Pay and performance in the Spanish soccer league: Who gets the

Pay and performance in the Spanish soccer league: Who gets the

Pay and performance in the Spanish soccer league:
Who gets the expected monopsony rents?
Pedr o Gar ci a- del - Bar r i o ( p gbar r i o@u nav. es)
Fr an cesc Pu j ol ( f p u j ol @u n av. es)
Dep ar t m en t of Econ om i cs
8 QL YH UV L W\ R I 1D YDU UD
Edi f i ci o Bi b l i ot ecas ( ent r ada Est e)
31080 Pam pl ona. SPAI N
Febr uar y 2004
$ EVWUDFW
I n t he l ab ou r m ar ket s t hat gat her f ew com pan i es t o com pet e f or m an y
w or ker s, t he econ om i c t h eor y p r ed i ct s t h e exi st en ce of m onopson y r en t s. I t
sh oul d al so be t he case of t he Spani sh soccer i nd ust r y. How ever , t he cl u bs
of t hi s l eag ue d o not p r of i t f r om t he exp ect ed r ent s. Th e p u r p ose of t hi s
paper i s t o exp l ai n su ch a con t r ov er si al evi den ce.
Spani sh soccer l abour m ar k et s i s char act er i sed b y t he p r esen ce of som e
ou t st an di ng w or ker s ( soccer su per st ar s ) . I t m eans t h at t he w i n n er - t ak e- al l
h yp ot hesi s h ol ds w hen anal y si ng t he soccer i n d u st r y . Thi s i dea st at es t hat
bei ng sl i g ht l y bet t er t h an t he ot her w or ker s gener at es l ar ge ear n i n gs
di f f er ent i al s ( escal at i ng ear ni n gs of l eag ue su p er st ar s ) .
Thi s p aper con si d er s t he soccer i n du st r y as a du al l ab our m ar ket . On e
segm en t of t hi s m ar ket coul d cer t ai nl y be char act er i sed b y t he t r ad i t i onal
anal y si s of m onopson y, i n w hi ch a l i t t l e nu m ber of cl ub s ar e w i l l i ng t o h i r e
m an y pot ent i al cand i dat es. The op posi t e occu r s w hen st ud y i n g t he case of
t he sup er st ar pl ayer s. A nu m ber of ent i t i es ( n ot j u st Span i sh cl u bs) w ou l d
f i er cel y com p et e f or h i r i n g t h ose f ew super st ar s , w h o accum ul at e m ar ket
pow er . Th e p aper su ggest s t hat t he m onopson y r en t s t h at t he cl ub s w er e t o
obt ai n f r om m ost of t he soccer pl ay er s, w oul d event ual l y r ev er t t o t h e
su per st ar s , w h o en j oy st r ong bar gai n i n g pow er .
I n or der t o em pi r i cal l y t est t hi s i dea, t he paper anal y ses t he dat a of t he
Spani sh pr of essi onal soccer l eag ue, f or t he season 2001/ 02. The anal y si s
pay s esp eci al at t ent i on t o t he econom i c i m pact associ at ed t o each par t i cu l ar
pl ayer , as f ar as i t m ay hel p t o expl ai n t he l ar ge w age di f f er ent i al s t hat
cou l d n ot be exp l ai ned du e t o p er f or m an ce di f f er ent i al s.
Key Wor ds:
JEL- Code:
Monopsony r ent s. Pay and per f or mance. Dual mar ket s.
J24, J31 and J42.
W e would like to thank: Francisco Galera, Javier Gómez-Biscarri and Javier Hualde for their useful
comments and suggestions.
1
1. Introduction
Much of t he w or k on monopsony r ent s has been t est ed i n t he cont ext of
pr of essional spor t s. Economi c t heor y point s t o t he exploit at ion of t he pr of essional
spor t player s under t he r eser ve cl ause, t hr ough t he i nt r oduct ion of monopsony
pow er . For i nst ance, Rot t enber g ( 1956) descr ibes t he clubs’ monopsony pow er in
t he Basebal l indust r y. This is also t he case of t he paper published by Scully
( 1974) , w ho develops a basic t heor et ical f r amew or k and cal culat es t he r at e of
monopsonist ic exploit at ion f or t he US Maj or league Baseball . 1 He concl udes t hat it
is of consider able magnit ude. Hunt and Lew is ( 1976) analyse empi r ical ly t he same
league and also cl aim t hat it exhibit s monopsony r ent s f or t he t eams ow ner s.
Monopsony pow er is init ial ly associat ed in t he lit er at ur e t o t he r eser ve
clause. I n t hi s sense, Scully ( 1974) insist s t hat cancelli ng t he r eser ve clause
w ould r esult i n benef it s f or t he player s w it h no damage t o t he game. 2 How ever ,
some st udi es ar gue t hat cer t ai n monopsonist ic exploit at ion w ill st ill r emai n once
t he clause had been r em oved, due t o speci f i c cont r act ual ar r angem ent s. I n f act ,
even t hough t he pl ayer is allow ed t o play out hi s opt ion and becom e a f r ee agent ,
it is unlikely t o happen. This i s because t he player could only sw it ch t o anot her
t eam as f ar as t he t w o t eams agr ee on a t r ansf er pr ice. 3
Anot her
cent r al
pol icy
issue,
in
t he lit er at ur e on
pr of essional
spor t
mar ket s, i s t he al locat ional ef f ect s t hat r esult f r om monopsony pr act i ces. El Hodi r i
and Quir k ( 1971) pr oved t hat t he dist r ibut i on of playing skills w ould be t he sam e
w it h or w it hout t he r eser ve clause. Also Hunt and Lew is ( 1976) ar gue t hat as long
as pr oper t y r ight s ar e w ell def ined and r econst r uct ing t hr ough sal es of player s’
cont r act s is per missibl e and cost less only t he dist r ibut ion of w ealt h bet w een
player s and
ow ner s w ould
be
af f ect ed.
Accor di ng
to
t his
vi ew ,
pr of it abl e
invest ment s i n t eams ar e st i ll possibl e in t he absence of monopsony r ent s, since
monopoly pr of it s r em ain. They j ust i f y t he l ast asser t ion by simply consider ing t he
1
This rate is computed as the difference between the estimated Marginal Revenue Product and the
salary, in terms of (divided by) the Marginal Revenue Product.
2
In fact, the amount of money destine to reward soccer players is so large that there is no reason why
lower earnings would not elude a comparable effort and performance from the players. In our opinion,
the efficiency wage hypothesis is not the crucial issue here, since there are inherent incentives, other
than those of monetary character, that persuade soccer players of doing their best.
3
The option payment is usually huge.
2
w hol e l eague ( inst ead of t he t eam) as a m onopoly, r at her t han as an inef f i ci ent
car t el.
