED TO
ARBITRATE HER ALLEGED CLAIMS:
JANE
DOE
AND
LLC
UNMISTAKABLY
AGREED
THAT
THE
ARBITRATOR
HAS
THE
AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE THE
SCOPE OF HIS JURISDICTION.
The TPI manifestly erred on assuming jurisdiction
to decide whether Jane Doe has to arbitrate her
alleged claims against LLC and the other defendantspetitioners.
Despite the fact that the TPI
acknowledged that the parties can agree to have the
arbitrator be the one to decide whether a dispute is
arbitrable as well as the merits thereof when it has
been clearly and unmistakably been agreed (Ap. TA.,
pg. 495.),12 that forum decided that “it is not
necessary to determine whether the delegation of
jurisdiction to the arbitrator is clear and
unmistakable because the arbitration clause is not
applicable to the controversies presented.” (Id.) In
other words the TPI rested on a completely
circular argument to ignore the clear language
of the broad arbitration clause in the
Agreement, the provisions of the FAA and its
interpretative case law, and Puerto Rican rules
on the interpretation of contracts. All of these
precepts required referring the matter of whether
Jane Doe’s claims are arbitrable under Section 14 of
the Agreement to the arbitrator.
See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945
(1995).
12
357a
As a preliminary matter, it is necessary to make a
brief statement on the FAA because [as] was
appropriately claimed by the defendants-petitioners,
Jane Doe did not dispute its application to the matter
that concerns us and such law is dispositive on this
petition. (Ap. TA., pgs. 52-58.) The FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 1
et seq. applies to contracts in the interstate commerce
and it applies both in the federal and the state courts.
World Films, Inc. v. Paramount Pict. Corp., 125
D.P.R. 352, 357 and 364 (1990). Section 2 of the FAA
stipulates that:
A written provision in any maritime
transaction or a contract evidencing
a transaction involving commerce to
settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction or the refusal to perform the
whole or any part thereof, or an
agreement in writing to submit to
arbitration an existing controversy
arising out of such a contract,
transaction or refusal,
shall be valid, irrevocable, save upon
such grounds as exist in law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (Emphasis ours).
The FAA reflects a clear, well established and
broadly recognized federal policy in favor of
arbitration. See Méndez Acevedo v. Nieves Rivera,
179 D.P.R. 359 (2010); KKW Enterprises v. Gloria
Jean’s Gourmet Coffees Franchising Corp, 184 F.3d
42, 50 (1st Cir. 1999); citing Vimar Seguros y
Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V SKY Reefer, 29 F.3d 727, 730
(1st Cir.) ; confirmed in 515 U.S. 528 (1995). On this
358a
strong public policy, the Supreme Court of the United
States (“SCOTUS”) has stated the following:
[The FAA] is a congressional declaration
of a liberal policy favoring arbitration
agreements,
notwithstanding
any
state substantive or procedural
policies to the contrary.
****
[I]n enacting § 2 of the federal Act,
Congress declared a national policy
favoring arbitration and withdrew the
power of the states to require a
judicial forum for the resolution of
claims which the contracting parties
agreed to resolve by arbitration.
Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987) (internal
citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
In other words, the FAA applies without accepting
state procedural or substantive policies otherwise and
it removed the power of the States to require a
judicial forum to resolve claims that the contracting
parties agreed to resolve through arbitration.
The FAA was passed precisely as a response to the
hostility that the Courts have traditionally shown
toward arbitration agreements. See Circuit City
Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 111 (2011) (deciding
that employment contracts in the interstate
commerce except those of certain transportation
employees are covered by the FAA). The Supreme
Court of Puerto Rico has recognized outright the
public policy contained in the FAA by stating that
such law stipulates that:
359a
…the arbitration clauses in these
contracts are valid, irrevocable and
mandatory. Once arbitration is agreed,
the courts lack discretion regarding
their efficacy and they have to enforce
the arbitration agreed. According to
this law, and the federal case law
interpreting it, any question about
the scope of the disputes that may
be taken to arbitration must be
resolved in favor of arbitration.
This applies to both the federal courts
and the state courts.
See Painewebber Incorporated of Puerto Rico v.
Service Concepts, Inc., 151 D.P.R. 307, 311-12 (2000)
(emphasis ours); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465
U.S. 1, 16 (1984).
Pictures Corp., supra.
As a general rule, the determination of whether
an agreement creates the duty of the parties to
arbitrate a certain dispute is a judicial task. Méndez
Acevedo, supra; World Films, Inc., supra.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the matter of
arbitrability shall not be under the jurisdiction
of a court if the parties agreed in the
360a
arbitration agreement that such authority is
delegated to the arbitrator. That is to say, if it is
agreed in an arbitration agreement that the
arbitrator is the one who will decide matters of
arbitrability, it is appropriate that he, and not the
court, be the one to determine whether there is an
obligation to arbitrate a certain dispute. U.G.T. v.
Corp. Difusión Pub., 168 D.P.R. 674, 684 (2006)
(“Ordinarily and except if the collective
agreement stipulates otherwise, matters of
substantive arbitrability must be resolved by the
courts…”) (emphasis ours).
principle in the federal jurisdiction and under the
FAA that a challenge to the validity of an arbitration
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995).
The foregoing is precisely the situation in the case at
bar. The FAA is applicable to the Agreement between
Jane and LLC and the parties delegated the
and therefore the TPI erred in assuming jurisdiction.
The FAA is applicable to the Agreement
between Jane Doe and LLC because it is a
contract that involves interstate commerce. To
determine whether there is a transaction that
involves interstate commerce, the Court must
examine the contract and the commercial
transactions of the parties, among other things. See
361a
Ideal Services Corp. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 727
F.Supp. 75, 76 (D.P.R. 1989).
In Allied Bruce Terminix v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265,
282 (1995), the SCOTUS decided that when the
Congress of the United States passed the FAA it
wanted to use its constitutional power under the
Commerce Clause to the utmost:
“involving commerce” as broadly as the
words “affecting commerce”; and, as we
have said, these latter words normally
mean a full exercise of constitutional
power. At the same time, the Court’s
opinion does not discuss the implications
of the “interstate” facts to which the
respondents now point. For these
reasons, Bernhardt does not require us to
narrow the scope of the word “involving.”
And, we conclude that the word
“involving,” like “affecting,” signals
an intent to exercise Congress’
commerce power to the full.
513 U.S. at pg. 277. In Allied Bruce, the dispute was
around an arbitration clause in an extermination
services agreement for a residence. The SCOTUS
determined that the contract involved interstate
commerce for the purposes of the FAA because the
pesticides were manufactured outside of the state and
the defendant had operations in multiple states.
The Agreement is a contract that involves
interstate commerce. Among other reasons, the
Agreement governs the proprietary interest of the
parties and the LLC’s operations in Puerto Rico and
in its office outside of Puerto Rico. See, SCI v.
362a
Fulmer, 883 So.2d 621, 629 (Ala 2003) ((“[I]t would
telephone,
and
other
means
of
interstate
communications. Likewise, the economic nature of
the Agreement and the fact that the following federal
statutes, among others, apply to the relationship of
LLC with those who are considered employees per se,
is significant: 1) Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,
29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78; 2) Occupational Safety and
(2011) (“A contract needs only the slightest nexus to interstate
commerce to apply the FAA.”); 21 Willinston on Contracts §57:
(4th ed. 2011) (“Consistent with the broad approach to
interpreting the term ‘involving commerce’ in the [FAA], it has
been said that a contract containing an arbitration
provision need only be related to commerce to fall within
the coverage of the Act “) (emphasis added); Bowen v.
Security Pest Control, Inc., 879 So.2d 1139, 1142 (Ala. 2003)
(decides that the transaction involved interstate commerce, in
part, because one of the parties to the transaction engaged in
business in two States). Indeed, the power of Congress under
the Commerce Clause of the United States is so broad that in
the last 75 years only two SCOTUS cases have decided that
Congress exceeded its powers under the aforementioned
Commerce Clause. See U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); US v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). Note that none of the statutes in
dispute in those cases was aimed at regulating purely economic
transactions, but rather criminal conduct of a noneconomic
nature.
13
363a
2000e-17; 4) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964;
and 5) Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34. Furthermore, and as we
indicated above, Jane did not dispute the application
of the FAA to the arbitration clause of the Agreement
and, therefore, she waived any right to the contrary.
See Caguas Satellite Corp. v. Echostar Satellite LLC,
_ F.Supp.2d _, 2011 WL 5517037, n. 2 (D.P.R.)
(“Plaintiffs [, the party opposing arbitration,] ... do not
make any arguments about whether or not the
agreement involves interstate commerce and therefore
waive this argument”).
Arbitration Rules of the AAA, Rule 7(a), Ap. TA. pgs.
14
364a
of a body of arbitration rules that delegates the
authority to determine to the arbitrator, it was clear
that it was not up to the TPI to determine whether
Jane’s claims were arbitrable.
Every federal court that has had this dispute
before it has decided that when the parties
incorporate institutional rules such as those of the
AAA into their arbitration agreement or clauses,
which delegate to the arbitrator the authority to
decide on his own jurisdiction – to decide arbitrability
–
that
constitutes
sufficient
(clear
and
unmistakable) evidence in law that that was the
intention of the parties. See Contec Corp. v. Remote
Solution Co., 398 F.3d 205, 208 (2nd Cir. 2005) See
Contec Corp. v. Remote Solution Co., 398 F.3d 205,
208 (2nd Cir. 2005) (“When … parties explicitly
incorporate rules that empower an arbitrator to decide
issues of arbitrability, the incorporation serves as
clear and unmistakable evidence of the parties’ intent
to delegate such issues to an arbitrator’); Sleeper
Farms v. Agway, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 197 (D. Me.
2002) (“[Since the AAA rules constitute] a clear and
unmistakable
delegation
of
scope-determining
1327, 29, 33-34 (11th Cir. 2005) (Deciding that because the AAA’s
Rules of Arbitration delegate the determination of arbitrability
to the arbitrator, the plaintiff’s claim that the arbitration
agreement illegally denied him of several statutory remedies,
was a matter to be adjudicated by the arbitrator, not by the
court); Qualcomm Inc. v. Nokia Corp., 466 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed.
Cir. 2006); Apollo Computer. Inc. v. Berg, 886 F.2d 469, 473 (1st
Cir. 1989) (“Ordinarily, [Plaintiff] would be entitled to have these
15
365a
arbitration forum, the courts tend to leave the
dispute to be resolved initially by the arbitrator when
the arbitrability cannot be determined without
entering into the merits of the dispute. Elkouri &
Elkouri, How Arbitrations Works, (BNA Books, 6th
Edition 2003), at pg. 281. (“However, even though the
merits ...”).
merits when jurisdiction is not in question ...
issues resolved by a court. [...] By contracting to have all disputes
resolved according to the Rules of the ICC, however, [Plaintiff]
agreed to be bound by Articles 8.3 and 8.4. These provisions
clearly and unmistakably allow the arbitrator to determine her
own jurisdiction when, as here, there exists a prima facie
agreement to arbitrate whose continued existence and validity is
being questioned.”).
366a
The federal case law cited is consistent with our
local law as regards contracts. At the end of the day,
concept.”
Méndez Acevedo, supra, at pg. 367;
Therefore, in terms of arbitration compliance with
what has been agreed in writing can be enforced. See
Crufon Const. v. Aut. Edif. Púbs., 156 D.P.R. 197, 204
(2002); Municipio de Ponce v. Gobernador, 136 D.P.R.
776, 783 (1994). In turn, when the terms of a
was given to it by the parties. Art. 1233 of the Civil
Code, supra, §3471. Once it is determined what it
was that the parties agreed, the court must decide
the disputes between the parties as stipulated. See
Therefore, according to the authorities herein cited, it
is appropriate for this Honorable Court to vacate the
Decisions by the TPI and order Jane to continue with
the arbitration proceeding that she agreed to, such
that the arbitrator will be the one who decides
whether he has authority to hear her claims on the
merits. This is what the parties agreed, without any
ambiguity whatsoever, and that constitutes the law
367a
between the parties. See HIETEL v. PRTC, 2011
T.S.P.R. 100. In the alternative, if this Honorable
Court believes that the TPI did not commit the
second error indicated, it must proceed to consider
the next two (2) indications of errors.
B.
SECOND INDICATION OF ERROR:
THE TPI MANIFESTLY ERRED BY
CONCLUDING THAT JANE DOE
DOES NOT HAVE TO ARBITRATE
HER ALLEGED CLAIMS AGAINST
LLC
AND
THE
OTHER
DEFENDANTS-PETITIONERS GIVEN
THAT THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE
OF THE AGREEMENT IS BROAD,
CLEAR, AND IT COVERS ANY CLAIM
BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
The TPI also manifestly erred in deciding that the
“constitutional” nature. (Ap. TA., pgs. 486-498.)
Essentially, the TPI based its decision on the
the purposes of the instant judicial action. (Ap. TA.,
pgs. 496-497.) To reach that result the TPI had to
impose by fiat an unsustainable limitation on the
scope of the arbitration clause in the Agreement,
which according to its literal text is clearly broad and
covers (“any claim”) between the parties – including
those that do not arise from the Agreement. By doing
so, the TPI not only erred, but it also made manifest
a marked hostility to the arbitration forum, thus
368a
violating the postulates of the FAA and its case law
interpretation.
From the face of the Decision it can be seen that
the TPI ignored the broad language of the binding
the TPI’s analysis. To facilitate the work of this
TPI should have compelled Jane to arbitrator her
claims:
Intent and Purpose – It is the intent and
resolve any Claim by mediation or
arbitration. The Claimant expressly agrees
that the Claim shall be settled or resolved
through the procedures set forth herein, and
shall not in any way circumvent or otherwise
challenge in any way these proceedings relative
to mediation and arbitration.
provided). (Ap. TA., pg. 97.)
parties, including Jane and the appearers, to resolve
“any Claim” through mediation and arbitration.
More revealing still is the fact that in the Agreement
“Claim” is defined as, “any action, suit, complaint
or demand of whatever nature and for whatever
Members or employees.” (Section 1.06 of the
Agreement; emphasis added.) (Ap. TA. pg. 66). In
other words, the term “any Claim” literally means
369a
any claim, complaint, demand, or action of any
nature and requesting any remedy.
Given the text of Section 14.01 and the definition
of “Claim” in the Agreement itself, “any Claim” can
presented by Jane.
That is, according to the
foregoing terms (and without need of any
interpretation whatsoever), any type of action, case,
demand, or claim of any nature and on any type of
relief or aid against LLC or any of its Members or
employees is covered by the arbitration clause. As we
indicated above, under Puerto Rican law when the
terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, its
provisions will be applied according to the literal
meaning that the parties gave to it. Art. 1233 of the
Civil Code, supra, §3471. On this matter, in Marcial
v. Tome, 144 D.P.R. 522 (1997), this Supreme Court
recognized that the clear letter of the contract had to
be followed, when it unmistakably reflects the will of
the parties.
Teamsters, 130 S.Ct. 2847, 2857 (2010) (likewise);
370a
Concepts, Inc., 151 D.P.R. 307, 311-12 (2000).
administrative,
contractual,
extracontractual,
arbitration clause that the TPI should have backed
pursuant to its terms under the FAA.
These
principles were grossly ignored by the TPI when it
entered its Decision which is being appealed.
basically
questions
and
challenges
is
her
from her internal claim to the Third Amended
Verified Complaint. (Ap. TA. pgs. 119-123; 1-13; 279305; 456-481; and 505-528).
with LLC tha t are expressly governed by the
determinations of fact by the Court. See Conclusion
of Fact Number 7, Decision. (Ap. TA., pg. 492.) That
translates into the fact that to be able to adjudicate
371a
Agreement.
TA., pgs. 84-86.) A reading of such sections is enough
to prove it. So much so that Jane herself admitted to
the TPI that “the mechanism by which compensation
is determined is governed by the [Agreement].” (See
Opposition, at pg. 9, footnote 12, Ap. TA., pg. 144).
As a matter of reality, the TPI failed to consider
the fact that from the internal claim that Jane Doe
made before the managing body of LLC, she
fundamentally claimed some alleged violations of the
Agreement. (Ap. TA., pgs. 119-123.) (See Section V
(B), paragraph 10, supra.)
Pursuant to the above, the TPI erred by not
referring Jane Doe’s claims to arbitration. As we
argued before the TPI, Jane Doe cannot escape the
reality that her claims arise from alleged violations of
the Agreement, whether for discriminatory reasons or
not. Precisely, that is what it is up to the Arbitrator
to settle.
The same thing happens with the alleged
expulsions in retaliation against Jane as a Member of
the managing body of LLC and a Capital Member of
LLC. The expulsion of a Member of the managing
body of LLC is governed by section 4.15 of the
Agreement; whereas the expulsion of a Capital
Member of LLC is governed by Section 12.02 of the
Agreement. (Ap. TA., pgs. 83 and 94-95.) Therefore,
any claim or challenge to those procedures must be
372a
handled through the dispute resolution process of
Clause 14 of the Agreement, which includes the
binding
arbitration that the parties agreed. That was the
undertaking signed by Jane Doe and the TPI erred by
allowing Jane Doe not to comply with what was
agreed.
To conclude, neither the clear and broad language
of the arbitration clause, nor the context provided by
the matters governed by the Agreement and Jane
Doe’s claims, can be interpreted as the obligation to
C. THIRD INDICATION OF ERROR: THE
TPI MANIFESTLY ERRED BY EXEMPTING
JANE DOE FROM ARBITRATING HER
CLAIMS BECAUSE OF THEIR ALLEGED
“EMPLOYMENT”
OR
“LABOR”
AND
CONSTITUTIONAL” NATURE BECAUSE
THE FAA DISPLACES (“PREEMPTS”) ALL
STATE
POLICY
CONTRARY
TO
ARBITRATION.
clause agreed in Section 14 of the Agreement, the TPI
“labor” or “constitutional” nature of Jane Doe’s claims
to exempt her from having to arbitrate them.
According to the TPI:
…the law protecting employees in
Puerto Rico is broad and unrestrictive in
373a
scope, and the exclusion of an employee
from the benefits of labor law must be
clear, and the courts must interpret
those exclusions restrictively.
See Decision, at pg. 12. (Ap. TA., pg. 497.) Moreover
the TPI stated its concern that if it accepted the
“arguments” of the defendants-petitioners:
…it would allow the capital members to
decide at another time to use protected
criteria such as race or religion to
deprive other capital members from
their
constitutional
protection.
According to the interpretation and
position of the LLC, through the OA [the
Agreement] it would be delegated to the
arbitrator to decide the dispute in a
confidential forum without a right to
appeal for the affected parties.16
See Decision, at pg. 12. (Id.) These determinations
by the TPI are impregnated with the hostility toward
arbitration that the FAA came to eradicate and show
that that forum based itself on the nature of Jane
Doe’s alleged claims as well as on alleged state
policies to refuse to compel arbitration. By acting
thus, the TPI acted in open contradiction to the FAA
and the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution. Once again, the TPI manifestly erred.
It is worth mentioning that under the FAA, the courts can
review the decision of the arbitrator if it is believed that he
exceeded his jurisdiction. See 9 U.S.C.A. § 10.
16
374a
See Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1745 (“courts must place
arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other
contracts, […] and enforce them according to their
terms”) (citations omitted). That is to say, what is
important is not the nature of the claim in question,
but rather whether the parties agreed to arbitration
such claim.18 Because the FAA does not differentiate
between the arbitrability of statutory rights or
constitutional rights, the TPI could not create that
distinction by judicial fiat under the scope of their
interpretation of Puerto Rican law.
It is an elemental principle of law that when a
federal law is in conflict with a state law, including
one of a constitutional nature, the state law is
displaced by the federal one by virtue of the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.
The Supremacy Clause stipulates that:
Insofar as SCOTUS case law that requirements to arbitrate
Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S.Ct. 2772, 2778, n. 1 (“[§ 2]
grounds do not include ... any requirement that its lack of
Brown, 132 S.Ct. 1201, 1203 (2012) (“[The FAA’s] text includes
‘requires courts to enforce the bargain of the parties to arbitrate.”)
(citation omitted).
18 As we have discussed above, Jane’s alleged constitutional
claim is covered within the arbitration clause of the Agreement
that requires that Jane Doe submit all of her claims (“any
Claim”) to arbitration.
17
375a
This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States…, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in
very State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or
notwithstanding.
matter Professor Gorrín Peralta states the following:
[A] federal law takes precedence over
the provisions of the Constitution of the
[Commonwealth] of Puerto Rico. … In
any situation in which a Puerto
Rican legal precept conflicts with
the “Supreme Law,” that is to say the
[US] Constitution, [or] with a federal …
law applicable in Puerto Rico, the
federal Law must always take
precedence over the Puerto Rican
one.
province”).19
See also Dowling v. Davis, 840 F.Supp. 731, 734 (E.D. Cal.)
