How do ethics affect our routine practice?
Transcripción
How do ethics affect our routine practice?
VIEWPOINT How do ethics affect our routine practice? FERNANDO MIGUEL GAMBOA ANTIÑOLO Comité de Ética, Servicio de Medicina Interna, Hospital Universitario Valme, Universidad de Sevilla, Spain. References to ethics in clinical practice appear almost daily in the general press and medical publications. But what role does ethics play? From the origins of human communities, people’s behavior has been guided by rules and value judgments, both individual and collective, derived from analysis of situations they were faced with. The rules that guide human behavior is the object of study of ethics1. Etymologically, ethics means character, intelligence, the outstanding feature of being human. Ethics is formed on the basis of careful reflective judgments, with previous interdisciplinary and intercultural deliberations, where truth or falsehood is rarely obvious2. Bioethics involves the application of ethics to health sciences. Clinical ethics is the application of bioethics to routine clinical practice and decision making in caring for the sick. Its growing importance is determined by the adaptation of health organization to a society in which very different values converge and greatly influence the daily process of decision making, from the purely clinical to resource allocation3. Clinical ethics provides a structured approach to identify, analyze and resolve ethical issues arising in the medical field. Good medical practice requires practical and operative knowledge of ethical issues, such as informed consent, the disclosure of truth, confidentiality, palliative care in the terminal phase of life, pain relief and patient rights. When doctors and patients differ in their scale of values and even have to face decisions that violate them, ethical problems arise. The lack of time in emergency situations further complicates the process. Clinical activity takes place at the bedside. It is always focused on the individual. Two wise and experienced clinicians deliberating on the same case may well make different decisions. This is inherent to cautious reasoning, which always admits more than one solution, and is typical of clinical practice, and ethics. Moral judgments are primarily empirical and concrete, hence the decision making process consists of careful and thoughtful analysis of the main factors involved. Deliberation requires analysis of problems in all their complexity, based on clinical facts and weighing up the principles and circumstances involved as well as the consequences4. This can be approached from the perspective of four principles. The first is respecting patient autonomy: believe what the patient says, but let him/her participate in designing the diagnostic and therapeutic plan. The second is beneficence: the principle requires us to seek what is good for the patient, provide the best available treatment, and this entails the need for updated training. The third is the principle of non-maleficence: avoid inflicting harm, minimize the risks of an intervention, ignorance, lack of expertise or training, which may undermine proper assistance. Finally, every action must be based on a previous risk-benefit assessment and analysis of adverse effects. All patients have the same right to appropriate care, regardless of the clinician or institution being seen; fair equitable and efficient healthcare is the guiding principle5. Other authors have proposed that ethical problems in clinical cases should be approached from the perspective of four parameters: medical indications, patient preferences, quality of life, and contextual aspects (social, economic, legal and administrative)6. The role of ethics in clinical practice is to aid the professional in the analysis of values involved in a particular clinical decision. By values we mean principles which are important for the human being, whether religious, cultural, political, culinary, aesthetic, etc.) and must be respected by the professional practitioner. Ethics helps to ensure that the decision taken is optimal, not only from the point of view of the clinical facts but also the values involved. Moral uncertainty should be dealt CORRESPONDENCE: F. M. Gamboa Antiñolo. Servicio de Medicina Interna. Hospital Universitario Valme. Ctra. Madrid-Cádiz, km. 548. 41014 Sevilla, Spain. E-mail: [email protected] RECEIVED: 20-7-2011. ACCEPTED: 2-8-2011. CONFLICT OF INTEREST: The author declares no conflict of interest in relation with the present article. Emergencias 2013; 25: 143-146 143 F. M. Gamboa Antiñolo with in the same way as clinical uncertainty to ensure that clinical decisions are prudent and reasonable. Not everyone will make the same decisions, in a specific case, but everyone should make prudent decisions. The deliberation must be based on clinical facts. Without test results and a good clinical history, the rest is uncertain. The objective is to identify the optimal course of action in situations of conflict of values7,8. These are often related with life values, patient welfare, scarcity of resources or religious beliefs. Patients must be supplied with and understand the information they need to make their decisions in an autonomous manner. The capacity for selfdetermination