At t his st age, a second st r eam of ar gum ent s ent er s in t he discussion. I t i s
not inf r equent t hat some mar ket s suppor t high concent r at ions of r ew ar ds among
smal l number s of par t icipant s. Fol low i ng t he t er m set t l e by Fr ank and Cook
( 1995) , w e w il l r ef er t o t hem as t he w inner - t ake- al l m ar ket s. This hypot hesis
st at es t hat bei ng sl ight ly bet t er t han ot her w or ker s, gener at es t hat t he w inner s
get much lar ger ear ni ngs t han t he losser s ( t he w ages of t he f or mer exhibit a mor e
t han pr opor t ional m agnit ud w it h r espect t o t he cor r esponding pr oduct ivit y) . I n a
pr evious w r it t i ng, Rosen ( 1981)
r ef er r ed t o t he phenom enon of
super st ar s ,
“ w her ein r el at ively sm al l number s of peopl e ear n enor mous amount s of money and
diminat e t he act ivit ies i n w hi ch t hey engage” . 4 Fr ank and Cook cl aim t hat quit e a
lar ge number of mar ket s l ike pr of essional spor t s, pop cult ur e, and ar t s
pr esent a si mil ar r ew ar d st r uct ur e, i n w hich many individuals compet e f or a
handf ul of big pr izes at t he t op. Per haps t he most novel ar gument all eged in t heir
book is t hat socially w ast ef ul pat t er ns of compet it ive invest m ent r esult f r om
w inner - t ake- all cont est s. I n ot her w or ds, t hey ar gue t hat t oo m any r esour ces ar e
dovet ed t o t he compet it ion it self and not enough t o r eal pr oduct ion. Ther ef or e,
cer t ai n ar r agem ent s t o r est r ict i nvest m ent s in super st ar s w ould be advi sibl e.
They also st r ess t hat t he case f or excess compet it ion i s st r ongest w hen t he
act ivit y is zer o sum and w hen compet it ion it sel f is w or t hless. I f only r ank or der
( not per f or m ance level ) mat t er s, t he game is pur e lot t o and r esour ces used t o
impr ove per f or mance t o gain compet it ive edge ar e w ast ed. ( A t ypi cal exampl e of
t his sor t of w ast ef ul act ivit i es ar e t he ar m s r aces bet w een count r ies) . 5 Finally t hey
point out t hat subst ancial inef f i ci enci es r esult f r om mar ket f ai lur es i n cont est s.
Fur t her mor e, t hey consider t hat t he w i nner - t ake- al l phenom enon char act er ize a
br oad r ang of w or k act ivit ies in t he US economy, so t hat it account s f or som e of
t he i ncr eased income i nequalit y. 6
4
Rosen (1981) also pointed out that “in certain kinds of activities there is concentration of output
among a few individuals, marked skewness in the associated distributions of income and very large
rewards at the top“.
5
Rosen and Sanderson (2001) assert that professional sport markets experience a curious combination
of cooperation and competition, which would be another variant of the Arms Race phenomenon.
6
The winner-take-all hypothesis, as stated by Frank and Cook, received some critical remarks in the
review made by Rosen (1996). Firstly, he believe that the apparent abundance of VXSHUVWDUV today is
unrelated to the decrease in wages of unskilled labour that dominate inequality statistics. At least this
correlation has not been empirically proved in the book. Secondly, Rosen considers that the relevance
3
This paper aim s t o pr ovide an answ er f or a cont r adi ct or y evidence, w hi ch
act ual ly is only an out w ar dly cont r adi ct ion. I n t he Spanish f oot bal l l eague t her e
ar e f ew t eams t o com pet e f or m any w or ker s. I n t his sit uat ions t he economi c
t heor y pr edict s t he exist ence of monopsony r ent s. 7 How ever , t he cl ubs of t his
league do not pr of it f r om t he expect ed r ent s. Mor eover , t he maj or it y of t he clubs
in t he Spani sh l eague exhibit s negat ive econom ic out com es. 8
This paper pr opose an or iginal hypot hesis, built upon t he sim ult aneous
analysis of bot h monopsony r ent s and w inner - t ake- al l elem ent s. Nat ur al ly, in or der
t o exami ne j oint ly t hese t w o aspect s, it seem s accur at ed t o asume t hat Spanish
soccer indust r y is a dual labour m ar ket . One segm ent of it could cer t ainly be
char act er ised by t he convent ional analysis of monopsony, in w hich a l it t le number
of clubs w ish t o at t r ack many pot ent i al candidat es. The m aj or it y of t hose ar e
mediocr e candidat es, w hose i nst r uct ion has of t en t ake pl ace i n second- cat egor y
t eam s. On t he ot her hand, t his mar ket is also composed by t he pr esence of a f ew
out st anding w or ker s ( soccer super st ar s ) , so t hat t he w inner - t ake- all hypot hesis
cl ear ly appl ies. A r elat ively lar ger number of ent it i es ( not only Spani sh clubs)
w ould f i er cely compet e f or hi r ing t hose super st ar s , w ho accumul at e m ar ket pow er .
I n sumar y, t his paper suggest s t hat t he monopsony r ent s t hat t he cl ubs
w er e t o obt ain f r om most of t he soccer player s, w ould event ual l y r ever t t o t hese
super st ar player s, w ho enj oy st r ong bar gaini ng pow er . I n t his cont ext , w hen
analysi ng t he cont r ibut ion t hat a f oot ball pl ayer impl ies f or a t eam, espet ial
at t ent ion w il l be pl aced upon his capabilit y of gener at ing econom ic r evenues
of the mentioned inefficiencies is greatly exaggerated, since the winner-take-all hypothesis would apply
to a little number of markets and since “the book contains many examples, but is rather short on
serious evidence.”
7
Note that this is also the case even once the reserve clause was disappeared in 1995, at the time in
which the Bosman law was introduced. Although it is true that this law brought a revolution in the
European football labour market, we argue that monopsony power has persisted, as a result of other
contractual arrangements. Before 1995, any club willing to hire a player had to pay a compensation fee
to the former club even if the contract had expired. Hence, even out-of-contract players were not
completely free to leave their employer. Moreover, the clubs were not allowed to employ more than
three players coming from abroad. The clubs had strong bargaining power since they could prevent a
player from changing team if they were not satisfied by the compensation fee. Since 1995, an out-ofcontract player can freely negotiate with a team and does not have to pay any compensation fee to his
former club. The clubs now anticipate this new ingredient and provide the players with incentives to
sign long-term contracts. Any player willing to breach the contract in order to change club has to pay
the compensation fee mentioned above. Cf. Ascari and Gagnepain (2003).
8
Cf. Deloitte & Touche (2003): although this report present no records of the evolution of team profits
in the Spanish league for the last seasons, it is unquestionable that the industry is facing a big and
growing deficit. This conclusion emerge from analysing the trend of the business as well as considering
the escalating earnings of the footballers. In fact, the clubs integrated in the LFP (Spanish professional
football league) admit a permanent economic crisis in the sector. In a letter sent to the vice-president
4
( achivied t hr ough br oadcast r ight s, m er chandising cont r act s, et c. ) no less t han
upon his spor t per f or mance.
2. A basic theoretical framework
The i nt r oduct i on has been devot ed t o descr ibe t he mot ivat ion of t he paper . I n
or der
to
r elat e t he issues t hat
have been
m ent i oned,
a basi c t heor et i cal
f r amew or k i s r equi r ed. I n som e aspect s, t he model par alels t he one pr esent ed by
Scully ( 1974) : a model of mar ginal r evenue pr oduct and salar y det er mi nat ion, in
w hi ch t he dem and of som e i nput s is est abl ished i n a m onopsony f r amew or k.