19
376a
displaced by the FAA.
That was specifically
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), by indicating the
following:
In enacting § 2 of the [FAA], Congress
declared a national policy favoring
arbitration and withdrew the power of
the states to require a judicial forum
for the resolution of claims which
the contracting parties agreed to
Id. at pg. 10 (emphasis ours).20
citing Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1747 (2011),
…(5) the Constitution of the [Commonwealth] of Puerto Rico; (6)
Puerto Rico];….” Gorrín Peralta, supra, at pg. 43.
See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 491 (“This clear federal policy places § 2 of
the Act in unmistakable conflict with California's § 229 requirement that
litigants be provided a judicial forum for resolving wage disputes.”)
20
377a
arbitration of a particular type of claim,
the analysis is straightforward: The
conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA.
... West Virginia's prohibition against
predispute agreements to arbitrate
personal-injury or wrongful death claims
against nursing home is a categorical
rule prohibiting arbitration of a
particular type of claim, and that rule is
contrary to the terms and coverage of the
FAA.
marks omitted). In Marmet the SCOTUS decided
that the Supreme Court of West Virginia had erred
by applying the public policy of that State, which
prohibits enforcement of an arbitration clause
contained in an admission agreement to an old-age
home signed prior to the occurrence of an event of
negligence that results in death or bodily injury. In
the case that concerns us, the TPI has sought to
relieve an attorney with 38 years of experience from
her obligation to arbitrate, and all of that without
there even being a law in Puerto Rico to require that
Jane’s claims be decided by a court, which would also
infringe the FAA. Such that, if the FAA displaces any
state legislation that conflicts with its provisions, it is
even more clear that any decision by a court (such as
the appealed Decision) that infringes the FAA also
must be vacated.
This Supreme Court is fully aware of these
principles. In World Films, Inc. v. Paramount Pict.
Corp., supra, it recognized that the state laws that
limit arbitration clauses are displaced (“preempted”)
378a
by the FAA. The dispute in World Films was whether
the application of Article 3-B of Law 75, 10 L.P.R.A.
278b-2, which established the nullity of any
stipulation in a distribution contract that forced a
distributor to arbitrate outside of Puerto Rico any
dispute that arose from such contract, had to take
precedence over the FAA. This Supreme Court of
Puerto Rico determined that insofar as Article 3-B of
Law 75 conflicted in its application with the FAA, the
latter would take precedence. Id., pg. 364. Indeed,
the Supreme Court in effect determined that faced
with the FAA, Article 3-B was ineffective and illegal.
By deciding thus, the provisions of Walborg Corp. v.
Tribunal Superior, 104 D.P.R. 184 (1975), which had
determined that the state courts were not obligated
to apply the LFA, were expressly revoked.
In
Walborg, the court had decided that an arbitration
clause could not be given greater force than the policy
established in Law 75, and that the state courts were
not obligated to apply the LFA. That doctrine was
revoked by World Films.
Pursuant to the above, there is no question that
the TPI erred by denying the arbitration based on the
alleged “constitutional” and “labor” nature of Jane
Doe’s claims. The FAA displaces any statutory legal
precept or precept under the Constitution of Puerto
Rico that does not enforce and recognize the
commitment assumed by Jane Doe and LLC to
resolve all claims (“any Claim”) through the
Agreement.
379a
VIII. CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR
RELIEF
Jane Doe commenced the proceedings with the
TPI in violation of the terms of the binding
arbitration clause that all of the Capital Members of
LLC agreed to in the Agreement. The TPI’s ruling
must be overturned because it infringes the clear
terms of Section 14 of the Agreement, the provisions
of the Federal Arbitration Act, the Supremacy Clause
of the United State Constitution and its
interpretative case law.
WHEREFORE, we very respectfully ask that this
Honorable Court grant this Petition for Certiorari,
overturn the TPI’s Decision, order Jane Doe to submit
her claims to the arbitration commenced before the
AAA, and dismiss the Complaint.
copy of this brief, simultaneously with its submission,
the plaintiff-respondent, Juan R. González, Esq.
MENDOZA LAW OFFICES
Attorney for the defendantspetitioners
380a
PO Box 9282
San Juan, Puerto Rico 009080282
Tel. (787) 722-5522; 5530; 5540
Fax: (787) 723-7057
Electronic mail:
[email protected]
/s/
[signature]
Enrique J. Mendoza Méndez,
Esq.
TSPR-8304
381a
APPENDIX H
JANE DOE,
Demandante-Recurrida
v.
Fulano y Fulana de Tal; Sutano De Cual
Esperencejo Mas Cual personalmente, en su carácter
de patrono de JANE DOE y como co-administrador
de la SLG constituida con ESPERENCEJA MAS
CUAL, quien es demandada como coadministradora
de la SLG constituida con Esperencejo Más Cual;
“SLG Esperencejo y Esperenceja Más Cual”
constituida por Esperencejo y Esperenceja Más Cual;
Demandados Desconocidos A, B y C; Demandadas
Compañías Aseguradoras, Desconocidas X, Y, Z,
Demandados-Peticionarios.
CERTIORARI NÚM:
382a
CC__________
Certiorari procedente del Tribunal de Apelaciones,
Región Judicial de San Juan
___________
Núm. Caso TA: KLCE-2012-00821
___________
PETICIÓN DE CERTIORARI
383a
Abogados de la DemandanteRecurrida Jane Doe:
Lcdo.Juan Rafael González Muñoz.
TSPR-8185
GONZALEZ MUÑOZ LAW OFFICE,
P.S.C.
PO Box 9024055
San Juan, P.R. 00902-4055
Tel. (787) 766-5052
Fax: (787) 766-5551
[email protected]
[email protected]
Lcdo Manuel Porro Vizcarra
TSPR-7994
MANUEL PORRO VIZCARRA LAW
OFFICES
Tel. (787) 774-8200
Fax: (787) 774-8297
[email protected]
Abogados de los Demandados
Peticinarios
Lcdo Enrique J. Mendoza Méndez
TSPR-8304
MENDOZA LAW OFFICES
PO Box 9282
San Juan, P.R. 00908-0282
Tel. (787) 722-5522; 5530; 5540
Fax: (787) 723-7057
[email protected]
[
384a
JANE DOE,
Demandante-Recurrida
v.
Fulano y Fulana de Tal; Sutano De Cual
Esperencejo Mas Cual personalmente, en su carácter
de patrono de JANE DOE y como co-administrador
de la SLG constituida con ESPERENCEJA MAS
CUAL, quien es demandada como coadministradora
de la SLG constituida con Esperencejo Más Cual;
“SLG Esperencejo y Esperenceja Más Cual”
constituida por Esperencejo y Esperenceja Más Cual;
Demandados Desconocidos A, B y C; Demandadas
Compañías Aseguradoras, Desconocidas X, Y, Z,
Demandados – Peticionarios
CERTIORARI NÚM:
CC__________
385a
Certiorari procedente del Tribunal de Apelaciones,
Región Judicial de San Juan
___________
Núm. Caso TA: KLCE 2012-00821
___________
PETICIÓN DE CERTIORARI
AL HONORABLE TRIBUNAL SUPREMO:
COMPARECEN los demandados-peticionarios,
Cual1 y Esperencejo Más Cual y la SLG constituida
solicitan la expedición de la Petición de Certiorari.
I. INTRODUCCIÓN
La Petición de Certiorari de epígrafe busca
vindicar el derecho de los demandados protegido por
la § 2 del Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) y su
jurisprudencia interpretativa de dilucidar los
reclamos presentados en su contra por Jane Doe
(“Jane”) mediante el procedimiento de arbitraje
pactado. El referido pacto requiere, además, que
dicho proceso sea privado y confidencial. A esos
dicha parte identificó a cada uno de los demandados-recurridos
con sus respectivos nombres, direcciones y teléfonos. (Apendice
Peticion Certiorari Apéndice Petición Certiorari ("Ap. TS.", págs.
55-56; 346-348; y 549-571.)
1
386a
efectos, el presente recurso busca que se deje sin
efecto la Resolución del Tribunal de Apelaciones
(“TA”) que denegó la expedición del auto de certiorari
por entender que el Tribunal de Primera Instancia
(TPI”) resolvió correctamente la controversia sobre
arbitraje presentada ante su consideración. Además,
la Resolución del TA denegó la Moción en Auxilio de
Jurisidicción presentada por los demandados que
buscaba paralizar los procedimientos ante el TPI,
debido a que dicho foro se apresta en cualquier
momento a resolver en los méritos las controversias
entre las partes que deberían ser adjudicadas
mediante el arbitraje acordado.
II. DISPOSICIONES LEGALES QUE
ESTABLECEN LA JURISDICCIÓN Y
COMPETENCIA DE ESTE TRIBUNAL
Este Honorable Tribunal tiene jurisdicción y
competencia para entender en los méritos de este
recurso conforme al Artículo V §§ 1 y 3 de la
Constitución del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto
Rico; los Artículos 2.001 y 3.002(d) de la Ley de la
Judicatura del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico
de 2003 (4 L.P.R.A. §§ 24b, 24s(d)); la Regla 52.2(b)
de las de Procedimiento Civil (32 L.P.R.A. Ap. V); el
Artículo 670 del Código de Enjuiciamiento Civil (32
L.P.R.A § 3491); y las Reglas 20 y 30 del Reglamento
del Tribunal Supremo de Puerto Rico, 2011 T.S.P.R.
174.
III. RESOLUCIÓN CUYA REVISIÓN SE
SOLICITA
Los co-demandados-peticionarios solicitan la
revisión de la Resolución dictada el 15 de junio de
2012 por el TA, Región Judicial de San Juan, Panel
III integrado por los Honorables Jueces Ramírez
Nazario, Piñero González y Surén Fuentes, en el Caso
387a
Núm. KLCE-2012-00821 (“Resolución”). (Ap. TS.
págs. 707-724) La Resolución del TA denegó la
expedición del auto de certiorari solicitado. El TA
resolvió que el FAA no aplica y que el TPI resolvió
correctamente la controversia sobre arbitrabilidad, y
que no había circunstancia alguna que provoque
efecto perjudicial a CRL en esta etapa del pleito. En
su recurso, los demandados-peticionarios solicitaron
del TA que revocara de la Resolución del TPI emitida
el 4 de junio de 2012 (“Resolución del TPI”) en el caso
Civil Núm. KPE 2012-1204 (904)(Hon. Juez Ángel R.
Pagán Ocasio), Sala Superior de San Juan (Ap. TS.,
527-541), que denegó La Solicitud de Desestimación
por Falta de Jurisdicción y para Compeler Arbitraje
Compulsorio en Vista de Acuerdo Vinculante de
Arbitraje que había sido presentada por los
comparecientes el 11 de abril de 2012 (Ap. TS., págs.
81-169.).
La Resolución recurrida se notificó el 15 de junio
de 2012. (Ap. TS., págs. 707, 709 y 724) El término de
30 días que tienen los comparecientes para presentar
el presente recurso vence el 16 de julio de 2012. Este
recurso ha sido presentado a tiempo y el Tribunal
tiene jurisdicción para entender en el mismo.
IV. OTROS RECURSOS PENDIENTES
Al presente no existe otro recurso sobre este caso
pendiente ante este Honorable Tribunal ni ante el
TA.
388a
V. PROCEDENCIA DE LA EXPEDICIÓN DEL
RECURSO
Este recurso cumple con los criterios de la Regla
30 del Reglamento de este Honorable Tribunal,
supra, (“Regla 30”) para su expedición.2 Veamos.
Según se discute en este escrito, las Resoluciones
del TA y TPI son contrarias a derecho y, en
particular, a las normas sobre arbitraje e
interpretación de contratos, pues resuelven que Jane
no está obligada a seguir el procedimiento de
Los criterios aquí relevantes son
(1)
Si el remedio y la disposición de la sentencia o resolución
recurrida, a diferencia de sus fundamentos, son contrarios a
derecho, tomando este último en su más amplia acepción.
(2) …..
(3)
Aun cuando no sea novel, si la expresión de la norma es
importante para el interés public
(4)
Si los hechos expuestos presentan la situación más
indicada para el análisis del problema planteado.
(5)
Si la norma existente debe ser redefinida o variada.
(6)
…..
(7)
Si ha mediado prejuicio, parcialidad o error craso y
manifiesto en la apreciación de la prueba por el tribunal de
primera instancia.
(8)
....
(9)
Si la etapa en que se presente el caso es la más propicia
para su consideración.
(10)
Si la expedición del auto o de la orden de mostrar causa
no causan un fraccionamiento indebido del pleito y una dilación
indeseable respecto a la solución final del litigio.
(11)
Si la concesión del auto o la emisión de una orden de
mostrar causa contribuyen de otro modo a las funciones de este
Tribunal de vindicar la ley y pautar el derecho en el país.
(12)
Si se ha cumplido con los otros requisitos que establece
el Reglamento de este Tribunal.
(13)
Si la expedición del auto o de la orden de mostrar causa
evita un fracaso de la justicia.
2
389a
arbitraje que dio inicio el 22 de marzo de 2012 ante el
American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) a pesar de
que el acuerdo entre las partes requiere que Jane
presente en el arbitraje todos sus reclamos contra los
demandados
(“resolve
any
Claim
by
...
arbitration”) independiente de la naturaleza de los
mismos (“any action... of whatever nature...
against the Firm or any of its Members...”).
Evidentemente, se cometió error de Derecho y, en
consecuencia, procede expedir el recurso de certiorari
de conformidad con el inciso (1) de la Regla 30.
El presente recurso sirve además para aclarar la
norma sobre qué significa un contrato en el comercio
interestatal. Dicha determinación es importante para
el interés público, pues sólo de esa forma las partes
podrán estar en posición de conocer si sus contratos
de arbitraje estarán cobijados por la fuerte política
pública a favor del arbitraje que provee el FAA. Perry
v. Thomas. 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987) (‘‘[I]n enacting §
2 of [FAA], Congress declared a national policy
favoring arbitration...”) (Énfasis nuestro). El hecho
de que el TA resolviera incorrectamente que el
Acuerdo no es un contrato en el comercio interestatal
demuestra que este Honorable Tribunal debe
establecer criterios claros sobre el particular para
guiar a los tribunales inferiores. Véanse incisos (3),
(5) y (11) de la Regla 30.
Además, el TA y TPI cometieron error craso en su
interpretación y apreciación de la cláusula de
arbitraje. Ello, pues, del texto de la cláusula de
arbitraje en cuestión surge claramente que es el
árbitro quien tiene la obligación de resolver las
controversias planteadas por Jane ante el foro
judicial. En consecuencia, procede expedir recurso de
certiorari de conformidad con el inciso (7) de la Regla
30.
390a
Tampoco existe duda de que, de conformidad con
el inciso (4) de la Regla 30, la situación de hechos que
se plantea es la más indicada para el análisis de la
controversia ante este Ilustrado Tribunal, pues para
su resolución sólo se requiere que el Tribunal
interprete la cláusula de arbitraje pactada de
conformidad con el FAA y las normas de
interpretación contractual.
La intervención del Honorable Tribunal en esta
etapa es la más propicia, pues de no revocarse la
Resolución del TA y paralizarse los trámites ante el
TPI, se tornará académica la obligación de Jane de
ventilar sus reclamos ante el foro arbitral y se
causaría daño irreparable a los demandadospeticionarios al verse incumplidos los compromisos
pactados de llevar a cabo un procedimiento de
arbitraje confidencial, Véase City of Meridian Miss. v.
Alaernon Blair. Inc.. 721 F.2d 525, 529 (5to Cir. 1983)
(un injunction paralizando un arbitraje constituye
daño irreparable debido a los costos de litigar). Sería
impráctico y constituiría un fracaso irremediable de
la justicia tener que esperar hasta la resolución final
del caso ante el TPI para poder presentar un recurso
ante los foros apelativos y plantear como error que los
reclamos de Jane debieron ser adjudicados en un
procedimiento confidencial de arbitraje. Además, de
no expedirse el auto de certiorari, se le estaría
permitiendo a Jane burlar su obligación de someter a
arbitraje confidencial toda reclamación, de cualquier
naturaleza, que pudiera tener en contra de los
demandados, obligación que contrajo libre y
voluntariamente.
En consecuencia, a los fines de evitar un fracaso
de la justicia procede expedir el recurso de certiorari
de conformidad con los incisos (9)-(10), (13) de la
Regla 30. Máxime, cuando también se han cumplido
391a
con todos los requisitos que establece el Reglamento
de este Honorable Tribunal para la expedición del
auto solicitado. Véase inciso (12) de la Regla 30.
VI. RELACIÓN DE HECHOS PROCESALES Y
SUSTANTIVOS
A. Relación de Hechos Procesales Pertinentes
1. El 2 de abril de 2012, Jane presentó ante el TPI
Demanda Jurada y Solicitud de Sentencia
Declaratoria e Injunction Preliminar y Permanente
(“Demanda”), Jane alegó que no le es de aplicación la
cláusula de arbitraje del “Operating Agreement” o
Acuerdo Operacional de CRL (‘Acuerdo’’) arguyendo
que ese contrato sólo regula las operaciones
comerciales y administrativas de CRL. Jane alegó
además que sus reclamaciones son de índole laboral y
que éstas están cobijadas por la Constitución de
Puerto Rico, la Ley Núm. 100 de 30 de junio de 1959
(edad), la Ley Núm. 69 de 6 de julio de 1985 (sexo y
represalias), la Ley Núm, 115 de 20 de diciembre de
1991 (represalias) y el Manual de Empleados de CRL
(“Manual”), el cual no contiene cláusula de arbitraje,
A esos efectos, Jane solicitó que el TPI declare
inaplicable la cláusula de arbitraje del Acuerdo a sus
alegadas reclamaciones laborales y que se ordene a
CRL a que solicite la paralización del arbitraje bajo la
Regla 57 de Procedimiento Civil en lo que el TPI
resuelve
la
controversia
planteada
sobre
3
arbitrabilidad. (Ap. TS., págs. 44-56.)
2. Junto con la Demanda, Jane presentó una Moción
Las alegaciones de Jane a los efectos de que el Acuerdo no
tiene pertinencia a sus reclamos son abiertamente
contradictorias a la reclamación extrajudicial que hizo Jane al
Consejo Directo de CRL donde expresamente enmarcó los
mismos reclamos como violaciones al Acuerdo. (Ap. TS., págs.
162-166.)
3
392a
Solicitando Injunction Preliminar y Permanente
(“Solicitud de Injunction”), en la que solicitó
igualmente una orden para paralizar el arbitraje en
lo que el TPI resuelve la Sentencia Declaratoria, pero
con el pedido de que una vez la misma sea resuelta a
favor de Jane dicho foro convierta la orden de
paralización en permanente y proceda a resolver en
los méritos las controversias planteadas. (Ap. TS.,
págs. 57-62.)
3. Además, Jane presentó una Moción Urgente en
Solicitud de Orden a los fines de que todos ios
procedimientos
se
mantengan
estrictamente
confidenciales. (Ap. TS., págs. 63-64.)
4. El 3 de abril de 2012, el TPI emitió una Orden
señalando una vista para el 11 de abril de 2012, para
dilucidar la procedencia del recurso extraordinario
solicitado. (Ap. TS., págs. 66.)
5. El 11 de abril de 2012, los demandadospeticionarios
presentaron
una
Solicitud
de
Desestimación, en la que argumentaron que el
Acuerdo es un contrato en el comercio interestatal,
por lo que es de aplicación el FAA, que conforme a la
cláusula de arbitraje del Acuerdo toda controversia
sobre si los reclamos de Jane son arbitrables o no le
corresponde resolverla al propio árbitro y no al TPI y
que, en la alternativa, procede que el TPI reconozca
que mediante la Sección 14.04 del Acuerdo Jane se
obligó a tramitar todos su reclamos (“any Claim’’) de
forma confidencial mediante el procedimiento de
arbitraje independientemente de la naturaleza de los
reclamos o si éstos surgen bajo el Acuerdo. Además,
los demandados-peticionarios argumentaron que bajo
Estados Unidos, independientemente de la alegada
naturaleza constitucional y laboral de las
393a
reclamaciones de Jane, la § 2 del FAA requiere que
dichos reclamos sean adjudicados en el procedimiento
de arbitraje iniciado ante la AAA. (Ap. TS., págs. 81169.)
6. Ese mismo día se celebró una vista en la cual se
acordó que los demandados-peticionarios paralizarían
sus gestiones en el caso de arbitraje en lo que el TPI
resolvía
las
mociones
presentadas
sobre
arbitrabilidad, que se mantendría la confidencialidad
del expediente y que todo documento se presentaría
bajo sello. Además, el TPI indicó que el primer asunto
a resolver será la arbitrabilidad de los reclamos de
Jane. Finalmente, el TPI señaló una vista de
injunction preliminar para el 10 de mayo de 2012, de
ser necesario el desfile de prueba.4 (Ap. TS., págs.