may be undermined by illness, mental disability or circumstances that severely restrict freedom9. Autonomous choice requires mental ability, competence, understanding of the situation and the possible courses of action and the likely consequences. Until proven otherwise, all patients are competent. We talk about "capacity for"an activity at any particular time. To be truly autonomous, a person should be free (no external control or influences) and mentally capable. Informed consent is a communicative process that formalizes the therapeutic contract but requires constant and updated information for the patient4. Informed consent can be waived in situations of life-threatening emergency, serious risk to public health or legal imperative. For incompetent patients, informed consent is given by their representative, taking into account the opinion of the patient and considering that incompetence for a particular task does not mean incompetence for all tasks9. The process of obtaining informed consent is often subverted, contravening the principles of good clinical practice10 (Table 1). Some authors have argued that the overriding ethical principle should be patient autonomy. In that case the role of health professionals would be reduced to actions that accord with the wishes of the patient. But, can the principle of beneficence be understood without acceptance by the patient? And, conversely, can we accept a vision of patient autonomy that makes the doctor do what the patient wants without considering the doctor’s clinical judgement of what needs to be done?11,12. Clinical practice is complex, and more so in the field of urgent attention. It is necessary to justify by objective empirical data the utility or futility of medical procedures13. Extreme situations require medical interventions whose usefulness may be debatable. Simplifying, futility conveys the idea of “not useful”, but does this mean very limited usefulness, that the probability of success or bene144 Table 1. Ten mistakes concerning informed consent (IC)10 1. IC is not part of the moral duties of physicians. 2. IC consists of getting patients to sign the form which authorizes the performance of an intervention. 3. Good clinical practice consists of performing clinical actions well from the scientific-technical point of view. IC has nothing to do with this. 4. The ethical foundation of IC is the principle of autonomy. 5. Obtaining IC is an obligation of professionals who perform interventions, but not of those who prescribe. 6. IC makes no sense because most patients do not wish to be informed. 7. Patients have the right to refuse treatment, but only before it is applied to them. Once started, the professional cannot suspend or withdraw treatment. 8. Assessing the ability of patients to decide is the responsibility of psychiatrists. 9. IC requirements can be respected without health organizations investing additional resources in this. 10. Obtaining IC is a responsibility of physicians, but not nursing staff. fit is remote, or that the patient deems he/she will not benefit from a procedure? Or, does it mean the cost of the procedure is excessive considering the remote possibility of success or benefit? As in all questions of moral judgment, there may be different opinions and legitimate discrepancies about the utility or futility of a particular treatment. According to Iceta: "a futile medical act is one whose application is inadvisable in a particular case because it is clinically ineffective, does not improve the prognosis, symptoms or current disease, or one that produces predictably adverse effects which are disproportionate considering the possible benefit for the patient or their family, economic or social conditions"14. There are no futile medical acts per se: rather they become futile when they meet some of the above-mentioned criteria. Futility implies no medical indication for a particular patient. A medical procedure may be effective and useful for one patient but futile for another. If we perceive a discrepancy between the end and the means to be used, we ask ourselves about the limitation of the therapeutic effort. We consider the technical indication, and therefore the ethical justification of applying the measure in that particular situation. Treatments with a low probability of clinical benefit may not be futile. In decision making, one should attempt to reduce the level of uncertainty as far as possible, but it can never be totally eliminated. The assessment of the benefits of treatment is subjective, and the process requires patient participation and consideration of their preferences11. Ethical conflict may arise when an action aimed at avoiding harm or producing benefit, relatively necessary, also causes undesired harm: the Emergencias 2013; 25: 143-146 HOW DO ETHICS AFFECT OUR ROUTINE PRACTICE? Table 2. Ethical principles in end-of-life medicine15 Principle of the inviolability of human life Principle of therapeutic proportionality Principle of double effect (or indirect will) Principle of truthfulness Principle of prevention Principle of non-abandonment Life is not an extrinsic good, but a fundamental value from which human rights are derived. The duty to respect and promote life is, therefore, the first moral imperative for each