Rem ember t hat i f t he labour mar ket w er e per f ect ly compet it ive, pl ayer
salar i es w ould be equat ed w it h pl ayer mar ginal r evenue pr oduct s ( MRP) ; w her eas
it is not t he case if t he r eser ve clause ( or ot her cont r act ar r angem ent s) r est r i ct s
player bar gai ning t o one ow ner . I n t he lat t er case, player s and ow ner s shar e t he
player ’ s MRP. 9
Consider t he player ’ s MRP i n t he f oot bal l indust r y. Let ’ s pr esume t hat
player per f or mance pr oduces dir ect as w el l as i ndi r ect ef f ect s on t he t eam’ s
r evenue. Follow ing t he f r amew or k pr esent ed by Scully ( 1974) , 10 t he f or mal pr ocess
of MRP and salar y det emi nat ion should incor por at e t w o maj or f eat ur es: ( 1) Gr oss
f oot bal l r evenues ar e r elat ed t o individual per f or mance pr i mar ily t hr ough t heir
ef f ect on t eam st andi ng; and ( 2) Monopsol ist ic f act or s r educe pl ayer salar ies
below player m ar gi nal r evenue pr oduct s.
Most especif i cally, t his paper assum es t hat f oot bal l player s endow a vect or
of t al ent s. These t alent s can be gr ouped in t w o gener al t ypes: or di nar y skil ls ( 6 )
and super st ar abi lit ies ( $ ) . 11 To det er mine t he pr evalent salar y f or t he f or mer
t ype of i nput s, a m onopsonist ic f r am ew or k w il l be suit abl e. The case of t he l at t er
of the Spanish government, in April 2003, they manifested a debt of around 2.000 million Euro.
9
Note that, the Spanish professional football league considered as a whole, can be seen as the unique
provider of this peculiar type of spectacle. In this sense, it enjoys monopoly power.
10
He assumes slightly different hypotheses and states that: “The player’ s marginal revenue product in
baseball is the ability or performance that he contributes to the team and the effect of that performance
on gate receipts. The effect of player performance on revenue may be direct or indirect. Ability
contributes to team performance and victories raise gate receipts and broadcast revenues; this is the
substantial effect of the individual’ s performance. Additionally, it is possible that some players may
attract fans over and above their individual contribution through the team.”
11
The latter might be also called “galactical” abilities, as Spanish journalist do when referring to certain
players who play in F.C.Barcelona and Real Madrid.
5
is dif f er ent , si nce it is a ver y excl usive pr oduct ion f act or . Ther ef or e, no monopoly
r ent s w i ll be ext r act ed f r om t he pl ayer s w ho possess t hese super st ar abilit ies. 12
On t he ot her hand, t he t eams der ive r evenue m ai nly f r om t w o sour ces:
dir ect r evenues ( coming f r om bot h per f or m ance and gat e r eceipt s, mer chandisi ng,
et c. ) and t he shar e of t he t ot al i ndust r y r evenue, st ipul at ed f or each t eam ( w hi ch
w ill depend m ainly on popular it y, br oadcast r igt hs, et c. ) . I n addit ion t o t hat , t he
analysis decomposes t he pr of it s dir ect ly obt ained by t he t eam i n t w o gr oups:
t hose linked t o t he spor t per f or m ance of a f oot ball pl ayer , and t hose gener at ed by
t he m er chandasi ng pow er associ at ed t o each par t i cular player . Let ’s st ar t by
def i ni ng t he expr esi on f or t he r evenues dir ect ly achi eved by t he t eam:
[ 2. 1]
5 = 5 ( I ( 6 , $ ), P( 6 , $ ) )
For L 1«, ; and M 1«-. Wher e I and P r epr esent , r espect ivel y, t he pr oduct ivit y
r el at ed t o per f or mance and t o m er chandasing capacit y; and w her e t he r evenue
f unct ion ( 5) 13 depends on t w o ki nds of pr oduct ivit y: t he spor t per f or m ance and t he
econom ic pr of it abil it y associat ed t o each par t i cul ar skill.
I n addit ion, t her e is anot her sour ce of pr of it s: t he por t ion of t he r evenues
achieved by t he i ndust r y as a w hol e, t hat cor r espond t o each par t icul ar t eam. This
amount can be di f ined as t he pr oduct of t w o el em ent s. Fir st , t he t ot al r evenue
gener at ed by t he w hol e i ndust r y ( () t hat depends basicly on t he special t al ent s
pr esent in t he l eague ( Aj ) ; and sencond, t he pr opor t ion of t his ear nings t hat
r eceives each t eam ( α ) . 14 Obviously, t he l at t er f act or var ies depending on t he
st at us of t he t eam Q. The f or mer element may be char act er ised as:
[ 2. 2]
( = ( (ψ , $
)
12
This is the reason why we refer to a segmented labour market. Note that it is not necesary the case
that football players are placed in the monopsonistic market or in the competitive. The idea is rather
that some skills are rewarded as it occurs in a monopsonistic framework, whereas the extraordinary
abilities do not. Hence, there is a dual labour market depending on the type of skill considered.
13
If the market prices of the outputs produced by each player skill were known, the revenue function
could also be defined, in a less broad way, by:
5 = 3 ⋅ I ( 6 , $ ) + 3 ⋅ P( 6 , $ ) .
This element could be thought of varying as 6 and $ do. However, the present analysis treats it as a
paramenter: α represents the market quota assigned to the Q club.
14
6
Wher e ψ account s f or a br oad ar r ay of char act er ist i cs: l eague compet it iveness,
number of f ans, et c. On t he ot her hand, w e can expr ess t he cost of hir ing f oot ball
skills by t he f ol low i ng equat i on:
& = ∑ Z ( 6 ) ⋅ 6 + ∑ Z ( 6 ) ⋅ 6 + ∑ Z ⋅ $ + ∑ Z ⋅ $
[ 2. 3]
The w age have been split ed out in t w o elem ent s: t he sal ar y t o r ew ar d player
per f or m ance cont r ibut ion ( Z ) , and t he paym ent s associ at ed t o mer chandising
act ivit i es ( Z ) . Not e t hat w ages have been def ined so t hat t hey also di f f er f or
each t ype of skill of t he l abour input . Not e also t hat t he t w o f ir st t er ms of
expr ession [ 2. 3] cor r espond t o t he labour i nput s const r ained t o a monopsony
sit uat ion. This i s t he r eason w hy t he w ages ar e not given but t hey have been
expr esed as f unct ions of t he quant it y of input hir ed. I n ot her w or ds, t her e ar e
monopsony r ent s associ at ed t o t hem. Accor di ngly, t he t ot al pr of it f or t he t eam,
may be def ined by:
Π = 5 + α ⋅ ( − &
[ 2. 4]
or also:
Π = 5( I ( 6 , $ ), P( 6 , $ ) )+ α ⋅ ( (Ψ , $ ) − ∑ Z ( 6 ) ⋅ 6 − ∑ Z ( 6 ) ⋅ 6 − ∑ Z ⋅ $ − ∑ Z ⋅ $
The f ir st - or der condict ions f or a m axim um ar e calculat ed by def f er ent iat ing t he
t ot al pr of it f unct i on w it h r espect t o 6 and $ :
[ 2. 5]
∂Π =0⇒
∂6 [ 2. 6]
∂Π
=0⇒
∂$
∂5 ∂I
∂5 ∂P
Z (6 ) + Z (6 ) =
⋅ +
⋅ −6
∂I ∂6 ∂P ∂6
$
#
Z! = Z! + Z! =
 ∂Z
∂Z
⋅  +
∂6
 ∂6



∂5 ∂I
∂5 ∂P
∂(
⋅
+
⋅
+α" ⋅
∂I ∂$!