170-171.)
7. El 23 de abril de 2012, Jane presentó su
Oposición a la Solicitud de Desestimación. En dicha
Oposición Jane alegó, entre otras cosas, que la
cláusula de arbitraje del Acuerdo no aplica a sus
alegados reclamos de índole laboral pues dicho
documento sólo aplica a asuntos relacionados con la
administración de CRL, máxime cuando los reclamos
de Jane son de rango constitucional. Además, Jane
alegó que es el TPI el llamado a resolver todos sus
reclamos.5 (Ap. TS., págs. 177-321.)
8. Luego de la presentación de varios escritos por las
El 8 de mayo de 2012, dicha vista fue re-señalada para el 5 de
junio. (Ap. TS., págs. 493-494.)
5 Ese mismo día, Jane presentó una Demanda Enmendada y
Jurada a los fines de incluir como demandadas a las cónyuges
de los demandados en calidad de co-administradoras de las
respectivas Sociedades Legales de Gananciales y enmendar sus
causas de acción. (Ap. TS., págs. 322-348.) El 1 de mayo de 2012,
los demandados se opusieron a la referida enmienda. (Ap. TS.,
págs. 349-356.)
4
394a
partes 6 y que Jane presentara una Segunda
Demanda Enmendada, el 4 de junio de 2012, a las
11:41 a.m., el TPI notificó vía correo electrónico la
Resolución objeto del recurso ante el TA, la cual, como
mencionamos, resuelve contrario al FAA y su
jurisprudencia interpretativa que es al TPI al que le
compete resolver la controversia sobre arbitrabilidad
y que, además, Jane no tiene que arbitrar sus
reclamaciones de alegado discrimen laboral,
represalias y daños por éstas no estar cobijadas por la
cláusula de arbitraje del Acuerdo. (Ap. TS., págs. 527541.) En la nota al calce 12 de la Resolución, el TPI
hace las siguientes expresiones que hacen evidente su
hostilidad hacia el procedimiento de arbitraje: “De
acuerdo a la interpretación y postura de la CRL,
mediante el [Acuerdo] se delegaría al árbitro
resolver la controversia en un foro totalmente
confidencial y sin derecho de apelación para los
afectados.” (Ap. TS., pág. 540; énfasis nuestro.)
9. Además, el TPI indicó que se mantendría en pie
la vista de injunction señalada para el día siguiente
en donde las partes tendrán que presentar prueba en
relación a la solicitud de remedio interdictal.
Igualmente, autorizó la presentación de la Segunda
Demanda Enmendada. (Ap. TS., pág. 541) De un
análisis del formato, tipografía y estilo de la
Resolución se puede razonablemente inferir que la
misma probablemente es producto de un borrador de
proyecto de Resolución sometido por Jane, por lo que,
El 1 de mayo de 2012, los demandados-peticionarios
presentaron su Réplica a Oposición a la Solicitud de
Desestimación por Falta de Jurisdicción y para Competer
Arbitraje Compulsorio en Vista de Acuerdo Vinculante de
Arbitraje. (Ap. TS., págs. 357- 459.) Por su parte, el 7 de mayo de
2012, Jane presentó un escrito intitulado Dúplica de la
Demandante. (Ap. TS., págs. 460- 492.)
6
395a
de ser ello correcto, ésta habría tenido conocimiento
de la determinación del TPI mucho antes que los
10. De hecho, sorpresivamente, a tan sólo cuatro (4)
horas de notificarse la Resolución, Jane presentó ante
el TPI una Solicitud de Orden Sobre la
Confidencialidad de los Procedimientos Ulteriores
alegando que en vista de lo resuelto horas antes por
el TPI no existía razón para que los procedimientos
continuaran tramitándose de forma confidencial. (Ap.
TS., págs. 542-547.) Además, Jane presentó bajo sello
una Tercera Demanda Enmendada y Jurada donde
se identifica a los demandados con sus respectivos
nombres. (Ap. TS., págs. 548-571.)
11. Además, justo antes de que iniciara la vista
señalada para el 5 de junio de 2012, Jane presentó en
el TPI a las 8:47 a.m., una Solicitud de Reinstalación
Como Remedio Adicional al Amparo de la Regla 59 4
de Procedimiento Civil mediante la cual solicita que
se dicte Sentencia Parcial ordenando mediante un
injunction preliminar y permanente su reinstalación
a CRL. (Ap. TS.; págs. 572- 578.)
12. Minutos más tarde, las partes comparecieron a la
vista de injunction preliminar señalada para ese día.
Aunque no habían transcurrido ni tan siquiera 24
horas desde que los demandados-peticionarios
advinieron en conocimiento de que la acción judicial
de Jane no sería desestimada para que procediera el
arbitraje, el TPI pretendía que éstos presentarán
prueba sobre las alegaciones del caso para poder
entrar a resolverlo en los méritos. En vista de lo
atropellado que pretendía ser el proceso, los
demandados-peticionarios objetaron el proceder del
TPI amparándose en argumentos de razonabilidad y
de Debido Proceso de Ley, entre otros. El TPI
396a
concedió entonces hasta el 8 de junio para que Jane
presentara la propuesta de estipulaciones de hechos
que no habían sido aceptadas por los demandadospeticionarios, para que los demandados presentaran
propuestas de hechos y para que ambas partes
presentaran los documentos que deberían ser
considerados por el TPI.7 Además, el TPI consolidó la
vista de injunction preliminar con la de injunction
permanente e indicó que de ser necesario el desfile de
prueba las partes serán notificadas sobre la
celebración de la vista.8 (Ap. TS., págs. 591- 594.)
13. Inconformes con lo anterior, el 12 de junio de
2012, los demandados presentaron una Solicitud de
Certiorari ante el TA, en la cual señalaron que el TPI
había errado al: (1) asumir jurisdicción sobre la
controversia de si Jane está obligada a arbitrar sus
reclamos debido a que las partes inequívocamente
pactaron que sería el árbitro quien determinará el
alcance de su jurisdicción; (2) en la alternativa,
concluir que Jane no tiene que arbitrar sus reclamos
contra los demandados a pesar de que la cláusula de
arbitraje pactada es amplia, ciara y abarca cualquier
reclamo entre las partes; (3) eximir a Jane de arbitrar
sus reclamos por la alegada naturaleza “de empleo” o
“laboral” y “constitucional” de éstos ya que el FAA
desplaza toda política estatal contraria al arbitraje.
(Ap. TS., págs. 1-43.)
14. Junto con el Certiorari, los demandados
presentaron una Moción Urgente en Auxilio de
El 8 de junio, los demandados cumplieron con la referida
Orden del TPI. (Ap. TS., págs. 595 y 660).
8 El TPI también concedió 10 días para que los demandadospeticionarios presenten su posición en cuanto a la solicitud de
días para que se expresen sobre la solicitud de reinstalación de
Jane a CRL. (Ap. TS., pags. 591-594)
7
397a
Jurisdicción. (Ap. TS., págs. 667-683; 684-686.)
15. El 15 de junio de 2012, el TA emitió una
Resolución denegando la expedición del auto de
certiorari y declarando, además, que el Acuerdo no es
un contrato en el comercio interestatal, que la
disputa en este caso no es un asunto relativo al
Acuerdo por lo que la controversia no está gobernada
por el mismo, y que el TPI debe resolver de forma
prioritaria el tema sobre la confidencialidad de los
procedimientos. (Ap. TS., págs. 707-724.) Es de esta
Resolución que acudimos a este Honorable Tribunal.
2. Relación de Hechos Materiales.
16. En o alrededor de noviembre de 1979, Jane se
unió a CRL como abogada. (Ap. TS., pág. 55.)
17. En aquel entonces, CRL era una sociedad civil.
Desde entonces, CRL provee servicios en el comercio
interestatal a su clientela foránea, mayormente de
Estados Unidos, y local. (Ap. TS., págs. 98-99.)
18. En septiembre de 1987, Jane fue promovida a
socia capital de CRL. (Ap. TS., págs. 90.) El contrato
social requería que sus socios dirimieran sus disputas
mediante arbitraje confidencial. (Ap. TS., págs. 312313.)
19. El 13 de septiembre de 2007, CRL se convirtió en
una compañía de responsabilidad limitada bajo las
leyes de Puerto Rico. En consecuencia, Jane advino
Miembro Capital de CRL. (Ap. TS., págs. 102, 108 y
145.)
20. Ese mismo día, Jane y los demás Miembros
Capitales de CRL suscribieron un documento
intitulado
Operating
Agreement
(‘Acuerdo
398a
Operacional’ o ‘Acuerdo’).9 (Ap. TS., págs. 103-158 y
381- 396.) En vista de que siempre ha sido la práctica
acordar que las disputas se resuelvan mediante
arbitraje, el Acuerdo, al igual que el anterior pacto
social, incluye una cláusula de arbitraje confidencial.
21. El Acuerdo rige entre otras materias, los procesos
de admisión, compensación, y expulsión de los
Miembros Capitales, asi como la elección de los
Miembros del Consejo Directivo o “Policy Commitee”.
(Ap. TS., págs. 77-78, 80-83, 127,132, 137-138.) Dicho
Consejo formula las políticas y planes a largo plazo de
CRL. El proceso de compensación de los Miembros
Capitales
concluye
con
una
aprobación
o
desaprobación de la Compensación de los Miembros
Capitales por el Consejo Directivo. Jane fue miembro
del Consejo Directivo.
22. En lo pertinente, dicho Acuerdo (Ap. TS. 102-158)
provee en sus Secciones relevantes lo siguiente:
A. Definitions.
For the purposes of this
1.06 “Claim” means any action, suit,
Firm or any of its Members or employees. ….
1.07 “Claimant” means any
Member
or
El 8 de junio, los demandados cumplieron con la referida
Orden del TPI. (Ap. TS., págs. 595 y 660).
9
399a
5.
Compensation.10
5.02 Salaries of Members- Each Capital
installments. ….
10.
of Members.
10.1 Fiduciary Duties of Members- Members
among other things:
(f)
To treat all Firm Documents as
confidential ‘trade secrets’, except to the extent such
Firm Documents are publicly available other than
as a result of any violation of this or any other
confidentiality obligation... and to treat as
12.
Withdrawal, Retirement,
Suspension, Expulsion ... of a Member.
12.02 Suspension and/or Expulsion- The Firm
may, upon the recommendation of the Policy
Committee and the affirmative vote of threeEl TPI también concedió 10 días para que los demandadospeticionarios presenten su posición en cuanto a la solicitud de
días para que se expresen sobre la solicitud de reinstalación
10
400a
fourths (3/4) of the Capital Members, ...(b) expel
14.
14.01 Intent and Purpose– It is the intent
and arbitration.
14.04 Arbitration– If mediation fails, the
14.05 Confidentiality– The Claimant and the
without
publicity
and
the
attendant
distractions. …. The parties agree to
maintain the confidentiality of such meetings
and hearings, and of the documents
produced or created in such meetings and
hearings. Any and all actions taken by the
401a
parties shall be in conformity with the
underlying purpose set forth in section 14 of
this Agreement.
Nótese que Jane no disputa que el Acuerdo
es un contrato en el comercio interestatal a los
fines del FAA. (Ap. TS., págs. 44-56; 81-101; 177321; 357-459; 460-492.) Tampoco está en
controversia la validez de la cláusula de
arbitraje de la Sección 14 del Acuerdo, (id.)
23. El 22 de octubre de 2007, entró en vigor el
Manual de Empleados de CRL el cual aplica a todos
sus empleados y a los Miembros de CRL. Dicho
Manual no convierte a un Miembro en empleado. Por
el contrario, el Manual claramente mantiene la
diferencia entre la clasificación de “Miembro” y
“empleado”. (Ap. TS., págs. 233-300.) El Manual
tampoco establece las políticas reiacionadas a la
compensación de los Miembros, ni el proceso de
terminación de su relación con CRL, ni el método
para resolver disputas entre los Miembros y CRL.
Dichas políticas están contenidas en las Secciones
5,12 y 14 del Acuerdo, respectivamente. (Ap. TS.,
págs. 127-129 y 137-141.)
24. CRL tiene oficinas en y fuera de Puerto Rico.
Además, la gran mayoría de sus clientes están
ubicados fuera de Puerto Rico (principalmente en ios
Estados Unidos), lo cual requiere que CRL y sus
clientes mantengan comunicación constante como
parte de sus operaciones mediante el uso del correo,
internet, teléfono y otros medios de comunicación
interestatal, incluyendo viajes hacia y fuera de
Puerto Rico. (Ap. TS., págs. 81-170.)
25. A mediados del 2009, Jane fue electa al Consejo
Directivo de CRL, el cual es el organismo rector de
402a
mayor jerarquía de CRL.
26. La compensación de Jane tuvo que ser reducida
porque llevaba varios años que no estaba generando
suficiente trabajo para ella y para ocupar a otros, lo
que es una función vital de los miembros capitales.
Como resultado de ello, el 24 de enero de 2012, Jane
presentó una reclamación extrajudicial a los
Miembros del Consejo Directo de CRL, según
requerido por a Sección 14.02 del Acuerdo. En su
reclamación extrajudicial, Jane alegó en síntesis que
su compensación había sido reducida en violación al
Acuerdo. En ninguna parte de su reclamación Jane
mencionó que se hubiera violado el Manual. El único
contrato escrito que Jane alegó fue violado es el
Acuerdo.
En lo pertinente, la recurrida
específicamente alegó amparándose en el Acuerdo lo
siguiente:
...[L]es solicito formalmente que reconsideren la
decisión de [Fulano de Tal] y pauten, lo más rápido
posible y antes de los próximos 15 días, una reunión
del Consejo Directivo a tenor con la cláusula 14 y
siguiente del “Operating Agreement”, de manera
que yo como Miembro Capital presente mi posición y
objeciones. Quiero dejar claro que el someterme al
procedimiento de la cláusula 14 no debe entenderse
como una renuncia de los derechos que me amparan
bajo las leyes locales y federales.
Procedo a reseñar brevemente mis objeciones:
1.
La reducción de mi salario y
beneficios se hizo (sic) infringe el
“Operating Agreement” y el acuerdo entre
[Fulano de Tal] y yo, y está en contravención
con el acuerdo particular establecido conmigo.
2.
Evidentemente,
el
procedimiento
seguido fue inadecuado y en violación al
403a
“Operating Agreement”, a las decisiones del
Consejo Directivo aprobadas al 31 de mayo de
2011 y la decisión del 20 de diciembre de 2011.
….
16. Igualmente me sentí ofendida cuando
[Sutano de Cual] en una reunión del Consejo
dijo que ‘para sentarse en esa mesa hay que
traer negocio’ y nadie le aclaró lo impropio de
su comentario. ¿Es ese un requisito en el
Operating Agreement? ....
(Ap. TS., págs. 162-166; énfasis nuestro.)
27. De conformidad con la Sección 14.03 del Acuerdo,
el 20 de marzo de 2012 las partes se sometieron al
proceso de mediación el cual culminó sin lograrse
acuerdo alguno.
28. Ante el fracaso de la mediación, el 22 de marzo de
2012, CRL presentó ante la AAA una Demanda de
Arbitraje contra Jane para darle curso a la cláusula
de arbitraje de la Sección 14.04 del Acuerdo que
requiere que toda disputa (“any Claim”) entre las
partes independientemente de su naturaleza o de si
surge o no bajo el Acuerdo sea resuelta mediante
dicho método de resolución de disputas y de forma
confidencial. (Ap. TS., págs. 302-303.)
VII. SEÑALAMIENTO DE ERROR
1.
ERRÓ EL TA AL CONCLUIR QUE EL
FAA NO APLICA. LAS OPERACIONES DE CRL Y
SU RELACION CON JANE TIENEN UN NEXO
SUFICIENTE
CON
EL
COMERCIO
INTERESTATAL Y JANE NO DISPUTÓ LA
APLICACIÓN DE DICHA LEY.
2.
ERRÓ EL TA AL CONCLUIR QUE EL TPI
404a
ERA EL FORO CON PODER DE DETERMINAR EL
ALCANCE DE LA CLÁUSULA DE ARBITRAJE
PACTADA. JANE Y LOS DEMÁS MIEMBROS
CAPITALES DE CRL CONFIARON DICHO PODER
AL FORO ARBITRAL AL ADOPTAR LAS REGLAS
DE ABRITRAJE COMERCIAL DEL AAA.
3.
ERRÓ EL TA AL RESPALDAR LA
CONCLUSIÓN DEL TPI DE QUE LOS RECLAMOS
DE JANE ESTÁN FUERA DEL ALCANCE DE LA
CLÁUSULA DE ARBITRAJE. DICHA CLÁUSULA
ES AMPLIA, CLARA Y ABARCA CUALQUIER
RECLAMACIÓN ENTRE LAS PARTES.
4.
ERRÓ EL TA AL CONCLUIR QUE LAS
RECLAMACIONES
DE
JANE
NO
SON
ARBITRABLES
POR
VERSAR
SOBRE
ALEGACIONES DE DISCRIMEN, REPRESALIAS Y
DERECHOS CONSTITUCIONALES.
EL FAA
IMPIDE (“PREEMPTS”) QUE LOS ESTADOS
CATEGORIZEN
RECLAMACIONES
PARA
EXCLUIRLAS DEL ARBITRAJE.
VIII. DISCUSIÓN DEL PRIMER
SEÑALAMIENTO DE ERROR
No es correcta la determinación del TA de que el
FAA no aplica porque alegadamente la transacción
envuelta en la controversia no forma parte del
comercio interestatal. (Ap. TS., pág. 722).
Lo
importante para que el FAA aplique es que el
Acuerdo tenga un nexo suficiente con el comercio
interestatal, criterio que es sumamente laxo y que
como veremos se satisface ampliamente en el
presente caso. SCI v. Fulmer. 883 So.2d 621, 629
(Ala. 2003)(“[A] trial court evaluating a contract
connected to some economic or commercial activity
would rarely, if ever, refuse to compel
405a
arbitration on the ground that the transactions
lacked ‘involvement’ in interstate commerce.”)(énfasis
suplido).
Es norma establecida que el FAA es de aplicación
a los contratos en el comercio interestatal. Véase § 2
del FAA.11 El significado de lo que es un “contrato en
el comercio interestatal” fue establecido por el
Tribunal Supremo de los Estados Unidos (“TSEU”) en
Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies. Inc. v. Dobson.
513 U.S. 265 (1995) (“Allied-Bruce”) y Citizens Bank
v. Alafabco. Inc. 539 U.S. 52 (2003) (“Citizens”).
Veamos lo resuelto en esos casos.
En Allied-Bruce un residente de Alabama adquirió
en la sucursal de Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies
(“Allied-Bruce”) en ese Estado un Plan de Protección
contra Termitas para su hogar (el “Plan”). El Plan
contenía una cláusula de arbitraje. El cumplimiento
de dicho Plan fue garantizado por Terminix
International Company (“Terminix’’), quien era el
dueño de la franquicia bajo la cual Allied-Bruce
operaba en Alabama. La residencia en cuestión fue
vendida a un tercero, a quien le fue transferido el
referido Plan. Dado que en la residencia había un
enjambre de termitas, el tercero-adquirente reclamó
judicialmente contra el vendedor de la propiedad,
Allied-Bruce y Terminix. En respuesta, Allied-Bruce
y Terminix solicitaron al tribunal que hiciera valer la
cláusula de arbitraje por virtud de la § 2 del FAA.
Dicha solicitud fue denegada.
Allied-Bruce y
11
La § 2 del FAA, en lo pertinente, dispone como sigue
A written provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract... shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable ....
406a
Terminix apelaron hasta el Tnbunal Supremo de
Alabama y luego al TSEU.
El TSEU revocó al Tribunal Supremo de Alabama
porque el Plan era un contrato en el comercio
interestatal
independientemente
de
que
la
transacción
sólo
se
realizó
en
Alabama.
Específicamente, el TSEU señaló que el término
“involving commerce” de la § 2 del FAA es el
equivalente funcional del término “affecting
commerce”, lo cual demuestra la intención del
Congreso al promulgar el FAA de ejercer al máximo
su poder bajo la Cláusula de Comercio. Id. en la pág.
277.12 En vista de ello y de que el propósito básico
del FAA es superar la renuencia de los
tribunales de poner en vigor los acuerdos de
arbitraje, el TSEU resolvió que el término “involving
commerce” debe ser interpretado ampliamente.
Id., en la pág. 275 (“a broad interpretation of this
language is consistent with the Act’s basic purpose”).