person with respect to himself and others. Bodily life is a necessary condition for the exercise of any other right. This refers to the moral duty to provide the means necessary for proper health care, both own and that of others. But it is clear that nobody is forced to use all medical measures currently available, only those that offer a reasonable probability of benefit. There is a moral obligation to implement only that proportion of therapeutic measures necessary. Interventions involving more are considered disproportionate and are not morally obligatory. This principle states some conditions that must be met for an act that has two effects, one good and one bad, to be morally licit. These are: – that the action in itself is good or at least indifferent – that foreseeable bad effect is not directly willed, but only tolerated – that the good effect is not immediately and necessarily caused by the bad – that the benefit sought is proportional to the potential harm. Truthfulness is the foundation of trust in interpersonal relationships. Therefore, in general, telling the truth to patients and their families is beneficial for them, because it allows active participation in the decision making process (Autonomy). However, in practice, there are situations in which this creates particular difficulty. Respect the patient's desire to opt for a family decision making process may represent the optimal form of respecting their autonomy. Consider possible complications or symptoms that are likely to occur during the course of a particular disease or clinical condition. This is part of medical responsibility (duty to know and forsee such complications). Implement measures to prevent these complications and provide timely advice. Except for serious cases of conscientious objection, it is ethically unacceptable to abandon a patient who refuses certain therapies, even when health professionals consider that this rejection is a mistake. "principle of double effect"15 (Table 2). This principle states that not all actions allowing or causing damage are morally wrong, because in some cases there is a "proportionate reason" justifying it. The objective of the action is greater benefit than harm. When forced to take a decision involving two evils, we must clearly choose the lesser16. Intuitively, ethics and quality in medical practice are directly interrelated concepts. Both the moral imperative to do good and the principles of social justice are sufficient reasons to justify the ethical-quality association, and oblige doctors to measure, analyze and improve their practice. The quality of medical attention has been defined as "The provision of accessible and equitable service, by healthcare personnel with optimal professional level, using available resources, to achieve user adhesion and satisfaction". There are basic concepts contained in this definition, such as accessibility, fairness, professional competence(scientific, technical, ethical and humanistic), effectiveness and patient satisfaction, all of which must be carefully and honestly analyzed. We all have our duties and responsibilities17. Another ethical requirement is to improve the quality of research, including methodological aspects, the inclusion of patients with adequate informed consent and proper dissemination of results through comprehensive reports to improve clinical practice16. Professionals have some basic obligations, some at a higher level (to cause no Emergencias 2013; 25: 143-146 harm and be fair) and others at a lower level (to do good and respect patient autonomy). We cannot speak of the ethical dimension of man without first accepting that every person has absolute intrinsic value, from which ethical values are derived11. Decent treatment involves not only humane attention, but also helping the ill to live a fully human life18. This is what medical ethics is all about. References 1 Cordero Escobar I. Enfoque ético del dolor. Rev Cubana Salud Pública [revista en la Internet]. 2006 Dic. (Consultado 28 Agosto 2010). Disponible en: http://scielo.sld.cu/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S086434662006000400009&lng=es. 2 Álvarez T, Velásquez O. La ética en la asistencia al paciente con dolor y sufrimiento. Iatreia. 1995:8:116-23. 3 Gómez-Batiste X, Roca J, Trelis J, Borrell R, Novellas A. 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ERRATA In the article “Patient responses to symptoms of acute coronary syndrome: a gender-perspective study” published in Emergencias 2013;25:23-30, the correct posts of the authors and their affiliations are as follows: Julia Bolívar Muñoz1,2, Rafael Martínez Cassinello1, Inmaculada Mateo RodrÍguez1,2, Juan Miguel Torres Ruiz3, Nuria Pascual Martínez3, Fernando Rosell Ortiz4, Antonio Reina Toral5, Carmen Martín Castro6, Antonio Daponte Codina1,2. 1 Escuela Andaluza de Salud Pública, Granada, España. 2CIBERESP, Centros de Investigación Biomédica en Red de Epidemiología y Salud Pública, Instituto de Salud Carlos III, España. 3Hospital Universitario San Cecilio, Granada, España. 4Empresa Pública de Emergencias Sanitarias (EPES), Almería, España. 5 Hospital Universitario Virgen de las Nieves, Granada, España. 6Empresa Pública de Emergencias Sanitarias (EPES), Granada, España. 146 Emergencias 2013; 25: 143-146