∂P ∂$!
∂$!
These t w o equat ions r eveal t hat t eam s maxi mize pr of it s by select ing a level of
player or di nar y skil ls ( 6 ) such t hat pl ayer s r eceive a salar y salar y equal t o t hei r
mar gi nal r evenue pr oduct s less monopsony r ent s ( r epr esent ed by t he last t er m of
equat ion [ 2. 5] ) . I n t he case of out st anding abil it i es ( 6 ) , t hey do not suf f er f r om
monopsonist ic dist or t ions, so t hat t hey ar e r em uner at ed equal t o t her i m ar ginal
r evenue pr oduct s.
7
Each f oot ball pl ayer gat her s a set of skil ls and i f hi r ed, he should be
r ew ar d f or all of t hem. Ther ef or e, t he t ot al w age bi ll r eceived by a f oot ball er w ill
compr ise t he pr eviously det er mined m ar ket salar ies, as show ed i n expr esion [ 2. 7] :
'
'
'
&
: = Z( + Z( + Z% ( 6 % ) + Z% ( 6 % )
[ 2. 7]
∂5  ∂I
∂I
) +
: =
⋅

∂I  ∂6 ∂$,
 ∂5  ∂P ∂P
+
⋅ ) +
 ∂P  ∂6 ∂$,



 +α

 ∂(
⋅
 ∂$,


)
−6


or :
)+
)*
 ∂Z
∂Z
)
⋅  ) +
∂6
 ∂6




The l ast expr esions simply says t hat t he w or ker w ill be paid accor di ng t o t he t ot al
pr oduct ivit y t hat he get s f or t he club. How ever , it m ay be t he case t hat cer t ai n
super st ar player s w ould acumul at e char act er ist i cs t hat ar e out st andi ng abilit i es.
The m ar ket is w ill ing t o pl ay huge amount s of money f or t hose ski lls, w her eas it is
not t he case f or t he or di nar y skil ls of ot her pl ayer s. I n sumar y, each : r epr esent s
t he ear ni ngs of a i ndividual, but it m ay occur t hat f or a speci f ic f oot ball er :
[ 2. 8]
 ∂(
α 2 ⋅ 
1
 ∂$

.
≥6


.0
./
 ∂Z
∂Z
.
⋅  . +
∂6
 ∂6




I t means t hat , f or som e especi al i ndividual, t her e is a plus of pr oduct ivit y ( t he
f ir st t er m of t he inequalit y) over comes t he pr esum ed monopsony loss. The
opposit e w ould occur
t o t he m aj or it y of
t he f oot ball pl ayer s,
so t hat
t he
monopsony r ent s ext r act ed f r om t hem w ould event ual ly enr i ch t he pocket s of
t hese f ew super st ar s .
3. Description of the variables and data source
I n or der t o empir i cally t est t his issue, t he paper anal yses t he dat a of t he Spanish
pr of essional soccer league, f or t he season 2001/ 02. 15 The analysis pays especial
at t ent ion t o t he economi c impact associ at ed t o each par t icular player , as f ar as it
may help t o explai n t he l ar ge ear nings dif f er ent i als t hat could not be expl ained
due t o spor t per f or mance dif f er ences.
The dat a sour ce f or t his st udy is t he spor t s j our nal: MARCA. I n speci f i c,
most of t he inf or m at ion has been obt ai ned f r om: Guía MARCA ( Liga 2003) and
15
For a general knowledge of the type of industry which is going to be empirically examined, it may be
helpful to read: Ascari and Gagnepain (2003), Hoehn and Szymanski (1999), and Szymanski (2001).
8
Guía MARCA ( Liga 2002) . The l at t er has been used t o compl ement t hose pieces of
inf or m at ion t hat w er e not r ecor ded in t he f or m er . I n spit e of t his r ecover y
pr ocedur e, it w as impossibl e t o avoid t he loss of a lar ge number of obser vat ions,
due t o l ack of i nf or mat ion on some aspect s of t he pl ayer s. The i ndividual s f or
w hi ch all t he i nf or m at ion w as avail able w er e r educed f r om 518 t he number of
t hose r egist er ed in t he l eague t o 370.
The most impor t ant var iabl es i ncluded i n t he analysis ar e t he dependent
var i able plus t hr ee explanat or y var iables, w hich const it ut e t he nucl eus of t he
analysis. I t also i ncor por at es a number of var iables t o account f or a br oad ar r ay
of char act er ist i cs of each soccer player . The dependent var iable is designat ed as
( not ar io) and r epr esent t he est im at ed mar ket value of a f oot ball player . As no
publi c inf or mat i on i s available about payr ol ls and ot her sour ces of soccer pl ayer ’ s
ear ni ngs, w e use ( not ar io) as a “ pr oxy” var i abl e of t hat m ar ket value. I t t r ies t o
eval uat e t he amount of money t hat a club is w i lli ng t o pay f or t he ser vice of a
cer t ai n soccer player , and has been coll ect ed f r om diar io MARCA, t he m ain spor t s
daily j our nal. 16
Tw o “ pr oxy” var iables of w or ker pr oduct ivit y w i ll be used i n t he st udy: an
index of per f or mance m easur ed by t he “ punt os Mar ca” ( mpunt Mar ) ; 17 and anot her
alt er nat ive index of pr oduct ivit y evaluat ed t hr ough “ li ga Fant ást i ca” ( m ligFant ) . 18
Obviously, t hese t w o i ndexes w i ll not be int r oduced i n t he same r egr ession, si nce
t hey t r y t o capt ur e t he sam e r eal it y and w il l undoubt edly be cor r elat ed.
Anot her pr incipal her e i s t o size up t he econom ic pr of i t abi lit y t hat a
f oot bal ler r epor t s t o his cl ub. Cer t ainly, as it w as poi nt ed out in t he pr evious
sect ion, t he economic f act or s i n t hi s cont ext pl ay a cent r al r ole, w hi ch might be
16
th
In particular, it is reported in the issue printed in the 27 September 2001. The market value of a
soccer player is established by a board of experts, that meets under official supervision. They accord
the accurate value of the individual, both relying on the quality of the player and depending on the
economic cost of getting his job services. This index is provided to the readers by MARCA in order for
them to elaborate a hypothetical team, which will compete in the game: “Liga Fantástica”. For the very
few cases in which the rank was not complete for this year, we have taken the value reported for the
following season (Cf. diario MARCA, 22.IX.2002), after checking the consistency of the information.