Además, el TSEU aclaró que el término “involving
commerce” no requiere que las partes hayan
contemplado conexión alguna con el comercio
interestatal, sino sólo que la transacción, de hecho
(“in fact”), envuelva comercio interestatal. Id., en la
pág. 281 (“we accept the ‘commerce in fact’
interpretation, reading the Act’s language as
insisting that the ‘transaction’ in fact ‘involv[e]’
El poder del Congreso bajo la Cláusula de Comercio de la
Constitución de los Estados Unidos es tan amplio que en los
pasados 75 años sólo dos casos del TSEU han resuelto que el
Congreso excedió sus poderes bajo la referida Cláusula de
Comercio. Véanse U.S. v. Lopez. 514 U.S. 549 (1995); US v.
Morrison. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). Nótese que ninguno de los
12
407a
interstate commerce, even if the parties did not
contemplate an interstate commerce connection “).
En apoyo de la conclusión de que el Plan era un
contrato en el comercio interestatal el TSEU
consideró la naturaleza multi-estatal de las
compañías Terminix y Allied-Bruce y el que los
materiales utilizados para cumplir con los términos
del Plan provenían de otros Estados. Id. en la pág.
282.
Posteriormente, en Citizens el TSEU nuevamente
tuvo que determinar si ciertos acuerdos entre dos
entidades de un mismo Estado eran contratos en el
comercio interestatal. Dicho Tribunal contestó la
pregunta en la afirmativa al señalar que las
transacciones (i.e., restructuración de deuda) tenían
nexo suficiente con el comercio interestatal.
Citizens envolvía una institución prestataria de
Alabama de nombre The Citizens Bank (“Citizens”) y
la compañía de construcción Alafabco, Inc., localizada
en ese mismo Estado. Las referidas partes otorgaron
varios acuerdos para restructurar la deuda de
Alafabco con Citizens, los cuales contenían una
cláusula que requería arbitrar las disputas qué
surgieran entre ellos. Posteriormente, Alafabco instó
demanda judicial contra Citizens por incumplimiento
de contrato y otras causas de acción.
En
consecuencia, Citizens solicitó una orden para
compeler el arbitraje. La solicitud fue concedida por
el tribunal/ pero el Tribunal Supremo de Alabama la
revocó. El TSEU a su vez revocó y ai así hacerlo
expresó lo siguiente:
Because the statute provides for ‘the
enforcement of arbitration agreements within the
full reach of the Commerce Clause’,... it is
perfectly clear that the FAA encompasses a wider
408a
range of transactions than those actually ‘in
commerce’-that is, ‘within the flow of
interstate commerce....
The Supreme Court of Alabama was therefore
misguided in its search for evidence that a ‘portion
of the restructured debt was actually attributable
to interstate transactions’ or that the loans
‘originated out-of-state’ or that ‘the restructured
debt was inseparable from any out-of- state
projects.’ ... Such evidence might be required
in the FAA were restricted to transactions
actually ‘in commerce,’... but,... that is not the
limit of the FAA reach.
Nor is application of the FAA defeated because
the
individual
debt-restructuring
transactions, taken alone, did not have a
‘substantial effect on interstate commerce.’ ...
Congress’ Commerce Clause power ‘may be
exercised in individual cases without
showing any specific effect upon interstate
commerce’ if in the aggregate the economic
activity in question would represent ‘a general
practice ... subject to federal control.’... Only that
general practice need bear on interstate
commerce in a substantial way.
Id. en las págs. 56-57 (citas omitidas, énfasis en
negritas y subrayado suplido).
Así las cosas, el TSEU concluyó que los acuerdos
en cuestión, a pesar de haber sido suscritos en
Alabama por residentes de ese Estado, eran contratos
en el comercio interestatal, como mínimo, por las
siguientes tres razones; (a) Alafabco realizaba
negocios en Carolina del Norte, Tennessee y
Alabama; (b) los acuerdos de restructuración de
deuda habían sido garantizados con los activos de
409a
Alafabco, incluyendo su inventario de bienes
ensamblados con material proveniente fuera de
Alabama, y; (c) el impacto en el comercio interestatal
que representa la práctica general de la
transacción económica en cuestión satisface el
significado de “involving commerce” bajo la § 2 del
FAA. Sobre este particular, el TSEU expresó lo
siguiente;
No elaborate explanation is needed to make
evident the broad impact of commercial
lending on the national economy or
Congress’ power to regulate that activity
pursuant to the Commerce Clause.
Id. en la pág. 58 (énfasis en negritas y subrayado
nuestro).
A base de lo anterior, podemos colegir que para
determinar si cierto acuerdo constituye un contrato
en el comercio interestatal hay que evaluar si la
transacción afecta el comercio interestatal (“affects
interestate commerce”) o si la actividad económica en
cuestión representa una práctica general sujeta a
control federal bajo la Cláusula de Comercio.
En cuanto a lo que constituyen para efectos del
FAA prácticas sujetas a control federal bajo la
Cláusula de Comercio se ha expresado lo siguiente:
“‘No commercial enterprise of any kind which
conducts its activities across state lines has been held
to be wholly beyond the regulatory power of Congress
under the Commerce Clause.’” BWI Comp, v. Beck,
910 S.W.2d 620, 623 (Tex. App. 1995)(citas
omitidas).13
Sobre este particular, resultan
Véase además, Sewer v. Paragon Homes, Inc.,351 F.Supp.
596, 599 (D.V.I. 1972)(“Of more general importance, however, is
the fact that Congress has the authority to regulate all
transactions within the territories.”)
13
410a
ilustradoras las expresiones del mismo Tribunal
Supremo de Alabama en su posterior aplicación de los
casos Allied-Bruce y Citizens:
As the decisions of the [US] Supreme Court have
made clear, there are few, if any economic or
commercial transactions that are beyond the
reach of Congress’s commerce power.
Furthermore, virtually every kind of industry,
small or large, is currently regulated by
some sort of federal state enacted pursuant
to Congress’s commerce power. See, e.g., 29,
U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938); 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970); 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654
(Family Medical Leave Act of 2000); 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e to 2000e-17 (Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as amended).
SCI v. Fulmer, 883 So.2d 621, 628 (Ala. 2003)(énfasis
suplido).
Más adelante, el Tribunal añade lo
siguiente:
The transaction underlying the contract between
Fulmer and SCI-Alabama (for the sale of goods and
services), is unquestionably economic in nature,
and the nationwide aggregate effect of such a
transaction on interstate commerce easily brings the
practice of contracting to provide funeral services and
associated goods within the reach of Congress
through the FAA. ... This is true even though
the effect of this particular transaction
(Fulmer’s contract with SCI-Alabama) on interstate
commerce may be considered trivial.
See
Wickward, 317 U.S. [111, 127-28 (1942)].14
En Wickard v, Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), el Tribunal
Supremo de Estados Unidos expresó lo siguiente en cuanto a
prácticas locales que podrían parecer triviales:
14
411a
Id, en la pág. 629-30 (énfasis suplido).
A la luz del marco legal anteriormente discutido,
veamos porqué el Acuerdo es un contrato en el
comercio interestatal bajo la § 2 del FAA.
El Acuerdo es un contrato en el comercio
interestatal, pues, entre otras razones, el mismo
gobierna la relación entre los miembros capitales de
CRL, incluyendo la relación con Jane, y las
operaciones de la firma en Puerto Rico y en su
sucursal ubicada en Washington, D.C. Véase, SCI v.
Fulmer, 883 So.2d 621, 629 (Ala. 2003)(“[i]t would
under the FAA.”)(énfasis suplido).15 Además, la
But even if appellee's activity be local and though it may not
be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature,
be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic
effect on interstate commerce and this irrespective of
whether such effect is what might at some earlier time have
been defined as ‘direct' or ‘indirect.
Id. en la pág. 125. Más adelante Wickard añade io siguiente:
That appellee's own contribution to the demand for wheat
may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the
scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution,
taken together with that of many others similarly situated,
is far from trivial.
Id. en las págs. 127-28.
Véase además, Thomas H. Oehmke, Commercial Arbitration §
3:6 (2011 )(“A contract needs only the slightest nexus to
interstate commerce to apply the FAA.''); 21 Willinston on
Contracts § 57: (4th ed. 2011)(‘Consistent with the broad
approach to interpreting the term 'involving commerce’ in the
[FAA], it has been said that a contract containing an
arbitration provision need only be related to commerce
15
412a
gran mayoría de los clientes de CRL están ubicados
fuera de Puerto Rico (principalmente en los Estados
Unidos), lo cual requiere que CRL y sus clientes
mantengan comunicación constantemente como parte
de sus operaciones mediante el uso del correo,
interestatal, incluyendo viajes hacia y fuera de
Puerto Rico. Igualmente, resulta significativa la
naturaleza económica del Acuerdo y que los
siguientes estatutos federales, entre otros, aplican a
la relación de CRL con aquellos que son propiamente
considerados empleados: 1) Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§651-78; 2) Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601- 2654; 3)
Family Medical Leave Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e
to 2000e-17; 4) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964; y 5) Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34.
Además, y según
señalamos previamente, Jane no disputó la
aplicación del FAA a la cláusula de arbitraje del
Acuerdo y, por ende, ésta renunció cualquier
argumento al contrarío. Véase Caquas Satellite
Corp. v. Echostar Satellite LLC. _ F.Supp.2d, 2011
WL 5517037, n. 2 (D. P.R.)(“Plaintiffs [,the party
opposing arbitration,] ... do not make any arguments
about whether or not the agreement involves interstate
commerce and therefore waive this argument’’).
De lo anterior surge, que el FAA es de aplicación
al Acuerdo dado su carácter económico y nexo con el
comercio interestatal.
Los hechos anteriormente
relatados, evidencian que el Acuerdo afecta el
to fall within the coverage of the Act")(énfasis suplido);
Bowen v. Security Pest Control. Inc., 879 So.2d 1139,1142 (Ala.
2003)(resuelve que la transacción envolvía el comercio
interestatal, en parte, porque una de las partes en la transacción
realizaba negocios en dos Estados).
413a
comercio interestatal (“affects interestate commerce”)
y que la actividad económica en cuestión representa
una práctica general que afecta el comercio
interestatal substancialmente y que está sujeta a
control federal bajo el poder amplio que le provee al
Congreso la Cláusula de Comercio. En consecuencia,
erró el TA al resolver que no aplica el FAA.
IX. DISCUSIÓN DEL SEGUNDO
SEÑALAMIENTO PE ERROR
El TA erró manifiestamente al no expedir el auto
solicitado y revocar la Resolución del TPI, pues dicho
foro no tenía jurisdicción para decidir si Jane tiene
que arbitrar sus supuestos reclamos contra los
Las controversias sobre arbitrabilidad comportan
tres (3) modalidades: (i) si existe un convenio de
arbitraje; (ii) el alcance de un convenio de arbitraje
(“si tal convenio alcanza determinada controversia”);
(iii) y si tal convenio alcanza una disputa sobre la
duración o expiración del contrato. Véase Méndez
Acevedo v. Nieves Rivera, 179 D.P.R. 359,367-68
(2010): Municipio de Mayagüez v. Lebrón, 167 D.P.R.
713, 720-21 (2006); World Films. Inc. v. Paramount
Pictures Corp., 125 D.P.R. 352 (1990).
Como regla general, la determinación de si un
acuerdo crea el deber de las partes de arbitrar
determinada controversia es tarea judicial. Méndez
Acevedo, supra; World Films. Inc. supra, en la pág.
361. No obstante lo anterior, el asunto de la
el árbitro quien resolverá las cuestiones de
414a
Pub., 168 D.P.R. 674, 684 (2006) (“De ordinario y
ser resueltos por los tribunales..,”) (énfasis nuestro).
arbitrabilidad (si determinada controversia es
evidence”) de que las partes asi lo pactaron-de que esa
fue su intención. First Options of Chicago, inc. v.
Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995). La anterior es
autos. El FAA aplica al Acuerdo entre Jane y CRL y
las partes delegaron al foro arbitral la determinación
de arbitrabilidad por lo que el TPI erró al asumir
jurisdicción.
Dado el lenguaje claro de la Sección 14 del
Acuerdo, el TPI erró manifiestamente al asumir
jurisdicción sobre la controversia de si los
reclamos de Jane Doe son arbitrables o no. En
la cláusula de arbitraje contenida en el Acuerdo, Jane
se comprometió a que el arbitraje se condujera bajo
las Reglas de Arbitraje Comercial de la AAA.16 La
Sección 14.04 del Acuerdo dispone en lo pertinente
“[i]f mediation fails, the Claim shall be settled by
arbitration under its Commercial Arbitration
Rules...”. A su vez, la Regla 7(a) de dicho cuerpo de
Las Reglas de Arbitraje Comercial de la AAA gozan de la
misma generalidad que las Regias de Procedimiento Civil de
Puerto Rico.
16
415a
Reglas dispone: “[t]he arbitrator shall have the power
to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any
objections with respect to the existence, scope or
validity of the arbitration agreement” (Commercial
Arbitration Rules de la AAA, Regla 7(a), Ap. TS.,
págs. 116-118.) (énfasis nuestro).
Ante la
incorporación en la cláusula de arbitraje entre Jane y
CRL de un cuerpo de reglas de arbitraje que delega al
árbitro la facultad de determinar, era claro que no le
competía al TPI determinar si los reclamos de Jane
eran arbitrables.
Los
tribunales
federales
han
resuelto
consistentemente que cuando las partes incorporan a
sus acuerdos o cláusulas de arbitraje regias
institucionales de entidades como la AAA en las que
se delega al árbitro la facultad de decidir sobre su
propia jurisdicción - decidir arbitrabilidad - ello
constituye evidencia suficiente en Derecho (clara e
inequívoca) de que esa era la intención de las
an arbitrator”)] Sleeper Farms v. Agway, Inc., 211 F.
court] refers this dispute [to the arbitrator] to
arbitration clause.”)17
Véase, además; Terminix Int'l. Co. v. Palmer Ranch Ltd, 432
F.3d 1327, 29, 33-34(11th Cir. 2005) (Resolviendo que toda vez
que las Reglas de Arbitraje de la AAA delegan al árbitro la
determinación de arbitrabilidad, la reclamación del demandante
17
416a
De hecho, aun cuando las partes no han acordado
el someter las controversias de arbitrabilidad
sustantivas al foro arbitral, los tribunales tienden a
dejar la controversia para que sea resuelta
inicialmente por el árbitro cuando la arbitrabilidad
no puede ser determinada sin entrar en los méritos
de la controversia.
Elkouri & Elkouri.
How
Arbitrations Works, (BNA Books. 6ta Edición 2003) en
la pág. 281. (“However, even though the agreement
does not expressly leave the determination of
arbitrability to the arbitrator, and in spite of the fact
that the parties have first gone to court, courts have
left the initial determination to the arbitrator. This
was the result, for instance, where arbitrability could
not be determined without delving into the merits...”)
Así, en Camden Indus. Co. v. Carpenters Local
1688. 353 F.3d 178,180 (1st Cir. 1969) el Primer
Circuito de Apelaciones resolvió:
unlike a finding on the merits when jurisdiction is
not in question... will not be insulated from
de que el acuerdo de arbitraje lo despojaba ilegalmente de varios
remedios estatutarios, era materia a ser adjudicada por el
árbitro, no por el tribunal); Qualcomm Inc. v. Nokia Corp., 466
F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Apollo Computer. Inc. v. Berq.
886 F. 2d 469, 473 (1s1 Cir. 1989)(“Ordinarily, [Plaintiff] would
be entitled to have these issues resolved by a court. [...] By
contracting to have all disputes resolved according to the Rules of
the ICC, however, [Plaintiff] agreed to be bound by Articles 8.3
and 8.4. These provisions clearly and unmistakably allow the
arbitrator to determine her own jurisdiction when, as here, there
exists a prima facie agreement to arbitrate whose continued
existence and validity is being questioned.”).
417a
subsequent judicial review...
We believe full
recognition of the role of labor arbitration requires
court intervention in a case such as this only when
it has become absolutely necessary, viz., on a
petition to vacate or enforce the award.
La casuística federal citada es consistente con
nuestro ordenamiento local en materia de contratos.
inherentemente contractual.” Méndez Acevedo,
supra, en la pág, 367; Municipio de Mayaqüez. Supra;
133. 144 (1994).
Por lo tanto, en materia de arbitraje puede
exigirse el cumplimiento de aquello que se haya
pactado por escrito. Véase Crufon Const, v. Aut. Edif.
Púbs., 156 D.P.R. 197.204 (2002); Municipio de Ponce
v. Gobernador, 136 D.P.R. 776, 783 (1994). A su vez,
cuando los términos de un contrato son claros y no
presentan ambigüedad, sus disposiciones se aplicarán
según el sentido literal que le dieron las partes. Art,
1233 del Código Civil, supra, § 3471. Una vez se
determina qué fue lo que las partes acordaron, el
juzgador debe resolver las controversias entre las
partes de conformidad con lo estipulado. Véase
su vez delegan en el árbitro -de forma clara e
inequívoca- la autoridad para determinar su propia
jurisdicción.
Por tanto, conforme a las
autoridades aquí citadas, procede que este
Honorable Tribunal revoque la Resoluciones del
TA y TPI y ordene a Jane continuar con el
procedimiento de arbitraje que pactó, de suerte
418a
que sea el árbitro el que resuelva si tiene
autoridad para entender en los méritos las
reclamaciones de ésta. Así lo pactaron las
partes, sin ambigüedad alguna, y ello
constituye la ley entre las partes. Véase HIETEL
v. PRTC, 2011 T.S.P.R. 100. En la alternativa, de este
Honorable Tribunal entender que el TA no cometió el
segundo error señalado, debe pasar considerar los
próximos dos (2) señalamientos de error.
X. DISCUSIÓN DEL TERCER SEÑALAMIENTO
DE ERROR
El TA también erró manifiestamente al resolver
que las reclamaciones presentadas por Jane no están
cobijadas por la cláusula de arbitraje del Acuerdo
porque éstas son supuestamente de naturaleza “de
empleo” o “laboral” y “constitucional”. (Ap. TS., págs.
723-724.) Esencialmente, el TA fundamentó su
decisión en la conclusión errada de que el Acuerdo no
rige la relación entre CRL y Jane para fines de la
presente acción judicial. (Ap. TS., pág. 722.) Para
llegar a este resultado, el TA tuvo que imponer por
fíat una limitación insostenible al alcance de la
cláusula de arbitraje del Acuerdo, la cual según su
texto literal es claramente amplia y cubre toda
reclamación (“any Claim”) entre las partes incluyendo aquellas que no surgen del Acuerdo. Al
así hacerlo, el TPI no tan sólo erró, sino que hizo
manifiesta una marcada hostilidad al foro arbitral,
violando así los postulados del FAA y su
De la faz de la Resolución surge que el TA hizo
caso omiso al lenguaje amplio de la cláusula de
arbitraje compulsorio contenida en el Acuerdo.
Muestra de ello, es el hecho de que ni siquiera
el texto íntegro de la cláusula fue citado en el
419a
cuerpo de la Resolución como parte del análisis
del TA. Para facilitar la labor de este Tribunal,
reproducimos la sección relevante del Acuerdo, que
evidencia sin lugar a dudas que el TA debió haber
competido a Jane a arbitrar sus reclamos:
Intent and Purpose -It is the intent and purpose of
the Firm and any Claimant to resolve any Claim
by mediation or arbitration. The Claimant
expressly agrees that the Claim shall be settled or
resolved through the procedures set forth herein,
and shall not in any way circumvent or otherwise
challenge in any way these proceedings relative to
mediaiion and arbitration.
Véase Sección 14.01 del Acuerdo (énfasis suplido).
(Ap. TS., páq. 140;)
La Sección 14.01 del Acuerdo antes transcrita
demuestra que era la intención y el propósito de las
partes, incluyendo Jane y los comparecientes, el
resolver cualquier reclamación (“any Claim”)
mediante mediación y arbitraje. Más revelador aún
es el hecho de que en el Acuerdo se define “Claim”
como “... any action, suit, complaint or demand
of whatever nature and for whatever relief or
or employees” (Sección 1.06 del Acuerdo’, énfasis
suplido.) (Ap. TS., pág. 109.) En otras palabras, el
término
“any
Cliaim”
significa
literalmente
cualquier reclamación, queja, demanda o pleito de
cualquier naturaleza y solicitando cualquier
remedio.
Dado el texto de la Sección 14.01 y la definición de
“Claim” del propio Acuerdo, “any Claim” no puede
significar otra cosa que no sea “cualquier
reclamación”, y ello abarca todo tipo de reclamo y
solicitud de remedio presentado por Jane. O sea,
420a
según los antedichos términos (y sin necesidad de
interpretación alguna), cualquier tipo de acción, caso,
CRL o cualquiera de sus Miembros o empleados está
cubierta por la cláusula de arbitraje.
Según
señalamos
anteriormente,
bajo
el
derecho
puertorriqueño cuando los términos de un contrato
son claros y no presentan ambigüedad, sus
disposiciones se aplicarán según el sentido literal que
le dieron las partes. Art. 1233 del Código Civil,
supra, § 3471. Sobre este particular, en Marcial v.
Tome, 144 D.P.R. 522 (1997), este Tribunal Supremo
reconoció que se debe seguir la letra clara del
contrato, cuando la misma refleja inequívocamente la
voluntad de las partes.
Aún si hubiera alguna duda sobre el alcance de la
cláusula de arbitraje y el significado de “any Claim”,
lo cual se niega, el FAA requiere que la duda sea
resuelta a favor del arbitraje. Véase Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S.
1,24-25 {1983)(“The [FAA] establishes that, as a
matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope
of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of
arbitrability.”); Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Broth, of
Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2857 (2010) (igual);
Painewebber incorporated of Puerto Rico v. Service
Concepts. Inc., 151 D.P.R. 307, 311-12 (2000)(“Una
vez acordado el arbitraje, los tribunales carecen de
discreción en cuanto a su eficacia y tienen que dar
cumplimiento al arbitraje acordado. [Además],
cualquier duda sobre el alcance de las
controversias que pueden ser llevadas a
421a
arbitraje debe resolverse en favor del arbitraje.
“)
Por
consiguiente,
no
importa
para
la
determinación de arbitrabilidad si el reclamo es de
naturaleza laboral o administrativo, contractual,
extracontractual,
estatutario
o
constitucional.
Tampoco importa si los Miembros Capitales de CRL
pueden clasificarse como dueño o empleados o ambos.
Se trata de una cláusula de arbitraje amplísima que
el TA debió avalar conforme a sus términos bajo el
FAA. Estos principios fueron crasamente ignorados
por el TA al emitir la Resolución de la cual se recurre.
No debemos olvidar que el FAA fue promulgado como
respuesta a la hostilidad que tradicionalmente los
Tribunales han mostrado hacia los acuerdos de
arbitraje. Véase Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532
U.S. 105,111 (2001 ) (resolviendo que los contratos de
empleo en el comercio interestatal están cubiertos por
el FAA salvo aquellos de ciertos empleados de
transportación).
La conclusión de que Jane tiene que arbitrar
sus reclamos se impone aún si este Tribunal
estuviese inclinado a ir más allá del texto de la
Sección 14 y las definiciones del Acuerdo para
determinar el alcance de la obligación de
arbitrar de los Miembros Capitales (presentes y
antiguos) de CRL. Ello es así, toda vez que lo que
Jane cuestiona e impugna fundamentalmente es su
compensación como Miembro Capital de CRL (por
alegado discrimen), y su expulsión del ente directivo
de CRL y como Miembro Capital de CRL (por
alegadas represalias). Véase las distintas alegaciones
que Jane ha presentado como parte de este caso,
desde su reclamación interna, hasta la Tercera
Demanda Enmendada y Jurada. (Ap. TS., págs. 162166; 44-64; 322-348; 499-524; 548-571.)
422a
Todos estos son aspectos de la relación de Jane
con CRL que están regidos expresamente por el
Acuerdo. De hecho, así surge de las propias
determinaciones de hecho del TPI. Véase
Determinación de Hecho Número 7, Resolución. (Ap.
TS., pág. 535.) Ello se traduce en que para poder
adjudicar los reclamos de Jane de alegado discrimen o
de represalia, el foro correspondiente -el arbitraltendrá que necesariamente referirse al Acuerdo.
Según surge fehacientemente del récord, la
compensación de los Miembros Capitales de CRL se
rige por las secciones 5.01-5.06 del Acuerdo. (Ap. TS.,
págs. 127-129.) Basta una lectura de dichas secciones
para constatarlo. Tan es así, que la propia Jane
admitió ante el TPI que “el mecanismo mediante el
cual se determina la compensación lo rige el
[Acuerdo]”. (Véase Oposición, en la pág. 9, nota al pie
12., Ap. TS., pág. 187.)
Como cuestión de realidad, el TA omitió
considerar el hecho que desde la reclamación interna
que Jane Doe presentó ante el ente directivo de CRL,
ésta alegó fundamentalmente unas supuestas
violaciones al Acuerdo. (Ap. TS., págs. 162-166.)
(Véase Sección VI(B), párrafo 11, supra).
Conforme a lo anterior, el TA y TPI erraron al no
referir a arbitraje los reclamos de Jane. Ésta no
puede escapar la realidad de que sus reclamos se
originan de alegadas violaciones al Acuerdo, sea por
razones discriminatorias o no. Precisamente, ello es
lo que le compete al Árbitro dirimir.
De igual forma sucede con la alegada expulsión en
represalias de Jane como Miembro del ente directivo
de CRL y Miembro Capital de CRL. La expulsión de
un Miembro del ente directivo de CRL está regida por
la sección 4.15 del Acuerdo; mientras que la expulsión
423a
de un Miembro Capital de CRL está regida por la
Sección 12.02 del Acuerdo. (Ap. TS., págs. 126 y 137138.) Por tanto, cualquier reclamación o impugnación
de dichos procedimientos debe atenderse mediante el
proceso de resolución de disputas de la sección 14 del
Acuerdo, el cual incluye el arbitraje compulsorio que
las partes pactaron. Ese fue el compromiso suscrito
por Jane y erraron ios foros inferiores al permitir que
Jane no cumpliera con lo pactado.
Para concluir, ni del lenguaje claro y amplio de la
cláusula de arbitraje, ni del contexto provisto por las
materias gobernadas por el Acuerdo y los reclamos de
Jane, se puede interpretar como que la obligación de
arbitrar se limita a reclamaciones sobre asuntos
operativos o administrativos de CRL. El TPI no sólo
asumió
jurisdicción
erróneamente
sobre
la
controversia de arbitrafailidad sino que la resolvió de
forma completamente contraria a derecho.
XI. DISCUSIÓN DEL CUARTO
SEÑALAMIENTO DE ERROR
Además de hacer caso omiso de la letra clara de la
cláusula de arbitraje pactada en la Sección 14 del
Acuerdo, el TA amparó su determinación en la
alegada naturaleza “de empleo” o “laboral” y
“constitucional” de los reclamos de Jane para eximirla
de tener que arbitrarlos. De acuerdo al TA:
..la reclamación que Jane Doe interesa que el foro
Judicial adjudique es una que imputa a la CRL el
haberla separado de manera discriminatoria y por
represalias. Además, dicha controversia trata de
una conducta imputada a la CRL en violación de
sus derechos constitucionales fundamentales, por
lo que nuestro estado de derecho le reconoce a la
recurrida vindicar tales derechos mediante una
acción de injunction. (Ap. TS., págs. 723-724.)
424a
Esta determinación del TA evidencia la hostilidad
al arbitraje que el FAA vino a erradicar y demuestra
que dicho foro se amparó en la naturaleza de los
alegados reclamos de Jane así como en supuestas
políticas estatales para rehusarse a compeler el
arbitraje. Al así proceder, el TA actuó en abierta
contradicción al FAA y a la Cláusula de Supremacía
de la Constitución de los Estados Unidos.
Nuevamente, el TA erró manifiestamente.
Como se desprende de su § 2, de la cual
transcribimos su texto pertinente en la nota al
calce 11, el FAA no establece distinción alguna
entre la arbitrabilidad de derechos estatutarios
o derechos constitucionales.18 Todo lo que el FAA
requiere es que los pactos de arbitraje se pongan en
vigor conforme a sus propios términos. Véase AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion. 131 S. Ct. 1745 (“courts
must place arbitration agreements on an equal footing
with other contracts, [...] and enforce them according
to their terms”)(citas omitidas). Es decir, lo
importante no es la naturaleza del reclamo en
cuestión, sino si las partes acordaron arbitrar dicho
reclamo.19 Como el FAA no distingue entre la
En cuanto a jurisprudencia del TSEU indicativa de que no se
deben incluir requisitos para arbitrar controversias que no
surjan del texto de la §2 del FAA, véase Rent-A-Center v.
Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2778, n. 1 (“[§ 2] grounds do not
include ... any requirement that its lack of unconscionability
must be 'clear and unmistakable.) Marmet v Brown, 132 S. Ct.
1201, 1203 (2012)(The FAA’s] text includes no exception for
personal-injury or wrongful-death claims. It requires courts to
enforce the bargain of the parties to arbitrate.”)(cita omitida).
19 Como hemos discutido anteriormente, el alegado reclamo
constitucional de Jane está cobijado dentro de la cláusula de
arbitraje del Acuerdo que requiere que Jane Doe presente en
arbitraje todos sus reclamos contra los demandados (“any
Claim").
18
425a
arbitrabilidad de derechos estatutarios o derechos
constitucionales los foros inferiores no podían crear
dicha distinción por fiat judicial al amparo de su
interpretación del derecho puertorriqueño.
Es un principio elemental de derecho que cuando
una norma federal está en conflicto con una norma
estatal, incluso de rango constitucional, la norma
estatal queda desplazada por la federal por virtud de
Estados Unidos. La Cláusula de Supremacía dispone
que:
States ..., shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
notwithstanding.
Const. E.U.A., Art. VI, cl. 2 (énfasis nuestro). Sobre
este particular el Profesor Gorrín Peralta expresa lo
siguiente:
[U]na ley federal prevalece sobre lo dispuesto en
la Constitución del [ELA] de Puerto Rico. ... En
cualquier situación en que conflija una
norma jurídica puertorriqueña con la Ley
Suprema,’ es decir con la Constitución de [EU],
[o] con una ley... federal aplicable en Puerto
Rico,... siempre debe prevalecer el Derecho
federal sobre el puertorriqueño.
Carlos I. Gorrín Peralta, Fuentes y proceso de
investigación jurídica 43 (1991) (énfasis suplido).
Véase además, U.S. v. Georgia Public Service Comm.,
371 U.S. 285, 293 (1983)(“a State is without power by
426a
province’).20
Como consecuencia de estos principios, es
norma
establecida
y
consistentemente
reiterada que cuando un Estado requiere que
cierto
tipo
de
reclamo
se
dilucide
exclusivamente en los tribunales, a pesar de
que las partes acordaron arbitrar sus disputas,
dicha norma estatal queda desplazada por el
FAA. Ello fue resuelto específicamente por el TSEU
en Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), al
indicar lo siguiente:
national
policy
favoring
arbitration
and
withdrew the power of the states to require a
judicial forum for the resolution of claims
which the contracting parties agreed to
Id. en la pág. 10 (énfasis nuestro). 21
Véase además Dowling v. Davis, 840 F.Supp. 731,734(E.D.
Cal.)(“The Supremacy Clause does not permit federal law to be
provisions.”); U.S. v. Spencer, 160 F. 3d 413, 414 (7th Cir.
1998)(igual); Keaveney v. Town of Brookline, 937 F.Supp. 975,
982 (D. Mass. 1996)(igual). El Prof. Gorrín Peralta también
expresa sobre este particular lo siguiente: "Las fuentes legales
en Puerto Rico son, pues: (1) la Constitución de EE.UU.; (2) las
leyes federales...;... (5) la Constitución del [ELA] de Puerto Rico;
(6) las leyes ordinarias aprobadas por la Asamblea Legislativa
[de Puerto Ricol:Gorrín Peralta, supra, en la pág. 43.
21 Véase Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 491 (“This clear federal
policy places ss 2 of the Act in unmistakable conflict with
California ss 229 requirement that litigants be provided a
judicial forum for resolving wage disputes.)”
20
427a
Recientemente, el TSEU reafirmó esta norma en
1201 (Op. del 21 de febrero 2012). En Marmet, el
TSEU. citando a Concepción, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747
(2011), resolvió lo siguiente:
straightforward: The conflicting rule is displaced
by the FAA. ... West Virginia’s prohibition against
predispute agreements to arbitrate personal-injury
or wrongfut-death claims against nursing home is
particular type of claim, and that rule is contrary
to the terms and coverage of the FAA.
omitidas). En ese caso se resolvió que el Tribunal
Supremo de West Virginia había errado al aplicar la
política pública de ese Estado, la cual prohíbe dar
validez a una cláusula de arbitraje contenida en un
acuerdo de admisión a un asilo de ancianos suscrita
previo a la ocurrencia de un evento de negligencia
que resulte en muerte o daños corporales. De manera
que, si el FAA desplaza cualquier legislación estatal
que conflija con sus disposiciones, es aún más claro
que cualquier determinación de un tribunal (como la
Resolución recurrida) que atente contra el FAA
también se tiene que dejar sin efecto.
Este Honorable Tribunal Supremo es plenamente
consciente de estos principios. En World Films. Inc.
v. Paramount Pict. Corp., supra, reconoció que las
leyes estatales que limitan las claúsuia de arbitraje
quedan desplazadas (“preempted’) por el FAA. La
controversia en World Films giraba en torno asi la
aplicación del Artículo 3-B de la Ley 75,10 L.P.R.A.
278b-2, que establecía la nulidad de cualquier
428a
estipulación en un contrato de distribución que
obligue a un distribuidor a arbitrar fuera de Puerto
Rico cualquier controversia que surja de dicho
contrato, había de prevalecer por encima del FAA.
Este Tribunal Supremo determinó que en la medida
que el Artículo 3-B de la Ley 75 conflija en su
aplicación con la FAA, prevalecerá esta última. Id.,
pág. 364. En efecto, este Tribunal determinó que
ante el FAA, el Artículo 3-B era inoficioso y contrario
a derecho. Al resolver de esta manera, se revocó de
manera expresa los pronunciamientos de Walborg
Corp. v. Tribunal Superior, 104 D.P.R. 184 (1975), en
el cual se había determinado que los tribunales
estatales no venían obligados a aplicar el FAA. En
Walborq, el Tribunal había resuelto que no podía
concedérsele a una cláusula de arbitraje mayor fuerza
que la política establecida en la Ley 75, y que los
tribunales estatales no estaban obligados a aplicar el
FAA. Dicha doctrina quedó revocada por World
Films.
Conforme lo anterior, no hay duda de que los
tribunales inferiores erraron al denegar el arbitraje
basado en la supuesta naturaleza “constitucional” y
“laboral” de los reclamos de Jane Doe. El FAA
desplaza cualquier disposición legal estatutaria o bajo
la Constitución de Puerto Rico que no haga valer y
reconozca el compromiso asumido por Jane Doe y
CRL de resolver toda reclamación (“any Claim”)
mediante el procedimiento de arbitraje pactado en la
Sección 14 del Acuerdo.
XII. CONCLUSIÓN Y SÚPLICA
EN MÉRITO DE LO ANTERIORMENTE
EXPUESTO, muy respetuosamente solicitamos de
este Honorable Tribuna que expida el auto de
certiorari solicitado y revoque la Resolución del TA a
429a
los fines de ordenar a Jane a que presente mediante
el arbitraje confidencial iniciado ante el AAA todos
sus reclamos contra los demandados.
En San Juan, Puerto Rico, hoy 19 de junio de
2012.
CERTIFICO que he notificado copia fiel y exacta
del presente escrito, simultáneamente con su
abogados de la parte demandante-recurrida, el Ledo.
Office, 261 Tetuán, San Juan, Puerto Rico 009011916; [email protected]; y el Ledo. Manuel Porro
MENDOZA LAW OFFICES
Abogado de los demandadospeticionarios
PO Box 9282
San Juan, Puerto Rico
00908-0282
Tel. (787) 722-5522;
5530; 5540
Fax (787) 723-7057
Correo electrónico:
[email protected]
/s/
Enrique J. Mendoza Mendez
TSPR-8304
430a
APPENDIX H
JANE DOE
Plaintiff –
Respondent
v.
LIMITED
LIABILITY
COMPANY
(LLC); JOHN
DOE, in his
personal capacity
and as employer
of JANE DOE
and as coadministrator of
the Conjugal
Partnership
(“CP”)
constituted with
JEAN DOE, who
the CP
constituted with
John Doe; “CP
John and Jean
Doe”; JACK
JOE in his
personal capacity
and as employer
of Jane Doe and
CERTIORARI NO.
CC___________
Certiorari
from Court
of Appeals,
San Juan
Judicial
Region
Case No.
TA: KLCE2012-00821
431a
the “CP”
constituted with
JACKY JOE,
who is sued as coadministrator of
the “CP Jack and
Jacky Joe”
constituted by
Jack and Jacky
Joe; LARRY
LOE in his
personal capacity
and as employer
of Jane Doe, and
the CP
constituted with
LARISSA LOE,
the CP
constituted with
Larry Loe; “CP
Larry and
Larissa Loe”
constituted by
Larry and
Larissa Loe;
Unknown
Defendants A, B
and C; Unknown
Insurance
Companies
Defendants,
432a
X,Y,Z,
Defendants –
Petitioners,
433a
Attorneys for the Plaintiff –
Respondent Jane Doe:
Attorneys for the
Defendants – Petitioners
Juan Rafael González Muñoz,
Esq.
TSPR-8185
GONZALEZ MUÑOZ LAW
OFFICE,
P.S.C.
PO Box 9024055
San Juan, P.R. 00902-4055
Tel. (787) 766-5052
Fax: (787) 766-5551
[email protected]
[email protected]
Enrique J. Mendoza
Méndez, Esq.
TSPR-8304
MENDOZA LAW OFFICES
PO Box 9282
San Juan, P.R. 00908-0282
Tel. (787) 722-5522; 5530;
5540
Fax: (787) 723-7057
[email protected]
[Puerto Rico Tax Stamp:]
Manuel Porro Vizcarra, Esq.
TSPR-7994
MANUEL PORRO VIZCARRA
LAW
OFFICES
Tel. (787) 774-8200
Fax: (787) 774-8297
[email protected]
[Puerto Rico Tax Stamp Receipt:]
434a
JANE DOE
Plaintiff –
Respondent
v.
LIMITED
LIABILITY
COMPANY
(LLC); JOHN
DOE, in his
personal capacity
and as employer
of JANE DOE
and as coadministrator of
the Conjugal
Partnership
(“CP”) constituted
with JEAN
DOE, who is
sued as coadministrator of
the CP
constituted with
John Doe; “CP
John and Jean
Doe”; JACK JOE
in his personal
capacity and as
employer of Jane
Doe and as coadministrator of
CERTIORARI
NO.:
CC
Certiorari
from the
Court of
Appeals,
Judicial
Region of
San Juan
TA Case
No.: KLCE2012-00821
435a
the “CP”
constituted with
JACKY JOE,
the “CP Jack and
Jacky Joe”
constituted by
Jack and Jacky
Joe; LARRY
LOE in his
personal capacity
and as employer
of Jane Doe, and
the CP
constituted with
LARISSA LOE,
the CP
constituted with
Larry Loe; “CP
Larry and
Larissa Loe”
constituted by
Larry and
Larissa Loe;
Unknown
Defendants A, B
and C; Unknown
Insurance
Companies
Defendants,
436a
X,Y,Z,
Defendants –
Petitioners.
TO THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT:
APPEAR
defendants–petitioners,
Limited
Liability Company (“LLC”), John Doe and the
conjugal partnership (“CP”) established by Jean Doe,
Jack Joe and the CP established with Jacky Joe and
Larry Loe and the conjugal partnership established
by Larissa Loe,1 and they very respectfully request
the granting of the Petition for Certiorari.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Petition for Certiorari of reference seeks to
vindicate the right of the defendants protected by §2
of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) and its
interpretative case law to settle claims submitted
against them by Jane Doe (“Jane”) through the
agreed arbitration procedure. The aforementioned
agreement further requires that such procedure be
private and confidential. To that end, this petition
seeks to vacate the Decision of the Court of Appeals
(“TA”) that denied the issuance of a writ of certiorari
because it believed that the Court of First Instance
For reasons of strict confidentiality, the parties to this action
Under Seal by the plaintiff-appellee submitted together with the
Complaint and subsequent amendments, that party identified
each one of the defendants-appellees by their respective names,
addresses and telephone numbers. (Exhibit Petition Certiorari
(“Ap. TS.,” pgs. 55-56; 346-348; and 549-571.)
1
437a
(“TPI”) correctly decided the controversy on
arbitration
submitted
for
its
consideration.
Furthermore, the decision by the TA denied the
Motion in Aid of Jurisdiction submitted by the
defendants that sought to stay the proceedings before
the TPI, due to the fact that such forum is ready at
any time to decide on the merits of the controversies
between the parties which should be adjudged
through the agreed arbitration.