17
It consists of a cumulative rank, elaborated upon the records that journalists assign to each soccer
player after the game. At the end of the season, an accurate ranking can be obtained with the sum of
the points granted to each individual along the league. This index is certainly a natural measure of
productivity, including even aspects that can hardly be quantified, like the elegance of the game and
the attitude of the footballer in the field, etc.
18
This alternative index is computed by adding quantifiable indicators on play performance in addition
to the score given by the journalists. It means that the ranking provided by (LiguaFantastica) enriches
and encompasses that of (PuntosMarca). The shortcoming of this index comes from the fact of the
arbitrary way to weigh up each quantifiable indicator.
9
even mor e i mpor t ant t han t he spor t per f or m ance cont r ibut ion of t he pl ayer . A
simpl e and accur at e w ay of evaluat i ng t he capabi lit y t hat a player possesses of
gener at ing econom ic r evenues ( t hr ough br oadcast r ight s, mer chandising cont r act s,
et c. ) is const r uct i ng an homogeneous r anking t o line up all t he individuals. To t his
aim, a “ pr oxy” var i able designed by ( googl e) has been sel ect ed. I t compr i ses t he
t ot al number of li nks r epor t ed by t he i nt er net sear ching engi ne pr ovided by
Googl e. 19 The f or eseeabl e m ult i col inear it y bet w een ( googl e) and t he i ndexes of
per f or m ance, r equi r es f r om t he f or m er var i able t o be f ilt er ed bef or e ent er i ng t he
r egr ession. The pr ocedur e t o get t his r ef ined var iable w ill be explai ned lat er .
Ther e is st ill a t hir d essent i al explanat or y var iabl e i n t he analysis. I t t ar get
t o pr ove w het her t he w inner - t ake- all hypot hesis holds or not in t he l abour mar ket
of t he Spanish pr of essional f oot ball er s. The most simpl e m anner of t est i ng t hi s
f eat ur e is by means of a “ dum my” var iable, t hat t akes t he val ue 1 f or t he case of
t he f ew w i nner s of t he m ar ket ( soccer super st ar s ) , w her eas it t akes t he val ue 0
f or t he ot her individuals. The nam e r eser ved f or t hi s qualit at ive var iabl e is
( w i nner all) .
Ther e ar e as w ell a number of var iabl es r equir ed t o cont r ol f or di f f er ent
f act or s: ( deur ope) t o account f or t he number of gam es t hat have t ake place in t he
Champions League or i n t he UEFA Cup; ( int er nnal) t hat quant if i es t he number of
games in w hi ch a pl ayer has def ended t he cor r espondent nat ional t eam. Also t he
age i s r elevant in t his cont ext . And, as it i s convent ional, t he age is int r oduced
int o t he model adopt ing a quadr at i c f or m: age ( edad) and age^ 2 ( edad2) .
I n addit ion, t he empir i cal est im at ion w i ll incor por at e a “ dum my” var iable
f or t he f or eign non- Eur opean pl ayer s ( ext r a) ; and f or f or eign pl ayer s w ho belong
t o t he Eur opean Union ( comuni t ) .
Finally, w e use t hr ee “ dummy” var iabl es associ at ed t o t he f i eld posit ion of
soccer player s: def ender s ( def ) , midf i elder s ( med) and at t acker s ( del) . Obviously,
goalkeeper act s as t he r ef er ence gr oup. These “ dum my” var iabl es ar e usef ul t o
cont r ol f or t he posit ion of t he pl ayer s i n t he f i eld and f ulf i l t he unquest ionabl e
r ole of cont r olli ng t he het er ogeneit y associat ed t o pl ayer ’ s f i eld posit ion. Thi s is
impor t ant , since, f or inst ance, t he indexes of per f or m ance em pl oy t he same
19
The specific values associated to each footballer were those that resulted of including in the search:
“name of the player” AND “name of the corresponding team” AND “football”. (The last element was
written in the most common languages in which soccer has a popular support). This rank was computed
10
cr it er ia f or all t he soccer player s, no m at t er t heir dem ar cat ion i n t he pit ch. And
how ever ,
it
is uncl ear
t hat
one could compar e t hr ough t hese i ndexes t he
per f or m ance of a goalkeeper w it h t hat of a midf ielder . 20
(PSLULFDOUHVXOWV
As expl ained, our aim is t o pr ovide an empir ical explanat ion of t he
det er mi nant s of t he m onet ar y r ew ar ds r eceived by soccer player s, w ho par t icipat e
in a l abor mar ket of a special nat ur e.
The basel ine model consider s t hat all agent s in t he supply side of t he l abor
mar ket ar e under an homogeneous pay syst em, w her e monet ar y val uat ion ar e
linked t o t he sour ces of r evenues t hey gener at e t o t heir t eam s: t heir spor t
per f or m ance, but also t hei r cont r ibut ion t o sour ces of r evenues com ing f r om t he
f ans suppor t t r aduced int o soccer t eam sal es. Spor t per f or m ance of each si ngl e
soccer player is capt ur ed t hr ough t w o alt er nat ive composit e values descr ibed i n
t he pr ecedent sect ion: Punt osMar ca and LigaFant ast ica. The cont r ibut i on of each
soccer player t o t heir t eam r evenues t hr ough mer chadisi ng r elat ed sales is
measur ed by t hei r individual pr esence at int er net , w it h t he number of sit es w her e
t hey appear , accor ding t o t he w eb sear cher Google. This pr oxy var i abl e w as
denot ed as ( googl e) .
We cannot dir ect ly int r oduce t he Google var i abl e int o t he explanat or y
model of soccer paym ent , as w e can suspect a st r ong pr obl em of int er dependence
beet w en player s’ r enommée ( googl e) and t he measur e of spor t per f or mance
( Punt osMar ca or LigaFant ast ica) , i nduci ng clear r isks of m ult i coll ini ar it y. We
consider t hen necessar y t o f ilt er t he i nit i al m easur e of soccer pl ayer s’ int er net
pr esence ( googl e) against all t he f act or s r elat ed w it h i ndividual spor t per f or m ance
and ot her measur able i ndividual char act er ist i cs, like age, nat ionalit y or posit ion in
t he game f i eld. We w i ll use t he r esiduals of t hi s r egr ession as a f ilt er ed m easur e
of st r ict non spor t ive val ue ( f ilt er ed google) gener at ed by t he soccer player by his
for all the observations in May 2003.
20
To illustrate this difficulty, observe the annual average for each field position, according to the
average value of the (LigaFantastica) index. It takes the following values: goalkeepers (2.01);
defenders (2.36); midfielders (2.28); and attackers (2.36). As regards to the index (PuntosMarca) the
annual average is: goalkeepers (1.39); defenders (1.20); midfielders (1.24), forward players (1.19).
Hence, it is quite obvious that the goalkeepers presents a differential character.
11
publi c exposur e. This appor t should be t aken i nt o account in t he paym ent schem e
is t he spor t labor mar ket i s not f ar f r om ef f iciency.
Table 1 show s t he r esult s of t hi s f ilt er ing pr ocedur e. We w ill concent r at e
now our analysis on r esult s pr esent ed in colum n ( 2) and ( 3) , w hi ch r ef er s t o t he
baseline model. Our m ai n goal her e, as r ef er r ed, is t o pr oduce t he r esidual s t o be
used as one i mpor t ant explanat or y var iable of t he soccer pl ayer payment scheme.