II. LEGAL PROVISIONS ESTABLISHING THE
JURISDICTION AND VENUE OF THIS COURT
This Honorable Court has jurisdiction and venue
to hear the merits of this petition pursuant to Article
V §§ 1 and 3 of the Constitution of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico; Articles 2.001 and
3.002(d) of the Judiciary Act of the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico of 2003 (4 L.P.R.A. §§24b, 24s(d)); Rule
52.2(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure (32 L.P.R.A.
Ap. V); Article 670 of the Code of Civil Procedure (32
L.P.R.A. § 3491); and Rules 20 and 30 of the Rules of
the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, 2011 T.S.P.R. 174.
III. DECISION OF WHICH REVIEW IS SOUGHT
The co-defendants – petitioners request the review
of the Decision entered on June 15, 2012 by the TA,
Judicial Region of San Juan, Panel III comprised of
the Honorable Judges Ramírez Nazario, Piñero
González and Surén Fuentes, in Case No. KLCE2012-00821 (“Decision”). (Ap. Ts., pgs. 707-724)[.] The
Decision by the TA denied the issuance of the writ of
certiorari requested. The TA determined that the
FAA is not applicable and that the TPI decided the
dispute on arbitrability correctly, and that there was
no circumstance whatsoever that could cause a
prejudicial effect on the LLC at this stage of the
438a
action. In their petition, the defendants-petitioners
asked the TA to vacate the Decision by the TPI
entered on June 4, 2012 (“Decision by the TPI”) in
Civil Case No. KPE 2012-1204 (904) (Hon. Judge
Ángel R. Pagán Ocasio), Superior Court of San Juan
(Ap. TS., 527-541), which denied the Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and to Compel
Arbitration Agreement which had been submitted by
the appearing parties on April 11, 2012 (Ap. TS, pgs.
81-169).
The appealed Decision was noticed on June 15,
2012. (Ap. TS., pgs. 707, 709, and 724.) The 30-day
period that the appearing parties have to submit this
petition expired on July 16, 2012. This petition was
submitted on time and the Court has jurisdiction to
entertain it..
IV. OTHER PENDING APPEALS
At present, there is no other appeal on this case
pending before this Honorable Court or before the
TA.
V. GROUNDS FOR GRANTING THIS PETITION
This petition meets the requirements of Rule 30 of
the Rules of this Honorable Court, supra, (“Rule 30”)
to grant it.2 Let us see.
2
The relevant criteria here are:
(1)
(2)
(3)
If the remedy and the dispositive part of the judgment or
law, taking the latter in its broadest sense.
…
Even if it is not novel, if the expression of the precept is
important for the public interest.
439a
As discussed herein , the Decisions of the TA and
the TPI infringe the law and, in particular, the rules
on arbitration and the interpretation of contracts,
because they determine that Jane is not obligated to
continue the arbitration proceeding that commenced
on March 22, 2012 before the American Arbitration
defendants
(“resolve
any
Claim
by
…
or any of its Members…”). Evidently, an error of
Law was committed and, as a result, it is necessary to
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
If the facts stated present a situation more indicative for an
If the existing precept must be redefined or changed.
…
If there has been prejudice, partiality or a gross and
court of first instance.
…
If the phase that the case is in is the most appropriate one
If the issuance of the writ or the order to show cause do not
If the granting of the writ or the issuance of an order to
show cause otherwise contribute to the functions of this
Court to vindicate the law and to set guidelines for the law
in the country.
If the other requirements established by the Regulation of
this Court have been met.
If the issuance of the writ or the order to show cause
440a
grant the petition for
subsection (1) of Rule 30.
certiorari
pursuant
to
This petition also serves to clarify the rule on
what an interstate commerce contract means. Thais
determination is important for the public interest,
because only in that way may the parties be in a
position to know whether their arbitration
agreements are covered by the strong public policy in
favor of arbitration provided by the FAA. Perry v.
Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987) (“[I]n enacting § 2
favoring arbitration…”) (Emphasis ours). The fact
that the TA incorrectly determined that the
Agreement is not a contract in the interstate
commerce proves that this Honorable Court must
establish clear criteria on the matter to guide the
lower courts. See subsections (3), (5) and (11) of Rule
30.
Furthermore, the TA and TPI committed a gross
error in their interpretation and evaluation of the
arbitration clause. That, inasmuch as from the text of
the arbitration clause in question it is clearly seen
that it is the arbitrator who has the obligation of
resolving the controversies put forth by Jane in the
judicial forum. As a result, it is appropriate to grant
the petition for certiorari pursuant to subsection (7)
of Rule 30.
Nor is there a question that, pursuant to
subsection (4) of Rule (30), the factual situation
established is the most indicative one for an analysis
of the controversy before this Honorable Court,
because for it to be decided only requires that the
Court interpret the arbitration clause agreed
441a
pursuant to the FAA and the rules of contract
interpretation.
phase is most propitious, because if the Decision by
the TA is not vacated and the proceedings before the
TPI stayed, Jane’s obligation to prosecute her claims
before the arbitral forum would become moot and
irreparable harm would be caused to the defendantpetitioners because the commitments made to
undertake a confidential arbitral proceeding would
not be met. See City of Meridian Miss. v. Algernon
Blair, Inc., 721 F.2d 525, 529 (5th Cir. 1983) (an
injunction halting arbitration constitutes irreparable
harm due to the litigation costs). It would be
impractical and would constitute an irreparable
miscarriage of justice to have to wait for the final
judgment in the case before the TPI to be able to file
an appeal in the appeals forums and to establish as
an error that Jane’s claims should have been
adjudicated in a confidential arbitral proceeding.
Furthermore, if the writ of certiorari is not issued, it
would allow Jane to ignore her obligation to submit
all claims, of any nature, that she might have against
the defendants, to confidential arbitration, which
obligation she freely and voluntarily contracted.
As a result, in order to avoid a miscarriage of
justice, it is necessary to grant the petition of
certiorari pursuant to subsections (9)-(10), (13) of
Rule 30. Moreover, when all of the requirements
established by the Rules of this Honorable Court for
issuing the requested writ have also been met. See
subsection (12) of Rule 30.
442a
VI. LIST OF PROCEDURAL AND
SUBSTANTIVE FACTS
A.
1.
List of Pertinent Procedural Facts
On April 2, 2012, Jane submitted a Verified
and
Preliminary
and
Permanent
Injunction
(“Complaint”) to the TPI. Jane claimed that the
arbitral clause of the “Operating Agreement” of the
LLC (“Agreement”) is not applicable to her, arguing
that that agreement only governs the commercial and
administrative operations of the LLC. Jane further
claimed that her claims are of a labor nature and that
they are covered by the Constitution of Puerto Rico,
Law No. 100 of June 30, 1959 (age), Law No. 69 of
July 6, 1985 (sex and retaliation), Law No. 115 of
December 20, 1991 (retaliation) and the LLC’s
Employee Manual (“Manual”), which does not contain
an arbitration clause. To that end, Jane asked the
TPI
to
declare
the
arbitration
clause
of
the
Agreement inapplicable to her alleged labor claims
and that the LLC be ordered to cease the arbitration
under Rule 57 of Civil Procedure until the TPI can
443a
resolve the controversy set forth on arbitrability. (Ap.
TS., pgs. 44-56)3
2. Together with the Complaint, Jane submitted a
Motion Requesting a Preliminary and Permanent
(Ap. TS., pgs. 57-62.)
3.
Jane also submitted an Emergency Motion in
remain strictly confidential. (Ap. TS., pgs. 63-64.)
4.
On April 3, 2012, the TPI issued an Order
setting a hearing for April 11, 2012, to determine the
requested. (Ap. TS., pgs. 66.)
5.
On April 11, 2012, the defendants-petitioners
submitted a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the
Agreement is a contract in the interstate commerce,
and therefore the FAA is applicable to it, that
pursuant to the arbitration clause of the Agreement
all disputes on whether Jane’s claims are arbitrable
or not are up to the arbitrator himself to decide and
not the TPI and that, in the alternative, it would be
appropriate for the TPI to recognize that through
Jane’s claims with respect to the Agreement not being
pertinent to her claims openly contradict the extrajudicial claim
that Jane made to the Managing Board of LLC where she
expressly stated that those claims are violations of the
Agreement. (Ap. TS., pgs. 162-166.)
3
444a
Section 14.04 of the Agreement Jane undertook to
prosecute all of her claims (“any Claim”)
confidentially through the arbitration procedure
regardless of the nature of the claims or whether they
arise under the Agreement. Furthermore, the
defendants-petitioners argued that under the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,
regardless of the alleged constitutional and labor
nature of the Jane’s claims, § 2 of the FAA requires
that such claims be adjudicated under the arbitration
proceeding initiated before the AAA. (Ap. TS., pgs.
81-169.)
6.
On that same day a hearing was held in which it
was agreed that the defendants-petitioners would
submitted under seal. Furthermore, the TPI
TS., pgs. 170-171.)
7.
On April 23, 2012, Jane submitted her
Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. In that
Opposition Jane claimed, among other things, that
the arbitration clause of the Agreement was not
applicable to her alleged labor claims because that
document only applies to matters related to the
management of the LLC, especially because Jane’s
claims are constitutional in nature. Furthermore,
TS., pgs. 493-494.)
4
445a
Jane claimed that the TPI is the one that must
resolve all of her claims.5 (Ap. TS., pgs. 177-321.)
8.
After the submission of several memoranda by
appeal before the TA which, as we stated, decides, in
violation of the FAA and its interpretative case law,
that the TPI is the one that has jurisdiction to decide
the controversy on arbitrability and that,
furthermore, Jane does not have to arbitrate her
claims of alleged employment discrimination,
retaliation, and damages because they are not
covered by the arbitration clause of the Agreement.
(Ap. TS., pgs. 527-541). In footnote 12 of the Decision,
the TPI makes the following statements that make
evident its hostility toward the arbitration
proceeding: “According to the interpretation and
position of the LLC, through the [Agreement] the
arbitrator would be delegated a decision on the
dispute in a completely confidential forum
without a right for the affected parties to
appeal.” (Ap. TS., pg. 540; emphasis ours.)
respective conjugal partnership, and to amend her causes of
action. (Ap. TS., pgs. 322-348.) On May 1, 2012, defendants
opposed the aforementioned amendment. (Ap. TS., pgs. 349356.)
Binding Arbitration Agreement.’ (Ap. TS., pgs. 357-459.) For her
part, on May 7, 2012, Jane submitted a brief called Plaintiff’s
Sur-reply. (Ap. TS., pgs. 460-492.)
5
446a
9.
Furthermore, the TPI indicated that the
injunction hearing scheduled for the next day would
remain in effect, where the parties would have to
submit evidence in relation to the application for
injunctive relief. Likewise, it authorized the
submission of the Second Amended Complaint. (Ap.
TS., pg. 541.) From an analysis of the format,
typography and style of the Decision it can be
reasonably inferred that it is most like the result of a
draft Decision submitted by Jane, and if that is
correct, she would have had knowledge of the decision
by the TPI significantly in advance of the defendantpetitioners.
10. Indeed, surprisingly, only four (4) hours after
the Decision was notified, Jane submitted to the TPI
a Motion for an Order on the Confidentiality of
Further Proceedings, claiming that in view of the
decision hours earlier by the TPI there was no reason
for the proceedings to continue to be prosecuted
confidentially. (Ap. TS., pgs. 542-547.) Also, Jane
respective names. (Ap. TS., pgs. 548-571.)
11. Furthermore, right before the hearing set for
issued by means of a preliminary and permanent
injunction. (Ap. TS., pgs. 572-578.)
12. Minutes later, the parties appeared at the
447a
time the defendant-petitioners became aware that
proceeding was becoming, the defendant-petitioners
objected to the action by the TPI, using arguments of
accepted by the defendant-petitioners, for the
considered by the TPI.7 Furthermore, the TPI
hearing.8 (Ap. TS., pgs. 591-594.)
13. Being in disagreement with the foregoing, on
June 12, 2012, the defendants submitted a Petition
for Certiorari with the TA, in which they indicated
that the TPI had erred by: (1) assuming jurisdiction
over the controversy of whether Jane is obligated to
arbitrate her claims due to the fact that the parties
unequivocally agreed that the arbitrator would be the
one who would determine the scope of his
jurisdiction; (2) in the alternative, concluding that
Jane did not have to arbitrate her claims against the
On June 8, the defendants complied with the aforementioned
order by the TPI. (Ap. TS., pgs. 595 and 660.)
8 The TPI also granted 10 days for the defendant-petitioners to
order of confidentiality and 15 days to state on the request for
reinstatement of Jane at the LLC. (Ap. TS., pgs. 591-594.)
7
448a
defendants despite the fact that the arbitration
clause is broad, clear, and covers any claim between
the parties; (3) exempting Jane from arbitrating her
claims because of the alleged “employment” or “labor”
and “constitutional” nature thereof because the FAA
displaces all state policy contrary to arbitration. (Ap.
TS., pgs. 1-43.)
14. Together with the Certiorari, the defendants
submitted an Emergency Motion in Aid of
Jurisdiction. (Ap. Ts., pgs. 667-683; 684-686.)
15. On June 15, 2012, the TA entered a Decision
denying the issuance of the writ of certiorari and
further stating that the Agreement is not an
interstate commerce contract, that the dispute in this
case is not a matter related to the Agreement and,
therefore, the dispute is not governed by it, and that
the TPI must decide as a priority on the matter of the
confidentiality of the proceedings. (Ap. TS., pgs. 707724.) It is because of this Decision that we appeal to
this Honorable Court.
B.
1.
In or around November 1979, Jane joined the
LLC as an attorney. (Ap. TS., pg. 55.)
2.
At that time, LLC was a civil-law partnership.
Since then, LLC provides interstate commerce
services to its foreign clientele, mainly in the United
States, and locally. (Ap. TS., pgs. 98-99.)
3.
In September 1987, Jane was promoted to
Capital Partner of the LLC. (Ap. TS., pgs. 90.) The
articles of organization require that its members
settle disputes through confidential arbitration. (Ap.
TS., pgs. 312-313.)
449a
4.
On September 13, 2007, LLC became a limited
liability company under the laws of Puerto Rico. As a
result, Jane became a Capital Member of LLC. (Ap.
TS., pgs. 102, 108, and 145.)
5.
On that same day, Jane and the other LLC
Agreement (“Operating Agreement” or “Agreement”).9
(Ap. TS., pgs. 103-158 and 381-396.) In view of the
fact that it was always the practice to agree that
disputes be resolved through arbitration, the
Agreement, like the prior partnership agreement,
includes a confidential arbitration clause.
6.
The Agreement governs, among other matters,
admission procedures, compensation, and expulsion
of the Capital Members, as well as the election of the
Members of the Managing Board or “Policy
Committee.” (Ap. TS. pgs. 77-78, 80-83, 127, 132, 137138.) That Board formulates the long-term polices
and plans of LLC. The compensation process for
Capital Members concludes with the approval or
disapproval of the Compensation of the Capital
Members by the Managing Board. Jane was a
member of the Managing Board.
7.
Insofar as pertinent, such Agreement (Ap. TS.
102-158) stipulates the following in its relevant
Sections:
1.
to June 1, 2007.
9
450a
1.06 “Claim” means any action, suit,
Firm or any of its Members or employees…
1.07 “Claimant” means any
5.
Member
or
Compensation.10
5.02 Salaries of Members – Each Capital
installments.....
10.
of Members.
10.1 Fiduciary Duties of Members – Members
among other things:
(f)
To treat all Firm Documents as
confidential ‘trade secrets’, except to the extent such
Firm Documents are publicly available other than
as a result of any violation of this or any other
12.
Withdrawal. Retirement.
Suspension. Expulsion ... of a Member.
Section 5 of the Agreement. (Ap. TS., pgs. 127-129.)
10
451a
12.02 Suspension and/or Expulsion – The
Firm may, upon the recommendation of the Policy
Committee and the affirmative vote of threefourths (%) of the Capital Members, ... (b) expel
14.
14.01 Intent and Purpose – It is the intent
and arbitration.
14.04 Arbitration – If mediation fails, the
14.05 Confidentiality – The Claimant and the
without
publicity
and
the
attendant
distractions. ... The parties agree to maintain
the confidentiality of such meetings and
hearings, and of the documents produced or
452a
created in such meetings and hearings. Any
and all actions taken by the parties shall be
in conformity with the underlying purpose set
forth in section 14 of this Agreement.
Note that Jane does not dispute that the
Agreement is an interstate commerce contract
for the effects of the FAA. (Ap. TS., pgs. 44-56; 81101; 177-321; 357-459; 460-492.) Nor is the validity
of the arbitration clause in Section 14 of the
Agreement in dispute. (Id.)
8.
On October 22, 2007, the LLC’s Employee
Manual took effect, which manual applies to all
employees and Members of LLC. That Manual does
not make a Member an employee. Rather, the
Manual clearly maintains the difference between the
classification of “Member” and “employee.” (Ap. TS.,
pgs. 233-300.) The Manual also does not establish the
policies related to the compensation of Members, or
the process of terminating their relationship with
Sections 5, 12 and 14 of the Agreement, respectively.
(Ap. TS., pgs. 127-129 and 137-141.)
9.
LLC has offices within and outside of Puerto
Rico. Furthermore, the great majority of its clients
are located outside of Puerto Rico (principally in the
telephone
and
other
means
of
interstate
communications, including trips to and from Puerto
Rico. (Ap. TS., pgs. 81-170.)
453a
10. In the middle of 2009, Jane was elected to the
11. Jane’s compensation had to be reduced because,
for several years, she had not been generating enough
work for herself and for others, which is a vital
function of the capital members. As a result of that,
on January 24, 2012, Jane filed an extrajudicial claim
against the Members of LLC’s Managing Board, as
required under Section 14.02 of the Agreement. In her
extrajudicial t claim, Jane alleged, in summary, that
her compensation had been reduced in violation of
the Agreement. In no part of her claim did Jane
mention that the Manual had been violated. The only
written contract that Jane claimed was violated was
the Agreement. Insofar as pertinent, the appellee
specifically claimed the following, based on the
Agreement:
…I formally ask you to reconsider the
decision by [John Doe] and to schedule, as
soon as possible and within the next 15
days, a meeting of the Managing Board
pursuant to Clause 14 et seq. of the
“Operating Agreement,” such that I, as a
Capital Member, can present my position
and objections. I want to make clear that
subjecting myself to the procedure under
Clause 14 should not be construed as a
waiver of the rights that protect me under
local and federal laws.
I will now proceed to summarize my
objections briefly.
1.
The reduction in my salary
and benefits was done (sic) violates the
454a
“Operating
Agreement”
and
the
agreement between [John Doe] and me, and
it
violates
the
specific
agreement
2.
…Evidently,
the
procedure
followed was inadequate and in violation of
the “Operating Agreement,” the decisions
by the Managing Board approved on May
31, 2011, and the decision of December 20,
2011.
…
16.
Likewise I was offended when
[Jack Joe], in a meeting of the Board stated
that “to sit at that desk means having to
bring in business” and no one clarified the
impropriety of his comment. Is that a
requirement
in
the
Operating
Agreement?...
(Ap. TS., pgs. 162-166; emphasis ours.)
12. Pursuant to Section 14.03 of the Agreement, on
March 20, 2012, the parties submitted to the
mediation process which ended without achieving any
agreement whatsoever.
13. Faced with the failure of mediation, on March
22, 2012, LLC submitted an Arbitration Complaint
arbitral clause of Section 14.04 of the Agreement
and confidentially. (Ap. TS., pgs. 302-303.)
455a
VII.
INDICATION OF ERROR
1.
THE TA ERRED BY CONCLUDING THAT
THE FAA IS NOT APPLICABLE. THE LLC
OPERATIONS AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH
JANE HAVE A SUFFICIENT CONNECTION TO
INTERSTATE COMMERCE AND JANE DID NOT
DISPUTE THE APPLICATION OF THAT LAW.
2.
THE TPI WAS THE FORUM WITH AUTHORITY
TO
DETERMINE
THE
SCOPE
OF
THE
ARBITRATION CLAUSE AGREED. JANE AND
THE OTHER CAPITAL MEMBERS OF LLC
ENTRUSTED THAT AUTHORITY TO THE
ARBITRAL FORUM BY ADOPTING THE AAA’S
RULES OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION.
3.
THE TA ERRED BY SUPPORTING THE
CONCLUSION OF THE TPI THAT JANE’S CLAIMS
ARE
BEYOND
THE
SCOPE
OF
THE
ARBITRATION CLAUSE. THAT CLAUSE IS
BROAD, CLEAR, AND INCLUDES ANY CLAIM
BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
4.
JANE’S
CLAIMS ARE NOT ARBITRABLE
BECAUSE THEY DEAL WITH ALLEGATIONS OF
DISCRIMINATION,
RETALIATION,
AND
CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS.
THE
FAA
PROHIBITS
(“PREEMPTS”)
STATES
FROM
CATEGORIZING CLAIMS TO EXCLUDE THEM
FROM ARBITRATION.
VIII. DISCUSSION OF THE FIRST
INDICATION OF ERROR
The decision of the TA that the FAA is not
applicable allegedly because the transaction involved
456a
in the dispute does not form part of interstate
commerce is not correct. (Ap. TS., pg. 722.) What is
important for the FAA to be applicable is that the
Agreement have a sufficient connection to interstate
commerce, which criterion is exceedingly lax and, as
we shall see, is broadly satisfied in this instant case.
SCI v. Fulmer, 833 So.2d 621, 629 (Ala. 2003) (“[A]
trial court evaluating a contract connected to some
economic or commercial activity would rarely, if
ever, refuse to compel arbitration on the ground
that the transactions lacked ‘involvement’ in
interstate commerce.”) (emphasis added.)
It is an established standard that the FAA is
applicable to contracts in interstate commerce. See §2
of the FAA.11 The meaning of what a “contract in
interstate commerce” is was established by the
Supreme Court of the United States (“SCOTUS”) in
Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson,
513 U.S. 265 (1995) (“Allied-Bruce”) and Citizens
Bank v. Alfabaco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52 (2003)
(“Citizens”). Let us see what was decided in those
cases.
In Allied-Bruce, an Alabama resident acquired a
Termite Protection Plan for his home (the “Plan”) at
the Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies (“AlliedBruce”) branch in that State. The plan included an
arbitration clause. The performance of that Plan was
guaranteed by Terminix International Company
(“Terminix”), which was the owner of the franchise
under which Allied-Bruce operated in Alabama. The
11
§2 of the FAA, insofar as pertinent, stipulates as follows:
A written provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out
of such contract. .. shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable ....
9 USCA § 2 (emphases added)
457a
residence in question was sold to a third party, to
whom the aforementioned Plan was transferred.
Given that there was a swarm of termites in that
residence, the third party acquirer sued the vendor of
the property, Allied-Bruce, and Terminix in court. In
response, Allied-Bruce and Terminix asked the court
to enforce the arbitration clause by virtue of § 2 of the
FAA. That request was denied. Allied-Bruce and
Terminix appealed to the Supreme Court of Alabama
and then to the SCOTUS.
The SCOTUS overturned the Supreme Court of
Alabama because the Plan was an interstate
commerce contract regardless of the fact that the
transaction only took place in Alabama. Specifically,
the SCOTUS indicated that the term “involving
commerce” of § 2 of the FAA is the functional
equivalent of the term “affecting commerce,” which
proves the intention of Congress when passing the
FAA to exercise to the utmost its power under the
Commerce Clause. Id. at pg. 277.12 In view of that
and the fact that the basic purpose of the FAA is
to overcome the reluctance of courts to enforce
arbitration agreements, the SCOTUS decided that
the
term
“involving
commerce”
should
be
interpreted broadly. Id., at pg. 275 (“a broad
interpretation of this language is consistent with the
Act’s basic purpose”). Furthermore, the SCOTUS
The power of Congress under the Commerce Clause of the
United States is so broad that, in the last 75 years, only two
SCOTUS cases have decided that Congress exceeded its powers
under the aforementioned Commerce Clause. See U.S. v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995); US v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). Note
that none of the statutes in dispute in those cases was aimed at
regulating purely economic transactions, but rather criminal
conduct of a noneconomic nature.
12
458a
clarified that the term “involving commerce” does not
require that the parties have contemplated any
connection whatsoever with interstate commerce, but
only that the transaction, “in fact,” involve interstate
commerce. Id., at pg. 281 (“we accept the ‘commerce
in fact’ interpretation, reading the Act’s language as
insisting that the ‘transaction’ in fact involve[e]’
interstate commerce, even if the parties did not
contemplate an interstate commerce connection.”).
In support of the conclusion that the Plan was a
contract in interstate commerce the SCOTUS
considered the multistate natures of the companies
Terminix and Allied-Bruce and the fact that the
materials used to comply with the terms of the Plan
came from other States. Id. at pg. 282.
Subsequently, in Citizens, the SCOTUS once
again had to determine whether certain agreements
between two entities in the same State were
contracts in interstate commerce. That Court
answered the question affirmatively by indicating
that the transactions (i.e., debt restructuring) had a
sufficient connection to interstate commerce.
Citizens involved a lending institution in Alabama
named The Citizens Bank (“Citizens’) and the
construction company Alafabco, Inc., located in that
same State. The aforementioned parties entered into
several agreements to restructure Alafabco’s debt
with Citizens, which contained a clause that required
arbitration of such disputes as arose between them.
Subsequently, Alafabco filed legal action against
Citizens for breach of contract and other causes of
action. As a result, Citizens requested an order to
compel arbitration. The request was granted by the
court, but the Supreme Court of Alabama overturned
459a
it. The SCOTUS then overturned and when it did it
stated the following:
Because the statute provides for ‘the
enforcement of arbitration agreements within
the full reach of the Commerce Clause’, ... it is
perfectly clear that the FAA encompasses a
wider range of transactions than those
actually ‘in commerce’ - that is, ‘within
the flow of interstate commerce ....
The Supreme Court of Alabama was therefore
misguided in its search for evidence that a
‘portion of the restructured debt was actually
attributable to interstate transactions’ or that
the loans ‘originated out-of-state’ or that ‘the
restructured debt was inseparable from any
out-of-state projects.’ … Such evidence
might be required if the FAA were
restricted to transactions actually ‘in
commerce,’ … but … that is not the limit of
the FAA’s reach.
Nor is application of the FAA defeated because
the
individual
debt-restructuring
transactions, taken alone, did not have a
‘substantial effect on interstate commerce.’ …
Congress’ Commerce Clause power ‘may be
exercised in individual cases without
showing
any
specific
effect
upon
interstate commerce’ if in the aggregate
the economic activity in question would
represent ‘a general practice … subject to
federal control.’ … Only that general
practice
need
bear
on
interstate
commerce in a substantial way.
460a
Id. on pgs. 56-57 (citations omitted, bold and
underlining added).
Therefore, the SCOTUS concluded that the
agreements in question, despite having been signed
in Alabama by residents of that State, were contracts
in interstate commerce, at least, for the following
three reasons: (a) Alafabco engaged in business in
North Carolina, Tennessee, and Alabama; (b) debt
restructuring agreements had been guaranteed with
Alafabco’s assets, including its inventory of products
assembled from material coming from without
Alabama; and (c) the impact on interstate commerce
that is represented by the general practice of the
economic transaction in question satisfies the
meaning of “involving commerce” under §2 of the
FAA. On this matter, the SCOTUS stated the
following:
No elaborate explanation is needed to make
evident the broad impact of commercial
lending on the national economy or
Congress’ power to regulate that activity
pursuant to the Commerce Clause.
Id. on pg. 58 (emphases in bold and underlining
ours.)
Based on the foregoing, we can conclude that, to
determine whether a certain agreement constitutes a
contract in interstate commerce, it is necessary to
evaluate whether the transaction “affects interstate
commerce” or whether the economic activity in
question represents a general practice subject to
federal control under the Commerce Clause.
In terms of what constitutes practices subject to
federal control under the Commerce Clause for
461a
purposes of the FAA, the following has been stated:
“No commercial enterprise of any kind which
conducts its activities across state lines has been held
to be wholly beyond the regulatory power of Congress
under the Commerce Clause.” BWI Comp. v. Beck,
910 S.W.2d 620, 623 (Tex. App. 1994) (citations
omitted).13 On this matter, the statements of the
Supreme Court of Alabama in its subsequent
application of the Allied-Bruce and Citizens cases are
illustrative:
As the decisions of the [US] Supreme Court
have made clear, there are few, if any
economic or commercial transactions that
are beyond the reach of Congress’s
commerce power.
Furthermore, virtually every kind of industry,
small or large, is currently regulated by some
sort of federal state enacted pursuant to
Congress’s commerce power. See, e.g., 29,
U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938); 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970); 29 U.S.C. §§
2601-2654 (Family Medical Leave Act of 2000);
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended).
SCI v. Fulmer, 833 So.2d 621, 628 (Ala. 2003)
(emphasis added). Later, the Court adds the
following:
The transaction underlying the contract
between Fulmer and SCI-Alabama (for the sale
of goods and services), is unquestionably
See also, Sewer v. Paragon Homes, Inc., 351 F.Supp. 596, 599 (D.V.I. 1972)
(“Of more general importance, however, is the fact that Congress has the
authority to regulate all transactions within the territories.”)
13
462a
economic in nature, and the nationwide
aggregate effect of such a transaction on
interstate commerce easily brings the practice
of contracting to provide funeral services and
associated goods within the reach of
Congress through the FAA .... This is true
even though the effect of this particular
transaction (Fulmer’s contract with SCIAlabama) on interstate commerce may be
considered trivial. See Wickward, 317 U.S.
[111, 127-28 (1942)].14
Id., at pg. 629-30 (emphasis added).
In light of the legal framework discussed above,
let us see why the Agreement is a contract in
interstate commerce under §2 of the FAA.
The Agreement is a contract in the interstate
commerce because, among other reasons, it governs
the relationship among the capital members of LLC,
In Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), the United States
Supreme Court stated the following regarding local practices
that might seem trivial:
But even if appellee’s activity be local and though it may
not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its
nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial
economic effect on interstate commerce and this
irrespective of whether such effect is what might at
some earlier time have been defined as ‘direct’ or
‘indirect.’
Id., at pg. 125. Later in Wickard it adds the following:
That appellee’s own contribution to the demand for
wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove
him from the scope of federal regulation where, as here,
his contribution, taken together with that of many
others similarly situated, is far from trivial.
Id., at pgs. 127-128.
14
463a
including the relationship with Jane, and the
operations of the firm in Puerto Rico and at its
branch located in Washington, D.C. See, SCI v.
Fulmer, 883 So.2d 621, 629 (Ala. 2003) (“[I]t would
telephone,
and
other
means
of
interstate
communications, including trips to and from Puerto
Rico. Likewise, the economic nature of the Agreement
and the fact that the following federal statutes,
among others, apply to the relationship of LLC with
those who are considered employees per se, is
significant: 1) Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29
U.S.C. §§ 651-78; 2) Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654; 3) Family
(2011) (2011) (“A contract needs only the slightest nexus to
interstate commerce to apply the FAA.”); 21 Willinston on
Contracts §57: (4th ed. 2011) (“Consistent with the broad
approach to interpreting the term ‘involving commerce’ in the
[FAA], it has been said that a contract containing an
arbitration provision need only be related to commerce
to fall within the coverage of the Act “) (emphasis added);
Bowen v. Security Pest Control, Inc., 879 So.2d 1139, 1142 (Ala.
2003) (decides that the transaction involved interstate
commerce, in part, because one of the parties to the transaction
engaged in business in two States).
15
464a
2000e-17; 4) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; y
5) Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29
U.S.C. §§ 621-34. Furthermore, and as we indicated
above, Jane did not dispute the application of
the FAA to the arbitration clause of the
Agreement and, therefore, she waived any right
to the contrary. See Caguas Satellite Corp. v.
Echostar Satellite LLC, _ F.Supp.2d _, 2011 WL
5517037, n. 2 (D.P.R.) (“Plaintiffs [,the party opposing
arbitration,] ... do not make any arguments about
whether or not the agreement involves interstate
commerce and therefore waive this argument”).
From the foregoing it can be seen that the FAA is
applicable to the Agreement given its economic nature
and nexus to interstate commerce. The facts
indicated above evidence that the Agreement “affects
interstate commerce” and that the economic activity
in question represents a general practice that
materially affects interstate commerce and that is
subject to federal control under the broad power that
is given to Congress by the Commerce Clause. As a
result, the TA erred by deciding that the FAA was not
applicable.
IX. DISCUSSION OF THE SECOND
INDICATION OF ERROR
The TA manifestly erred by not issuing the writ
requested and overturning the TPI’s decision,
because that forum did not have jurisdiction to decide
whether Jane must arbitrate her alleged claims
against the defendants-petitioners.
465a
Pictures Corp., 125 D.P.R. 352 (1990).
As a general rule, the determination of whether
an agreement creates the duty of the parties to
arbitrate a certain dispute is a judicial task. Méndez
Acevedo, supra; World Films, Inc., supra, at pg. 361.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the matter of
arbitrability shall not be under the jurisdiction
of a court if the parties agreed in the
arbitration agreement that such authority is
delegated to the arbitrator. That is to say, if it is
agreed in an arbitration agreement that the
arbitrator is the one who will decide matters of
arbitrability, it is appropriate that he, and not the
court, be the one to determine whether there is an
obligation to arbitrate a certain dispute. U.G.T. v.
Corp. Difusión Pub., 168 D.P.R. 674, 684 (2006)
(“Ordinarily and except if the collective
agreement stipulates otherwise, matters of
substantive arbitrability must be resolved by the
courts…”) (emphasis ours).
principle in the federal arena and under the FAA that
any challenge to the validity of an arbitration
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995). The
466a
foregoing is precisely the situation in the case at bar.
The FAA is applicable to the Agreement between Jane
and LLC, and the parties delegated the
and, therefore, the TPI erred in assuming
jurisdiction.
Arbitration Rules of the AAA, Rule 7(a), Ap. TS. pgs.
of a body of arbitration rules that delegates the power
to determine to the arbitrator, it was clear that it was
not up to the TPI to determine whether Jane’s claims
were arbitrable.
The federal courts have consistently decided that
when the parties incorporate in their arbitration
agreements or rules the institutional rules of entities
such as the AAA in which the right to decide on his
16
467a
own jurisdiction – decide arbitrability – is delegated
to the arbitrator, that constitutes sufficient (clear
and unequivocal) evidence in Law that that was
the intention of the parties. See Contec Corp. v.
Remote Solution Co., 398 F.3d 205, 208 (2nd Cir.
2005) (“When … parties explicitly incorporate rules
that empower an arbitrator to decide issues of
arbitrability, the incorporation serves as clear and
unmistakable evidence of the parties’ intent to
delegate such issues to an arbitrator”); Sleeper Farms
v. Agway, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 197 (D. Me. 2002)
(“[Since the AAA rules constitute] a clear and
unmistakable
delegation
of
scope-determining
arbitral forum, the courts tend to leave the dispute to
be resolved initially by the arbitrator when the
1327, 29, 33-34 (11th Cir. 2005) (Deciding that, because the
AAA’s Rules of Arbitration delegate the determination of
arbitrability to the arbitrator, the plaintiff’s claim that the
arbitration agreement illegally denied him of several statutory
remedies, was a matter to be adjudicated by the arbitrator, not
by the court); Qualcomm Inc. v. Nokia Corp., 466 F.3d 1366,
1373 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Apollo Computer. Inc. v. Berg, 886 F.2d
469, 473 (1st Cir. 1989) (“Ordinarily, [Plaintiff] would be entitled
to have these issues resolved by a court. [...] By contracting to
have all disputes resolved according to the Rules of the ICC,
however, [Plaintiff] agreed to be bound by Articles 8.3 and 8.4.
These provisions clearly and unmistakably allow the arbitrator
to determine her own jurisdiction when, as here, there exists a
prima facie agreement to arbitrate whose continued existence and
validity is being questioned.”).
17
468a
arbitrability cannot be determined without entering
into the merits of the dispute. Elkouri & Elkouri,
How Arbitrations Works, (BNA Books, 6th Edition
2003), at pg. 281. (“However, even though the
merits ...”).
merits when jurisdiction is not in question ...
The federal case law cited is consistent with our
local law as regards contracts. At the end of the day,
concept.” Méndez Acevedo, supra, at pg. 367;
469a
Therefore, in terms of arbitration, compliance
with what has been agreed in writing can be
enforced. See Crufon Const. v. Aut. Edif. Púbs., 156
D.P.R. 197, 204 (2002); Municipio de Ponce v.
Gobernador, 136 D.P.R. 776, 783 (1994). In turn,
when the terms of a contract are clear and
unambiguous, its provisions will be applied according
to the literal meaning that was given to it by the
parties. Art. 1233 of the Civil Code, supra, §3471.
Once it is determined what it was that the parties
agreed, the court must decide the disputes between
the parties as stipulated. See C.F.S.E. v. Unión de
Médicos, 170 D.P.R. 443 (2007).
Therefore, according to the authorities cited
herein, it is appropriate for this Honorable
Court to vacate the Decisions by the TA and TPI
and order Jane to continue with the arbitration
proceeding that she agreed to, such that the
arbitrator will be the one who decides whether
he has authority to hear her claims on the
merits. This is what the parties agree, without
any ambiguity whatsoever, and that constitutes
the law between the parties. See HIETEL v.
PRTC, 2011 T.S.P.R. 100. In the alternative, if this
Honorable Court believes that the TA did not commit
the second error indicated, it must proceed to
consider the next two (2) indications of errors.
470a
X. DISCUSSION OF THE THIRD
INDICATION OF ERROR
The TA also manifestly erred in deciding that the
“constitutional” nature. (Ap. TS., pgs. 723-724.)
Essentially, the TA based its decision on the
the purposes of the instant judicial action. (Ap. TS.,
pg. 722.) To reach that result the TA had to impose
by fiat an unsustainable limitation on the scope of the
arbitration clause in the Agreement, which according
to its literal text is clearly broad and covers “any
Claim” between the parties – including those that do
not arise from the Agreement. By doing so, the TA
not only erred, but it also made manifest a marked
hostility to the arbitral forum, thus violating the
postulates of the FAA and its case law interpretation.
From the face of the Decision it can be seen that
the TA ignored the broad language of the binding
the TA’s analysis. To facilitate the work of this
TA should have compelled Jane to arbitrate her
claims:
Intent and Purpose – It is the intent and
resolve any Claim by mediation or
arbitration. The Claimant expressly agrees
471a
that the Claim shall be settled or resolved
through the procedures set forth herein, and
shall not in any way circumvent or otherwise
challenge in any way these proceedings relative
to mediation and arbitration.
provided). (Ap. TS., pg. 140.)
parties, including Jane and the appearing parties, to
resolve any Claim through mediation and
arbitration. More revealing still is the fact that, in
the Agreement, “Claim” is defined as, “any action,
suit, complaint or demand of whatever nature
and for whatever relief or remedy against the
Firm or any of its Members or employees.”
(Section 1.06 of the Agreement; emphasis added.) (Ap.
TS. pg. 109). In other words, the term “any Claim”
literally means any claim, complaint, demand, or
action of any nature and requesting any remedy.
Given the text of Section 14.01 and the definition
of “Claim” in the Agreement itself, “any Claim” can
presented by Jane. That is, according to the foregoing
terms (and without need of any interpretation
whatsoever), any type of action, case, demand, or
claim of any nature and on any type of relief or aid
against LLC or any of its Members or employees is
covered by the arbitration clause. As we indicated
above, under Puerto Rico law when the terms of a
the parties gave to it. Art. 1233 of the Civil Code,
472a
supra, §3471. On this matter, in Marcial v. Tome, 144
D.P.R. 522 (1997), this Supreme Court recognized
that the clear letter of the contract had to be followed,
when it unmistakably reflects the will of the parties.
Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2857 (2010) (likewise);
Concepts, Inc., 151 D.P.R. 307, 311-12 (2000) (“Once
arbitration is agreed to, the courts lack discretion in
terms of its efficacy and they have to comply with the
arbitration agreed. [Furthermore], any question
on the scope of the disputes that might be taken
to arbitration must be resolved in favor of
arbitration.”).
administrative,
contractual,
extracontractual,
arbitration clause that the TA should have backed
pursuant to its terms under the FAA. These
principles were grossly ignored by the TA when it
473a
entered its Decision which is being appealed. We
must not forget that the FAA was passed as a
response to the hostility that the Courts have
traditionally shown toward arbitration agreements.
See Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 111
(2011) (deciding that employment contracts in
interstate commerce are covered by the FAA except
for certain transportation employees).
basically
questions
and
challenges
is
her
from her internal claim, through the Third Amended
Verified Complaint. (Ap. TS. pgs. 162-166; 44-64; 322348; 499-524; 548-571).
with LLC that are expressly governed by the
conclusions of fact by the TPI. See Conclusion of Fact
Number 7, Decision. (Ap. TS., pg. 535.) That
translates into the fact that, to be able to adjudicate
Agreement.
474a
TS., pgs. 127-129.) A reading of such sections is
enough to prove it. So much so that Jane herself
admitted to the TPI that “the mechanism by which
compensation is determined is governed by the
[Agreement].” (See Opposition, at pg. 9, footnote 12,
Ap. TS., pg. 187).