The adj ust ed R squar ed i s slighly above 0. 50. So, an i mpor t ant shar e of t he soccer
player pr esence i n i nt er net
cannot
be explained j ust
by spor t
per f or m ance
consider at i ons. Even i f it i s mar gi nal t o t he mai n goal of t he paper , w e can
succent ely m ent i on t hat it appear s t hat , as one can guess, i nt er net pr esence
depends i n a st at ist ically signi f i cant w ay of each soccer pl ayer per f or mance ( eit her
measur ed by Punt osMar ca or by LigaFant ast i ca) . I t depends also i n a decisive w ay
of t he number of mat ches pl ayed in i nt er nat ional compet ions, at t eams l evel
( deur ope) , as w ell as at count r y level ( int er nat ional) . The nat ionalit y seems not t o
have a deci sive impact ; i f any, it is negat ive f or f or eign pl ayer s f r om out side
Eur ope ( ext ) . The age does not af f ect in any sense t heir pr esence in i nt er net . The
impact of soccer dem ar cat ion is unclear , as t he over exposur e of at t acker s is
st at ist ically signi f i cant w it h t he var iable Punt osMar ca, but not w it h LigaFant ast i ca.
7DEOH )LOWHULQJ SHUIRUPDQFH LQIOXHQFH RQ IRRWEDOOHUV
SXEOLF H[SRVXUH
E\2/6
Dependent var i abl e: Googl e
Monopsony Model
Var i ab l e
Monopsony + Winner - t ake- all
Pu n t o sMar ca
Li g aFan t ast i ca
Pu n t o sMar ca
Li g aFan t ast i ca
Coef f i ci en t
Coef f i ci en t
Coef f i ci en t
Coef f i ci en t
( t - st u d en t )
( t - st u d en t )
( t - st u d en t )
( t - st u d en t )
( 2)
( 3)
( 4)
( 5)
( 1)
w i n n er al l
15.0365 * * *
( 14.82)
Pu n t o sMar ca 3 . 1 3 6 4 * * *
( 14.43)
2.6599 * * *
( 4.95)
Li g aFan t ast i ca
15.5547 * * *
( 5.36)
1.9621 * * *
1.4819 * * *
12
( 5.88)
goo gd
6.9514 * * *
( 3.93)
d eu r o p e
0.4058 * * *
( 4.70)
i n t er n at i on al 0 . 1 3 1 7 * * *
com u n i t
ex t
edad2
d ef
m ed
d el
( 4.53)
0.1284 * * *
0.1469 * *
( 2.11)
0.0687 * * *
( 4.61)
0.1312 *
( 1.90)
0.0691 * * *
( 5.00)
( 5.08)
-0.1651
-0.2182
-.06879
-0.1074
( -0.63)
( -0.84)
( -0.33)
( -0.52)
-0.8982
-0.2862
-0.2399
( -1.72)
( -1.54)
( -0.62)
( -0.52)
0.6233
0.6080
0.2829
0.2935
( 0.83)
( 0.82)
( 0.48)
( 0.50)
-0.1216
-0.0122
-0.0061
-0.0066
( -0.95)
( -0.97)
( -0.62)
( -0.66)
-0.4863
-1.1502
-0.3308
-0.8834
( -0.54)
( -1.31)
( -0.47)
( -1.27)
1.0016
0.3361
0.7344
0.1899
( 1.11)
( 0.38)
( 1.04)
( 0.27)
( 2.64)
Real Mad r i d
0.3833 * * *
( 4.71)
6.3332 * * *
( 7.81)
2.6426 * * *
Depor t i v o
( 3.89)
6.4998 * * *
( 7.91)
-1.0216 *
edad
6.7801 * * *
( 5.59)
-6.7153 * * *
0.3361
( 0.38)
-6.8540 * * *
1.3646 *
( 1.73)
-2.3918 * *
0.6241
( 0.81)
-2.5532 * *
( -5.39)
( -5.57)
( -2.35)
( -2.51)
2.9999 * *
2.7859 * *
3.8331 * * *
3.6593 * * *
( 2.32)
( 2.18)
( 3.79)
( 3.62)
-7.4297
-6.2029
-2.2624
-1.3836
( -0.68)
( -0.58)
( -0.27)
( -0.16)
R Sq u a r ed
0.562
0.573
0.733
0.735
Ad j R Sq u a r ed
0.527
0.540
0.711
0.713
F St at
16.22 * * *
17.02 * * *
33.50 * * *
33.80 * * *
Con st an t
N. Ob s
370
370
370
370
We can m ove i nt o t he analysis of t he det er mi nant s of our baseli ne m odel ,
using t he f i lt er ed m easur e of Google ( f ilt er ed googl e) , al t oghet her w i t h t he
var i ables cat chi ng spor t ive per f or m ance and ot her cont r ol var iables f or speci f i c
char act er ist ics.
13
The r esult s ar e show n i n Tabl e 2. The r esult s concer ning t he baseli ne
model ( columns 2 and 3) w her e w e suppose t hat
all soccer player s shar e
subst ant i ally simi lar l abour asset s and, consequent ly, ar e payed accor ding t hei r
individual cont r ibut ion t o t he t eam i ncome in a f unct ional r el at ionship t hat w e
appr oxim at e by t he assumpt ion of linear it y. The explanat or y pow er of t he model is
subst ant i ally high, as t he adj ust ed R squar e is i n bot h cases 0. 786.
We f i nd, as expect ed t hat t he spor t ive per f or m ance ( Punt osMar ca or
LigaFant ast ica) i s a m ai n expl anar ot y f act or of soccer player ’s economi c valuat ion.
Thei r publ ic exposur e ( f i lt er ed Googl e) seems t o appear also a m aj or ingr edi ent of
t he pl ayer s’ paym ent . One int er est ing r esult is t hat player s havi ng pl ayed m at ches
w it h t he nat ional select ion exper i ence a hi gher econom ic r ew ar d. This is net
ef f ect , because t hei r act ual spor t cont r ibut ion t hough t hei r per f or mance has
alr eady been capt ur ed by Punt osMar ca or LigaFant ast i ca. Playing i nt er nat ional
mat ches in t he past gener at es a posit ive signal f r om w hi ch t he player t akes an
econom ic
advant adge.
A
si mil ar
f eat ur e
ar r ives
concer ning
w it h
player s
par t i cipat ion in i nt er nat ional t eams compet it ion like t he Champi ons League and
t he UEFA Cup.
Accor di ng t o our dat a set , w e do not f ind any evidence of paym ent
discr imi nat ion because of nat ionalit y or being Eur opean, neit her posit ive nor
negat ive, in cont r ast w it h common i nt uit ions i n t he Spani sh spor t cir cles on t his
issue.
The i nf l uence of
age exper i ence t he expect ed
quadr at ic
f or m,
w it h
exper ience being a plus on sal ar y, but w it h a pr onounced i ncr ease in t he midel
par t of t he car eer . This r elat ionship bet w een economi c val uat ion and age is
t ypically f or spor t labour m ar ket s.
Concer ni ng t he inf l uence of player s’ dem ar cat ion on economi c val uat i on,
w e can obser ve t hat , r elat ed t o goalkeeper s valuat ion, at t acker s and, t o a cer t ain
ext ense also midf ielder s, r eceive m uch higher at t ent ion and pay. We have t o
r em ind t hat i n t hi s r egr ession w e have alr eady t r i ed t o capt ur e t he spor t ive
cont r ibut ion of each pl ayer t hr ough t heir per f or m ance. We f ind t hat w it h bot h
alt er nat ive
measur es
of
spor t
per f or m ance,
at t acker s
ar e
syst emat ically
over payed. This i s a clear f ir st indice t hat t he impli cit hypot hesis of t he basel ine
model is usat isf act or y, as w e do not have in f act an hom ogeneous gr oup of supply
of labor i n t he soccer m ar ket .
14
We f i nd f inally t hat Real Madr id seem s t o syst emat ically over pay t hei r
player s i n compar ison w it h Spani sh m ar ket pr act i ces.
7DEOH ([SODLQLQJ 6RFFHU3OD\HUV(FRQRPLF9DOXDWLRQE\2/6
Dependent var i abl e: Not ar io
Monopsony Model
Monopsony + Winner - t ake- al l
Pu n t o sMar ca
Li g aFan t ast i ca
Pu n t o sMar ca
Li g aFan t ast i ca
Coef f i ci en t
Coef f i ci en t
Coef f i ci en t
Coef f i ci en t
( t - st u d en t )
( t - st u d en t )
( t - st u d en t )
( t - st u d en t )
( 2)
( 3)
Var i ab l e
( 1)
w i n n er al l
( 4)
57.0137 * * *
( 34.49)
Pu n t o sMa r ca
4.8394 * * *
2.9387 * * *
1.2187 * * *
( 24.17)
d eu r o p e
0.3615 * * *
( 4.49)
i n t e r n a t i o n al
co m u n i t
ex t
ed ad
0.1678 * * *
1.8305 * * *
d ef
m ed
0.3255 * * *
( 4.07)
0.1637 * * *
( 6.42)
0.4162 * * *
( 6.73)
0.5168 * * *
0.3978 * * *
( 6.08)
0.3899 * * *
( 6.37)
0.0512 * * *
( 4.17)
( 4.16)
-0.0684
-0.1520
-0.1882
-0.2331
( -0.33)
( -0.62)
( -1.00)
( -1.24)
-0.7142
-0.5429
-0.4189
-0.3338
( -1.29)
( -0.98)
( -0.99)
( -0.79)
1.4960 * *
1.4839 * *
0.5095
0.5198
( 0.95)
( 0.97)
-0.0095
-0.0099
( -1.09)
-0.2745 * *
( 2.13)
-0.0277 * *
( -2.30)
( -2.32)
( -1.03)
-0.3258
-1.3471
-0.3788
( -0.39)
( -1.62)
( -0.59)
( -1.65)
2.1830 * * *
1.1592
1.5852 * *
0.9185
5.7653 * * *
( 6.17)
Esp an y o l
( 23.77)
0.4158 * * *
( 10.54)
( 2.59)
d el
1.2145 * * *
( 7.52)
( 10.80)
( 2.15)
ed ad 2
( 34.20)
( 7.04)
( 9.33)
f i l t er ed g o o g l e
56.5653 * * *
3.2087 * * *
( 8.20)
Li g aFa n t ast i ca
( 5)
( 1.38)
4.3614 * * *
( 4.75)
( 2.45)
4.4156 * * *
( 6.15)
-1.0475 *
( 1.43)
3.4939 * * *
( 4.96)
2.0134 * *
15
( 1.91)
Dep o r t i v o
-1.7297
Real Mad r i d
-1.9269 *
( -1.49)
( -1.66)
5.7579 * * *
5.4413 * * *
( 4.77)
Co n st a n t
2.6119 * *
( 2.19)
-1.4781
( 4.51)
-21.033 * *
-19.215 *
2.3205 *
( 1.94)
-1.6133 *
( -1.56)
( -1.70)
-6.0881
-5.0338
( -2.07)
( -1.90)
( -0.78)
( -0.65)
R Sq u a r ed
0.802
0.802
0.884
0.884
Ad j R Sq u a r ed
0.786
0.786
0.874
0.875
F St at
51.24 * * *
51.26 * * *
92.37 * * *
93.05 * * *
N. Ob s
370
370
370
370
How can w e check t he pr esence of t he Winner - t ake- al l hypot hesis in t he
Spanish soccer l abor m ar ket ? We pr opose t o r et hr ace it by t aking advant adge of
one of t he expl anat or y var i abl es of t he baseli ne model: t he player public exposur e
by t he f ilt er ed m easur e of Googl e. The w inner - t ake- al l hypot hesis r ef er s t o t he
pr esence of some super t ar s i n t he l abor m ar ket t hat , by som e spor t ive or per sonal
char act er ist ics becom e unique and succeed i n at t r act ing t he at t ent ion of t he
pr ess, t he media i n gener al and suppor t ed. This popul ar it y allow t hem t o be
decisive f or t he global spor t ive per f or mance of t he t eam and/ or t o gener at e
impor t ant
amount
of
r evenues
by
higher
at t endance,
t el evision
shar e
and
mer chadising sal es. I f t her e i s a pr esence of soccer super st ar s , w e can expect
t hat f or t his gr oup of player s t he nor mal linear r elat ionship w e have est abli shed
bet w een per f or mance and pay does not hold anymor e. The event ual mar gi nal
higher l evel of spor t per f or m ance t hat t hose pl ayer s pr esent should t hen be
associat ed w it h a signif icat ive posit ive j ump i n economi c valuat ion.
Our pr oposal is t hat w e can indi r ect ly ident if y w ho t hose super st ar s ar e by
t he higher ext r eme values of f ilt er ed Google. Those w ho becom e soccer super st ar s
ar e pr eci sely t hose w it h higher i nt er net cover age because of t he digit al pr ess and
f ans’ sit es. Gr aph 1 show s Googl e values f or t he i nit i ally sel ect ed 518 Spanish
soccer player s ( Annex 1 pr ovide t he i ndividual val ues f or each soccer player ) ,
or der ed by t he Googl e r anki ng. Those pl ayer s w it h l ess t han 8. 000- 10. 000 w eb
sit es r ef er r i ng t o t hem seem t o belong t o a comm on gr oup. Ther e ar e 5 clear
out li er s and anot her 20- 30 player s f ollow ing a speci al pat h.
16
*UDSK
JRRJOHLQGH[
70000
60000
50000
40000
30000
20000
10000
0
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
This f eeli ng is r ei nf or ced w hen w e plot t he sam e dat a but
using a
logar it hm ic pr esent at ion of t he google values ( Gr aph 2) , as even i n t his case t he
uncommon pat h of t he t op 5 soccer player s r em ai ns.