As a matter of reality, the TA failed to consider
the fact that, from the internal claim that Jane Doe
made before the managing body of LLC, she
fundamentally claimed some alleged violations of the
Agreement. (Ap. TS., pgs. 162-166.) (See Section
VI(B), paragraph 11, supra.)
Pursuant to the above, the TA and TPI erred by
not referring Jane’s claims to arbitration. She cannot
escape the reality that her claim arises from alleged
violations
of
the
Agreement,
whether
for
discriminatory reasons or not. Precisely, that is what
it is up to the Arbitrator to settle.
The same thing happens with the alleged
expulsions in retaliation against Jane as a Member of
the managing body of LLC and a Capital Member of
LLC. The expulsion of a Member of the managing
body of LLC is governed by section 4.15 of the
Agreement, whereas the expulsion of a Capital
Member of LLC is governed by Section 12.02 of the
Agreement. (Ap. TS., pgs. 126 and 137-138.)
Therefore, any claim or challenge to those procedures
must be handled through the dispute resolution
process of section 14 of the Agreement, which includes
the binding arbitration that the parties agreed. That
was the undertaking signed by Jane and the lower
475a
forums erred by allowing Jane not to comply with
what was agreed.
To conclude, neither the clear and broad language
of the arbitral clause, nor the context provided by the
matters governed by the Agreement and Jane’s
claims, can be interpreted as the obligation to
XI. DISCUSSION OF THE FOURTH
INDICATION OF ERROR
clause agreed in Section 14 of the Agreement, the TA
“labor” and “constitutional” nature of Jane’s claims to
exempt her from having to arbitrate them. According
to the TA:
…the claim that Jane Doe wants the Judicial
forum to adjudicate is one that holds that the LLC
fired her discriminatorily and because of reprisals.
Furthermore, that dispute relates to conduct
attributed to the LLC in violation of her basic
constitutional rights, and therefore our state of
law grants the appellee the ability to vindicate
those rights through a motion for injunction. (Ap.
TS., pgs. 723-724.)
This determination by the TA evidences the
hostility to arbitration that the FAA came to
eradicate and shows that such forum based itself on
the nature of the alleged claims by Jane was well as
on alleged state policies to refuse to compel
476a
arbitration. By acting thus, the TA acted in open
violation of the FAA and the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution. Once again, the TA
manifestly erred.
See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct.
1745 (“courts must place arbitration agreements on an
equal footing with other contracts, […] and enforce
them according to their terms”) (citations omitted).
That is to say, what is important is not the nature of
the claim in question, but rather whether the parties
agreed to arbitrate such claim.19 Because the FAA
does not differentiate between the arbitrability of
statutory rights or constitutional rights, the lower
forums could not create that distinction by judicial
fiat under the scope of their interpretation of Puerto
Rican law.
Insofar as SCOTUS case law that requirements to arbitrate
Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2778, n. 1 (“[§
2]grounds do not include ... any requirement that its lack of
Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1203 (2012) (“[The FAA’s] text includes
‘requires courts to enforce the bargain of the parties to
arbitrate.’”) (citation omitted).
19 As we have discussed above, Jane’s alleged constitutional
claim is covered within the arbitral clause of the Agreement that
requires that Jane Doe submit all of her claims (“any claim”) to
arbitration.
18
477a
It is an elemental principle of law that when a
federal law is in conflict with a state law, including
one of a constitutional nature, the state law is
displaced by the federal one in virtue of the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.
The Supremacy Clause stipulates that:
States…, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in very State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
matter, Professor Gorrín Peralta states the following:
[A] federal law takes precedence over the
provisions of the Constitution of the
[Commonwealth] of Puerto Rico. … In any
situation in which a Puerto Rican legal
precept conflicts with the “Supreme Law,”
that is, the [US] Constitution, [or] with a
federal … law applicable in Puerto Rico, the
federal Law must always take precedence
over the Puerto Rican one.
478a
province”).20
displaced by the FAA. That was specifically
Keating,
465 U.S. 1 (1984), by indicating the following:
In enacting § 2 of the [FAA], Congress declared
a national policy favoring arbitration and
withdrew the power of the states to require
a judicial forum for the resolution of
claims which the contracting parties
agreed to resolve by arbitration.
Id. at pg. 10 (emphasis ours).21
See also Dowling v. Davis, 840 F.Supp. 731, 734 (E.D. Call.)
(5) the Constitution of the [Commonwealth] of Puerto Rico; (6)
Puerto Rico];…” Gorrín Peralta, supra, at pg. 43.
21 See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 491 (“This clear federal
California's § 229 requirement that litigants be provided a
20
479a
Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct.
citing Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747 (2011),
rule is displaced by the FAA. ... West Virginia's
prohibition against predispute agreements to
arbitrate personal-injury or wrongful-death
claims against nursing home is a categorical
rule prohibiting arbitration of a particular type
of claim, and that rule is contrary to the terms
marks omitted). In that case, it was decided that the
Supreme Court of West Virginia had erred by
applying the public policy of that State, which
prohibits enforcement of an arbitral clause contained
in an admission agreement to an old-age home signed
prior to the occurrence of an event of negligence that
results in death or bodily injury. Such that, if the
FAA displaces any state legislation that conflicts with
its provisions, it is even more clear that any decision
by a court (such as the appealed Decision) that
violates the FAA also must be vacated.
This Honorable Supreme Court is fully aware of
these principles. In World Films, Inc. v. Paramount
Pict. Corp., supra, it recognized that the state laws
that limit arbitration clauses are displaced
(“preempted”) by the FAA. The dispute in World
Films was whether the application of Article 3-B of
Law 75, 10 L.P.R.A. 278b-2, which established the
480a
nullity of any stipulation in a distribution contract
that forced a distributor to arbitrate outside of Puerto
Rico any dispute that arose from such contract, had
to take prevalence over the FAA. This Supreme Court
determined that insofar as Article 3-B of Law 75
conflicted in its application with the FAA, the latter
would take precedence. Id., pg. 364. Indeed, this
Court determined that faced with the FAA, Article 3B was ineffective and illegal. By deciding thus, the
provisions of Walborg Corp. v. Tribunal Superior, 104
D.P.R. 184 (1975), which had determined that the
state courts were not obligated to apply the FAA,
were expressly revoked. In Walborg, the court had
decided that an arbitral clause could not be given
greater force than the policy established in Law 75,
and that the state courts were not obligated to apply
the FAA. That doctrine was revoked by World Films.
Pursuant to the above, there is no question that
the lower courts erred by denying the arbitration
based on the alleged “constitutional” and “labor”
nature of Jane Doe’s claims. The FAA displaces any
statutory legal precept or precept under the
Constitution of Puerto Rico that does not enforce and
recognize the commitment assumed by Jane Doe and
LLC to resolve all claims (“any Claim”) through the
Agreement.
XII. CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF
IN VIEW OF THE AFORESAID, we very
respectfully request that this Honorable Court issue
the writ of certiorari requested and vacate the
Decision of the TA for the purposes of ordering Jane
to present through the confidential arbitration
481a
instituted before the AAA all of her claims against
the defendants.
I CERTIFY that I have provided notice of a true
and exact copy of this writing, simultaneously with
its submission, by electronic mail and courier to the
attorneys for the plaintiff-appellee, Juan R. González
Muñoz, Esq., González Muñoz Law Office, 261
Tetuán, San Juan, Puerto Rico 00901-1916;
[email protected]; and Manuel Porro Vizcarra,
Esq., Manuel Porro Vizcarra Law Offices, 382 Ave.
Escorial, Urb. Caparra Heights, San Juan, PR 00920;
[email protected].
MENDOZA LAW OFFICES
Attorney for the defendantpetitioners
PO Box 9282
Tel. (787) 722-5522; 5530; 5540
Fax: (787) 723-7057
Electronic mail:
[email protected]
/s/
[signature]
TSPR-8304
482a
APPENDIX I
McCONNELL VALDÉS LLC
OPERATING AGREEMENT
Amended and Restated
June 1, 2007, as further amended on
December 15, 2010
483a
1.01 “Absolute Majority” means that more than half
of all of the Capital Members of the Firm (including
those absent and those present but not voting) must
vote affirmatively in favor of a proposition in order
for it to be passed.
1.02 “Accumulated Earnings” means all the earnings
of the Firm that have been retained and not
distributed to the Capital Members.
1.03 “Assigned Capital” means the cumulated capital
contribution a Capital Member has to make each
Fiscal Year under the Capital Program, as of the end
of the Fiscal Year for which the net earnings (or
losses) of the Firm are to be determined. For
purposes of this definition, the Paid-In Capital of
each Capital Member as of Fiscal Year 2007 shall
also be considered “Assigned Capital.”
1.04 “Capital Member” means each of the parties to
this Agreement, and any other person who is
hereinafter admitted to membership in the Firm as a
Capital Member pursuant to section 7.01 of this
Agreement.
1.05 “Capital Program” means the method whereby
Capital Members make capital contributions to the
Firm.
demand of whatever nature and for whatever relief or
remedy against the Firm or any of its Members or
employees. However, it excludes any action, suit,
complaint or demand by the Firm for declaratory,
injunctive or any other equitable relief for unfair
competition or the use or unauthorized disclosure of
trade secrets or confidential information of the Firm,
484a
as to which the Firm may seek and obtain equitable
or legal relief from a court of competent jurisdiction.
Member asserting a Claim. The term “Claimant” also
covers any person or entity asserting a Claim directly
or indirectly through any Member or Former
Member.
****
5. Compensation.
5.01 Compensation Review Process
Not later than sixty (60) days before the end of
each Fiscal Year, the Managing Director shall
request each Member to fill-out a Compensation SelfEvaluation Form. The information provided in the
Compensation Self-Evaluation Form, together with
other data, will be analyzed by the Managing
Director in consultation with the Practice
Management
Committee
and
the
Chief
Administrative and Financial Officer. Not later than
thirty (30) days before the end of each Fiscal Year,
the Managing Director shall prepare and deliver to
each member of the Policy Committee a unified
compensation schedule, which may include bonuses
for the current Fiscal Year, and compensation and
other benefits for the next Fiscal Year. Not later
than five (5) days after receipt of the unified
compensation schedule, the members of the Policy
Committee shall provide their comments to the
Managing Director. Not later than fifteen (15) days
before the end of the Fiscal Year, the Managing
Director shall prepare a final unified compensation
schedule and, upon reasonable notice, call a meeting
485a
of the Policy Committee for the purpose of adopting
the final unified compensation schedule. Not later
than five (5) days before the end of the Fiscal Year,
the Policy Committee, by a majority vote of the
members present, shall approve or reject the final
unified compensation schedule as a whole.
5.02 Salaries of Members
Each Capital Member shall be entitled to such
annual salary as shall be determined pursuant to
section 5.01 of this Agreement, to be paid in one (1) or
more installments.
Each Income Member shall
initially be entitled to such salary as shall be fixed in
the agreement pursuant to which he/she shall be
admitted as an Income Member. Salaries of Income
Members shall ordinarily be paid on a monthly basis.
The Managing Director may at any time, with the
consent of the Policy Committee, increase or reduce
the salary of any Member.
5.03 Bonus of Members
In addition to the salary, the Firm may award a
bonus to any Member in respect of any Fiscal Year,
which bonus, if paid, shall be paid at such time and in
such amounts as shall be fixed pursuant to section
5.01 of this Agreement. The bonus of any Member
shall be entirely discretionary on the part of the
Firm, however, and no Member shall have the right
to receive a bonus, regardless of the earnings of the
Firm for the Fiscal Year concerned.
5.04 Additional Perquisites of Members
Each Member shall be entitled to the following
benefits, determined pursuant to the procedures set
forth in section 5.01 of this Agreement:
486a
(a) An allowance for such ordinary travel and
entertainment expenses, as shall be incurred by a
Member from time to time. The amount shall be
fixed pursuant to section 5.01 of this Agreement, and
payable subject to the applicable standard operating
instructions of the Firm, as amended from time to
time.
(b) An allowance for Capital Members for automobile
expense, which amount shall be fixed pursuant to
section 5.01 of this Agreement, and payable subject to
the applicable standard operating instructions of the
Firm, as amended from time to time.
(c) An allowance for Members for automobile lease
expense, which amount shall be fixed pursuant to
Firm, as amended from time to time. This allowance
shall be used for the lease of an automobile only.
(d) An allowance for Members for automobile
insurance, which amount shall be fixed pursuant to
Firm, as amended from time to time.
****
10. Fiduciary Duty and Duty of Loyalty.
10.01 Violations of Fiduciary Duties
A Member who violates any of his or her duties to
the Firm will be liable to the Firm in damages and/or
for compensation for the use of the Firm’s services or
resources, and will be subject to other remedies
487a
including, but not limited to, injunctive relief, where
such relief would not prejudice a client.
10.03
Policy
Regulations
Committee’s
Authority
to
Adopt
The Policy Committee shall have the authority to
adopt regulations clarifying and defining the type of
conduct that violates a Member’s duty of loyalty and
fiduciary duty.
11. No Liability of Members.
11.01
No personal Liabilities of Members for
Obligation and Liabilities of Firm Solely by Reason of
Being a Member
As a limited liability company under Puerto Rico
law, all debts, obligations and liabilities of the Firm,
whether arising in contract, tort or otherwise, shall
be solely the debts, obligations and liabilities of the
Firm, and no Member shall be obligated personally
for any such debt, obligation or liability solely by
reason of being a Member.
12.
Withdrawal,
Retirement,
Expulsion or Death of a Member.
Suspension,
12.01 Withdrawal and/or Retirement
A Member may withdraw or retire from the Firm
as of a specified date by giving the Managing Director
not less than thirty (30) days written notice to that
effect. Upon receipt of any such notice, the Managing
Director may specify an earlier date (than the date
specified in such notice) as of which such withdrawal
or retirement shall be effective. As of the date
specified in such withdrawal or retirement notice or
as of such earlier date as shall be specified by the
488a
Managing Director, the withdrawing or retiring
Member shall cease to be a Member.
12.02 Suspension and/or Expulsion
The Firm may, upon the recommendation of the
Policy Committee and the affirmative vote of threefourths (3/4) of the Capital Members, which vote shall
be cast by secret ballot, either (a) suspend the
membership of any Member in the Firm at any date
and for any period of time, or for an indefinite period
of time until action shall be taken to terminate the
suspension, as may be specified by the Policy
Committee, or (b) expel any Member at any date
specified by the Policy Committee with or without
cause or prior notice to such Member. In the case of
any such expulsion, the Member so expelled shall
cease to be a Member on the date specified by the
Policy Committee.
12.03 Bankruptcy
If a Member is adjudicated bankrupt or insolvent
by a court of competent jurisdiction, or voluntarily
files a petition under the Bankruptcy Code, such
Member shall thereupon automatically be deemed to
have withdrawn from the Firm and shall cease to be
a Member as of the date of such event or filing,
subject to applicable provisions of law.
12.05 Failure to Pay a Capital Call
If a Capital Member fails to timely pay the capital
contribution required by a capital call pursuant to
section 3.08 of this Agreement, such Capital Member
shall thereupon automatically be deemed to have
withdrawn from the Firm and shall cease to be a
Member as of the date of such event.
489a
12.05 Pledge or Hypothecate
If a Member attempts to pledge, hypothecate, or in
any manner transfer his or her interest in the Firm,
or his or her interest in any of its assets, receivables,
records, documents, files or clientele, such Member
shall thereupon automatically be deemed to have
withdrawn from the Firm and shall cease to be a
Member as of the date of such event.
12.06
Payments in the Events of Withdrawal.
Retirement. Expulsion or Death of a Capital Member
In the event of the withdrawal, retirement,
expulsion or death of a Capital Member, the Capital
Member or his or her personal representative or heirs
shall be entitled to receive from the Firm, within
thirty (30) days after the effective date of such
withdrawal, retirement, expulsion or death and in
full payment of all liabilities of the Firm to the
Capital Member (except with respect to the amount of
his or her capital account in the Firm), a cash
payment equal to the amount, if any, of his or her
salary accrued to the date of such withdrawal,
retirement, expulsion or death and not previously
paid, less all liabilities of such Capital Member to the
Firm. At the close of such Fiscal Year, the capital
account of such Capital Member shall be credited
with his or her share in the net earnings of the Firm
for the Fiscal Year in which such withdrawal,
retirement, or expulsion becomes effective or such
death occurs, or shall be charged with his or her
share in the losses of the Firm for such Fiscal Year,
based upon the portion of such Fiscal Year prior to
the date of such withdrawal, retirement, expulsion or
death, in accordance with the provisions of section
3.03 of this agreement.
490a
13. Dissolution, Liquidation or Merger.
13.01 Procedure Sale of Assets,
Merger
Dissolutions or
Upon the recommendation of the Policy
Committee and the affirmative vote of the Capital
Members holding a majority of the Paid-In Capital of
the Firm, the assets and business of the Firm may be
sold, or the Firm may be merged with any other firm,
or liquidated and dissolved at any time.
13.02 Withdrawal of Members upon Liquidation and
Dissolution of the Firm
In case of the liquidation and dissolution of the
Firm, each Member shall be deemed to have
withdrawn from the Firm as of the date of such
liquidation and dissolution, and the Firm shall be
absolutely obligated to pay in full, in cash, the
balance of the capital account of each Capital
Member. Provided, however, that if upon liquidation
and dissolution the assets of the Firm, less its
liabilities, are insufficient to pay in full the balance of
the capital account of each Capital Member, a pro
rata portion of each such balance shall be paid.
14. Resolution of Claim.
14.01 Intent and Purpose
Claimant to resolve any Claim by mediation or
arbitration. The Claimant expressly agrees that the
Claim shall be settled or resolved through the
procedures set forth herein, and shall not in any way
circumvent or otherwise challenge in any way these
14.02 Submission to Policy Committee
491a
As a prerequisite to bringing any Claim, the
Claimant shall first submit the Claim to the Policy
Committee. The Claim must be in writing, stating
the nature of the Claim and the relief requested. The
Claimant shall provide to the Policy Committee such
other information as the Policy Committee deems
necessary
and
reasonable
for
the
proper
consideration of the Claim. If the Claimant does not
submit the Claim to the Policy Committee or fails to
provide within thirty (30) days the information
requested by the Policy Committee, the Claim shall
be void and deemed waived.
14.03 Mediation
The Claimant and the Firm shall in good faith
attempt to resolve the Claim amicably. If the Claim
cannot be resolved amicably within a reasonable
period of time, the parties agree first to try in good
faith to settle the Claim by mediation administered
by the American Arbitration Association under its
Commercial Mediation Procedures before resorting to
arbitration or some other dispute resolution
procedure.
14.04 Arbitration
If mediation fails, the Claim shall be settled by
jurisdiction thereof. The Claimant and the Firm
further agree that the Claim be submitted to one (1)
arbitrator to be mutually selected. If the parties fail
to appoint an arbitrator, either party may then
appoint an arbitrator and notify the other party of
such appointment. The Claim will be submitted to
492a
this arbitrator. However, if within thirty (30) days of
such notice, the other party appoints an arbitrator,
then the two (2) arbitrators will select a third
arbitrator, and the Claim will be submitted to the
three (3) arbitrators for resolution, which resolution
shall be final, binding and unappealable.
14.05 Confidentiality
The Claimant and the Firm agree that the
underlying purpose of the provisions set forth in
section 14 of this Agreement is to provide a
mechanism by which any Claim shall be resolved in a
confidential manner, without publicity and the
attendant distractions. Accordingly, all mediation
meetings and arbitration hearings shall be private
and confidential, and attended by the parties,
maintain the confidentiality of such meetings and
in such meetings and hearings. Any and all actions
taken by the parties shall be in conformity with the
underlying purpose set forth in section 14 of this
Agreement.
15. Miscellaneous.
15.01 Meetings
(e) Capital Members shall meet at least once each
quarter of the Fiscal Year, on the day called by the
Managing Director. Special meetings shall be held at
any time if called by the Managing Director or a
majority of the Capital Members voting on a per
capita basis. At the discretion of the Managing
Director, Income Members may be invited to any
meeting of the Capital Members.
(f) Only Capital Members present in person at a
493a
meeting shall have the right to vote thereat. Each
Capital Member shall cast only one (1) vote on any
matter to be decided by the Capital Members at the
meeting. Ordinarily, the vote is public. However, at
the request of any Capital Member, or whenever it is
expressly required in this Agreement, the vote on any
matter may be taken by secret ballot.
(g) Notwithstanding sub-section (b) above, if for any
reason any Capital Member is unable to attend a
meeting of the Capital Members at which a vote by
ballot is to be taken on any matter requiring a vote,
the Capital Member may vote by mail or by proxy,
subject to the following conditions:
(i) The Capital Member shall timely notify the
Managing Director of the intention to vote by proxy,
and the name of the Capital Member who will have
the proxy.

Supreme Court of the United States

Transcripción

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