*UDSK
JRRJOHLQGH[
100000
Logarithmic scale
10000
1000
100
10
1
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
17
Taking all t hese elem ent s i nt o account , w e pr opose t o i nt r oduce t he
w inner - t ake- all ef f ect by simply using act ive dummi es f or t he ext r eme higher
values of Google. The exact number of super st ar s ident if ied by t his pr ocedur e is
evident ly a mat t er of choi ce. We have r un t he new r egr ession using t hr ee di f f er ent
level of elit ism: a set of 5, 10 or 20 soccer pl ayer s. We pr esent in t abl e 2 t he
number s r ef er r ing t o t he f ir st case, r est r ict i ng t he dum my sampl e t o t he 5 pl ayer s
w it h higher Googl e pr esence.
Empir i cal
independent ly
of
r esult s
t he
show
us
measur e of
( Tabl e
spor t
2,
col umns
per f or mance
( 4)
used
and
( 5) )
t hat ,
( Punt osMar ca
or
LigaFant ast ica) , t he sci ssion of t he mar ket of soccer player s int o t w o gr oups is
meani ngf ul, as t he select ed gr oup of super st ar s appear s t o r eceive a posit ive
salar y ext r a payment , compar ed w it h t he r emai ni ng 365 soccer player s of t he dat a
set . The size of t he coef f i ci ent i s consider abl e, and it is st r ongly st at ist i cally
signi f i cant . The speci al salar y t r eat ment pr ovided t o super st ar s become st r onger
each t i me t hat t he size of t he number of super st ar s st at us i s r educed.
The
coef f icient w hen t he number of super st ar s ar e 5 ( i n our case, Raul , Zidane, Figo,
Rober t o Car los and Rivaldo) , r anges bet w een 56. 565 and 57. 014 ( w it h a t - st udent
ar ound 34) . I f t he sel ect ion of super st ar s is incr eased t o 10 member s, t hen t he
coef f icient moves bet w een 22. 533- 31. 018 ( t - st udent ar ound 18) . Fi nal ly, i f w e
sel ect 20 super st ar s, t he over paym ent t o t hose player s oscill at es bet w een 15. 554
and 15. 936 ( t - st udent ar ound 15) .
These r esult s push us t o conclude t he exist ence of t w o segm ent s in t he
labor mar ket supply. Top r enow ned pl ayer s r eceive an incr ease in salar y w hi ch is
out of pr opor t i on t o t he m ar gi nal incr ease of spor t ive pr oduct ivit y t hey pr ovide t o
t he t eam. We acknow l edge her e t he pr esence of t he w i nner - t ake- all ef f ect . The
pr esence of t his ef f ect
i n t he Spanish soccer league can t hus help us t o
under st and w hy most t eams ar e not able t o pr oduce ext r aor di nar y pr of it s even i f
t he global st r uct ur e of t he m ar ket al low s t hem in pr inciple t o cr eat e monopsony
r ent s 21. Empir ical r esult s ar e in line w it h our t heor et i cal assumpt ion t hat an
impor t ant shar e of t he event ual monopsony r ent s capt ur ed f r om nor mal soccer
player s ar e absor bed i n a second mom ent by t hose f ew soccer super st ar s w it h
st r ong bar gaini ng pow er .
21
W hich also survive from the fact that soccer league enjoys a monopoly situation as provider of soccer
entertainment services in Spain.
18
The addit ion of t he w inner - t ake- al l t est in t he economet r i c speci f i cat i on
af f ect s some of t he ot her r esult s r eached w it h t he basel ine model. The i nf l uence
of age ( edad and edad2) i n salar y condit ions t ends t o disappear ( i s not signi f i cant
at all w hen w e count j ust w it h 10 or 5 super st ar s) . The over payment due t o t he
par t i cipat ion in i nt er nat ional t eams championships ( deur ope) r em ai ns signif i cant i f
t he sampl e is r educed t o 5 super st ar s, but i s not anymor e signi f i cant in t he model
w it h 20 super st ar s.
Ot her r esult s cont i nue t o appear in close r el at ionship w it h economi c
valuat ion.
Playi ng
( int er nat ional)
At t acker s
( del)
f or
cont inue
cont inue
t he
to
to
nat ional
pr oduce
be
a
t eam
in
f avor able
syst em at i cal ly
int er nat ional
bias
over paid
on
in
salar y
compet it ions
condit i ons.
compar i son
w it h
goalkeeper s. Even i f w e show i n t he paper t hat some t eams over or under pay t heir
player s i n compar ison w it h Spani sh st andar ds, t his r esult i s not r obust , as it var ies
accor di ng t he si ze of t he select ed super st ar s m ember ship. Fi nal ly, t he i nf l uence of
publi c exposur e ( f ilt er ed googl e) on salar ies is mai nt ai ned, and is a det er m inant
piece of t he paym ent scheme in t he soccer mar ket .
19
5HIHUHQFHV
ASCARI , Guido and GAGNEPAI N , Phil ippe ( 2003) , “ How I nef f i ci ent ar e Foot ball clubs?
The Case of t he Spanish Foot ball I ndust r y” . Unpublished paper .
EL H ODI RI , M. and QUI RK J. ( 1971) : “ An Economet r ic Model of a Pr of essional Spor t s
League” Jour nal of Polit ical Economy , 79: 1302- 1319.
FRANK, Rober t H. and COOK, Phil ip J. ( 1995) : The winner - t ake- all societ y: How
mor e and mor e Amer icans compet e f or ever f ew er and bigger pr izes,
encour aging economic w ast e, income inequalit y, and an impover ished cult ur al
lif e. New Yor k; London and Tor ont o. Si mon and Schust er , Fr ee Pr ess, Mar t i n
Kessler Books.
H OEHN , Thom as and SZYMANSKI , St ef an ( 1999) , “ Eur opean f oot bal l. The st r uct ur e
of leagues and r evenue shar ing. ” Economic Policy: A Eur opean For um 0 ( 28) :
203- 240.
H UNT , Joseph W. And L EWI S, Kennet h A. ( 2003) : “ Domi nance, Recont r act ing, and
t he Reser ve Cl ause: Maj or League Baseball . ” Amer ican Economic Review , Vol.
66, No. 5: 936- 943.
ROTTENBERG, S. ( 1956) “ The Basebal l Player s Labour Mar ket . ” Jour nal of Polit ical
Economy , 64: 242- 258.
ROSEN , Sher w i n ( 1981) : “ The Economi cs of Super st ar s” Jour nal of Polit ical
Economy , 79: 1302- 1319.
ROSEN , S. and SANDERSON A. ( 2001) : “ Labour Mar ket s i n pr of essional Spor t s. ” The
Economic Jour nal, 111 ( Febr uar y) : F47- F69.
ROSEN , Sher w i n ( 1996) : Review of : “ The w inner - t ake- al l soci et y” Jour nal of
Economic Lit er at ur e , ( Mar ch) , Vol. 34, I ssue 1: 133- 135.
SCULLY, Ger ald W. ( 1974) : “ Pay and Per f or m ance i n Maj or League Basebal l. ”
Amer ican Economic Review , ( December ) : 915- 930.
SZYMANSKI , St ef an ( 2001) : “ I ncome inequalit y, compet it ive balance and t he
at t r act iveness of t eam spor t s: some evidence and a nat ur al exper im ent f r om
English soccer . ” The Economic Jour nal, 111 ( Febr uar y) : F69- F84.
20
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2090
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430
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432
433
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436
437
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442
443
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449
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455
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457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
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475
476
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479
480
481
482
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484
485
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